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Former UN Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and Legal Counsel
In the field of international criminal justice, we have seen a tremendous development 
over the last 25 years. It started with the establishment of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993 and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994. Four years later, in 1998, the Rome Conference 
adopted the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). This was then 
followed by the agreements between the United Nations (UN) and Sierra Leone on 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) in 2002, and then between the UN and 
Cambodia on the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) in 
2003. There are many additional experiences in this field, including purely national 
proceedings in such places as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Argentina, 
and internationally assisted domestic proceedings in such places as Bosnia. But the 
examples I mention at the outset are very special to me, since I was directly involved 
in these efforts during the years when I was the Under-Secretary-General for Legal 
Affairs and the Legal Counsel of the United Nations in 1994–2004.
In the ensuing years, both the United Nations General Assembly and the Security 
Council have further entrenched norms of criminal accountability for the gravest 
of crimes. They have done this, in part, by adopting resolutions that emphasize 
the importance of the rule of law at the national and international levels. By way 
of example, reference could be made to the declaration adopted by the high-level 
meeting of the General Assembly on September 24, 2012 (A/RES/67/1).
In this resolution, heads of state and government and heads of delegation reaffirm 
their solemn commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations, international law and justice, and to an international order based 
on the rule of law, all of which are indispensable foundations for a more peaceful, 
prosperous, and just world (para. 1). They further reaffirm that human rights, 
the rule of law, and democracy are interlinked and mutually reinforcing and 
that they belong to the universal and indivisible core values and principles of the 
United Nations (para. 5). In addition, they state that they are convinced that the 
rule of law and development are strongly interrelated and mutually reinforcing, 
that the advancement of the rule of law at the national and international levels is 
essential for sustained and inclusive economic growth, sustainable development, 
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the eradication of poverty and hunger, and the full realization of all human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, including the right to development, all of which in 
turn reinforce the rule of law (para. 7). They also reaffirm the principle of good 
governance and commit to an effective, just, nondiscriminatory, and equitable 
delivery of public services pertaining to the rule of law, including criminal, civil, and 
administrative justice; commercial dispute settlement; and legal aid (para. 12).
Of particular interest in this context is that they commit to ensuring that impunity is 
not tolerated for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, or for 
violations of international humanitarian law and gross violations of human rights law. 
They also commit to ensuring that such violations are properly investigated and 
appropriately sanctioned, including by bringing the perpetrators of any crimes to 
justice, through national mechanisms or, where appropriate, regional or international 
mechanisms, in accordance with international law. For this purpose, they encourage 
states to strengthen national judicial systems and institutions (para. 22).
It should be emphasised that in a system under the rule of law, the protection of 
human rights and ability to deal with serious crimes through a proper criminal 
justice system both at the national and international levels are core elements.
From the vantage point of 2018, such language may strike many working in the field 
of international justice as relatively unremarkable. It is, however, worth recalling  
that the understandings now enshrined in UN resolutions were, not so long ago, 
far from self-evident. For those with backgrounds in domestic justice systems, 
they may still not be.
When I joined the United Nations as Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and 
Legal Counsel, I had been a judge in my country, Sweden, for some 10 years, from 
1962 to 1972. The main focus of the work in these courts was criminal law. In 1972, 
I joined the Ministry of Justice to do legislative work, and after 13 years in this ministry, 
the last three years as its Chief Legal Officer, I became the Legal Adviser of the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs in 1984, a position that I held until I joined the United Nations. 
In August 1992, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), now 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), appointed me and 
two colleagues as war crimes rapporteurs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. 
My colleagues were Ambassador Helmut Türk, the Legal Adviser in the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs in Austria, and Gro Hillestad Thune, the Norwegian member 
of the Council of Europe Commission of Human Rights. On February 9, 1993, we 
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presented our final report: Proposal for an International War Crimes Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia by Rapporteurs (Corell-Türk-Thune) under the CSCE Moscow Human 
Dimension Mechanism to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. In this report, we proposed 
that a war crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia should be established on the 
basis of a treaty. This was the only legal avenue for the CSCE. At the same time, 
the question of establishing such a court was discussed in the UN Security Council. 
The CSCE therefore immediately forwarded our proposal to the United Nations. On 
February 22, 1993, the Security Council decided to establish the ICTY, mainly on the 
basis of a report just delivered by a UN Commission of Experts.
The reason I mention this here is that, as a judge at the national level, I was very 
doubtful about the idea of international criminal courts. I thought that they would be 
too politicized and that it would be difficult for such courts to deliver justice in a safe 
and secure manner. However, I completely changed my mind when I was charged 
with serving as war crimes rapporteur in the former Yugoslavia. I realized that 
nobody was doing anything about bringing to justice those who were responsible for 
the crimes that I had identified during our visit to Croatia. At the same time, I had 
become more aware of the interdependence between the rule of law and criminal 
justice. One of the major challenges in the future, if we want to create a world 
where people can live in dignity with their human rights protected, is to establish an 
effective criminal justice system at the national and international levels.
Against this background, it was with great interest that I read Options for Justice:  
A Handbook for Designing Accountability Mechanisms for Grave Crimes. With reference 
to the experiences over the years analyzed in the handbook and the requirements 
relating to the rule of law reaffirmed by the General Assembly of the United Nations, 
it is obvious that there will be a need for additional mechanisms to deal with the 
impunity that actually breeds new conflicts in the world. There are clear demands 
for justice from Syria to Sri Lanka, from El Salvador to South Sudan. It is therefore of 
the utmost importance to make use of the experiences of the institutions that have 
been established so far when designing new mechanisms. 
The manner in which the handbook is organized should be of great assistance here. 
What I found particularly helpful is the way in which the material is presented: a 
summary of what is being examined, experience to date, lessons and considerations, 
and a key questions to make a determination in the subject matter. This will greatly 
assist those concerned. In particular, the key questions should assist in focusing on 
the specifics of the situation at hand. As stated in the handbook, these questions 
should serve as a checklist. 
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The value of comparative experience when designing new mechanisms and the 
need for models tailor-made to the particularities of each situation cannot be 
overemphasized. Of particular importance is that there will be a need for new 
models, despite the existence of the ICC. 
Needless to say, I read the analyses of the institutions mentioned above with 
specific interest. The analyses are very much along the lines of my own assessment 
of the situations. This applies in particular to the analyses of the SCSL and the 
ECCC, where I represented the United Nations as chairman of the UN delegations 
responsible for negotiating the agreements with the two host states. The handbook 
takes note of serious flaws in the ECCC’s design, and in my view, in the future, 
the United Nations imprint should not be given to institutions over which the 
organization does not have full administrative control. While I believe that the 
ECCC is not a model to be replicated, the handbook details the negative lessons 
while also noting some positive innovations.1 
The purpose of this handbook is twofold: (1) to assist policymakers in deciding 
whether to establish or support a justice mechanism, and (2) to assist those 
who are charged with the task of developing models once the policy decision is 
made. In the latter category, we will find: state officials and diplomats, national 
investigation and prosecution authorities, staff and officials of the United Nations 
and other inter-governmental organizations, and those who work for national and 
international nongovernmental organizations. In my view, the handbook will serve 
these categories well. The policymakers are well advised to keep in mind also the 
requirements relating to the rule of law reaffirmed by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations and the commitments mentioned above.
Finally, there are three elements that I often reflect on when it comes to establishing 
criminal justice mechanisms: languages, the principle of legality, and financing.
With respect to languages, it is very important to keep in mind what is said in the 
handbook: that having too many official languages can cause delay and raise costs. 
One single additional language will have a dramatic impact on the costs for the 
institution contemplated.
1. I have further developed my thoughts on this in my introduction to The Founders: 
Four Pioneering Individuals Who Launched the First Modern-Era International Criminal 
Tribunals, ed. David M. Crane, Leila Sadat, and Michael P. Scharf (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), see cambridge.org/9781108424165.
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With respect to the principle of legality, in addition to what is said in the handbook, 
reference should be made to Article 15, second paragraph of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any 
person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, 
was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the 
community of nations.
The existence of the Rome Statute is an important clarification in this respect.  
I also think that the fact that the UN Security Council, on May 25, 1993, adopted the 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia must be 
taken into consideration when this provision is construed today (S/RES/827 [1993]).
With respect to financing, I realize that this sometimes has to be organized through 
voluntary contributions. However, as I have said in the past, I was deeply concerned 
that the funding of the SCSL was not made through assessed contributions. There 
is actually a constitutional element here too, which becomes apparent if one makes 
a comparison with funding of courts at the national level. What credibility would 
national courts have if they were funded by different donors and not from taxes or 
similar official revenues? It is obvious that the same reasoning should be applied at 
the international level. In my view, this is an element that should be borne in mind 
in designing new mechanisms.
These are just some of the lessons that I find to be of particular importance. There 
are many others found throughout this valuable handbook. Which lessons are most 
salient will depend on a given context. This handbook has content relevant to those 
designing accountability mechanisms for grave crimes in any location and under 
any circumstances. In the future, it should be possible to design smarter, more 
effective and efficient mechanisms to enforce the mounting expectation of criminal 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Emergence of Accountability Mechanisms for Grave Crimes
In the aftermath of World War II, the victorious powers created the first mechanisms 
dedicated to holding some perpetrators of grave crimes criminally accountable. The 
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, which largely took place between late 1945 and 1947,2 
provided hope that future grave crimes would be punished. Perhaps the prospect 
of criminal justice could even deter such crimes, which were being defined by an 
emergent field of international criminal justice. However, soon after the conclusion 
of the Nuremberg and Tokyo experiments, the Cold War dawned and largely stalled 
the field’s development for the next four decades.
Mass violence continued throughout this period and beyond. In the 63 years following 
World War II, an estimated 92–101 million people were killed in the course of some 
313 armed conflicts along cultural, political, social, economic, racial, ethnic, and 
religious lines.3 These figures do not include countless victims of other atrocities, 
including rape and other forms of sexual assault, enforced disappearance, and torture.
“Grave Crimes”
This handbook uses the general term “grave crimes” to refer to crimes of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious forms of crime that merit 
international concern. Other common terms used to refer to overlapping categories 
of crimes include “international crimes,” “Rome Statute crimes,” and “crimes 
under international law.” “Grave crimes” are defined in some national legal codes, 
but this handbook does not use the term in the sense of any particular domestic 
definition. Internationally, the term is legally imprecise. This handbook uses “grave 
crimes” as shorthand when discussing a broad range of mechanisms that deal with 
international criminal law. 
By the early 1990s, the Cold War had ended, allowing diplomatic space for the 
establishment of ad hoc tribunals in response to grave crimes in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In the 25 years since the creation of the two courts, there 
has been a proliferation of mechanisms around the world for the investigation, 
prosecution, and adjudication of grave crimes cases. 
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In 1998, states agreed to establish a permanent court for war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and genocide: the International Criminal Court (ICC), which became 
operational in 2002. The ICC is a court of last resort, meant to complement national 
jurisdictions that retain primary responsibility to prosecute crimes under the Rome 
Statute.4 States within this “Rome Statute system” and many of those that still fall 
outside of it have pursued various approaches to criminal justice for grave crimes. 
Grave crimes continue to be committed on an alarming scale around the globe—in 
such places as Syria, Palestine, Iraq, South Sudan, Burundi, Afghanistan, Ukraine, 
Mexico, the Philippines, Myanmar, and North Korea. For those demanding 
criminal accountability in relation to these situations, the experiences of existing 
accountability mechanisms may hold important lessons.
Some models of criminal accountability have proved more effective than others. 
Mechanisms in such places as Senegal (in relation to grave crimes committed in 
Chad), Sierra Leone, Guatemala, and Bosnia have achieved notable successes, 
while others, in such places as East Timor / Timor-Leste, Kosovo, and Uganda have 
struggled. In part, results can be explained by operational performance. But in large 
measure, the design of accountability mechanisms for grave crimes has influenced 
their efficacy. Much can be learned from justice models of the past 25 years, which 
may inform the design of new institutions.
Purpose of this Report
This handbook seeks to distill lessons from past experiences to help guide those 
designing new mechanisms of criminal accountability for grave crimes. There is 
no optimal mechanism model or set of models. In choosing which design elements 
best suit a new context, policymakers must weigh the strengths and weaknesses 
of different possibilities; certain design choices may be appropriate in some places 
but poor choices in others.5 The lessons and considerations this handbook offers 
are meant to guide policymakers through often-thorny calculations about costs, 
benefits, and even contradictions in design choices. Adding a layer of complexity, 
stakeholders may have differing views on the issues at stake and the solutions that 
strike the right balance. 
Extensive work has been done by a number of actors in the field of international 
criminal justice in extracting “lessons learned” and “best practices” from various 
international justice-related endeavors, including by a number of mechanisms 
themselves.6 However, most of this body of work consists of reports on individual 
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mechanisms, or places great emphasis on their operations and proceedings. This 
handbook is distinct in the breadth of its comparative analysis and its focus on 
the design of mechanisms, as opposed to their operation. For example, questions 
of prosecution strategy (including who should be targeted for investigation, or 
prosecution, and how) are not considered. To be sure, the line between design and 
operational lessons is not always clear; mechanism design influences operational 
decisions. For example, the operational experience of a specific mechanism might 
have been negative because of a particular design flaw, such as its jurisdiction being 
too broad, or too narrow, or its independence compromised. 
In the past, stakeholders have tended to approach decisions about post-conflict 
justice “in a reactive, improvised and often inefficient manner.”7 With a more 
comprehensive overview of past experiences, stakeholders should be able to make 
better choices from a broader palette of options. 
The handbook’s intended audience includes: state officials and diplomats, as well 
as national investigation and prosecution authorities; United Nations (UN) staff 
and officials; staff and officials of other inter-governmental organizations; and 
national and international nongovernmental organizations. The handbook examines 
mechanisms established in response to crimes in Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, 
and the Middle East. Domestic actors may prefer to look to regional examples first 
before examining other models. The demonstration effect of mechanisms within the 
same region may be strongest.
Methodology
The identification of lessons from this large pool of diverse experiences relied 
on an extensive review of documents from international bodies and domestic 
governments regarding mechanism creation, as well as from primary and secondary 
legal instruments, reports from the mechanisms themselves, reports from civil 
society, and news reports. Where details on design were not obtainable through 
public sources, the Open Society Justice Initiative conducted interviews with 
officials involved in mechanism operation, and officials involved in the design and 
operation of mechanisms also offered detail in the course of commenting on drafts 
of this handbook.
Accountability mechanisms were selected for inclusion in the survey with a view 
to diversity of model and geography. Even with 33 mechanisms, the list is not 
exhaustive; it includes Argentina, Colombia, and Serbia, but not Chile, Peru, or 
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Ukraine. It includes the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala 
(CICIG), because it has had success in dealing with serious crimes, even though 
international crimes fall outside of its mandate. It also includes an expert mission 
to Mexico, the Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts (GIEI), deployed to 
audit a domestic atrocity investigation, because a mechanism with such a limited, 
nonprosecution mandate may be the most politically feasible option in some 
situations. And it includes a UN-created International, Impartial and Independent 
Mechanism (IIIM) for Syria, which is an innovative model despite its lack of a direct 
prosecution mandate or structure for adjudication. The list of mechanisms includes 
some that are not yet fully operational, as well as other design proposals that are 
stalled or more definitively moribund. These can still help illustrate trends in the 
design of new models and provide examples for others in their regions.
Falling outside the scope of this study are: commissions of inquiry (which have 
commonly preceded the establishment of a prosecution mechanism),8 truth 
commissions (which have typically preceded or existed alongside a prosecution 
mechanism), and forms of transitional justice not of a criminal justice nature.9 
Additionally, the survey omits review of isolated cases brought on the basis of 
universal jurisdiction,10 or immigration-related proceedings that have often been 
based on alleged commission of international crimes.11 Finally, the permanent ICC is 
not profiled in the annexes, as information about the court is abundant. Innovations 
from the Rome Statute and ICC are mentioned at times in this report, as is the ICC’s 
relevance to some domestic prosecution initiatives.12 
Structure of this Report
The handbook’s main body reviews the nine essential elements of mechanism 
design. This analysis begins with two elements of fundamental nature: the 
mechanism’s purpose and its relationship to the domestic system. Decisions in 
those areas set important parameters for decisions to be made in the remaining 
seven areas: jurisdiction, basis of authority, location, structure, the integration 
of international judges and staff, financing, and oversight. Each section begins 
with a brief explanation of what is being examined. There follows a summary of 
experiences to date, describing the spectrum of options that have been pursued. The 
heart of each section is a list of lessons and considerations that stakeholders should 
take into account when designing that element. Finally, a list of key questions can 
serve as a checklist to ensure that important considerations are not overlooked. 
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The main part of the handbook makes frequent reference to prior mechanism 
designs, 33 of which are profiled in the annexes. (Where information in the main 
part of the handbook draws on detailed, sourced information from the annexes, it 
is not footnoted again, unless sources are directly quoted.) Each mechanism profile 
follows the same outline. The first three sections summarize the circumstances in 
which the mechanism was created or proposed: conflict background and political 
context, existing justice-sector capacity, and existing civil society capacity. These 
are followed by sections on the mechanism’s creation (or events leading to its 
non-adoption), legal framework and mandate, location, structure and composition 
(including information on any involvement of international judges or staff ), 
prosecutions, legacy, financing, and oversight and accountability.
Notes
2. Officially named the International Military Tribunal (IMT) and the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), respectively, these tribunals were 
established to prosecute international crimes committed by Nazi and Japanese political 
and military officials during World War II. See Kevin Jon Heller, The Nuremberg Military 
Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011); Y. Tanaka, T. McCormack, and G. Simpson, eds., Beyond Victor’s Justice? 
The Tokyo War Crimes Trial Revisited (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2011).
3. M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., The Pursuit of International Criminal Justice: A World Study on 
Conflicts, Victimization, and Post-Conflict Justice (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2010), xiii. 
These figures are based on data gathered 1945–2008 in Christopher Mullins, Conflict 
Victimization and Post-Conflict Justice 1945–2008.
4. The ICC can only assert jurisdiction where states are “unable” or “unwilling” to 
prosecute international crimes at home. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, UN Doc 2187, UNTS. 90, entered into force July 1, 2002 (Rome Statute), at 
Preamble, arts 17–20 and 53. 
5. As the UN cautioned in 2004, while “the lessons of past transitional justice efforts help 
inform the design of future ones, the past can only serve as a guideline. Pre-packaged 
solutions are ill-advised. Instead, experiences from other places should simply be used 
as a starting point for local debates and decisions.” The Rule of Law and Transitional 
Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, S/2004/616, para. 16.
6. See, for example, ICTY Manual on Developed Practices, May 2009, available at: icty.org/
sid/10145 (Topics covered include investigations, judgment drafting, management of 
the Detention Unit, and legal aid policies, as well as a range of other judicial support 
issues.); Best Practices Manual for the Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Violence 
Crimes in Post-Conflict Regions: Lessons Learned from the Office of the Prosecutor for 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, January 2014, available at: unictr.
org/sites/unictr.org/files/legal-library/140130_prosecution_of_sexual_violence.
pdf; Complementarity in Action: Lessons Learned from the ICTR Prosecutor’s Referral of 
International Criminal Cases to National Jurisdictions for Trial, February 2015, available 
 at: unictr.org/sites/unictr.org/files/legal-library/150210_complementarity_in_action.pdf. 
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7. Bassiouni, The Pursuit of International Criminal Justice, 8.
8. Where a Commission of Inquiry’s work led to a mechanism being proposed or created, 
or affected its mandate, the mechanism profile may include such information.
9. For example, in the United States since the 1980s, a number of cases concerning 
torture, extrajudicial killing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity have been 
brought pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute (known as “ATS cases”). As the statute 
indicates, these claims have been brought pursuant to tort law (the law of civil wrongs) 
as opposed to criminal law, though the acts giving rise to the litigation have often 
related to the commission of grave crimes. For further reading on these types of 
cases, see the website of the Center for Justice and Accountability at: cja.org/article.
php?id=435. 
10. Universal jurisdiction is “a legal doctrine which permits domestic courts to try and 
punish perpetrators of some crimes so heinous that they amount to crimes against the 
whole of humanity, regardless of where they occurred, or the nationality of the victim 
or perpetrator.” See the American Non-Governmental Organization Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court (AMICC), Questions and Answers on the ICC and Universal 
Jurisdiction. The most well-known cases concerning the use of the universal jurisdiction 
doctrine include the UK House of Lords in Ex Parte Pinochet, as well as a number of 
Spanish prosecutions concerning Guatemalan, El Salvadoran, and Argentinian officials 
for international crimes. See ijrcenter.org/cases-before-national-courts/domestic-
exercise-of-universal-jurisdiction/#Prominent_Cases_Involving_Universal_Jurisdiction. 
See also Human Rights Watch, The Long Arm of Justice: Lessons from Specialized War 
Crimes Units in France, Germany and the Netherlands, September 17, 2014.
11. With respect to immigration proceedings, a number of countries including the United 
States and Canada have specialized agencies concerned with pursuing immigration 
proceedings against those accused of grave crimes. Generally, however, the focus of 
these proceedings has not been criminal sanction, but immigration-related action, such 
as deportation.
12. For example, Kenya, Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, Uganda, Sudan (Darfur), Central African 
Republic, and the Democratic Republic of Congo are all situation countries before  
the ICC. 
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II. THE ELEMENTS OF MECHANISM DESIGN
A. Purpose
A mechanism’s mandate is articulated in its source documents.13 The term comprises 
the purpose behind its establishment as well as the scope of its authority (for more 
on the latter, see II. C. JURISDICTION). 
What is the mechanism intended to achieve? What are its judicial aims (for example, 
criminal accountability for perpetrators)?14 These are usually readily quantifiable. 
But what legacy, or lasting impact, should the mechanism aim to achieve?15 Legacy, 
including impact outside the courtroom, is usually difficult to measure, especially 
in the near term. Should the mechanism attempt to address root causes of the 
conflict?16 Does it aim to increase respect for the rule of law? Is it intended to spur 
justice sector reform and build technical capacity within the domestic justice 
system? Should it aspire to create an accurate record of disputed events, which may, 
in turn, foster reconciliation between previously warring factions of society?17 Does 
it intend to deter future grave crimes? As former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
has said, “It is essential that, from the moment any future international or hybrid 
tribunal is established, consideration be given, as a priority, to the ultimate exit 
strategy and intended legacy in the country concerned.”18
Experiences to Date 
All mechanisms considered for the purposes of this handbook have the express 
or implied aim of delivering criminal accountability for the commission of 
grave crimes. For example, the Special Panels for Serious Crimes established 
in East Timor refer to a Security Council resolution stressing the importance of 
bringing perpetrators of serious violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law to justice.19 The preamble to the 1973 Act establishing the 
International Crimes Tribunal for Bangladesh (ICTB) states that it is “expedient to 
provide for the detention, prosecution and punishment of persons for genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes.”20
The mechanisms have greater diversity when it comes to additional objectives. The 
Security Council Resolution establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for 
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the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) refers not only to ending the commission of crimes 
and bringing perpetrators to justice, but also contributing to the restoration and 
maintenance of peace, halting violations, and providing effective redress. The 
Security Council Resolution that established the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) describes aims of contributing to national reconciliation and 
to the deterrence of (future) commission of these crimes. The agreement between 
the UN and Cambodian government establishing the Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) refers to “the pursuit of justice and national 
reconciliation, stability, peace and security.”21 Significantly, the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone’s (SCSL) resolution (1315 of 2000) mentions bringing perpetrators 
to justice “in accordance with international standards.” Further, it includes 
the establishment of “a strong and credible court” as one of its aims, as well as 
assisting in the “strengthening of the Sierra Leone judicial system.” The purpose 
of the establishment of International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala 
(CICIG) was to “support, strengthen and assist [State institutions] responsible 
for investigating and prosecuting crimes [within the mandate of CICIG].” 
The Security Council Resolution establishing the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
(STL) mentions assisting Lebanon “in the search for the truth” about the Hariri 
assassination.22 The creation of the Extraordinary African Chambers (EAC) was 
based on the African Union’s powers to intervene in a member state in respect of 
“grave circumstances” (war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity) and a 
right of member states to request intervention from the Union in order to restore 
peace and security.23
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the preamble of the bill proposing 
to create specialized chambers contains language on the connection between 
peace and justice. It states that whereas the country used to say “no justice without 
peace,” it was now taking the position of “no peace without justice.”24 One of the 
draft Kenyan bills to establish a special tribunal listed as a purpose, “to ensure that 
violations are effectively redressed and will not recur in future; and for other 
purposes connected thereto;”25 and to “contribute to the process of national 
reconciliation.”26 Neither of these mechanisms has ultimately been established. In 
Uganda, the mission of its International Crimes Division (ICD) is to fight impunity 
and promote human rights, peace, and justice. It is also intended to ensure 
Uganda has a strong and independent judiciary that “delivers and is seen by the 
people to deliver justice and contribute to the economic, social and political 
transformation of society based on [the] rule of law.”27
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Finally, the Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights,28 which contemplates the establishment of a 
regional criminal mechanism, recognizes a number of purposes, including:
 • peace (the settling of regional disputes through peaceful means; the 
promotion of peace, security, and stability);
 • the protection of human and peoples’ rights (mentioned at several 
junctures);
 • the right of the AU to intervene in a Member State in respect of grave 
circumstances, namely, war crimes, genocide, and crimes against 
humanity;
 • the respect for democratic principles, the rule of law, and good 
governance;
 • the respect for the sanctity of human life, and the condemnation and 
rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism 
and subversive activities, unconstitutional changes of governments 
and acts of aggression;
 • a commitment to the fight against impunity;
 • the interconnectedness of the promotion of justice and human and 
peoples’ rights on the one hand and political and socioeconomic 
integration and development on the other; and




1.  The mechanism’s stated purpose should be consistent with other 
elements of mechanism design. The mechanism’s relationship to the 
domestic system, jurisdiction, basis of authority, location, means of including 
international judges and staff (if at all), structure, scale, cost, anticipated 
period of operation, and oversight should all be reasonably aligned with the 
stated ambitions. A mechanism claiming ambitions that it is not realistically 
structured to fulfill will disappoint people who expected those outcomes. For 
example, as a court with a majority of international judges, and characterized 
by the judges as not belonging to the domestic justice system, the Special 
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Court for Sierra Leone was ill suited to deliver on its goal of strengthening 
Sierra Leone’s judicial system. And the ambition of Uganda’s ICD to deliver 
social and political transformation of society based on the rule of law remains 
elusive in a context where the executive has opposed prosecutorial scrutiny of 
the country’s military.
2. The mechanism’s purposes should be defined, taking into account related 
justice and peace initiatives. This is important for coherence: avoiding 
overlap and gaps that can feed opposition to the mechanism, making the most 
of limited resources, and harnessing synergies. Where multiple domestic 
courts have overlapping subject matter jurisdiction, issues of subsidiarity 
(which court can assert primacy over a case or set precedents for a type of 
case) should be clarified. This has been a challenge in Bosnia, for example. 
(See II.B. RELATIONSHIP TO THE DOMESTIC SYSTEM.) The mechanism 
to be designed is often for a place where there are other existing or planned 
transitional justice initiatives, including those for reparation, truth-telling, 
memorialization, and guarantees of nonrecurrence. In the DRC, for example, 
the range of transitional justice mechanisms has included multiple domestic 
prosecution initiatives (extant and proposed), ICC cases, a UN “mapping 
exercise” of atrocities, and a truth commission. There have also been 
continuous efforts to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate illegal combatants. 
In Colombia, the justice mechanism is bound to an integrated process 
that also includes demobilization and reintegration of combatants, truth-
telling, amnesty, and reparation. The relationship between prosecution 
mechanisms and truth commissions may raise a variety of difficult 
questions and tensions (as was the case in Sierra Leone). Where both are to 
exist simultaneously or in close sequence to each other, special care must 
be taken to ensure coherence.29 In almost every situation (with the usual 
exception of situations of ongoing conflict, as with the International, Impartial 
and Independent Mechanism [IIIM] for Syria), there will also be existing or 
planned efforts to reform and build the capacity of the justice system. 
Drafters should carefully examine how the nascent mechanism’s purpose 
meshes with these. (See also lessons 6 and 8, below.)
3. Consider including purposes in primary documents in order to create 
obligations. By elevating certain purposes to founding issues and including 
them in main founding instruments, drafters can create core obligations to 
guide the actions of implementers. For example, the United Nations included 
in the ICTY and ICTR statutes a mandate to protect victims and witnesses, 
ensuring that the tribunals were obligated to prioritize such protection. When 
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empowered through language in the core mandate, implementers can give 
effect to obligations through subsidiary legislation, rules, policies, structures, 
and budgets. For budgetary reasons alone, emphasizing purposes in core 
documents is important. A recurring problem for many mechanisms is that 
core budgeting has come to refer to the financing of investigation, prosecution, 
adjudication, and basic administration only, with most other activities left 
to the vagaries of voluntary, supplemental funding. This adversely affects 
the ability of the mechanism to deliver on its promises. In the case of the 
ICTR, although the UN Security Council resolutions establishing the tribunal 
specifically recognized purposes that included the promotion of reconciliation 
and the strengthening of domestic courts, these ideas did not appear in the 
court’s founding instrument. This resulted in significant delay in design 
and implementation of outreach, public information, and legacy programs. 
While including purposes in founding documents may increase the odds that 
priorities receive appropriate attention, it does not guarantee it. In Cambodia, 
the ECCC’s mandate includes expansive rights to reparations, but these have 
been narrowly interpreted by judges unfamiliar with reparations theory and 
practice, and the court has only meager resources for implementation. (See H. 
FINANCING). 
Core Purposes
4. Those designing a new investigative and/or prosecution mechanism 
should be clear about the forms of justice it aims to provide in 
relation to crimes within its jurisdiction. The mandate may include 
criminal accountability, truth, and reparation. That is, mechanisms should 
investigate and prosecute those against whom there is sufficient admissible 
evidence and impose punishments that take into account the nature of the 
crime. Mechanisms can aim to establish facts that lead to their broader 
acknowledgment in society. (See also recommendation 6, below.) And, as 
in Colombia, they can aim to provide victims with reparation, including 
compensation, restitution, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees 
of nonrepetition. For the vast majority of mechanisms examined by this 
handbook, holding perpetrators accountable, providing effective redress for 
grave crimes—and, in some instances where conflict is ongoing, ending the 
commission of grave crimes themselves—are their primary goals. Even in 
the case of Guatemala, where CICIG does not strictly have such powers, its 
primary goal is to “assist” national authorities in meeting such objectives. 
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5. Strongly consider including outreach and public information functions 
as core components of the mechanism. Grave crimes proceedings are very 
likely to touch on sensitive issues that may include conflict narratives, group 
identities, power politics, and economic interests. In an apparent attempt to 
undermine cooperation with the SCSL, allies of then-fugitive former Liberian 
President Charles Taylor actively spread false rumors that the SCSL would 
prosecute all former combatants in Liberia.30 If not contested vigorously, such 
attempts to delegitimize an institution through falsehoods about its mandate, 
independence, funding, or individual cases can lead witnesses and sources 
to distrust court officials and refrain from cooperation. Effective and early 
organization of outreach to key stakeholders and the ongoing provision of 
accurate public information are vital antidotes to rumor and misinformation. 
Outreach is a dialogue with stakeholders through which a mechanism can 
share information on its mandate, procedures, and activities, and communities 
can share their expectations and their views on the process. Beyond countering 
the threat of misinformation, outreach is essential in order to allow those 
affected by events to see justice being done, to manage expectations of 
what the mechanism can and cannot do, to build national ownership over 
domestic mechanisms, to encourage witnesses and victims to participate in 
proceedings, to inform the public about legal concepts and build trust in the 
rule of law, to build public expectations about public access to state institutions 
in settings where this has not been the experience, and to encourage ordinary 
justice systems to improve the transparency of less controversial proceedings. 
However, designers and donors have too often viewed outreach as a “noncore” 
activity. (See also II.F. STRUCTURE and II.H. FINANCING.)
Legacy Purposes
6. Strongly consider including an explicit truth-telling purpose to promote 
impartial and transparent justice. If contributing to the building of 
an accurate historical record of crimes committed is an explicit part of a 
mechanism’s mandate, this provides important guidance to those who 
will operate it and affects other elements of mechanism design. First, it 
underscores the imperative of pursuing impartial justice, including following 
evidence to suspects, regardless of their group affiliations.31 Even-handed 
justice can be key to dispelling old animosities and restoring lost faith in the 
justice system. Conversely, if a mechanism pursues only one side to a conflict 
and turns a blind eye to political elites, it may further entrench distrust.32 In the 
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long term, such outcomes can fuel further tensions and contribute to ongoing 
political instability. Further, including truth-telling among the mechanism’s 
purposes also encourages transparency, because the more limited act of 
producing historical records will be of questionable value if such records 
emerge in sequestered courtrooms and are then sealed away in judicial 
archives. Truth-telling suggests the need for active engagement with affected 
populations through outreach and public information. 
7. Be modest and realistic in stating purposes of reconciliation, deterrence, 
and sustainable peace. The work of a mechanism may well contribute to 
these goals, and there may even be good reason to believe that these goals 
cannot be achieved without the criminal accountability for grave crimes that 
the mechanism is meant to deliver.33 However, there are many factors that 
determine whether communities reconcile, would-be perpetrators refrain from 
committing atrocities, and sustainable peace can be achieved. Among others, 
these include political, possibly geopolitical, economic, and environmental 
factors, as well as the success or failure of myriad initiatives to address each. 
Accordingly, it is more appropriate to state that an accountability mechanism 
is intended to “contribute to” these outcomes.34 
8. Consult closely with rule-of-law assistance providers about purposes 
related to justice-sector reform and development. Domestic and 
international officials involved in planning and implementing rule-of-law 
reforms and capacity building are important constituencies for any new 
accountability mechanism. Too often, proponents of international criminal 
justice and those involved in broader rule-of-law reforms have failed to 
communicate and understand each other’s priorities.35 This can result in 
overlap and conflict. It can also lead to frequently encountered skepticism 
within the development community that international justice mechanisms 
are expensive, politically disruptive, isolated, and unsustainable in their 
rule-of-law benefits, and that they draw resources at the expense of other, 
more worthy, justice-sector priorities. Such skepticism contributed to a 
lack of coherent international support for mixed chambers in the DRC, for 
example. While certain tensions may persist, they can be minimized through 
communication.36 And there are numerous ways to design and implement 
international justice mechanisms in ways that maximize coherence with wider 
justice-sector reform agendas.37 If that is to be an imperative for the model’s 
design, then it should be explicitly stated as a purpose. 
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Key Questions to Help Determine Purpose
• What are the main options for defining the judicial purpose, and what effect 
would each option have on the other elements of design, including jurisdiction, 
structure, and financing?
• Are there functions—such as witness protection, outreach, public information, 
and reparation—that in a given context should be incorporated into the 
mechanism’s stated purpose in order to increase the chances that they are 
adequately reflected in other elements of design and in implementation?
• Are there other relevant planned or proposed transitional justice initiatives, 
including other mechanisms dealing with criminal accountability for grave 
crimes (including the ICC) or truth-telling? If so, how can the mechanism’s 
purpose define a unique role within a coherent approach?
• What is the strategy for justice-sector reform and development in the country, 
as articulated by the government, its international partners, and civil society? 
Can the mechanism’s purpose be refined for maximum congruence with this?
• Do stakeholders want and expect the mechanism to contribute to the truth 
about contested facts and history?
• In drafting the mechanism’s purpose, have all main domestic and international 
stakeholders (in government, victim communities, civil society, and the 
international community) working on issues of justice, peace, and the rule of 
law been consulted?
B. Relationship to Domestic System 
What is the relationship of the mechanism to the domestic judicial system? Is 
it an integrated part of the system, does it operate through parallel specialized 
institutions, or is it wholly outside of the system? Designers of a mechanism may 
begin with a preference for the nature of the relationship, or this may be derived 
from a series of discrete design decisions. In the end, to reflect the needs of a given 
context, a mechanism may be very integrated in some ways and remote in others.
There are many different design variables that determine or flow from a 
mechanism’s relationship to the domestic system. Some of these variables are 
examined in dedicated sections of this handbook, including BASIS OF AUTHORITY, 
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LOCATION, elements of STRUCTURE, whether international personnel are 
involved (discussed in INTEGRATION OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGES AND 
STAFF), FINANCING, and OVERSIGHT.
A number of other design variables concern legal features. Will the mechanism use 
the same legal system (civil law, common law, sharia, traditional or customary law, 
or some mixture) already present in the country? Among other things, decisions on 
criminal procedure may determine the extent to which victims can participate in 
proceedings, and the extent to which they are eligible for reparations. Will domestic 
amnesties, where present, be recognized? Will the mechanism use existing official 
languages, or also operate in one or more foreign languages or local dialects? 
Overlaid across this set of questions is another relating to international standards 
in criminal procedure. For example, will the mechanism ensure fair trial rights, 
even if the existing domestic system has shortcomings in this area? Will it adhere 
to international standards with regard to pretrial detention and provisional release? 
How will it handle acquitted persons? Will convicted persons face the death penalty? 
Experiences to Date
The continuum of mechanisms has ranged from wholly international tribunals (ad 
hoc tribunals, established by the UN Security Council, exercising peace and security 
powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter) to fully domestic mechanisms. But 
even those mechanisms considered to be fully domestic, such as the International 
Crimes Tribunal for Bangladesh (ICTB), or domestic prosecutions in Argentinian 
and Colombian courts, have at least some “international” dimensions, given their 
application (via domestic law) of a body of international criminal law. 
Where mechanisms have fallen along the international-domestic spectrum has 
generally depended on a number of factors. The following table illustrates broad 
tendencies in the relationship of mechanisms to the domestic justice system. There 
are, however, important exceptions and caveats to these (addressed in the Lessons 
and Considerations section that follows this one).
In addition to these factors, since the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR in the 
early 1990s and the drive for a permanent ICC during that decade, there has been a 
trend away from “heavier,” more intrusive and international mechanism models. In 
recent years, states have exhibited a preference for “lighter,” more domestic models 
where possible.  
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FACTOR MORE DOMESTIC MORE INTERNATIONAL 
Mechanism purpose Intended to help advance 
general rule of law development 
and/or promote other 
transitional justice goals, 
in addition to delivering 
accountability through cases.
Focused more narrowly 
on delivering criminal 
accountability through the 
investigation, prosecution, and 
adjudication of cases.
Political will Will or acquiescence (via 
domestic and/or international 
pressure) to adopt legislation 
and reform or create requisite 
institutions.
External imposition deemed 
necessary due to lack of 
domestic political will.
Domestic technical capacity Higher investigative, prosecutory, 
and judicial capacity.
Lower investigative, prosecutory, 
and judicial capacity.
Security situation Secure environment for 
participants in the proceedings.
Insecure environment for 
participants in the proceedings.
Infrastructure Good or adequate. Poor or non-existent. 
State of legal framework International criminal law and 
procedural law largely meet 
international standards (or 
planned passage of relevant 
reforms).
No international criminal law 
provisions in domestic code; 
procedural law that falls short of 
international standards.
Openness to foreign 
involvement (in general,  
or with regard to particular 
foreign actors)
Countries that experienced 
colonization and/or hegemony 
in living memory.
Countries seeking international 
integration (in general, or with 
particular alliances).
Availability of international 
funding 
Low likelihood of substantial 
international funding




existing or planned 
Little or no significant intrusive 
international involvement.
Presence of international 
administration or robust 
peacekeeping.
Wholly international tribunals exist as independent institutions, outside of the 
domestic justice system. The ICTY and the ICTR have carried out their own, 
independent mandates entrusted to them by the global community, via the UN 
Security Council. Yet these ad hoc models encountered numerous challenges 
arising from their physical and legal remoteness from affected societies and states. 
Distance presented challenges in such areas as access to evidence and witnesses and 
making proceedings accessible to affected populations. Ultimately, remote tribunals 
(including the ICC) struggle for relevance when it comes to issues of domestic  
rule-of-law reform, truth-telling, and reconciliation. Remoteness has also been a 
factor in the slow pace of proceedings and a key driver of cost.
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To an extent, the ad hoc tribunals reached past these limitations through liaison to 
other justice mechanisms operating within the countries concerned (Rwanda and 
the countries of the former Yugoslavia—Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, 
and Kosovo). The potential referral of cases to countries of the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda, and the ongoing monitoring of those cases by court-appointed 
observers as the cases have progressed, has been an important dimension to the 
relationship between the countries and the tribunals. The ICTY’s completion 
strategy (of which Rule 11bis case referrals were a key component) was the 
catalyst for the international community’s chief administrator in Bosnia (the High 
Representative) to create the State Court, the Prosecutor’s Office, and its special 
divisions for dealing with international and other forms of serious crime. A series 
of failed attempts by the ICTR prosecutor to refer cases to Rwanda led to a number 
of amendments being made to Rwandan domestic legislation so that referrals could 
ultimately be granted.38 Although the ad hoc tribunals exist wholly independently 
from the countries with which their proceedings are concerned, there has been a 
notable legal and political dialogue between them.
Between the two poles of wholly international and fully domestic mechanisms, there 
has been a vast array of hybrid, internationalized, and internationally-supported 
mechanisms with differing defining features.39 These range from treaty-based 
institutions (such as the SCSL or the ICC) to domestic courts with international 
assistance (such as the ECCC) and include various combinations and degrees of 
foreign involvement. The Extraordinary African Chambers (EAC) are established 
within the Senegalese court system, pursuant to an agreement between the African 
Union (represented by the African Union Commission) and the government of 
the Republic of Senegal. The statute establishing the Iraq High Tribunal explicitly 
described it as “an independent entity and not associated with any Iraqi government 
departments.”40 In Bangladesh, the International Crimes Tribunal is a wholly 
domestic court (a separate court, with specific international criminal jurisdiction) 
established within the domestic court system. In the DRC, there have been 
approaches embedded in the domestic system (military and, more recently, civilian 
courts, including mobile courts) and proposed mixed chambers that would establish 
specialized institutions and involve international judges and officials.
The Special War Crimes Chamber (SWCC) in Serbia is a domestic chamber 
established pursuant to Serbian domestic law. In Croatia, although four specialized 
war crimes chambers were established in county courts, most trials are prosecuted 
before regular chambers in those courts. Prosecutors in 20 county court jurisdictions 
have territorial jurisdiction over war crimes cases and are supervised in their work  
by the chief state prosecutor.41 Although beyond the scope of this handbook, 
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specialized war crimes units have been established in a number of countries for  
the purposes of investigating and prosecuting international crimes pursuant to 
universal jurisdiction.42
Incorporation of International Standards in Criminal Procedure
Mechanisms have incorporated international standards related to criminal 
procedure to varying degrees. (For discussion of international standards in 
substantive law, see C.1. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION.) 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) sets out bedrock 
standards for due process in criminal proceedings. Article 14 of the ICCPR 
outlines such concepts as:43 the right to equality before the law; the right to a fair 
and public hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal; the right 
to presumption of innocence;44 and the right to a number of minimum fair trial 
guarantees.45 It also refers to the right to appeal,46 to compensation following 
wrongful conviction, and to protection against double jeopardy.47 Article 15 of the 
ICCPR provides the right not to be punished through retroactive application of 
national or international law, but notes that individuals can be prosecuted and 
punished for an act or omission that was illegal under customary international law at 
the time of commission.48 Under international law, the requirement of competence, 
independence, and impartiality of a tribunal in the sense of ICCPR Article 14 is an 
absolute right that is not subject to any exception.49 
Other international standards relevant to the design of a new mechanism include 
the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary,50 the Bangalore 
Principles of Judicial Conduct, the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment 
of Prisoners,51 and the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy 
and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law 
and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law.52
Generally, mechanisms dealing with grave crimes that are most remote from 
domestic systems, including the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL, have anchored 
international standards in founding documents. They have done so through 
explicit reference to the ICCPR and other international covenants, or such regional 
instruments as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the American 
Convention on Human Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights. 
For mechanisms more integrated with domestic justice systems, the extent of 
compliance with international standards in criminal procedure has generally 
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reflected the given country’s general adoption of those standards. With regard to the 
independence of the judiciary, degrees of compliance with international standards 
are determined by constitutional and statutory laws that set out processes for the 
appointment and removal of judges and the independence of the body in charge of 
making judicial selections/appointments, including how its members are chosen.
As also provided by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,53 states parties 
to the ICCPR must respect the guarantees in Article 14 of the covenant regardless 
of their legal traditions and their domestic law.54 Some states parties to the ICCPR 
have expressed reservations on certain aspects of Article 14. Among these are 
countries that have created mechanisms to deal with grave crimes. For example, 
Bangladesh has reserved the ability to try accused persons in absentia under certain 
circumstances.55 And in both Bangladesh and Iraq, mechanisms have carried out the 
death penalty in contravention of international standards.56 
With varying degrees of success, the introduction of mechanisms to deal with 
grave crimes has led countries to accept new international standards. For example, 
Rwanda abolished the death penalty in order to try grave crimes cases transferred 
from the ICTR. By contrast, Cambodia resisted pressure to adopt international 
standards during the negotiations that led to the ECCC’s creation.57
Lessons and Considerations 
Security
1. Where conflict is ongoing or there is reason to believe that significant 
security threats to participants in judicial proceedings persist, a 
mechanism with more external characteristics may be most appropriate. 
Most notably, this may relate to location, as with the ICTY (which began 
its work in the midst of ongoing war in the former Yugoslavia), the IIIM for 
Syria (established at a time when there is no end in sight to the conflict), 
and the Kosovo Specialist Chambers (established in The Hague due to 
witness protection concerns in Kosovo). (For more detailed considerations, 
see E. LOCATION.) It may also be possible to proceed with an in-country 
mechanism that relies on external actors to provide security. Several 
mechanisms operating in conflict or fragile post-conflict settings have relied 
on UN peacekeeping operations. These include the Special Criminal Court for 
the Central African Republic (SCC), the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and 
domestic mobile courts hearing international crimes cases in remote locations 
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of the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Mechanisms in insecure 
environments may also seek to externalize witness protection through 
agreements with foreign witness protection agencies.  
Legitimacy
2. Usually, a mechanism more integrated with the domestic system can be 
expected to enjoy greater domestic legitimacy than would a mechanism 
external to it. A mechanism that is external in location includes international 
officials or introduces foreign legal concepts may naturally arouse doubt and 
suspicion within the affected population. Societies that experienced traumatic 
foreign control or influence, including through colonization (e.g., most of 
sub-Saharan Africa), invasion (e.g., Iraq), or hegemony (e.g., the Cold War 
experience in most of the developing world) are likely to have heightened 
sensitivity to mechanisms that concede elements of national sovereignty. 
3. There may be greater popular acceptance for external elements where the 
mechanism exposes crimes associated with the former colonial power or 
hegemon. Thus in Guatemala, victims of grave crimes perpetrated by  
U.S.-aligned military governments during the Cold War have embraced 
CICIG’s role in making prosecutions possible (perhaps despite the fact 
that CICIG has enjoyed American government support). In Ukraine, many 
officials, civil society organizations, and victims have welcomed international 
assistance in grave crimes cases; some even seek the temporary inclusion 
of international officials in the country’s justice institutions. The relative 
openness to Western international involvement is tied to the role of former 
hegemon and current adversary Russia in the perpetration of alleged crimes. 
4. Where the domestic justice system is widely discredited or viewed as 
partial, a mechanism external to it may enjoy greater popular legitimacy. 
Populations that broadly distrust their justice systems are more likely to 
want mechanisms external to those systems. In Mexico, popular distrust 
means that only one in ten crimes are reported to authorities.58 There, the 
involvement of the Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts (GIEI), 
deployed by the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights to audit the 
investigation of high-profile killings and enforced disappearances, was broadly 
accepted; the GIEI notably secured the trust of victims’ families who rejected 
the legitimacy of the investigation by Mexican authorities. Similarly, many 
Kenyans distrustful of national police and prosecutors, including top members 
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of the political opposition, advocated for creation of the external Kenya Special 
Tribunal; and a large majority of the population welcomed the involvement 
of the entirely international ICC despite government efforts to portray it as a 
neocolonial institution. 
Political Will
5. Where domestic authorities have a genuine desire to hold perpetrators 
to account for grave crimes without regard for their faction or rank, 
generally, better conditions are created for a mechanism that is 
integrated with the domestic justice system rather than external to it. 
Greater political will can also lead to greater openness to international 
involvement where this may be needed to add technical capacity. 
Prosecutions before the domestic courts of post-junta Argentina provide a 
good example of the former. The Special Court for Sierra Leone is a good 
example of the latter. 
 
6. Governments opposed to or wishing to control grave crimes proceedings 
are reluctant to accept mechanisms that are sufficiently external and 
independent. Government opposition has ultimately led to the defeat of 
proposals for mechanisms in locations including Liberia, Kenya, Burundi, and 
Darfur, Sudan. In negotiations with the United Nations to create the ECCC, 
Cambodia’s government insisted on safeguards that would allow it to place 
limits on the proceedings. The UN conceded to a model of co-administration 
that has led to obstruction, operational problems, and tremendous 
inefficiencies. Creating a mechanism despite government obstruction requires 
extensive international engagement (e.g., ICTY) and/or the persistent efforts 
of organized, capable civil society organizations (e.g., CICIG) to change the 
political dynamics. 
Jurisdiction
7. In planning a new mechanism, it is important to ensure clarity in the 
relationship between its jurisdiction and existing courts with overlapping 
jurisdiction. This relationship may concern international courts. In Rwanda 
and the former Yugoslavia, international tribunals had clear primacy of 
jurisdiction over national courts with overlapping jurisdiction. Within the 
Rome Statute system, the primary obligation to investigate and prosecute 
international crimes lies with national authorities, and in accordance with the 
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principle of complementarity, the ICC may only step in if states are unable or 
unwilling to do so. But questions of subsidiarity may relate to other domestic 
courts, as in Croatia and Bosnia. The Bosnia and Herzegovina War Crimes 
Chamber (BiH WCC) exists alongside local courts trying grave crimes cases, 
but the latter are not required to follow War Crimes Chamber jurisprudence. 
There has also been a lack of clarity over division of cases between the courts, 
making it difficult to develop a national strategy. Different entities in Bosnia 
have also interpreted applicable law differently.
8. External investigative mechanisms that operate alongside national 
institutions can be effective where political circumstances are conducive 
to collaboration. In Guatemala, CICIG has conducted independent and 
joint investigations with a willing Attorney General’s Office, and forged a 
productive, cooperative relationship with its prosecutors. By contrast, in 
Mexico, the GIEI conducted a parallel investigation into a notorious atrocity, 
but encountered obstruction by the Federal Prosecutor’s Office. The GIEI’s 
members were illegally surveilled by Mexican government institutions, and 
their findings, including the identification of leads not followed by national 
investigators, have remained largely ignored.
9. Nevertheless, parallel investigations in the absence of national political 
will can still deliver benefits. A prerequisite for providing value despite  
a lack of effective collaboration with national authorities may be strong 
support from domestic civil society and the international community. This 
was the case in Mexico, where the GIEI mechanism developed extensive 
new information on the disappearance of 43 students. The students’ grieving 
family members found value in this. And by revealing deep flaws in the federal 
government’s investigation of the case, as well as possibly greater government 
involvement in the perpetration of the crimes, the GIEI also contributed to a 
civil-society-driven national debate on the causes of impunity and the need  
for justice reform.
Capacity and Infrastructure
10. The less developed the country’s existing justice-sector capacity is, the 
more likely it is that a mechanism will need international characteristics 
to succeed. At issue are the capacities of officials across the judicial chain, 
including criminal investigators, prosecutors, judges, defense counsel, court 
administrators, witness protection officers, and prison officials, as well as 
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physical infrastructure, including offices, courthouses, and detention facilities. 
Where a country’s basic capacities have suffered from conflict and/or neglect, 
as in Timor-Leste, Kosovo, or the Central African Republic, it is more difficult 
for a domestic criminal justice system to address ordinary crimes, much less 
complicated international crimes, without significant foreign involvement. 
Where baseline capacities are stronger, as in Senegal or Argentina, the need 
for external participation or support is usually more specific to expertise in 
international criminal law or other special needs associated with complex 
grave crimes cases, such as forensics, witness protection, and outreach. 
Countries with higher baseline capacities may need external elements 
on a temporary basis (as with domestic proceedings in Bosnia), whereas 
international support and involvement are likely to be longer-term needs in 
countries with less developed justice systems (as in the DRC).  
Strengthening the Rule of Law
11. If part of the mechanism’s purpose is to strengthen the rule of law in the 
country concerned, then seeking maximum integration of the mechanism 
with the domestic justice system is usually preferable. The placement of a 
mechanism within the domestic system has the greatest potential for benefits 
to spill over into the justice sector as a whole, and the greatest potential that 
the mechanism itself will benefit from existing justice-sector development 
efforts. Mechanisms that are remote in physical location (e.g. the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon), in applicable legal framework (e.g., the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone), or in participation of national staff (e.g., the Kosovo 
Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office), generally have 
reduced chances of leaving legacies in one or more of the areas of domestic 
jurisprudence, domestic technical capacities, and physical infrastructure. The 
more remote a mechanism’s key characteristics, the less it can usually serve to 
enhance the capability and credibility of the domestic justice system. 
12. However, under certain circumstances, mechanisms not integrated with 
the domestic system can still have substantial impact on justice-sector 
reform. This has occurred where external mechanisms have had legal or 
political leverage over domestic authorities, and where they have invested in 
legacy programs, capacity building, and outreach. In Guatemala, the CICIG 
mechanism that exists in parallel with domestic authorities has played a major 
role in the successful promotion of rule-of-law reform, the advancement 
of reformist justice-sector officials, the introduction of new investigative 
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capacities, and the nurturing of a skilled group of prosecutors and investigators 
within the Attorney General’s Office who have asserted their autonomy from 
political elites. By successfully developing criminal cases against powerful 
individuals and successfully galvanizing political pressure, as well as through 
mentorship and collaboration with Guatemala’s Attorney General’s Office, 
CICIG has “helped Guatemalans reach a juncture where major political reform 
has become a real possibility for the first time since the signing of the Peace 
Accords 20 years ago.”59 The ICTY and the ICTR influenced the domestic 
systems with which they were concerned through the conditioned transfer 
of cases involving lower-level suspects to those jurisdictions; the conditional 
transfer of cases proper to those jurisdictions, via Rule 11bis proceedings; and 
various training initiatives. In the case of the ICTY, the completion strategy 
had the effect of shifting funds to national-level proceedings, where they 
contributed to general justice-sector development. While neither the SCSL nor 
the ECCC has transferred any cases to their respective domestic jurisdictions, 
they have each developed other legacy-related initiatives.60 The SCSL viewed 
outreach and legacy as core elements of its work from a very early stage, with 
corresponding discernible benefits.61
13. Under the wrong conditions, mechanisms more integrated with domestic 
systems risk damaging that system’s legitimacy. A mechanism proximate 
to a politicized judiciary, as in Cambodia, can reinforce the notion that strong 
executive control over the reach of criminal accountability efforts is normal. 
Similarly, even where there is greater judicial independence, as in Uganda 
and Kenya, mechanisms may remain at the mercy of police and prosecution 
services that refuse to investigate or prosecute any cases or advance cases 
only in relation to members of anti-state groups or the political opposition. 
Prosecutions that clearly align with the interests on one side of a political, 
ethnic, or religious divide (e.g., in Bangladesh, Iraq, and Côte d’Ivoire) taint 
the entire endeavor and may ultimately be destabilizing. 
14. Mechanisms integrated with the domestic system open greater 
opportunities for synergy between international support for the 
mechanism and other existing or planned rule-of-law development 
initiatives. A mechanism focused on grave crimes will have some needs 
specific to the nature, gravity, complexity, and controversy usually inherent to 
this type of case. Special needs arise in substantive international criminal law, 
and usually in areas such as provision of psychosocial assistance to victims and 
witnesses, enhanced witness protection, and outreach. The rule-of-law support 
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community has often expressed concern that donor support for high-profile 
specialized grave crimes mechanisms can detract from support for sustainable 
justice-sector reform and capacity building. However, there is broad overlap 
between the needs of a mechanism dealing with grave crimes and a domestic 
justice system when it comes to requisite technical skills and infrastructure. 
It follows that the more integrated a mechanism is with the domestic system, 
the more opportunities there will be for synergy in such areas as legal reform; 
training for police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges; courtroom  
and detention facility refurbishment; or the design of new institutions,  
such as witness protection agencies.62 However, this prospect does not 
guarantee mutual support. In the DRC, for example, some donors still worried 
that proposed mixed chambers for war crimes within the domestic system 
would detract from other rule-of-law priorities, and this contributed to the 
proposal’s collapse.
International Standards
15. If the intent is to create a mechanism that comports with international 
standards and best practices, then the extent to which the existing legal 
system already meets these, or the state is willing to adopt them, sets 
a key parameter for the mechanism’s potential integration with the 
domestic system. Relevant standards include those in the areas of substantive 
international criminal law, fair trial rights, reparations, victim participation, 
witness protection, and detention. 
16. Where domestic amnesties and other legal provisions do not meet 
international standards or are abused to shield perpetrators of grave 
crime, there is greater reason for a mechanism that is more external in 
nature. In recent decades, case law has increasingly constrained the granting 
of amnesty and immunities for crimes under international law and serious 
human rights violations.63 There is a growing consensus that amnesties for 
crimes under international law are prohibited, as they deny the right of victims 
to justice, truth, and reparation; the prohibition is clearest for genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes.64 Apart from amnesty laws, states 
sometimes grant statutory immunity to heads of state and other high officials 
or have statutes of limitations for grave crimes that do not comport with 
international standards. In some countries with weak judiciaries, elements 
including pardons, the prohibition on double jeopardy, plea bargaining, the 
filing of interlocutory appeals, requests for judges’ recusal, and other common 
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criminal procedures are sometimes inappropriately applied to shield the 
perpetrators of grave crimes. Such domestic obstacles might persist until there 
is a change in the political situation that removes them, as happened with 
amnesty laws for grave crimes in Argentina. Or an externalized mechanism 
can make international law directly applicable in ways that circumvent 
inappropriate domestic legal obstacles. For example, it has been argued that 
the SCSL “could not exist as part of the domestic legal system without raising 
complex questions relating to a prior amnesty law and the sovereign immunity 
of Charles Taylor.”65 
17. The introduction of external legal concepts may bring greater conformity 
with international standards, but can create complications that must 
be anticipated and addressed. To be effective, new legal concepts require 
implementation by officials familiar with them. This could mean including 
foreign legal experts in direct implementation and mentoring, as in East 
Timor, Kosovo, or Bosnia, and meeting the challenges that this entails. (See 
G. INTEGRATION OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGES AND STAFF.) Or where 
internationals are not directly involved in implementation, it could mean 
undertaking extensive training in other ways, as has been done across a large 
range of mechanisms. Changes to legal codes in order to meet international 
standards (or for other reasons) create inherent challenges. For example, 
in Bosnia, the creation of the War Crimes Chamber was accompanied by 
the introduction of adversarial concepts such as judicial notice and plea 
bargaining that were unfamiliar to judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel.66 
In Iraq, elements of the IHT statute inserted by U.S. officials were alien to 
Iraqi law and caused confusion.67 Mechanisms in Cambodia and East Timor 
encountered similar difficulties. The introduction of new substantive law 
through statute or application of customary international law may raise 
significant questions about the principle of legality, as it has in Uganda. (See 
also C.1. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION.) New standards may challenge 
amnesties, as has happened in Argentina and Sierra Leone. And the 
application of international standards in a specialized mechanism’s detention 
facility can create a situation in which those accused of the gravest of crimes 
enjoy much better conditions of detention than those accused of lesser crimes, 
who are locked up in national prisons.
18. The operation of a more integrated mechanism holds the potential 
to create jurisprudence that is helpful in propagating international 
standards in the judiciary’s future interpretation of substantive and 
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procedural law, especially in common law systems. The logic of this 
remains largely theoretical. In Uganda, for example, there has been so little 
activity by the International Crimes Division that it has not developed much 
jurisprudence of any kind. In Bosnia, which adopted many common law 
elements in its criminal procedure at the same time its War Crimes Chamber 
was created, there is still no system of precedent; the Chamber’s jurisprudence 
is not binding on lower courts dealing with grave crimes cases throughout  
the country.  
19. A thorough review of the existing legal framework and system should be 
conducted in order to weigh the advantages and risks of incorporating 
domestic elements that do not (yet) meet international standards. In Sierra 
Leone, the creation of the SCSL outside of the national justice system, along 
with the prosecutor’s decision not to apply domestic law (although possible 
under the statute), may have missed opportunities to bolster the application 
of international legal standards in the domestic system. However, the court 
arguably had an impact on improving standards in other areas. For example, 
the transfer of the SCSL detention facility to national authorities, and the 
experience of many Sierra Leonean guards at the SCSL may well have raised 
the standards of detention for some incarcerated Sierra Leoneans. The Iraq 
High Tribunal had inadequate protections for defense rights and foresaw 
the death penalty, in contravention of international standards. This resulted 
in rushed proceedings and the execution of Saddam Hussein and others 
following the hearing of only partial evidence. Victims interested in justice 
for other crimes and the truth-telling component of the proceedings were 
disappointed. In any situation, an assessment must be conducted before it 
is determined what kind of relationship between the mechanism and the 
domestic system best suits the circumstances.
20. A mechanism that flouts international standards will have fewer potential 
sources of international cooperation and support. For example, the 
applicability of the death penalty and deficits in fair trial rights at the Iraq High 
Tribunal and International Crimes Tribunal of Bangladesh alienated potential 
partners and donors.68 
21. If the mechanism’s purpose includes reparation to victims, in accordance 
with emerging standards in international law, there may be need for 
a more externalized mechanism if the domestic framework does not 
include or cannot be amended to include provision of reparations as 
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part of the criminal process. However, the existence of formal norms and 
procedures for reparation are no guarantee that they will be applied. (See II.F. 
STRUCTURE, and II.H. FINANCING.)
Language
22. More integrated mechanisms are likely to face fewer difficulties in making 
 trials comprehensible to affected populations than are external 
 mechanisms involving international officials who speak foreign languages. 
 Nevertheless, if the existing justice system does not already have a facility to 
interpret proceedings into minority languages of the country, special provision 
may need to be made to make trials accessible to minority communities 
affected by the underlying events. Uganda’s ICD, for example, has had to work 
with the Acholi language of northern Uganda, where it has also held hearings. 
23. Having too many official languages can cause delay and raise costs. 
Following the experience of the ad hoc tribunals, many court officials, 
administrators, and diplomats have concluded that it was a mistake for 
the ICTY and ICTR each to have three official languages, because each 
foreign language added (French and English) meant an immense cost for 
interpretation and translation, and led to delays. At the ECCC, many have 
regarded the need to interpret and translate everything into English and 
French as a vast waste of resources and a cause of significant delay. In 
East Timor, the use of four official languages (Portuguese, Tetum, Bahasa 
Indonesian, and English) delayed proceedings before the Special Panels. 
24. External sources of law can cause difficulties if not precisely translated. In 
Iraq, translation errors in the criminal procedure code created confusion over 
the standard of proof that would be applicable at the IHT. 
25. In areas where a major world language is not in official use, a 
mechanism that relies on external sources of law may struggle to find 
relevant international jurisprudence in the local language(s). In Bosnia, 
this necessitated a major effort to translate jurisprudence into Serbo-
Croatian. But even where there has been investment in the translation of 
jurisprudence, judgments can be too long or complex to be of much use in 
the national context. Investing in local-language digests and annotations of 
the mechanism’s decisions, as the UN’s Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (OHCHR) has done to an extent regarding the ECCC 
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in Cambodia, can increase their accessibility to domestic judges and thus 
increase the lasting effect on national judicial practice.
Acquittals and Sentencing
26. External mechanisms may face additional challenges in dealing with 
persons acquitted and those sentenced. Purely domestic mechanisms 
located in the country often face challenges in providing secure and humane 
detention and prison facilities for sentenced persons, and they often lack 
means to protect and support acquitted persons. Additionally, if a mechanism 
is located outside the domestic system of suspected perpetrators’ country of 
citizenship, the mandate must contemplate what will happen with those who 
are sentenced and acquitted. External courts, including the ICTR, ICTY, and 
SCSL, must negotiate agreements with states on the enforcement of sentences 
if the affected country is unable to securely detain convicted persons in 
accordance with international standards. It can be more difficult to find states 
willing to accept acquitted persons. Defendants acquitted at the ICTR, for 
example, were unable to return to Rwanda and found states unwilling to grant 
them visas due to lingering perceptions of their guilt, despite court rulings 
to the contrary. Many have had to continue living in UN “safe houses” in 
Arusha, Tanzania, while the UN and its Mechanism for International Criminal 
Tribunals (MICT) have struggled to resolve a problem that should have been 
anticipated at the tribunal’s inception.69
Transition Strategies
27. The design of external mechanisms must contemplate transitional 
issues. External mechanisms are extraordinary and temporary. Upon their 
completion, some apparatus must assume their residual functions, including 
the pursuit of remaining fugitives and their potential trials, the adjudication of 
new legal issues concerning conditions of detention, and witness protection 
and support. To deal with such issues following the expiration of the ICTY and 
ICTR mandates, the UN Security Council created the MICT in 2010. Similarly, 
the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone was created as a bare-bones but 
 expandable entity to deal with the SCSL’s residual functions. In Bosnia, external 
 components of the War Crimes Chamber and Special Division for War Crimes 
in the Prosecutor’s Office were phased out, leaving in place purely domestic 
mechanisms. In such places as Argentina, there is no transition because the 
proceedings occur within a domestic system that will continue to exist. 
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Key Questions to Help Determine the Relationship to the Domestic 
System
• Does the security situation in the country allow for a domestically located and 
operated mechanism, or does insecurity suggest that an external location and/
or inclusion of international officials may be necessary for it to function?
• Is there popular domestic sensitivity about the involvement of foreigners in 
internal affairs (as opposed to more limited government sensitivity, which 
could be based on self-interest)? If so, is that sensitivity general in nature or 
particularly acute with regard to certain countries (such as former colonial 
powers) or regions?
• Does the domestic justice sector enjoy popular credibility? If not, is there 
reason to believe that the incorporation of external elements, including foreign 
sources of law or the involvement of international officials, would increase the 
mechanism’s legitimacy?
• Has the executive respected the independence of domestic judges and the 
autonomy of prosecutors? If not, are there any promising measures being taken 
to strengthen judicial independence?
• What is the capacity of officials across the justice chain to conduct 
proceedings in accordance with law and to do so fairly and efficiently? Are 
there areas of need specific to proceedings for the grave crimes in question?70 
• Are there existing plans for general justice-sector development that could 
obviate the need for some external elements of mechanism design?
• Does the country’s substantive law meet international standards, especially 
with regard to crime definitions under international criminal law? If not, are 
there reasonable prospects for legal reform in the near future?
• Does the country’s criminal procedure comport with international standards 
and best practices, including in the areas of fair trial rights, prohibition of 
capital punishment, reparation, victim participation, witness protection, and 
conditions of detention?
• Are there domestic amnesties, immunity laws, statutes of limitation, or other 
legal provisions in place that might obstruct the prosecution of suspected 
perpetrators of grave crimes if the mechanism operates under domestic law?
• If the introduction of foreign legal concepts into the domestic system is being 
contemplated, are there resources available to ensure effective implementation 
through mentoring, training, translation of resource documents, or other means?
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• Would embedding the mechanism in the domestic system increase the chances 
that its functioning could strengthen standards in the regular justice system? In 
the country in question, could an integrated mechanism create positive judicial 
precedent in relation to the interpretation of substantive and/or procedural law? 
• What is the risk that integrating a mechanism in a politicized domestic justice 
system will result in proceedings that lack fairness and credibility? What types, 
intensity, and duration of external involvement would be needed to mitigate 
identified risks?
• Which working languages are essential for the mechanism to function, and what 
would be the implications of adding one or more foreign languages to facilitate 
possible international participation?
• Is relevant international jurisprudence already available in the possible working 
languages of the mechanism? If not, what are the implications of translation 
needs, in terms of cost and time?
• If an external mechanism is contemplated, where will convicted persons 
serve their sentences, and what will happen to those who are acquitted and 
to convicted persons who have completed their sentences? Are international 
cooperation agreements necessary?
• If an external mechanism is contemplated, what institution(s) will handle 
residual issues, including the prosecution of fugitives, legal challenges to the 
conditions of detention, witness protection, and the implementation of  
awarded reparations?
C. Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction component of a mechanism’s mandate encompasses subject matter, 
personal, temporal, and geographic (or territorial) jurisdiction. In other words, who 
will be subject to the court’s authority and pursuant to which forms of criminal 
liability, for which crimes, occurring when, and where? This section looks at each of 
these components in turn. 
1. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
Subject matter jurisdiction is the list of crimes a mechanism is authorized to investigate, 
prosecute, and adjudicate. This forms the core of a mechanism’s mandate.
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Experiences to Date
Most mechanisms considered for the purposes of this handbook have focused 
on three core international crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes. These core three, however, are in the process of making way for a fourth: 
the crime of aggression.71 In the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, a 
proposal for the establishment of specialized chambers reflected the currency of 
these developments.72 Meanwhile, in Bangladesh, despite its founding Act, which 
dates back to 1973, the International Crimes Tribunal for Bangladesh (ICTB) 
may have been ahead of its time in subject matter jurisdiction: it has jurisdiction 
over the core three, as well as “crimes against peace” (including waging a war of 
aggression).73 Mechanisms considered by this handbook that have been proposed 
but not implemented feature the core three. For example, with regard to Burundi, 
the Arusha Agreement of 2000 contemplates the establishment of an “international 
criminal tribunal to try and punish those responsible [for] acts of genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.”74 Similarly, the August 2015 peace agreement 
for South Sudan75 includes the proposed establishment of a hybrid court  
“to investigate and prosecute individuals bearing responsibility for violations of 
international law and/or applicable South Sudanese law,” in particular the core three 
and “other serious crimes under international law and relevant laws of the Republic 
of South Sudan including gender based crimes and sexual violence.”76 The proposed 
Special Court for Darfur would have jurisdiction over “gross violations of human 
rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law.”77
Some mechanisms have jurisdiction over crimes other than the core three, and this 
has legal consequences. The inclusion of additional crimes allows the prosecution 
of offenses without needing to prove additional contextual elements that would 
qualify them as “core three crimes” (such things as scale, policy, or the existence of a 
military conflict). However, while statutes of limitation, amnesties, and immunities 
should not apply for international crimes, including at least war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and genocide, such limitations on prosecution may apply for 
ordinary crimes included in the mandate. 
The Statute of the Extraordinary African Chambers specifically names the crime 
of torture in addition to the core three. Other mechanisms, such as the SCSL and 
ECCC, have had mandates to prosecute certain domestic crimes in addition to 
core international crimes. Others have had mandates to investigate and prosecute 
crimes that straddle the domestic/transnational crime divide, such as terrorism. 
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon only has jurisdiction over offences under the 
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Lebanese Criminal Code, most notably intentional homicide and acts of terrorism. 
The International Crimes Division of the Ugandan High Court has jurisdiction to 
deal with those who have committed “serious crimes,” which include the core three, 
as well as crimes of terrorism, human trafficking, piracy, and “other international 
crimes.”78 Some of these ideas are reflected also in the Protocol on Amendments to 
the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, which 
would give the court international criminal jurisdiction.79 Discussions and proposals 
for a Special Tribunal for Kenya contemplated subject matter jurisdiction over 
“genocide, gross violations of human rights, crimes against humanity and such other 
crimes as may be specified in the Statute.”80 
The Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT) had jurisdiction over the core three, as well as 
“violations of Iraqi laws.” Broadly, this provision encompassed “interference in the 
affairs of the judiciary or attempting to influence its functioning; the wastage and 
squandering of national resources; the abuse of position and the pursuit of policies 
that have almost led to the threat of war.”81 In Kosovo, international judges recruited 
by the UN could sit not only on grave crimes cases but also whenever “necessary to 
ensure the independence of the judiciary or the proper administration of justice.”82 
One of the most ambitious articulations of subject matter jurisdiction among the 
mechanisms reviewed for this handbook is that in the draft statute for the (proposed) 
Extraordinary Criminal Court for Liberia (ECCL). The document proposed several 
pages of international, transnational, and domestic crimes, including economic 
crimes. It aimed to give the ECCL both criminal and administrative jurisdiction. On 
the administrative side, it sought to establish jurisdiction over “final administrative 
acts of the institutions and or bodies of the Republic of Liberia, determine the 
legality of individual and general administrative acts taken under State authority, 
resolve property disputes and levy tort penalties in accordance with Liberian law and 
international standards.”83 
Mechanisms in South and Central America provide additional, diverse examples of 
subject matter jurisdiction. In Guatemala, CICIG has three categories of jurisdiction. 
First, to investigate the existence of illicit security forces and clandestine security 
organizations that commit crimes affecting the fundamental human rights of the 
citizens of Guatemala and to identify the structures of these illegal groups as well 
as their activities, operating modalities, and sources of financing. Second, to help 
the state to disband these structures and to promote the investigation, criminal 
prosecution, and punishment of the crimes committed by the members of such 
groups. Third, to make recommendations to the state of Guatemala regarding public 
policies to be adopted—including the necessary judicial and institutional reforms— 
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to eradicate and prevent the reemergence of clandestine security structures and 
illegal security forces. In other words, the subject matter jurisdiction of the CICIG 
is really an anomaly in comparison with the more “traditional” mechanisms 
established to deal with core international crimes, but nonetheless an available 
model for states seeking to target other forms of criminal activity contributing to a 
broader culture of human rights abuses.  
In Colombia, extrajudicial killings and serious human rights abuses by state and 
nonstate actors have been prosecuted in domestic courts, including (more recently) 
on the basis of domestically implemented Rome Statute provisions. Similarly, in 
Argentina, widespread killings, systematic torture, and abductions by death squads—
while formerly prosecuted as domestic crimes—have increasingly been labeled as 
crimes against humanity. In Haiti, although the death of Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” 
Duvalier subsequently ended proceedings, on February 20, 2014, a decision of the 
Court of Appeals of Port-au-Prince recognized that the concept of crimes against 
humanity was “part of customary international law and that customary international 
law is part of the national law of Haiti.”84 
In Europe, there are a number of domestic or hybrid mechanisms that illustrate the 
complexities involved—at the more domestic end of the spectrum—in deciphering 
applicable laws and in ensuring their adequacy. For example, the Supreme Court of 
Kosovo returned a number of war crimes cases for retrial before UN Regulation 64 
Panels due to confusion over applicable law. The Regulation 64 Panels’ successor, 
the European Union Rule-of-law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), relied on provisions 
in the criminal code of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), but 
these provisions only included war crimes, not crimes against humanity or genocide. 
Inadequacy of laws has also been an issue for prosecutions in Croatia, particularly 
with regard to notions of command responsibility and crimes of sexual violence.85  
In Bosnia, there was an attempt to avoid some of this confusion through  
sequencing processes: first, in 2003, the adoption of new criminal and criminal 
procedure codes, and then the planning for the establishment of the War Crimes 
Chamber, which was inaugurated in March 2005. Nevertheless, there are still 
disputes over applicable law at the BiH WCC and in local courts, and the new codes 
and old SFRY codes are still in use.
The Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office has jurisdiction 
over crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes under Kosovo Law, but only 
with reference to allegations in a “Council of Europe Assembly Report.”86 The 
mechanism’s jurisdiction is thus limited by reference to particular allegations.
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In the Central African Republic (CAR), the Special Criminal Court has jurisdiction 
over gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, as well 
as international crimes defined under the CAR criminal code (genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes, including those under current investigation and 
those to be investigated in future). Finally, although not the only crimes within their 
jurisdiction, mobile courts operating in remote parts of the DRC have been heavily 
devoted to hearing cases involving sexual offenses.
All mechanisms—particularly special mechanisms established entirely outside of 
a domestic jurisdiction, or in parallel to it—have come to require additional subject 
matter jurisdiction over offenses against the administration of justice (such as 
perjury, obstructing or interfering with witnesses, or obstructing or bribing court 
officials). In the case of the earlier (ad hoc) tribunals, jurisdiction over these offenses 
was left to subsidiary legislation (their Rules of Procedure and Evidence).87 By 
the time the Rome Statute was adopted, such offenses were included in primary 
legislation.88 Also included in this category of jurisdiction is the power to sanction 
counsel for misconduct. 
Lessons and Considerations
1. Subject matter jurisdiction should reflect the realities of the conflict in 
question. The broad consensus about prosecution initiatives for international 
crimes is that they should focus on international crimes of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes. However, some models have excluded 
categories of crime that did not feature in the conflict; for example, the statute 
for the SCSL did not include genocide. More commonly, founding documents 
have granted mechanisms jurisdiction over a broader set of offenses. These 
have included some domestic offenses (for example, in the ECCC and SCSL 
mandates) included for legal or policy reasons. Other mechanisms have 
included a broader raft of international crimes, including such matters as 
terrorism and piracy (for example, in the Uganda ICD statute).
2. Scoping missions or commissions of inquiry can provide guidance on 
which crimes to include in the mechanism’s mandate. An example of this 
is the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation report providing recommendations 
for the establishment of a criminal court (i.e., the ECCL) and annexing a 
draft statute to the report. The report included a list of potential targets for 
investigation/prosecution. Caution must be exercised, however, in relying 
wholly on such findings—they should be viewed as preliminary only and within 
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the limitations under which the inquiries were conducted. Such missions may 
overlook some forms of crime, especially such commonly stigmatized crimes 
as sexual and gender-based violence; subject matter jurisdiction must provide 
for all potential forms of atrocity-crime, even where there may be silences 
around their commission.89 
3. Mention of specific crimes of concern can provide guidance to the 
mechanism’s implementers. Explicitly granting the mechanism authority 
over specific crimes (such as sexual violence or torture) may be duplicative of 
a broader mandate over war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide, or 
can expand subject matter jurisdiction to include instances of crimes that do 
not fulfill additional contextual elements to qualify as international crimes. 
Doing so may be desirable where particular crimes featured heavily in the 
underlying situation. This can provide important guidance to the mechanism’s 
operators and send a signal to affected populations that these offenses will 
 not be ignored. 
4. Statutes should define subject matter jurisdiction consistent with 
international standards. The use of criminal definitions that comport with
  international standards (including those of the Rome Statute and/or 
 customary international law) can help ensure that the law’s scope is sufficiently 
 comprehensive with regard to specific criminal acts and chapeau elements, 
can prevent the application of statutes of limitations to grave crimes, and can 
facilitate the use of jurisprudence from other jurisdictions. If the country in 
question has already domesticated international crimes in accordance with 
international standards, or allows the direct application of such definitions, 
this may not be of concern. However, where neither of these is the case, the 
establishment of a new mechanism may present an opportunity to introduce 
criminal definitions of core international crimes that are in accordance 
with international standards. By contrast, the drafting of a mechanism’s 
subject matter jurisdiction should avoid introducing definitions at odds with 
international standards. This was the case with the statute for the ECCL, 
recommended by Liberia’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).90  
5. Defining the mechanism’s subject matter jurisdiction should take account 
of the subject matter jurisdiction of other relevant judicial authorities. It 
may be appropriate for the new mechanism to have overlapping subject matter 
jurisdiction with other institutions, but only if mandates are differentiated in 
other ways. For example, it may be understood that an existing international 
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court (such as the ICC, ICTY, or ICTR) will take on complex cases against 
more senior-level suspects, while domestic courts (for example, military courts 
in the DRC, the BiH WCC, or Rwandan domestic and Gacaca courts) deal 
with simpler cases involving lower-level perpetrators. This may be important 
to address the sheer number of cases in a given situation. Within a domestic 
system, there may be reasons for a mechanism to have differentiated temporal 
jurisdiction from existing authorities dealing with the same kinds of crime. 
However, if there is insufficient differentiation from the mandates of extant 
authorities, then there is a heightened risk of legal ambiguity, and even the 
political manipulation of such ambiguity as a means of evading accountability. 
Within the Rome Statute system, the principle of complementarity may make 
this phenomenon more common. 
6. A mechanism with jurisdiction over domestic crimes may have a 
greater impact on the country’s legal system. At least in theory, this may 
be especially true in common law countries, where jurisprudence can set 
important legal precedents. However, granting a mechanism an ability to apply 
domestic law does not guarantee that this will happen. The SCSL mandate 
allowed the prosecution of “crimes under relevant Sierra Leonean law,” in 
addition to international crimes. In practice, however, the prosecutor decided 
against using this latitude.
7. Subject matter jurisdiction that is too broad may create unrealistic 
expectations, open avenues for obstruction, and/or render the 
mechanism unworkable. Creating a mechanism that has very broad subject 
matter jurisdiction suggests a larger and costlier structure that is more likely 
to raise questions of feasibility. Such questions have emerged with regard 
to the proposed criminal jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights (ACJHR) and may have contributed to Liberia’s inability to 
create a specialized prosecution mechanism. Further, granting a mechanism 
with authority over a wide range of international crimes, as with the Uganda 
International Crimes Division, may allow governments to attract resources in 
the name of trying core international crimes, while building the infrastructure 
for a mechanism devoted mainly to dealing with other types of crime (such  
as terrorism).91 
8. The mechanism will need powers to investigate and prosecute crimes 
against the administration of justice in addition to the international 
and/or transnational crimes that form its core mandate. Any judicial 
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mechanism will require the requisite powers to control its own proceedings, 
including the power to impose criminal sanctions on those giving false 
evidence before it. It is preferable that this jurisdiction be created in primary, 
rather than subsidiary, legislation (with foresight).
Key Questions to Help Determine Subject Matter Jurisdiction
• In determining subject matter jurisdiction, have all major stakeholders been 
consulted, including victims and others in affected communities? 
• What were the main crimes of concern perpetrated during the conflict?
• What major sources of human rights and criminal documentation exist that can 
help determine this (including commissions of inquiry, scoping reports, and 
domestic and international civil society reports)?
• What crimes carry particular social stigma in the society in question, such that 
their occurrence may have been underreported. Have organizations or entities 
that are focused on those types of crimes in particular been consulted?
• Does the country concerned have legal definitions consistent with international 
standards?
• Can the country directly apply treaty law, allowing it to use criminal definitions 
from treaties to which it is party? If so, does the judiciary have an established 
practice of doing so?
• What other judicial authorities have jurisdiction over grave crimes? Are 
overlaps likely to strengthen or dilute chances for genuine and fair criminal 
enforcement?
• Is the proposed subject matter jurisdiction realistic?
• Could granting the mechanism jurisdiction over some domestic laws lead to 
jurisprudence that would aid broader legal reform?
• Does the mechanism need explicit jurisdiction over crimes against the 
administration of justice, or will other elements of the justice system handle 
such offenses as perjury and witness intimidation?
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2. PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND MODES OF LIABIILTY
Personal jurisdiction comprises the set of actors subject to the legal power of a 
judicial mechanism’s authority. Modes of liability comprise the basis in law by 
which individuals can be considered criminally responsible for crimes. Decisions 
to define personal jurisdiction and modes of liability narrowly or broadly will have 
implications for the total number of cases a mechanism might be expected to 
handle, with ramifications for its scale, structure, and financing. Further, it will play 




Most mechanisms considered in this handbook have the power to investigate and 
prosecute “natural persons.”92 However, some recent mechanisms and proposed 
mechanisms, including in the DRC and Guatemala, have begun to include broader 
notions of personal jurisdiction, so as to include those who finance or benefit from 
grave crimes.93 The draft Convention on Crimes against Humanity, provisionally 
adopted in 2017 by the International Law Commission, contains a provision on the 
liability of legal persons.94
Whereas the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia were granted 
personal jurisdiction over any perpetrator of crimes under their statutes, many 
hybrid and internationalized courts, including the SCSL and ECCC, have had their 
personal jurisdictional mandates limited through language directing them to focus 
on perpetrators in leadership positions and/or those most responsible for crimes. 
Some models, such as Colombia’s Justice and Peace Law (JPL) and Special 
Jurisdiction for Peace (SJP), have limited personal jurisdiction by explicitly 
accommodating amnesties granted to some types of suspected perpetrators (as 
well as through a directive from the attorney general narrowing the JPL’s broad 
prosecution mandate in law to those “most responsible”). As in post-apartheid 
South Africa, the proposed statute for Liberian war crimes court cited suspects’ 
cooperation with the truth commission as a reason to forgo their prosecution. The 
International Crimes Tribunal for Bangladesh recognizes an amnesty provided to 
those on one side of the conflict, and personal jurisdiction is further limited because 
it may not hear cases related to persons living outside of the country.
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Modes of Liability
Different mechanisms have had a wide variety of modes of liability. The ad hoc 
tribunals contemplate criminal liability for those who plan, instigate, order, commit, 
or aid and abet in the planning, preparation, or execution of a crime within their 
subject matter jurisdiction. They specify that official position does not exempt an 
individual from criminal liability; they note the concept of command responsibility 
(the responsibility of superiors for the actions of their subordinates, under certain 
circumstances); and they note that acting pursuant to the orders of a superior does 
not absolve an individual from liability. These concepts have been picked up in the 
SCSL Statute and ECCC Law. Additionally, judges have interpreted criminal liability 
to include the concept of acting in concert (joint criminal enterprise).95 
The Malabo Protocol, which (if ratified by a sufficient number of states) will 
establish criminal jurisdiction for the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
controversially limits criminal liability based on official capacity. It grants immunity 
to serving heads of state and government and “other senior officials” in relation to 
official acts. (See the discussion of international standards in relation to amnesties 
and immunities in II.B. RELATIONSHIP TO DOMESTIC SYSTEM.) In Colombia, a 
deviation from the Rome Statute’s definition of command responsibility in the 2016 
law creating the Special Jurisdiction for Peace has led some observers to believe that 
military commanders may have de facto immunity.
The “principle of legality” can also limit modes of liability. (See also Temporal and 
Territorial Jurisdiction, below.) At the ECCC, judges found that the form of joint 
criminal enterprise known as JCE III (or “extended” joint criminal enterprise)96 was 
not a form of liability “foreseeable to the Charged Persons in 1975–79” and that 
therefore the “principle of legality” required the court to “refrain from relying on the 
extended form of JCE in its proceedings.”97 Uganda’s International Crimes Division 
has been unable to use modes of liability from the Rome Statute, which were largely 
incorporated into the domestic ICC Act that came into effect in 2010. The ICC 
Act cannot be retroactively applied due to a strict understanding of the principle 
of legality expressed in the country’s constitution and judicial practice. The STL 
Statute has been criticized for violating the principle of legality by applying uniquely 
international forms of criminal responsibility (namely joint criminal enterprise and 
command responsibility) to domestic (Lebanese) crimes.98
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Lessons and Considerations
1. Personal jurisdiction and modes of liability should reflect evolving 
international standards. Accordingly, mandates should not include 
immunities for heads of states and government, or other persons based 
on offices they hold. Perpetrators of grave crimes are often highly ranked 
individuals who oversaw (rather than personally physically perpetrated) 
the crimes, so modes of liability written into any applicable laws should be 
broad enough to capture a wide range of conduct. The case law of several 
mechanisms illustrates that the availability of various concepts of liability is 
particularly important to ensure that criminal accountability can be secured 
for crimes of sexual violence. Extended form joint criminal enterprise—crimes 
outside the scope of an original common plan, but nonetheless foreseeable as 
a consequence of the original plan—is the form of liability that has been most 
commonly used to secure accountability for crimes of sexual violence. States 
and mechanisms contemplating adoption of Rome Statute standards should 
note that it is disputed whether the Statute encompasses this form of liability.99 
2. Drafters should take account of the principle of legality as understood 
in the country’s law and practice, as well as customary international law. 
They should be clear about which modes of liability apply to which period of 
events under existing law, and what statutory or constitutional changes may 
be desirable as part of the mechanism authorization package to ensure that 
prosecutors and judges have the discretion to consider cases involving key 
suspected perpetrators.
3. Personal jurisdiction should not be defined to shield possible perpetrators 
on any side of the conflict from legal scrutiny. Exercises in one-sided or 
“victors’” justice further divide riven societies and underscore perceptions 
that justice systems serve power rather than law. Although the president of 
Sierra Leone initially requested United Nations assistance in creating a court 
to try members of the Revolutionary United Front who committed atrocities 
(implicitly ignoring crimes by members of other fighting factions), the UN 
appropriately insisted on removal of this specification in the Special Court’s 
mandate. In the end, the SCSL convicted members of different factions, 
including those of a pro-government militia. 
4. Personal jurisdiction should be defined broadly enough to capture 
potential targets (leaving room for prosecutorial and judicial discretion), 
yet sufficiently defined so as not to create an indefinite mandate and 
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unmanageable costs. Almost across the board, prosecution mechanisms 
show that significant investment and expenditure is incurred during the 
start-up phase, with investigations and prosecutions becoming more 
streamlined and efficient as experience, expertise, and institutional memory 
accrues.100 Where a government’s acceptance of an independent mechanism 
is questionable, particular care should be given to wording that narrows 
mandates. In Cambodia, critics accuse some court officials of inappropriately 
exploiting the mandate’s wording on personal jurisdiction as a convenient 
legal basis to shield suspects from investigation.101
5. Personal jurisdiction should be defined with awareness of other existing 
or planned prosecution and transitional justice mechanisms. It should 
take express account of types of perpetrators of that may be left to lesser (or 
higher) courts, as is the case in Bosnia. It should also account for those who 
receive amnesty for noninternational crimes, as well as truth commissions 
that may deal with lower-level perpetrators (perhaps also through grants of 
amnesty for noninternational crimes in exchange for cooperation). Colombia 
offers a (troubled) example of a holistic approach to transitional justice.
Key Questions to Help Determine Personal Jurisdiction and Modes  
of Liability
• In determining personal jurisdiction and modes of liability, have all major 
stakeholders been consulted, including victims and others in affected 
communities? 
• Should the mechanism have jurisdiction beyond natural persons (for example, 
corporate actors)?
• Which standards are to be applied to the mechanism’s personal jurisdiction and 
modes of liability, and with what implications?
• Does existing criminal procedure (where it is to be applied) comport with 
international standards on personal jurisdiction and modes of liability? If not, 
what constitutional and/or statutory changes might be necessary?
• What limits does existing domestic law (where it is to be applied) place on the 
application of new modes of liability, through law and practice related to the 
principle of legality?
• Do judges have a practice of applying customary international law?
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• Does the proposed personal jurisdiction single out particular factions for 
scrutiny and/or shield others?
• Is the potential pool of suspects large enough that limiting language may be 
necessary (e.g., “most responsible”) to narrow personal jurisdiction, while 
remaining consistent with the mechanism’s intended purpose?
• If personal jurisdiction is narrowed, do prosecutors and judges nonetheless 
retain sufficient discretion to apply the mandate to a broad enough group of 
potential suspects?
• Do other existing or planned prosecution or non-prosecution mechanisms of 
transitional justice have jurisdiction over suspects who committed crimes under 
the mechanism’s subject matter jurisdiction? If so, how can the mechanism’s 
personal jurisdiction be tailored, consistent with international standards, to 
take account of these?
3. TEMPORAL AND TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
Temporal jurisdiction is the time period of underlying events over which a 
judicial mechanism may exercise authority. Territorial, or geographic, jurisdiction 
is the defined physical territory where events occurred, over which a judicial 
mechanism may exercise authority. The definition of each will affect the number 
of cases a mechanism may be expected to handle, with ramifications for its scale, 
structure, and cost. These definitions may also have important consequences for 
a mechanism’s fairness, popular legitimacy, and legacy, as well as the potential for 
creating political controversy. Finally, the definition of temporal jurisdiction may 
raise questions about the retroactive application of law.
Experiences to Date
Temporal Jurisdiction
With regard to temporal jurisdiction, there have been three typologies of 
jurisdiction. First, many mechanisms have jurisdiction over precise time periods. 
These include the mechanisms for Cambodia, Rwanda (the ICTR), Bangladesh, 
Iraq, and the Extraordinary African Chambers in the Courts of Senegal. Second, 
some mechanisms have mandates over particular events: the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon’s jurisdiction related to an assassination; the Interdisciplinary Group of 
Independent Experts was dispatched to Mexico in relation to crimes that unfolded 
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over two days; a proposed Special Tribunal for Kenya (STK) would have had a 
mandate over postelection violence that occurred during just a few months in 2007–
2008. Finally, there are also mechanisms that have had a defined start date for their 
temporal jurisdiction, but no defined end date. This was the case with the ICTY; it 
is the case with the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for Syria; 
and investigations and prosecutions in Côte d’Ivoire related to events following 2010 
presidential elections, none with a specified end date. 
Some mechanisms have struggled with issues of temporal jurisdiction as it relates 
to the principle of legality. (See also Personal Jurisdiction and Modes of Liability, 
above.) Courts applying international law are often required to retroactively 
apply contemporaneously created legal provisions. This means they must analyze 
whether the conduct referenced in those provisions was criminal under national or 
international law at the time of the commission of the offenses.102 Concerns around 
the interpretation of the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law have been 
raised in relation to Uganda’s ICD. Similarly, the court of justice of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) controversially found that Senegalese 
legislative changes adopted in 2007, which incorporated international crimes into 
its Penal Code, “would violate the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law if 
applied to prosecute crimes allegedly committed by Habré almost 20 years before.” 
For this reason, Senegal had to establish “extraordinary,” and internationalized 
chambers in order to try the Habré case.103 In Sierra Leone, the SCSL’s Appeals 
Chamber ruled in pretrial hearings that the forced recruitment of child soldiers had 
“crystallized” in customary international law by the time of the underlying events in 
question, and thus could properly be charged by the prosecutor.
Territorial Jurisdiction
The territorial jurisdiction of any mechanism is usually defined to encompass 
the territory on which grave crimes occurred. In most cases, it is defined as the 
entire territory of countries concerned (including mechanisms in Serbia, Croatia, 
Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Argentina, Guatemala, and Colombia). 
Where conflicts relate to a specific part of a country, there is precedent for limiting 
territorial jurisdiction to that area (the proposed Hybrid Court for Darfur). By 
contrast, there is also precedent for territorial jurisdiction that spans international 
borders, as with the ICTY’s jurisdiction over all countries on the territory of the 
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the proposed criminal chamber 
of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, which would have jurisdiction 
over an entire continent. 
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There have also been models of limited and unlimited extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
The ICTR’s jurisdiction extended to Rwandan citizens responsible for crimes 
committed in the territory of neighboring states. The Extraordinary African 
Chambers in the Senegalese Courts had jurisdiction over crimes in Chad. And, 
although beyond the scope of this handbook, many countries have legal frameworks 




1. Temporal jurisdiction should not be defined in order to bring about 
selective accountability. By itself, this is no guarantee of accountability on all 
sides (as seen with the ICTR in Rwanda104), but it is a fundamental prerequisite 
to fairly applied criminal accountability. Foresight at the time of a mechanism’s 
design could enhance maximum accountability and avoid shielding certain 
perpetrators. From a mandate and purpose perspective, this could be ensured 
by the use of strong preamble language in the founding legislative instrument 
and/or the founding agreement with an international body. Temporal 
jurisdiction can be designed to enhance these prospects, or at least to provide a 
legal basis to ensure that all perpetrators could—theoretically—be captured.105 
In Sierra Leone, the start date of the SCSL’s temporal jurisdiction was chosen 
as a “non-politically biased date.”106 Nevertheless, choosing a start date may 
present difficult choices between a need for inclusivity and questions of 
ambition. In the former Yugoslavia, the ICTY had no jurisdiction over previous 
grave crimes committed during and after World War II; in Côte d’Ivoire, 
grave crimes committed during cycles of violence prior to 2010 have not been 
investigated and prosecuted; and neither the ICTR nor the Gacaca mechanism 
have examined grave crimes in the decades prior to the Rwandan genocide.
2. Where a mechanism is being designed to address crimes in the more 
distant past, stakeholders must be aware of inevitable additional 
challenges. For example, if evidence was not gathered contemporaneously 
to the events, it may be difficult to do so now. Many of those who perpetrated 
or experienced atrocities (victims and witnesses) may no longer be alive. The 
lapse of time has burdened the ECCC’s attempt to investigate and prosecute 
historical crimes (committed 1975–1979, corresponding to the period of Khmer 
Rouge rule). Key accused persons, suspects, and witnesses have died in the 
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intervening years and during the court’s proceedings. Similar challenges have 
faced proceedings in Argentina, Guatemala, Bangladesh, and Senegal  
(in relation to Chad). Prosecuting crimes of a more distant past means that 
often younger generations are not familiar with the facts and issues involved.  
This can be a challenge, but also an opportunity for mechanisms to play a 
truth-telling role. To do so, mechanisms may need to place special emphasis 
on reaching youth through outreach and public information.
3. Mechanism designers should anticipate challenges arising from the bar 
on retroactive application of criminal law. One option might be for the 
founding legislation to make clear that the content of the laws are taken from 
customary international law and, therefore, do not violate the principle of 
non-retroactivity. However, where it is not clear that this is indeed the case, 
mechanisms can become bogged down in complex pretrial litigation. 
Territorial Jurisdiction
4. Territorial jurisdiction should not be defined in ways that shield 
particular factions suspected of perpetrating grave crimes. If crimes 
perpetrated by different factions occurred disproportionately in different 
geographical locations, it will be especially important to ensure that the 
mechanism’s territorial jurisdiction encompasses these. This will be critical to 
the mechanism’s fairness and legitimacy.
5. Territorial jurisdiction that extends across national borders will raise 
ancillary considerations for those designing a mechanism. These will 
include matters such as state sovereignty, cooperation, and the potential need 
for additional agreement(s) allowing state actors to access evidence, witnesses, 
territories, and suspects. Nonetheless, an expanded territorial jurisdiction may 
be necessary to capture the extent of criminality, especially where suspects 
have fled into neighboring states, or where conflict (and related atrocities) has 
expanded beyond state borders. This may be of increasing relevance, as many 
conflicts are moving away from traditional state-based (or entirely intrastate) 
conflict to criminal organizations operating simultaneously across multiple 
territories (such as Daesh / Islamic State, al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, or the 
Zetas cartel).
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Key Questions to Help Determine Temporal and Territorial Jurisdiction
• In determining temporal and territorial jurisdiction, have all major stakeholders 
been consulted, including victims and others in affected communities? 
• When and where were the main crimes of concern perpetrated during the 
conflict?
• What would be the effect on the mechanism’s fairness and perceived legitimacy 
of any proposed constraints on temporal and territorial jurisdiction?
• Were acts under the mechanism’s subject matter jurisdiction criminal under 
applicable domestic law during all times of the proposed mechanism’s 
mandate? If not, were they criminal under customary international law, and does 
the system in which the mechanism will operate have legal provisions allowing 
direct application of customary international law or a practice of recognizing 
customary international law?
• Where crimes have been perpetrated across borders, is there support from 
affected states and regional or international bodies to create a mechanism 
with jurisdiction beyond one country’s territory? If so, what agreements may be 
needed to secure access to evidence, witnesses, and suspects, and to conduct 
other functions, including outreach, across borders?
D. Basis of Authority
In the establishment of a mechanism for criminal accountability, consideration 
must be given to the body or source providing official permission or approval for its 
creation. Some examples of the sources of authority—in terms of a body as well as an 
instrument—are:
 • the United Nations Security Council (UNSC; via the instrument  
of a resolution);
 • the United Nations General Assembly (via the instrument  
of a resolution);
 • a domestic government, in partnership with the UN (via an 
agreement between the state and the United Nations); 
 • a domestic government, in partnership with a regional body  
(via an agreement between the state and the regional body);
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 • the relevant domestic legislative body (via a domestic legislative 
instrument, or series of legislative instruments); and
 • a decision of the executive, where legally possible. 
Clearly, there can be overlap in these categories, as some mechanisms require both 
international and domestic authorization.
The basis of a mechanism’s authority is closely related to its relationship with the 
domestic system. (See II.B.) For example, a mechanism that derives its authority 
from a UN Security Council resolution will likely have a more distant relationship 
with the domestic judicial system. Conversely, a mechanism whose authority derives 
solely from domestic legislation will have a more proximate relationship to the 
domestic judicial system.
Experiences to Date
The UN Security Council authorized the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR 
(through the passing of resolutions, pursuant to powers under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter). In both instances, the Council determined that the situations in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda constituted threats to international peace and security.  
The authority for both the SCSL and the ECCC largely derives from agreements 
between the UN and the Sierra Leonean and Cambodian governments, respectively. 
In the case of the ECCC, however, the agreement regulates Cambodia’s relations 
with the UN in terms of international assistance to the court, whereas the ECCC 
Law (domestic Cambodian legislation) establishes the court. In essence, therefore, 
the ECCC derives its legal authority from domestic legislation. 
Authority for the Extraordinary African Chambers also emanates from an agreement 
between the Republic of Senegal and the African Union, and like the ECCC, the 
EAC are located within an internationalized domestic court system (Senegal’s).  
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon is an anomaly on this spectrum of tribunals 
established by a Security Council resolution or by a treaty between the UN and 
a domestic government because it borrows from both. There was an attempt to 
create the STL as a treaty-based tribunal with domestic (Lebanese) implementing 
legislation, similar in nature to the ECCC (though located outside of Lebanon). 
However, when the Lebanese government met crippling opposition in passing 
domestic implementing legislation, the UN Security Council stepped in to pass a 
binding resolution (Resolution 1757) establishing the Tribunal.107 
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The UN General Assembly has a long history of involvement in efforts to 
create accountability for international crimes, including the affirmation of the 
Nuremberg Principles following World War II, requesting the drafting of the 
Genocide Convention, and passing a resolution (60/147) in 2005 to set forth “Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims 
of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law.” The General Assembly has also had indirect and 
direct roles in authorizing specific mechanisms. It authorized the Secretary-General 
to negotiate the agreement with the government of Cambodia to create ECCC and 
approved the draft agreement that emerged from those negotiations. In the face of 
Security Council deadlock over accountability for crimes in Syria, in December 2016 
the General Assembly authorized the creation of the IIIM for Syria.108 
Certain mechanisms, while deriving their authority from domestic legislation, have 
been precipitated by a partnership between domestic and international authorities 
for some kind of international assistance. For example, CICIG in Guatemala is a 
body created through a partnership between the UN and a domestic government. 
Although the commission derives its authority from an agreement, following 
endorsement by the Constitutional Court of Guatemala, the agreement was 
ratified by Guatemala’s Congress. The Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist 
Prosecutor’s Office required a constitutional amendment and is part of Kosovo’s 
judicial system, though proceedings will be held in The Hague.
Several countries, including the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, CAR, 
Argentina, Colombia, Haiti, Bangladesh, Croatia, and Serbia have either  
already-existing or emerging mechanisms that derive their authority from domestic 
legislation. It should be noted, however, that while all derive authority from one or 
more domestic legal instruments, the types of mechanisms created across these 
countries vary greatly; for example, CAR created a hybrid mechanism, while many 
other countries make use of either existing or new specialized divisions of domestic 
courts. In some cases, such as that of the DRC, a monist approach to the treatment 
of international law means that the provisions of the Rome Statute are domestically 
applicable from the date on which the statute came into effect for that country.109 
Proposals for specialized chambers in Burundi, Kenya, Liberia, and DRC have 
invariably stalled at least in part because of the fact that they require legislation to be 
passed domestically before being funded and becoming operational.
Another category consists of international criminal justice mechanisms that derive 
authority from a temporary or transitional authority or administration. Examples of 
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mechanisms falling within this category are the Regulation 64 Panels established 
by the UNMIK in Kosovo; the Special Panels for Serious Crimes (SPSC, and Serious 
Crimes Unit [SCU]) established by the UN Transitional Administration in East 
Timor (UNTAET); and the Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT) established by the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA).
Lessons and Considerations  
Security
1. Where conflict is ongoing, creation of a justice mechanism is more likely 
to require authorization by external entities. However, even where this 
is the case (as in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda), the establishment of 
peace can then open the door to the creation of additional accountability 
mechanisms (for example, the BiH WCC, domestic prosecutions in Serbia 
and Croatia, Regulation 64 Panels in Kosovo, and domestic prosecutions and 
Gacaca proceedings in Rwanda). The ICTY and the ICTR notably helped to 
pave the way for these more domestic initiatives.
2. Where the security situation has led a transitional authority or 
administration to create a mechanism, attention must be paid to 
how authority for it will be transferred to the new government, once 
established. For example, in Kosovo the UN Regulation 64 Panels passed 
authority to EULEX, which has devolved greater authority to domestic 
prosecutors and judges. 
Political and Legal Circumstances
3. Where governing authorities might be implicated in crimes, or feel that 
investigations and prosecutions may be destabilizing, a mechanism 
requiring domestic authorization will become more difficult. Such 
governments may overtly oppose the creation of any mechanism (as in Syria), 
support creation in theory but create obstacles in practice (as in Kenya), or 
create a mechanism that can be controlled to prevent the investigation and 
prosecution of government officials, forces, or allies (as in Uganda). In such 
instances, potential international partners will have a few main options: (1) 
try to work with the government to accept a credible mechanism that is not 
one-sided, as the UN succeeded in doing with the government of Sierra Leone 
in establishing the SCSL; (2) internationally authorize a mechanism, as the UN 
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Security Council did in relation to Lebanon (i.e., STL), and the UN General 
Assembly has done for Syria (i.e., IIIM); (3) make concessions to government 
influence over the mechanism, as the UN did in the process of creating 
the ECCC; or (4) decide not to participate in the authorization of a tainted 
mechanism. In making these choices, stakeholders should be clear-eyed about 
potential long-term ramifications on a mechanism’s legitimacy with different 
constituencies, its effectiveness, and its efficiency (including cost), and weigh 
these factors against potential moral, security, rule-of-law, political, and 
financial costs of withholding participation. 
4. Where there is political will and domestic law allows, some parts of 
specialized mechanisms can be created by the judiciary. In Bosnia, for 
example, the plenary of judges in the State Court’s War Crimes Chamber 
acted to create the Criminal Defense Support Section (the Odsjek Krivične 
Odbrane, known by its Serbo-Croatian acronym, OKO). However, politics may 
constrain such initiatives. For example, if a judiciary has the power to create 
a specialized division for international crimes, but police and prosecutors are 
unwilling or unable to investigate and prosecute those offenses, the division 
will be of little use. 
Legitimacy
5. Where a transitional authority or administration creates a mechanism, 
the authorizing authority’s public legitimacy will broadly determine the 
public legitimacy of the mechanism created. For example, in Iraq, the IHT 
lacked public legitimacy, especially among Sunnis, because it was created by 
the United States–led Coalition Provisional Authority and then run by a Shia-
dominated government.
6. Where a mechanism is established via a treaty between an international 
organization (such as the UN, the AU, or the EU) and a sovereign state, its 
perceived legitimacy and credibility can depend on that of the party with 
the balance of authority. This can be seen in the slightly different sources of 
authority for SCSL and ECCC. In the case of Sierra Leone, the SCSL’s Statute 
formed part of the treaty, whereas in the case of Cambodia, the Agreement 
and the Law addressed different substantive matters. The Cambodian 
government forged ahead in enacting the ECCC Law while the UN felt that 
there were still numerous outstanding issues to resolve (including the method 
of judicial appointment and oversight). The result in the case of the SCSL was 
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a partnership between the UN and the Sierra Leonean government, while the 
ECCC became a domestic court with more contested international assistance. 
These differences are also compounded by the different balance of power 
in the prosecutor’s offices and judicial chambers within those courts.110 The 
extraordinary process leading to the creation of the ECCC, and the nature 
of the resulting institution, has had grave implications for its functioning, 
legitimacy, and credibility. Any international organization contemplating a 
form of hybrid partnership with a domestic government in the creation of a 
mechanism must be cautious about lending its authority to the creation of 
an institution over which it has little real control. Extreme caution should be 
exercised in circumstances where there is ample evidence of executive control 
over the judiciary in the state concerned.
Enforcement
7. The use of a UN Security Council resolution adopted pursuant to Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter to create a mechanism can be beneficial for 
enforcement. If the mechanism is created in this way, the resolution and 
its provisions (including arrest orders and provisions for access to evidence) 
become binding on all UN Member States. In practice, the authority of 
any UNSC resolution may be tested by opponents, and compliance in such 
circumstances will depend on Member States’ willingness and ability to ensure 
enforcement.111 UNSC authorization may even impair the perceived legitimacy 
of a mechanism and exacerbate some challenges to enforcement. For example, 
the UNSC’s authorization of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Statute after 
a domestic bill to create the mechanism by an act of the Lebanese Parliament 
failed has been criticized as undermining the democratic process and 
impeding state sovereignty. Further, because the Security Council is a political 
body in which five powerful states hold veto power, it is able to agree to create 
mechanisms in some places but not in others (e.g., Syria). This can leave 
mechanisms created through Security Council resolutions prone to criticism 
that they exist to do the bidding of world powers.
Clarity of Law
8. When an international source authorizes an ad hoc or hybrid mechanism, 
this can provide clarity about applicable law and procedure. While 
embedding specialized international criminal investigations and prosecutions 
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in already existing courts or offices can have myriad discernible benefits (see 
II.B. RELATIONSHIP WITH DOMESTIC SYSTEM), it can be difficult to 
reconcile the application of domestic laws and procedures with specialized 
prosecutions. This can create confusion and, if not resolved prior to the 
commencement of investigations/prosecutions, can lead to time-consuming 
and resource-heavy litigation.112 As noted by the OHCHR:
It is critical to clarify from the outset which domestic laws apply. 
Moreover, in some cases the need to amend domestic laws which 
are contrary to international standards could usefully form part of 
the negotiations on the creation of the [mechanism]. For example, 
in Cambodia, prior reform of the criminal procedure code and of 
the law of the Supreme Council of the Magistracy [the Cambodian 
body responsible for judicial appointments] would have greatly 
assisted the Extraordinary Chambers.113
Time
9. Where domestic authorities create a mechanism, the inherently 
political legislative process—possibly including necessary constitutional 
amendments—may lead to delay or defeat. Proposals for mixed chambers in 
the DRC, a special tribunal for Kenya, and proposed courts in Liberia  
and Burundi all failed to gain parliamentary approval. In the absence of a 
Security Council resolution bringing it into being, the STL might never have 
been established.
10. Where the UN authorizes a mechanism, its procedures, rules, and 
regulations can also lead to delays in operations, the appointment of 
judges, and the start of trials. This can also contribute to lengthy pretrial 
detention, as was notoriously the case with the ICTR.114 Mechanisms that are 
backed by the UN but are not part of it (such as the SCSL, STL, and CICIG) 
have greater flexibility in recruitment and other areas and are typically 
nimbler. Similarly, other sources of international authorization (such as the 
Office of the High Representative in Bosnia) may be less bureaucratic.  
(See also G. INTEGRATION OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGES AND STAFF;  
H. FINANCING; and I. OVERSIGHT.)
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Key Questions to Help Determine Basis of Authority
• Is there a government with effective control over the state in question?
• Are domestic authorities interested in genuine criminal accountability for grave 
crimes, regardless of faction?
• Is there domestic political opposition to the creation of a mechanism (by one or 
more factions)? If so, would an international organization’s support likely help in 
overcoming this opposition? 
• Does domestic law include an adequate framework for handling international 
crimes? If not, would international authorization or co-authorization of a 
mechanism aid in establishing a suitable legal framework?
• Taking account of international and treaty law, as well as geopolitics and 
regional politics, which international or regional bodies could potentially 
authorize or co-authorize a mechanism?
• Is there reason to believe that there would be significant difficulties in 
enforcing the decisions of a mechanism related to the country, such that a UN 
Chapter VII mandate could be especially desirable?
• Are there imperatives of timing (i.e., a peace negotiation or a political window of 
opportunity) that weigh against domestic or international means of authorizing 
a mechanism that would likely take too long?
• Where a treaty-based hybrid mechanism is contemplated, what is the public 
perception of the partner organization being contemplated?
• From the viewpoint of the partnering organization, in real terms, where will the 
balance of power lie with the institution being contemplated (i.e., domestic 
authorities, international organization, or genuinely shared)? Is this the best 
model for balancing the imperatives of judicial independence and fair trial 
rights with the need for legitimacy and desire for positive impact on broader 
justice-sector development and reform? 
• If a transitional authority proposes to create an accountability mechanism, what 
body will take on responsibility for the mandate when the transitional authority 
expires?
• Under domestic law, are there elements of the mechanism that can be 
authorized by the judiciary?
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E. Location
Should the mechanism be located in the country in which crimes were committed 
(or in a specific part or parts of that country) or in an alternative place? If it will be 
outside the affected country, it may nevertheless be necessary to have in-country 
offices. If so, where should satellite offices be located, and what functions should 
they have? 
There is currently consensus in the field of international criminal justice that where 
circumstances permit, trials should be held in-country. This is encapsulated by the 
principle of complementarity, upon which the ICC is based. In-country proceedings 
can have several benefits: (1) facilitating greater local ownership and legitimacy over 
investigations and prosecutions; (2) having positive flow-on effects on the justice 
sector and the legal profession (fostering rule-of-law development); (3) allowing 
greater direct participation of affected communities in the proceedings; (4) allowing 
a greater breadth of inquiry; (5) improving access to evidence and witnesses;  
(6) ensuring that mechanism officials have a better understanding of the context; 
and (7) being more cost-effective. Conversely, security may not allow in-country 
proceedings, or the judicial system may be so politicized or weak that credible 
investigations, prosecutions, and trials are impossible. 
Experiences to Date
The modern era of international criminal justice began in the early 1990s with the 
creation of two ad hoc tribunals, for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, based outside 
the affected countries—in Arusha, Tanzania, and The Hague, in The Netherlands, 
respectively. There followed a shift from wholly international mechanisms to more 
localized ones. Recent exceptions to this are the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (located 
in The Hague), the Extraordinary African Chambers (located in Dakar, Senegal, 
dealing with crimes committed in Chad), and the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and 
Specialist Prosecutor’s Office (located in The Hague). The Hague was also the venue 
for the trial of former Liberian President Charles Taylor, although the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone held all other proceedings in Sierra Leone. The Hague has likewise 
been home to the joint appeals chamber of the ICTY and ICTR; the Mechanism for 
International Tribunals, which will handle remaining legal matters for both tribunals; 
and the similarly mandated Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone. If it comes into 
effect, the Malabo Protocol would expand the jurisdiction of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights, creating an Arusha-based international justice mechanism 
for Africa, which could also sit in AU member states (with their permission).
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Most of the mechanisms considered by this handbook are located in-country. 
They range from hybrid or internationalized institutions (including those in Sierra 
Leone, Iraq, Cambodia, and Guatemala) to purely domestic initiatives (including 
Argentina, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, and Croatia). There are a number of 
additional countries where proposals for hybrid or wholly domestic initiatives have 
been considered and rejected, or are emerging (including Kenya, Darfur, South 
Sudan, and CAR). In relation to wholly domestic initiatives, in some instances, 
trials have been heard only in a specific court or courts, often in the capital city, 
as in Bangladesh, and in others cases, have been heard throughout the country, as 
with Gacaca proceedings in Rwanda, specialized courts in four Colombian cities, 
or federal district courts across Argentina. The DRC has mobile courts, in which 
judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel “resolve disputes and dispense justice in 
areas where the nearest formal courthouse is more than a week’s journey away.”115 
Lessons and Considerations
Security
1. If a mechanism is placed in-country amidst ongoing conflict or general 
instability, there can be serious implications for the security of trial 
participants (accused persons, witnesses, judges, prosecution and 
defense counsel, and other staff ), as well as the protection of the 
mechanism’s premises, evidence, and court records. At the Iraq High 
Tribunal the assassination of judges, defense counsel, and witnesses marred 
the proceedings.116 Security concerns were central to the decisions to locate 
the ICTR, the ICTY, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, and the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone’s trial of Charles Taylor in alternative places. Similar 
considerations influenced the decision to locate the Kosovo Specialist 
Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office in The Hague. Some lessons 
can be drawn from these experiences. For example, security risks arising 
from the profile of individual accused persons can be addressed by moving 
particular (high-risk) trials to another location, while keeping the bulk of 
(less controversial) proceedings in-country. Where there are serious ongoing 
security concerns, trials should generally not be located in-country. This is 
not just a matter of the security of the participants, which is paramount, but 
also the credibility and cost of the proceedings. The mechanism must be able 
to guarantee the safety of all witnesses so that they are able to give a truthful 
account of events without fear of reprisals. 
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Legitimacy and Access to Justice
2. Proceedings within or close to affected societies are often perceived to be 
more legitimate than proceedings at mechanisms outside of the country. 
Typically, there are understandably high levels of suspicion about foreign 
mechanisms in countries whose histories are marked by colonialization and 
other forms of international exploitation. The degree to which this lesson 
applies also depends on the level of trust that local populations have in the 
justice system to handle grave crimes cases. This, in turn, can vary along ethnic, 
linguistic, religious, regional, or other conflict fault lines. Lopsided trust in 
grave crimes proceedings may reflect the realities of a lopsided conflict, as 
in Guatemala or Bosnia, where certain communities (i.e., indigenous Mayan 
groups and Bosniaks) disproportionately suffered atrocities. In such cases, 
domestic proceedings can polarize society, but may encourage necessary 
historical reckoning through court proceedings. In other places, as in Côte 
d’Ivoire or Uganda, the pursuit of one-sided justice may be seen as legitimate 
by groups associated with the government, while alienating communities who 
watch as the system fails to hold accountable the perpetrators of atrocities 
against them. Indeed, in such places, many may view an externally located 
mechanism (including the ICC) as having greater legitimacy.
3. Locating a mechanism outside the country in which crimes were 
committed usually makes it more difficult for affected communities to 
access justice. Externally located mechanisms usually present significantly 
greater logistical hurdles to victims and witnesses interacting with 
investigators, prosecutors, and victim representatives. And with greater 
distance, it becomes very difficult for average citizens or even local journalists 
to observe the trials. Because a mechanism located externally typically 
has greater difficulty managing public information available to citizens of 
the affected country, it is more prone to misinformation or demonization 
campaigns by those who oppose its mission or its pursuit of particular cases. 
This can create problems for legitimacy, which in turn can make witnesses 
more reluctant to participate in proceedings. This makes outreach and public 
information efforts all the more important. Broadcasting proceedings to local 
populations is one way to try to mitigate the problems of distance. However, 
in-country proceedings are generally the best way to facilitate outreach to 
affected communities and reduce transportation costs of accused persons, 
witnesses, and participating victims. Proximity can improve public attendance 
(as evident in Cambodia), though not necessarily so (as evident in Bosnia).  
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It can also engender greater public discussion and understanding of a conflict’s 
history. This may have a positive flow-on effect upon general human rights 
discourse, such as freedom of speech.  
Prosecutorial and Judicial Independence
4. When a mechanism is located in a country with systemic problems of 
judicial independence, a weak judiciary, and/or strong executive control 
over the judiciary, there is a greater risk that such issues will pervade 
the mechanism itself (as in Bangladesh and Cambodia), unless it has a 
strong international character (as in Sierra Leone). This may be a reason 
to favor locating the mechanism outside the country, though doing so may not 
overcome such issues entirely.117 Deciding to locate a mechanism in-country 
in circumstances where there is political opposition to genuine justice (for 
example, because members of the incumbent government are potential targets 
for investigation and prosecution) may cause insurmountable delays to the 
establishment of the mechanism itself, including in passing legislation creating 
the mechanism (or creating subsidiary bodies within already-existing judicial 
mechanisms). This has been the experience in Kenya, Darfur, and Burundi. 
Rule of Law Development
5. When a mechanism is located inside the country in which crimes were 
committed, spill-over benefits to the domestic system, including through 
transfer of skills and/or infrastructure, can be greater. For example, BiH 
WCC introduced modern courtrooms, detention facilities, and offices that 
could also be used for dealing with other forms of serious crime. Uganda’s 
High Court has benefited in similar ways from the establishment of the ICD. 
The SCSL left to the domestic system a campus that includes a courthouse 
with two modern courtrooms and a detention facility. In Guatemala, 
CICIG has empowered a cadre of prosecutors and judges to assert their 
independence from the executive; through work with CICIG and protection 
by it, justice-sector officials have developed investigative, prosecutorial, and 
trial management capacities that are applicable to a broad range of criminal 
cases. In some places, skills and knowledge vacuums (including those created 
by the deliberate targeting of judges and lawyers during the conflict, as in 
Cambodia, East Timor, and Rwanda) can be filled by internationals working 
alongside nationals. This also has the potential to contribute to justice-sector 
reconstruction and reform.
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6. When a mechanism is situated in-country, the risks of a “reverse-legacy” 
are much greater. In the case of the ECCC, despite some positive impacts, 
there has been a reverse-legacy in the sense of further entrenched popular 
skepticism about the independence of the domestic judicial system. Even with 
a mechanism with a partial international judiciary, the Cambodian government 
was still able to exercise a significant amount of control over the court’s 
docket (and over both Cambodian and international judicial appointees). Two 
independent studies (conducted in 2008 and 2010) by the University of Berkley 
demonstrated that, in spite of the general satisfaction of the Cambodian 
population with the ECCC, there was a worsening of Cambodians’ perceptions 
of the credibility of the justice system during the same period.118
Time and Money
7. If trials are located in-country, the cost-effectiveness of a mechanism will 
generally be greater. Remote courts, including the ICC, ICTY, and ICTR, 
have had to expend tremendous resources to send investigative, outreach, and 
witness protection missions to affected countries, and to transport victims and 
witnesses internationally to trial. Further, such operating costs as construction, 
rent, and maintenance for a court in The Hague or other remote locations 
usually far outpaces those of in-country mechanisms. By contrast, in-country 
mechanisms facilitate access to evidence and witnesses, and increase officials’ 
understanding of the context, which can help them avoid costly mistakes in 
the interpretation of evidence.
8. However, in-country proceedings are no guarantee for cost-effectiveness. 
If there is ongoing conflict, (as was the case in CAR as of late 2017), providing 
security for the mechanism can be costly. Politics are also a factor. For 
example, the ECCC, located in-country, has not been cost-effective, in part 
due to the complexity of its structure, some of which is duplicative (lengthy 
pretrial proceedings, followed by lengthy trials). Significantly, however, certain 
parts of the court—particularly the Office of Co-Investigating Judges who 
investigate and indict—have not been able to function for lengthy periods fully 
staffed. Most of this relates to the political context: government opposition to 
the pursuit of certain suspects. In Uganda, the international community has 
provided substantial support to the ICD tasked with handling international 
and other serious forms of crime. However, the ICD has shown no sign of 
dealing with alleged crimes by the Ugandan military, and as of October 2017, 
it was only handling one case related to the Lord’s Resistance Army. Resources 
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can be wasted if key actors or offices in the mechanism are unable to proceed 
with cases for political reasons. (See also H. FINANCING.)
9. In locations where there is little in the way of basic infrastructure, an 
elaborate setup can lead to lengthy delays in operations. In East Timor, 
the integration of the justice mission within a UN mission did not guarantee 
a smooth launch of the SPSC. The SCSL and CICIG—both UN-backed 
institutions, but not part of UN missions—faced numerous similar challenges 
in becoming operational. These problems can also arise for mechanisms 
located outside of the affected country, as they did for the ICTR in establishing 
itself in Arusha, Tanzania. (Nairobi had initially been floated as the preferred 
location for the Tribunal because its infrastructure is more developed than 
that of Arusha.) By contrast, mobile courts in eastern DRC have demonstrated 
that credible proceedings for international crimes need not necessarily involve 
elaborate physical and technological infrastructure. 
10. A hybrid tribunal that is in-country and has significant international 
involvement may also have positive flow-on effects on the local economy. 
But where insufficient planning is given to exit strategy, this may have drastic, 
though unintended, negative consequences for local communities, particularly 
in developing countries. Transition planning needs to be discussed from 
conception so that, for example, gradual draw-down or handover of offices is 
adequately provided for.
Choosing a Location inside the Country
11. If a decision is made to locate the mechanism inside the country, 
decisions must be made about where to locate the headquarters office 
and any satellite or mobile offices. Standard practice is for in-country 
mechanisms to be based in-capital, although there may be reasons to 
temporarily or permanently base operations in other locations. For example, 
out of security concerns and because its Freetown headquarters was not yet 
complete, for part of 2003, the SCSL operated in large part from a temporary 
courthouse and detention facility on remote Bonthe Island. In a very large 
country, such as the DRC, it is not possible or practicable for investigators, 
prosecutors, or judges in the capital to handle proceedings in distant parts 
of the country. Likewise, victims are unlikely to have access to justice 
mechanisms in a distant capital. Courts in eastern DRC, including mobile 
courts, have largely handled grave crimes cases. 
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12. Where the population is polarized and segregated, the choice of location 
can, perhaps unavoidably, create or reinforce perceptions of bias. The 
decision to base the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with its War 
Crimes Chamber, in the country’s capital of Sarajevo became inevitably 
caught up in heated disputes over federalism and secessionism. For some 
Bosnian ethnic communities, this location reinforced a perception of a Bosniak 
(Muslim)-dominated central government. The alternative in this case was 
far from clear, because any other solution may have fed harmful narratives 
of state disintegration. Nevertheless, the experience suggests that in similar 
contexts, the implications of location must be carefully considered. 
Choosing a Location outside the Country
13. Where there is a need to locate a mechanism outside the country in which 
atrocities were carried out, it may be preferable to locate it within the 
same region in order to capitalize on the financial, linguistic, cultural,  
and rule-of-law benefits. In other words, justice may still be viewed as 
local (and therefore have more local legitimacy) if there is as much physical 
proximity to the country in which the crimes were committed as circumstances 
permit. For example, the ICTR was located in Rwanda’s neighbor, Tanzania; 
and the EAC (for Chad) in Senegal. 
Key Questions to Help Determine Location
1. Is conflict ongoing or are there other major security concerns in the country/ies 
in which the crimes were committed? 
2. Will trial participants (including witnesses, victims, judges, prosecutors, defense 
counsel, and accused persons) and/or their families assume unacceptable 
levels of risk if they participate in local trials?119 If so, what measures could be 
taken to mitigate these risks? 
3. Is there good reason to believe that an in-country mechanism would further 
destabilize the country/region?
4. Are there political obstacles to the creation of an in-country mechanism 
that could be expected to operate fairly, with autonomy, and in keeping with 
international standards? 
5. Would an externally located mechanism increase or decrease the affected 
society’s trust in proceedings?
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6. If in-country, will existing infrastructure support the creation of a court/
mechanism? 
7. Are there significant justice-sector reform or development efforts that could 
mitigate concerns about an in-country mechanism, and strengthen and be 
strengthened by its establishment?
F. Structure
What institutional form should an accountability mechanism take? Should it be one 
entity with subsidiary organs and sections, or should multiple agencies and offices 
be responsible for implementing different pieces of the mandate? What are the main 
options for the design of organs/units/offices to implement proceedings across the 
judicial chain? When should structures be created, and when and how should they 
be phased out? 
Experiences to Date
Mechanisms designed to administer criminal accountability for grave crimes typically 
fulfill functions across the judicial chain, including investigations and prosecutions, 
defense, adjudication, witness protection, and detention. The mandates of some 
mechanisms limit them to working on only one or a few of these elements. Whether 
they have limited or comprehensive mandates, mechanisms have operated with 
various structural forms that can broadly be considered to fit along a spectrum. 
At one end are mechanisms that are distributed across multiple, already-existing, 
domestic institutions: an attorney general’s office or investigative judges working 
with police to develop cases; ordinary trial and appellate chambers hearing them 
with the support of court administrators; and national prison administrators dealing 
with detention issues. Of the mechanisms examined in this handbook, Argentina 
and the DRC offer the clearest examples of such a distributed model.
Further along the spectrum are mechanisms located within existing institutions, but 
where one or more structures have been specialized to handle the particular burdens 
of grave crimes cases. There have been many examples of this type, including the 
EAC in the Courts of Senegal, Colombia’s specialized prosecution and magistrate 
courts for implementing the Justice and Peace Law, the Bosnian model, Uganda’s 
ICD, the ICTB, and the proposed Special Chambers for Burundi. The mechanisms 
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may be temporary (as in Senegal, or with regard to Colombia’s SJP) or created as 
permanent fixtures of the domestic justice system (as in Uganda). 
Finally, there are mechanisms whose structures are both specialized and unified 
within one extraordinary entity. The wholly international ad hoc tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as well as the proposed ACJHR, belong to this type. 
So do the hybrid models seen in Sierra Leone and the CAR, as well as Rwanda’s 
Gacaca model. A recently developed subset of this group includes independent 
entities that work in parallel with national counterparts on the same cases: the 
CICIG in Guatemala and the GIEI in Mexico. With the notable exceptions of the 
permanent ICC and ACJHR, all of these unified, extraordinary mechanisms have 
been conceived as temporary constructs.
Lessons and Considerations
General Approach to Mechanism Structures
Alignment with Mandate
1. The mechanism’s purpose and mandate should determine the types of 
structures needed. A mandate may limit a mechanism to focus on particular 
parts of the judicial chain. For example, in Guatemala and Mexico, the 
focus of CICIG and the GIEI (respectively) is on investigations. Or, more 
commonly, the purpose and mandate will encompass other aspects, including 
the judiciary, defense, and reparations. Colombia’s JPL and SJP both feature 
ambitious transitional justice mandates beyond prosecutions. As in Colombia, 
every mechanism should have access to existing or new structures that 
correspond to each element of its mandate. 
2. The mechanism’s purpose and mandate should determine the scale of 
its structures. The scale of mechanism structures, including the number 
of prosecution divisions and the number of trial chambers, should correlate 
with the mechanism’s stated ambition. A court to try those “bearing greatest 
responsibility” for international crimes (Sierra Leone) may have only three 
trial chambers, whereas countries contemplating more comprehensive 
prosecutions (including Argentina, Bosnia, and perhaps most dramatically, 
Rwanda’s Gacaca proceedings) will need to have broader structures in place. 
Where broad mandates exist, a lack of adequate structures can impede 
implementation: a problem encountered in the DRC and Colombia.
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3. The possibility of mobile court structures and/or the possibility of in situ 
hearings should be included in the design of mechanisms mandated to 
promote access to justice and visibility of the proceedings—especially 
where crime bases are in remote locations. In the DRC, mobile courts 
foreseen under the domestic criminal code have made justice accessible to 
communities in remote parts of the country; trials for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity are among those that have been heard by itinerant courts 
sitting temporarily in small towns and villages. Similarly, Uganda’s ICD, which 
is usually based in Kampala, has held hearings in the country’s north, where 
communities most affected by the crimes at issue find it much easier to follow 
the proceedings. (See also II.E. LOCATION.)
4. Structures prescribed in the mechanism’s primary instruments 
(legislation or statutes) can help ensure that there are human and 
financial resources to implement important elements of the mandate. 
Where such structures are not specified but instead left to judges and 
mechanism administrators to create, there is a risk that they will be 
insufficiently robust, emerge with delay, or not emerge at all. This has been 
seen with regard to defense at the ICTY and ICTR, and with outreach and 
reparations at many mechanisms. In East Timor, there was no mention of 
witness protection in the UN decisions authorizing the serious crimes process, 
and no witness protection structures were created, seriously marring the 
proceedings. (See specific lessons on structures for each of these areas, below.)
5. Prescribing structures in primary instruments should be weighed 
against potential benefits of flexibility when mechanism operators have 
delegated authority to determine structures. Operators may be better 
placed to determine the design of structures that account for operational need, 
dynamic political contexts, and the availability of complementary efforts by 
other state, international, or civil society actors. There is arguably a higher 
premium on flexibility when dealing with highly fluid contexts and new types 
of institutions. The success of CICIG in Guatemala has been ascribed, in part, 
to the great discretion left to the institution to determine its priorities and 
the internal structures best suited to meeting them. Similarly, in creating the 
IIIM for Syria—which must operate in parallel and in conjunction with a large 
number of diverse stakeholders in a tremendously complex context—the UN 
 General Assembly specified the types of experts who should fill out a Secretariat, 
 but did not prescribe how the mechanism should be internally structured.
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Autonomy
6. The advisability of creating mechanism structures that are autonomous 
from national or international institutions is highly context-specific. 
An assessment of the real and perceived independence and integrity of 
authorizing institutions (whether national governments or international 
institutions), and that of mechanism implementers should determine the 
appropriate level of autonomy for a mechanism’s structures. The IHT suffered 
from its strong dependence on the widely distrusted American-led CPA. 
In Cambodia, the ECCC was arguably designed with insufficient reliance 
on the United Nations and has suffered from its dependence on a national 
judiciary prone to executive influence. The structures of the proposed 
hybrid court for Darfur would likely have faced distrust from victims and the 
international community due to its reliance on the Sudanese state, which 
was heavily implicated in the underlying crimes. By contrast, in Senegal, the 
EAC successfully relied on the institutions of a willing, impartial state and 
its capable, independent judiciary. The question of appropriate structural 
autonomy intersects with other aspects of mechanism design. (See II.A. 
PURPOSE; II.B. RELATIONSHIP TO DOMESTIC SYSTEM; and II.D. BASIS 
OF AUTHORITY.)
7. Autonomous institutions often lack political support when they take 
actions that have significant political implications, and so they must have 
structures capable of building constituencies for enforcement. When 
the SCU in East Timor indicted powerful Indonesian General Wiranto—at 
the time a presidential candidate in Indonesia—both the United Nations and 
the Timorese government distanced themselves from the decision, leaving 
the mechanism politically orphaned. At the ICTY, despite its Chapter VII 
mandate, most states were unwilling to prioritize cooperation issues in their 
relationships with Serbia at a time when it was shielding major war crimes 
indictees, including Slobodan Milosevic, Radovan Karadzic, and Ratko 
Mladic; it used financial leverage derived from the U.S. Congress and the 
determination of The Netherlands and Belgium to block progress in Serbia’s 
accession to the European Union in order to eventually achieve custody of 
the fugitives.120 Similarly, the SCSL faced a major challenge in achieving the 
arrest of former Liberian President Charles Taylor, following his exile to 
Nigeria pursuant to an agreement among Nigeria, the United Nations, the 
AU, South Africa, the United States, and the United Kingdom.121 The eventual 
successes of the ICTY and SCSL in securing politically sensitive arrests over 
fierce opposition was, in part, due to capacity within the prosecutors’ offices 
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and registries of both mechanisms to play appropriate political and diplomatic 
roles within broader coalitions demanding enforcement.
Efficiency
8. Trying to implement an accountability mechanism in partnership with 
a government not fully committed to the project can require additional 
structures, thus creating inefficiency. The ECCC is often said to follow 
a civil law tradition (and structure), yet it is a much more procedurally and 
substantively complex structure than the Cambodian domestic court system, 
or the French system from which it is derived. A case before the ECCC travels 
through a pipeline of often duplicative processes. In addition to having more 
steps in the process, there are more judicial officers involved at all stages of the 
proceedings than in the SCSL, ICTY, or ICTR, for example. In order to ensure 
that the ECCC could be established more or less on the terms demanded 
by the Cambodian government, the UN had to create additional processes 
designed to overcome political interference in the court’s docket (known as 
disagreement procedures). These additional mechanisms have resulted in 
additional litigation before the court’s Pre-Trial Chamber (disputes between 
the co-prosecutors and the co-investigating judges) and associated costs  
and expenditures.
9. Phasing in structures only as they are needed can lead to cost savings. 
The agreement between the UN and the Cambodian government to establish 
the ECCC contemplated a “phased-in approach … in accordance with the 
chronological order of the legal process”122 with a view to achieving efficiency 
and cost-effectiveness. In Sierra Leone, the Special Court only created a 
third Trial Chamber when the first two were occupied and new cases were 
ready. In Senegal, the Appellate Chamber at the EAC was only created 
following the trial verdict. And in the CAR, the SCC was operationalized 
in phases. However, poor timing can cause problems. In East Timor, the 
late establishment of the Appellate Chamber for the Special Panels created 
inefficiencies and delays throughout the judicial process. Careful strategic 
planning within each specific legal context is needed to determine which 
structures will be needed at which times.
10. For temporary mechanisms, the phase-out of structures should be 
planned at the outset. One option for mechanisms operating in countries 
undergoing broader justice-sector reform is for its structures to devolve 
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responsibilities to national institutions as the reform process progresses. For 
example, the temporary international Registry accompanying the BiH WCC 
and specialized prosecution office was initially responsible for the selection of 
international judges; once a reformed national High Judicial and Prosecutorial 
Council became functional, it took over this responsibility as one step of a 
gradual phase-out of international involvement in the mechanism. Other 
mechanisms have transferred responsibilities at the end of their mandates. 
The SCSL, for example, transferred responsibility for the ongoing protection 
of witnesses to national authorities as part of its exit strategy. In Sierra 
Leone, court infrastructure was also handed off to state authorities as the 
mechanisms’ mandates drew to a close. 
Considerations for Specific Structures
Chambers / Judiciary
11. Decisions about the mechanism’s purpose and its relationship to the 
domestic system, which in turn should take account of various factors 
(See II.A. and II.B.), will largely determine if it can make use of existing 
chambers, or if specialized chambers are required. Countries with 
generally more advanced capacities, including Argentina, have used existing 
courts, as has the DRC, through its ordinary military and (more recently) 
civilian courts. Other countries have chosen to use domestic courts, but 
establish specialized chambers with judges trained in international criminal 
law and possessing such skills as dealing with victim witnesses. These include 
Uganda, Bosnia, and Senegal, as well as proposals for mixed chambers in the 
DRC and a Special Tribunal in Kenya. Some of these specialized chambers 
have included international participation, while others have not. (See II.G. 
INTEGRATION OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGES AND STAFF.)
12. Creation of high-risk courts can boost judicial independence. Judges 
who face severe security threats may be more prone to compromising their 
judicial independence. Guatemala established “High Risk Courts” to deal with 
sensitive cases, including those involving grave crimes and grand corruption. 
The judges on these pretrial, trial, and appellate courts receive security 
protection for themselves and their families, and the courtroom facilities are 
more robust. Some judges serving in these purely domestic courts have made 
rulings against the interests of very powerful individuals even as they have 
continued to receive threats. 
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13. Where long, complex trials are anticipated, the inclusion of reserve 
judges on the panel can ensure continuity in the event that a judge is 
unable to continue. At the ICTY, the presiding judge in the years-long trial 
of former Serbian President Slobodan Milošević had to step down just as the 
prosecution was completing its case. The appointment of a “substitute judge” 
who had to review evidence presented to that point caused further delay.123 
The SCSL included a reserve judge on the panel hearing the case of former 
Liberian President Charles Taylor, and the STL has two reserve judges (one 
national and one international) on its panels. Reserve judges hear evidence 
and listen to but do not participate in judicial deliberations. 
Investigations and Prosecutions
14. Strong consideration should be given to establishing an investigation 
and prosecution office with specialized knowledge and skill. For these 
types of cases, investigators and prosecutors must have strong familiarity 
with international criminal law and skills in such areas as the management of 
complex cases; interviewing witnesses; interacting with vulnerable witnesses; 
interacting with “insider” witnesses; ensuring the protection of witnesses 
who may face severe threats; identifying and using expert witnesses; using 
documentary evidence; conducting financial investigations; and using 
evidence from forensic investigations. In contexts where extensive atrocities 
have been committed, prosecutors must also have the skill to draw up a 
prosecution strategy that determines which cases to pursue and how. Many of 
these skills will be largely or wholly unfamiliar to police and prosecutors who 
have only ever handled ordinary crime cases. Unless there is an ambition to 
comprehensively prosecute all grave crimes (see II.A. PURPOSE) and attempt 
to develop these skills among police and prosecutors across the board, then it 
makes sense to focus on skill development for officials working in specialized 
teams. Thus, even in such locations as Argentina and Guatemala, where cases 
have been adjudicated before nonspecialized chambers in the ordinary justice 
system, prosecution and investigation teams have been specialized.
15. Even in mechanisms that are largely external in nature, vetted national 
police investigators should be included in investigation and prosecution 
teams where possible. Domestic police are familiar with local communities, 
speak local languages, and have myriad useful contacts. Foreign investigators 
will never have these advantages. In many difficult settings, vetting processes 
can be used to identify and select conscientious, motivated local investigators 
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to be integrated into investigation and prosecution teams. In Sierra Leone, 
the Special Court’s success in conducting investigations and achieving the 
cooperation of local police in politically controversial arrests would not have 
been possible without the integration of Sierra Leone police in the Office of 
the Prosecutor’s investigations division. However, it is inadvisable to draw 
on domestic police if the forces were heavily implicated in atrocities, are 
hopelessly politicized, and/or marked by ethnic, linguistic, religious, or other 
biases. Where local police forces are extensively discredited, mechanisms can 
still seek investigators with strong local knowledge from among individuals 
who have documented crimes on behalf of national human rights commissions 
or local civil society organizations.
16. There are significant advantages to building joint investigation–prosecution 
 teams. In settings where national criminal procedure determines structures, 
this will often define the roles of investigators, investigative judges, and/or 
 prosecutors, as well as their relationships and the structures within which they 
 interact. (See II.B. RELATIONSHIP TO DOMESTIC SYSTEM.) In some 
systems, the process will be “horizontal,” with cases moving from office 
to office depending on the stage of the case (pretrial investigation, trial, or 
appeals); for mechanisms handling a large number of similar cases, such an 
approach may create efficiencies.124 However, in most situations, mechanisms 
tasked with the investigation and prosecution of grave crimes face the 
challenge of developing a relatively small number of highly complex cases, 
and thus a “vertical” structure is more advantageous.125 Accordingly, where 
the drafters or operators of new mechanisms have discretion to determine 
these structures, they should strongly consider organizing teams that integrate 
prosecutors and investigators under a prosecutor’s direction. At the ICTY, 
ICTR, and SCSL, practice shifted in this direction over time because the 
development of joint teams ensured better communication throughout the 
process of case development, decreased institutional tensions between 
investigation and prosecution divisions, better ensured that investigators 
were focused on pursuing high-priority leads from a multitude of possibilities, 
and helped avoid instances of investigators using practices (such as excessive 
witness compensation) that could later create problems for prosecutors at trial. 
At the ICC, the Office of the Prosecutor formed joint teams composed of three 
divisions of the office (investigations, prosecutions, and cooperation), but a 
model based on consensus among the three led to tension and inefficiency.126 
By 2015, the office had shifted to integrated teams directed by senior trial 
attorneys, along the lines of best practices developed at the ad hoc tribunals.127
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17. The merits of organizing investigation and prosecution teams by 
geography, suspected perpetrators, or other factors should be carefully 
weighed, and decisions should be made in light of the needs of the 
particular context. In Bosnia, the Special Division for War Crimes in the 
Prosecutor’s Office created five teams, each responsible for a particular region 
of the country, and a sixth dedicated to one large-scale crime (Srebrenica). 
This had the advantage of allowing investigators and prosecutors to develop 
detailed knowledge of events and actors in the regions of interest. In Sierra 
Leone, prosecution and investigation teams were largely organized by armed 
factions under investigation: rebels and an allied military junta, and a  
pro-government militia.128 This allowed team members to develop particular 
expertise on the hierarchies of the organizations involved. Some prosecutors’ 
offices have also hired experts in particular kinds of crime, such as sexual and 
gender-based violence, or crimes against children. This can help ensure that 
crimes that are often under-investigated receive appropriate attention.
18. To avoid the pitfalls of investigators and prosecutors working in silos, 
prosecutors’ offices should ensure resources for cross-cutting structures. 
Common criminal analysis sections can help ensure that evidence collected 
by different teams is analyzed for patterns. In Argentina, the autonomy of 
district prosecutors pursuing grave crimes cases created a natural geographic 
specialization. However, because the prosecutors were initially not working 
together, they failed to detect the kinds of patterns in crime occurring across 
their jurisdictions—evidence that crimes were widespread or systematic, 
which are necessary elements to establish crimes against humanity. Argentina 
eventually established a Coordination Unit for this purpose. Similarly,  
a legal advisory section working for all teams, as in Bosnia, can help ensure 
consistency of legal argumentation across different cases. And experts in 
particular crimes (such as sexual and gender-based violence, crimes against 
children, or enforced disappearances) or investigative methods (such as 
financial forensics, mass-grave exhumation, or wiretapping) can serve as 
common resources to teams.
Defense
19. To ensure that fair trial rights are upheld, a mechanism must provide 
for defense structures at the outset. When the UN peacekeeping mission 
established offices for the prosecution and adjudication of international 
crimes in East Timor, it initially made no provision for a defense office. 
The establishment of a Defense Lawyer’s Unit two years later led to some 
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improvement, but inadequate representation of accused persons amounted to 
an abuse of their fair trial rights. 
 
20. Defense structures should be autonomous to ensure that they serve the 
accused and not politically biased officials or the bureaucratic priorities 
of court administrators. In domestic systems, local bar associations may 
be aligned with government or other factions, leading to the assignment of 
counsel for the accused who have conflicts of interest; this can ultimately 
damage the mechanism’s fairness and credibility. In such situations, it 
may be desirable to establish an independent defense office to supplant or 
augment the ordinary process.129 In Kosovo, the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) established a Criminal Defense Resource 
Center to support defense before the UN-administered Regulation 64 
Panels; in Bosnia, a Criminal Defense Support Section was initially part of 
the Registry but became an independent organization. Within international 
tribunals, there has been an evolution in the status of defense offices.130 While 
the statutes of the ICTY and ICTR articulated a number of fundamental due 
process guarantees,131 the creation of offices to ensure that those guarantees 
were properly respected was left to the Registry, almost by default (and 
provided for through subsidiary judge-made rules).132 At the ICC and SCSL, the 
defense offices were still formally within the Registry, but granted significant 
autonomy. At the STL, the defense office was created as a fourth independent 
court organ.133 Momentum in this direction is also reflected in the design of the 
proposed ACJHR, where a defense office would have the same status as the 
prosecutor’s office. 
21. There should be clarity about which structure is responsible for 
administering the list of eligible defense counsel before the mechanism, 
and which office is responsible for administering a transparent appeals 
process for lawyers whose applications are refused. In domestic systems, 
which lawyers will have standing to appear before the courts will normally be 
clear under local law, but this will likely need to be augmented by a special 
mechanism that can screen potential defense lawyers for skills beyond 
those required to appear in ordinary criminal cases; upholding fair trial 
rights will require counsel knowledgeable in international criminal law and 
its application. In Bosnia, a new kind of hybrid defense office has offered 
training and expertise to domestic lawyers and is responsible for determining 
which members of the local bar associations are qualified to appear before 
the specialized BiH WCC. In hybrid and ad hoc tribunals, as in Sierra Leone 
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or Rwanda, a defense office typically develops and administers the criteria 
by which lawyers are chosen for a list of available legal representatives, from 
which clients may choose. A Registry or judges would be responsible 
 for hearing appeals from lawyers who want to challenge rejections. 
 No matter which structural options are chosen to fulfill these responsibilities, 
transparency in the process is paramount.134
Victim Participation
22. Where the purpose and mandate of a mechanism foresee victim 
participation, there must be structures in place to facilitate this and 
handle large numbers of applications. Some domestic systems, particularly 
civil law systems, may already have structures in place to facilitate victim 
participation in the proceedings, including legal representation in court, but 
also the provision of psychosocial assistance to those appearing in court and 
assistance in accessing procedures for reparation. In Senegal, for example, 
victim participation in proceedings is a standard practice. In Colombia, the 
National Ombudsman’s Office is responsible for providing legal aid to victims 
under the JPL. Where the mechanism is less integrated in a domestic system 
with such structures, there may be need to create new offices, as at the ECCC 
and the STL. Such structures will need to be able to establish streamlined 
processes to determine whether victims are eligible to participate in the 
proceedings. Considering the number of victims inherent to most contexts 
in which grave crimes have been committed, they will also likely need to be 
responsible for establishing databases that can help manage large numbers of 
victim files. For fulfillment of some functions beyond victim legal presentation 
in the proceedings (such as provision of psychosocial assistance), it may be 
possible for the mechanism to establish referral agreements with external 
actors, including nongovernmental organizations.
23. In designing structures to facilitate victim legal representation before the 
mechanism, thought must be given to how to represent large numbers 
of victims in court. In Colombia, the JPL provides victims a right to directly 
question the accused about crimes that affected them. The ECCC initially 
allowed victims to be represented in trials either individually or in groups, but 
when that proved unwieldy, it shifted to a system of collective representation 
in which co-lead counsel coordinated actions by lawyers representing different 
groups. Other variations of common legal representation have been used at 
the ICC and STL. When designing criteria to group victims for the purpose of 
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joint legal representation, it is important to ensure that victims with conflicting 
interests are represented by separate lawyers. Further, the structure should 
have capacity to support victim lawyers in fulfilling their obligation to consult 
regularly with their clients, who often may be quite numerous and—depending 
on the context—possibly spread over large, remote geographical areas; hard to 
reach electronically; and/or in communities with high rates of illiteracy. 
Reparation
24. Structures must exist to administer reparations where this is a part 
of the mechanism’s purpose and foreseen in its mandate. Where 
mechanisms are established within domestic systems that already have an 
established procedure and practice for administering reparations, structures 
and responsibilities may be clear. Yet these may still not be equipped to deal 
with issues that may emerge in grave crimes cases. Structures administering 
reparations for grave crimes will likely need to be authorized to trace and 
freeze the assets of (possibly powerful) convicted persons and to cooperate 
with officials in other states toward these ends. Further, it is commonly 
the case that the assets of convicted persons cannot be located, or they are 
indigent. For this common eventuality, it can be important to establish a 
reparations trust fund, as at the EAC in Senegal. As this experience shows, 
however, a trust fund alone will likely be inadequate unless it is staffed to raise 
funds or where another office (such as an administrator or registrar) is clearly 
mandated to do so. (See II.H. FINANCING.)
Administration
25. The nature of structures for administration of the mechanism will 
be determined by its relationship to the domestic system, its basis of 
authority, and whether it incorporates international judges and staff.  
A purely domestic process, as in Argentina, will use established structures for 
court administration. Where there is temporary international involvement 
and/or a limited mandate, as in Senegal or Bosnia, domestic institutions may 
need to be temporarily supplemented to handle the special needs inherent to 
grave crimes cases. These include the management of nonjudicial functions 
that may include outreach and public information, the management of 
relations with the international community around the proceedings, and the 
recruitment and management of participating international officials. At the 
EAC, this supplemental capacity took the form of an additional administrator 
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within the Registry of the domestic system. In Bosnia, where the external 
component was much more pronounced, it took the form of an adjunct 
Registry that gradually transitioned from international to domestic control.  
A heavily externalized hybrid or ad hoc court, such as the STL, ICTY, or ICTR, 
may have a large Registry to manage all aspects of court administration, 
including personnel, finance, security, procurement, court management, 
interpretation and translation, outreach, witness protection and support, and 
the maintenance of archives.
Outreach
26. Any mechanism of accountability for grave crimes must have a dedicated 
structure to conduct outreach to affected communities and stakeholders. 
In East Timor, the UN launched the SCU and Special Panels with no outreach 
structure or capacity, leaving their activities opaque to the communities they 
were meant to serve.135 The ICTY had no outreach program in its first six 
years, ceding the space to define its role and activities to nationalist forces 
in the former Yugoslavia, which had self-serving reasons to oppose the work 
of the Tribunal.136 The IHT never had a structure for outreach. By contrast, 
the outreach unit of the SCSL developed innovative ways to interact with 
communities across the country before, during, and after trials. With strong 
support and engagement from court principals, these methods included 
interactive forums at schools and other venues, where victims, school children, 
police, members of the military, or the general community could hear from 
court officials and share their views on the court’s work; the unit also screened 
summaries of trial proceedings, participated in radio call-in shows, and 
organized theater skits and conferences about the court. The court’s Registry 
organized the Special Court Interactive Forum, in which local civil society 
representatives could meet monthly with senior SCSL staff from all sections 
to ask questions and exchange views. The court was often at pains to convince 
donors to support outreach, which many viewed as not being a “core” court 
activity. (See II.H. FINANCING.)
27. Civil society organizations can augment and be vital partners for 
mechanism outreach structures, but not replace them. To be effective, 
outreach cannot be simply outsourced to nongovernmental organizations. 
To gain public trust, accountability mechanisms must be able to articulate 
information about what they are doing and why. And if affected communities 
are to feel that the mechanism is aware of their views, then mechanism 
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officials must participate in outreach events, even if there are limits on what 
they can say about active cases. While this kind of engagement requires 
resources and structure, civil society organizations can still be vital partners. 
For example, in Sierra Leone, local and international nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) conducted outreach-type events about the SCSL 
mandate prior to and during its establishment. The EAC in the Courts of 
Senegal developed a novel approach to outreach to deal with the challenge of 
engaging communities in both Senegal and Chad. The court’s administrator 
contracted with an NGO consortium comprised of international experts 
and local organizations in the two countries that were familiar with the local 
context and community networks. The consortium was able to organize events 
and trial screenings, and provide community feedback to court officials. 
However, delegating outreach functions to civil society organizations is not a 
simple solution to limitations in the mechanism’s funding, because NGOs may 
have similar difficulties in fundraising for outreach activities.
Witness Protection and Support
28. An assessment should determine whether new structures for witness 
protection and support are required. Countries in question may already 
have provisions for witness protection measures and witness support that may 
be rooted in the criminal procedure code, criminal code, executive decrees, 
rules of court, or special legislation. An assessment should be conducted to 
determine whether existing mandates and structures are effective at assessing 
the risks faced by individual witnesses, reducing risk inside and outside the 
courtroom, maintaining witness privacy where required, responding to threats, 
and relocating witnesses when necessary. Similarly, there may be provisions 
already in place to provide psychosocial and medical assistance to vulnerable 
witnesses, but the efficacy of existing measures to deal with the nature and 
scale of the crimes should be assessed. 
29. Where state institutions mandated to implement protection measures 
may be implicated in crimes or controlled by or allied with perpetrators, 
they will not perform well. In Serbia, for example, the police Witness 
Protection Unit, mandated to protect witnesses in war crimes trials, has been 
accused of having perpetrators among its ranks and engaging in witness 
intimidation. Within a deeply divided society, such as in Bosnia or Côte 
d’Ivoire, witness protection officials may have the trust of one community 
while enjoying little in others. This may be a matter of perception or 
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reflect a reality of “victors’ justice” being pursued by a mechanism that is 
fundamentally flawed (as in Bangladesh). Where there is reason to believe that 
societal divisions will cause mistrust of domestically administered protection 
measures or programs, new accountability mechanisms should consider 
establishment of a witness protection structure under international leadership 
(as was temporarily the case in Bosnia) or with international participation.  
(See II.G. INTEGRATION OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGES AND STAFF.)
30. Where mechanisms lack witness protection and support structures and 
capacities, outside actors can mitigate some of the risk of harm. In the DRC, 
domestic grave crimes trials have proceeded without resources or structures 
for witness protection and support, and this has left witnesses exposed to 
physical risk, intimidation, and trauma. Although an inadequate solution, 
the UN peacekeeping mission, diplomatic missions, and nongovernmental 
organizations have filled some of this gap by taking such actions as relocating 
some witnesses or referring them for psychosocial assistance.137 
31. Mechanism designers should make a point of consulting rule-of-law 
reformers, implementers, and donors with regard to witness protection 
in the country concerned because it is an area ripe for collaboration. 
The creation of a new accountability mechanism, whether temporary or 
permanent, can provide impetus for countries to establish witness protection 
programs for the first time. In Guatemala, one of CICIG’s early priorities 
was to propose the establishment of a witness protection program within the 
Attorney General’s Office and new court rules allowing protected witnesses  
to testify by video connection.138 Both have been vital not only to  
CICIG-developed grand corruption cases but also to the ability of national 
prosecutors to pursue grave crimes cases against powerful suspects.  
In Uganda, officials involved in the establishment of the ICD recognized 
witness protection as a priority early on,139 and several years later, a witness 
protection bill is on the parliamentary agenda. 
32. Structures for witness protection and support must exist after the 
departure of a temporary mechanism. Some witnesses will have protection 
and support needs long after a temporary mechanism closes down, and from 
the beginning, there should be a plan to ensure that vulnerable witnesses are 
cared for by follow-up structures. For example, the MICT will take on judicial 
oversight of protection issues in relation to the ICTY and ICTR, and the 
Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone (RSCSL) will do the same in relation 
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to the SCSL. Furthermore, in Sierra Leone, the SCSL’s Victim and Witness 
Section invested time and resources in training dozens of national police who 
would be responsible for implementing ongoing protection.
Detention
33. If detention facilities are inadequate, it can undercut the mechanism’s 
achievements and impact. The lack of adequate detention facilities can 
prevent the conduct of effective investigations and threaten the security 
of witnesses and that of mechanism personnel and premises. In the DRC, 
tremendous efforts by national courts to conduct trials for international 
crimes, which have received significant assistance from NGOs and 
international donors, have been diminished by reliance on unreliable  
domestic prisons. Numerous individuals convicted of grave crimes have  
easily escaped.140 
34. If new detention facilities are established that meet international standards 
to serve an accountability mechanism for grave crimes, attempts should 
also be made to improve conditions in the country’s ordinary detention 
facilities. Otherwise, the juxtaposition between alleged war crimes suspects 
enjoying proper conditions while those accused of lesser crimes are in squalid, 
overcrowded prisons may lead to criticism of the mechanism as a whole. This 
was a challenge for the SCSL, although perhaps somewhat mitigated by the 
court’s investment in the training of national prison staff and the eventual 
transfer of its modern detention facility to the government. 
Key Questions to Determine Structure
• For each element of the mechanism’s stated purpose and mandate, what 
institutional structures may be required to enable implementation?
• What does the breadth of the mandate suggest about the scale of structures 
necessary for implementation?
• What design options exist that would allow the most affected communities to 
access the mechanism—for example, enabling mobile courts or in situ hearings?
• In the context at hand, is there risk that some elements of the mandate important 
to the mechanism’s success will receive insufficient attention without structures 
that are prescribed through primary instruments (legislation or statutes)? 
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• Does the fluidity of the situation at hand suggest that key decisions about 
mechanism structures should be left to mechanism operators to determine?
• Are domestic governments and/or international institutions that are authorizing 
the mechanisms perceived as impartial by affected populations; and can 
national governments be trusted not to politicize judicial structures? If not, 
would mechanism structures that are more autonomous from the state and/or 
international bodies be protected from improper influence and be perceived as 
more legitimate?
• If it is expected that the mechanism will face domestic and/or international 
resistance to its judicial decisions, will its structures have the capacity to engage 
effectively in diplomatic and political discussions to encourage enforcement?
• What structures will be critical at the outset of the mechanism’s establishment, 
and which might await establishment until more advanced stages of the judicial 
process or a scaling-up of operations? 
• For temporary mechanisms, how will structures phase out over time, and what 
institutions will take over necessary residual functions?
• Do national justice sector capacities suggest that it would be feasible to use 
existing structures (in one or more areas), or rather, that creation of new, 
specialized structures is required?
• Do judges and their family members face significant threats that could be 
mitigated through the creation of high-risk courts?
• Are investigators and prosecutors familiar with international criminal law; the 
management of complex cases; dealing with insider, expert, and vulnerable 
witnesses; and using documentary and forensic evidence of types that are likely 
to occur in the given context?
• Is it possible to involve domestic police in investigations, including through 
setting up a vetting mechanism? If not, what other sources exist for the 
recruitment of domestic investigators with strong knowledge of the context?
• Is it anticipated that the mechanism will process a high number of cases
 —suggesting a more “horizontal” structuring of investigations and 
prosecutions—or relatively few large cases, such that a “vertical” structure 
makes more sense?
• What prosecution office structures or means of collaboration are required 
to allow prosecutors to see patterns of criminality across areas of focus for 
particular teams of investigators and prosecutors?
• In domestic systems, are local bar associations seen as impartial and 
independent by affected populations, or is there need for an independent 
defense office to deal with grave crimes?
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• Is there clarity about which structure will determine which counsel will have 
standing to represent the defense before the mechanism and which structure 
will hear rejected lawyers’ appeals?
• Where victim representation is included in the mechanism’s mandate, which 
structure will be responsible for organizing it?
• How many victims might be expected to seek representation in proceedings 
before the mechanism, and how can structures be designed to facilitate 
coordination among individual victim representatives, group representation, and 
consultation by victim counsel with affected communities?
• Where reparations are part of the mandate, what types are foreseen, and 
what structure will administer individual and/or group reparations, trace and 
freeze the assets of convicted persons, and/or establish a trust fund and raise 
resources for it?
• What administrative competencies can be implemented by structures of 
the ordinary justice system, and which may necessitate the creation of 
supplementary structures or a large, special registry?
• Which structure will be responsible for the design and implementation of 
outreach to communities affected by the mechanism’s work? How do the 
geography of affected communities and the existence of civil society capacity 
affect the structure’s design?
• Are existing mechanisms for witness protection and support effective and 
trusted by the population? How large is the pool of prospective threatened and 
vulnerable witnesses, what types of risk and trauma do they face, and what 
domestic and international partners may be available to assist the mechanism 
to provide protection and assistance?
• Have those tasked with protection and implementation mandates in the ordinary 
justice system been implicated in the crimes, or are they perceived by affected 
communities to be allied to any group of suspected perpetrators of grave crime?
• Have reformers, donors, and implementers working on the ordinary justice 
system been consulted about potential areas of overlap in the provision of 
witness protection and support?
• If the mechanism is temporary, what structures will assume continuing 
obligations of witness protection and support at the end of its mandate?
• Are there adequate detention facilities and management to meet the 
mechanism’s expected needs?
• How can the development of new or improved detention facilities and 
capabilities in relation to grave crimes cases benefit detention facilities and 
management in the broader justice sector?
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G. Integration of International Judges and Staff
Under what conditions does it make sense to include international judges and 
staff in a mechanism? Where they are included, and what is the scale and form 
of their participation? What qualifications should the mechanism expect from 
international participants? What form should the selection process take in order 
to recruit international participants, and how should they be held accountable for 
their conduct while working for the mechanism? What processes can be put in place 
that foster collegial relationships among national and international officials, with 
benefits for capacity building and the mechanism’s casework?
Experiences to Date
Accountability mechanisms that have included international judges and staff 
have done so for one or more of these main reasons: (1) to insert impartiality 
into a mechanism dealing with issues that have polarized societies and domestic 
institutions, and thus to enhance public trust in the objectivity of a mechanism’s 
operation and outcomes; (2) to lend substantive expertise in contexts where local 
justice-sector officials lack knowledge or experience in international criminal law 
or other relevant skills (including logistics, security, and other operational matters); 
and (3) to build the capacity of local officials through collaboration and training. 
Success has varied in response to a variety of factors. Most notably, these have 
been the quality of international officials recruited, and whether international 
involvement is designed in ways that foster collegiality with national counterparts 
rather than generate resentment.
The extent of international participation in accountability mechanisms has varied 
widely. In some places, as in Argentina, Bangladesh, and Uganda, there has been 
practically no international involvement apart from occasional expert advisors or 
trainers. At the Extraordinary African Chambers, domestic Senegalese judges and 
officials were predominant, but internationals played roles on the trial bench, in 
victim representation, and in outreach. In Sierra Leone, international officials played 
a much more prominent role through all sections of the court’s operations, and at 
the fully international ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, there 
were only international judges, and international staff predominated.
The form of international participation has also varied. In many models, 
internationals’ primary responsibility has been to directly administer proceedings as 
judges, prosecutors, victim and defense counsel, and court administrators, among 
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others. These include the ad hoc tribunals and mechanisms for Cambodia, CAR, 
East Timor, and Lebanon. In internationalized domestic courts, such as those in 
Bosnia and Kosovo, there has been a heavier emphasis on capacity building for 
domestic counterparts. International involvement through mentorship has been 
even more pronounced elsewhere, taking various forms, and with varying levels 
of success. In the DRC, UN-organized Prosecution Support Cells have placed 
international investigators into active domestic investigations in an advisory 
capacity. Initially, the model—which has been adapted for use in the CAR—struggled 
because the international investigators’ contracts were so short that they could not 
understand the context and cases well enough to make useful contributions before 
their departure. In Guatemala, CICIG has a mandate that allows it to conduct 
independent investigations, but in order to come to court, cases must be introduced 
by the Attorney General’s Office. CICIG has played a major role in recommending 
reforms to that office, and as these reforms have taken hold, CICIG has increasingly 
conducted joint investigations with national counterparts. The result has been 
the development of a skilled cadre of local prosecutors and police who take their 
autonomy seriously.
The qualifications required of international judges and staff, and the resulting 
quality of international officials, have varied across mechanisms and within them. 
Some judges and staff have contributed substantive knowledge gained through years 
of experience, been motivated by the mission of implementing justice effectively, 
and have been respectful, effective colleagues to national counterparts (where 
applicable). However, other internationals have had insufficient experience or 
knowledge, shown little dedication to their work, and treated national counterparts 
with condescension. While quality of personnel varies in any organization, when 
it comes to the quality of international judges and staff, selection processes have 
largely determined which qualifications apply and the ultimate mix of good and bad.
The selection of judges at the UN tribunals and the ICC has relied on states to make 
nominations according to disparate, often nontransparent criteria. At the ICTY and 
ICTR, judges were elected by the General Assembly from a list submitted by the 
Security Council. The intrusion of domestic politics and diplomatic horse-trading 
in the nomination and selection process has frequently resulted in the selection 
of candidates who were not the best qualified.141 Similar arbitrariness and uneven 
outcomes have resulted where mechanisms have received foreign judges and been 
staffed through secondment. Where mechanisms have been created under the 
auspices of the United Nations, or a regional inter-governmental body (as with 
the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, or the GIEI in 
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Mexico), it can be difficult for them to adapt flexible recruitment policies and avoid 
pitfalls of some international organizations’ long-established appointment and 
recruitment processes. 
With UN or EU pay scales, benefits, and tax advantages, mechanisms have attracted 
many good officials, but also internationals more interested in money than the 
mission. Meanwhile, such institutions as nongovernmental organizations or other 
transitional justice mechanisms (such as Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission) have been able to attract highly motivated, skilled international 
legal professionals with modest pay and benefits. Medical NGOs also regularly 
attract motivated doctors to serve in difficult locations, despite modest pay. 
Pay discrepancies between national and international officials within the same 
institutions can lead to significant resentment; in the DRC, government and civil 
society concerns about the prospect of a significant pay gap between international 
and national officials contributed to the defeat of proposed mixed chambers for 
grave crimes.
Where mechanisms have been backed by an international organization, but not 
been a formal part of it (CICIG in Guatemala or the SCSL in Sierra Leone), they 
have had greater flexibility to define the criteria by which international participants 
are recruited. Yet mechanisms such as the SCSL that have relied on voluntary 
contributions have also often had to accept in-kind contributions from states in the 
form of seconded personnel, with mixed results. 
The extent to which a mechanism has fostered an environment conducive to 
capacity building has depended in large part on the international officials recruited, 
their open-mindedness, their willingness to learn from national colleagues about 
local legal practice and culture, their willingness to be respectful, and their skill 
and experience in explaining legal or practical concepts. This underscores the 
importance of the recruitment process for the selection of international participants.
Lessons and Considerations
Form of International Participation
1. The reasons for international involvement in the mechanism’s operation 
should determine the extent of international participation. These reasons 
should align with decisions made about the mechanism’s purpose and its 
relationship to the domestic system. (See II.A. and II.B.) Where insecurity, 
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a lack of domestic political will, a high degree of societal polarization, and/
or the devastation of a country’s justice sector and infrastructure suggest 
need of more external elements in the mechanism’s design, countries will 
usually experience a greater need for international involvement. It would 
have been difficult to conceive of credible mechanisms without international 
participation for the former Yugoslavia while the war was still underway, or 
in immediate postwar Rwanda or Sierra Leone. Where there is a high degree 
of domestic capacity and political will, as in post-junta Argentina or Senegal, 
there may be no need for international participation. At the Extraordinary 
African Chambers, international judges were only included due to a ruling 
from the ECOWAS Court requiring that the EAC not be wholly a component of 
the Senegalese justice system.
2. Consider changing what form international participation takes over 
time. The conditions that lead to a need for international participation may 
change, thus there should be allowance for changing its form to meet new 
realities over time and possibly phasing it out altogether. The ICTY, SCSL, 
and other heavily international courts arguably could have transitioned to 
management by nationals from the affected countries as wars ended and 
domestic capacities accrued. Perhaps the greatest innovation of the Bosnian 
model was its preplanned phase-out of international judges, prosecutors, and 
defense support, ultimately transitioning to an all-domestic mechanism. In 
Bosnia, the phase-out was planned according to a timeline, which may have 
encouraged political attacks by politicians opposed to the court. A phased 
approach to withdrawing international participation could be pegged to 
justice reform benchmarks; this could create incentives for a government 
to implement reforms and provide greater integration between the effort to 
achieve accountability for grave crimes and general rule-of-law development.
3. Consider whether mentorship-only models may obviate the need for 
direct international involvement. There may be constitutional or statutory 
restrictions on involving international judges and officials directly in a 
domestic justice system. Even if legally possible, in settings where there is 
pronounced sensitivity about foreign influence (as in the DRC), any direct 
inclusion of internationals may be discrediting and/or politically impossible. 
And if one of the mechanism’s aims is to develop domestic capacity (as with 
CICIG in Guatemala), under some circumstances it may be preferable to use 
a lighter approach anyway and establish a model whereby internationals work 
alongside but are not officials of the system in question. 
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4. If international prosecutors are directly or indirectly involved in 
supporting cases, then there should be provision for international 
support for defense teams as well as any victim representatives. Especially 
where local defense capacities are very low, as was the case in East Timor, 
international support for the defense is vital to upholding fair trial rights. 
Establishing rights-of-audience for foreign lawyers in domestic courts may be 
challenging and require changes to court rules, the agreement of the local bar 
association, or a legislative amendment.142
Qualifications
5. International participants’ motivations and attitude are factors at least as 
important to their value as their expertise and experience. International 
judges and officials can make invaluable contributions to the success of a 
mechanism when they do the following: participate because they believe in the 
mission; treat their national colleagues with respect; are willing to learn from 
national counterparts about local context and applicable law and practice; 
embrace opportunities to share their own expertise without condescension; 
and are present long enough to learn the context and make real contributions. 
By contrast, the benefits of international involvement are diminished or 
nullified when officials are motivated primarily by high, tax-free pay, generous 
per diems, or lives of privilege and lack of personal accountability in “exotic” 
locations; when they treat national counterparts with arrogance; when they 
refuse to learn about applicable laws and legal customs; when they show 
little commitment to the job; or when they are on short-term contracts and 
never get their bearings. Every mechanism with international participation 
has attracted judges and officials who fall along a spectrum between these 
two extremes. However, the balance of this mix has varied depending on the 
selection process, and designers of new mechanisms should aim for significant 
improvement over past practice. (See lessons under Selection process and 
Accountability, below.) 
6. International officials must themselves have outstanding records 
on ethics issues. Prospective judges should have a consistent record of 
independence, impartiality, integrity, propriety, equality, and diligence—
consistent with the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct143—in their home 
jurisdictions and any previous national assignments. Judges and lawyers 
should have clean ethics records with all relevant oversight bodies in their 
home jurisdictions.
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7. Internationals must be familiar with the legal system in which they will be 
 working. When this is not the case, as in East Timor and Kosovo, it causes 
difficulties. For example, common law judges who don’t understand victim 
representation, or civil law investigative judges who don’t understand plea 
bargaining, will struggle to add value to mechanisms where these are legal 
features. In Bosnia, where adversarial elements were introduced into a civil 
 law criminal code, international prosecutors were largely from common law 
 backgrounds, while international judges were largely from civil law backgrounds, 
 leading to difficulties in harmonizing practice before the BiH WCC.
8. Internationals should have strong substantive expertise and experience 
commensurate to the roles they will fill. In the case of the ad hoc tribunals, 
judges must be “persons of high moral character, impartiality and integrity 
who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for 
appointment to the highest judicial offices.”144 In addition to this, in the overall 
composition of the chambers, “due account” must be taken of “the experience 
of the judges in criminal law, international law, including international 
humanitarian law and human rights law.”145 These requirements are replicated 
in the SCSL Statute.146 Practical skill and experience in legal drafting and 
case management is also important. In Bosnia, judges and prosecutors 
were required to have eight years’ experience in dealing with complex 
criminal matters. To avoid a source of resentment in mixed institutions, such 
requirements should never be lower for international participants than for 
domestic counterparts.
9. Where possible, internationals should be fluent in the working language 
of national colleagues. Working through interpreters and translators is costly, 
time-consuming, prone to error and misunderstanding, and less conducive to 
the building of collegial relationships that foster trust and capacity building. 
There are large pools of judges and lawyers experienced in international 
criminal law who speak English, French, and Spanish, and where one of these 
is the mechanism’s working language, fluency in that language should be 
an absolute requirement. In some places, such as East Timor or Kosovo, it 
may be obvious that the pool of internationals who speak the local language 
is insufficiently large to make fluency a requirement. And in other places 
(for example, where Russian and Arabic are spoken), an assessment may be 
necessary to determine whether there are enough internationals who are 
language proficient and meet the mechanism’s substantive needs.
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Selection Process
10. The recruitment of international judges and staff should be transparent. 
Foreign judges at the BiH WCC were initially seconded by governments, which 
resulted in some judges lacking in experience, expertise, and commitment.147 
Later, a newly established High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council, responsible 
for selecting national judges and prosecutors, took over the process for choosing 
international judges and prosecutors in accordance with criteria applied to their 
national counterparts. The involvement of a domestic institution in the selection 
of international judges or other officials becomes problematic, however, where 
the institution is politicized; this has been the experience in Cambodia, where 
a politicized Supreme Council of the Magistracy was granted a role in formally 
approving UN-appointed judges to the ECCC.
11. The process should emphasize gender equity and gender competence. 
The Rome Statute contains useful provisions on judicial selection and 
appointment. In addition to the ad hoc tribunals’ requirement for due regard 
 to the representation of the principal legal systems of the world, the Rome Statute 
requires “equitable geographical representation” and a “fair  representation 
 of female and male judges.”148 Experience demonstrates that it is essential 
that fair gender representation among judicial officers (and staff ) be written 
into founding legislation. These legal provisions are essential to ensuring 
equal or equitable representation, and in providing a basis for accountability 
where judicial appointing authorities fail to meet these standards. In the 
case of mechanisms backed by the UN, there is also a long-stated UN goal of 
achieving a 50–50 gender distribution at all levels of the UN, with particular 
attention to those at decision-making levels (including judicial officers).149 
In addition to equality arguments, and improved decision-making through 
consideration of different perspectives, there is some evidence to suggest 
that the gradual shift of earlier international criminal justice institutions 
toward taking rape and other sexual crimes seriously, and investigating them 
zealously, can be traced to the participation of women in the ad hoc tribunals 
as investigators, researchers, judges, legal advisors, and prosecutors.150
12. Avoid exorbitant pay and benefits for international judges and staff. 
Unless the basis of authority binds the mechanism to an existing UN or other 
system characterized by high pay, mechanisms should be designed with the 
flexibility to establish more reasonable rates and benefits. A needs-assessment 
may be required to establish what appropriate pay and benefits are required. 
High-risk, nonfamily posts may require higher pay to recruit qualified officials 
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for an extended period. This has been a challenge for the SCC in the CAR. 
Where high pay is necessary, the importance of targeted advertising to experts 
in the field (rather than relying on standard UN or other listings) becomes 
more important in order to attract well-qualified internationals. (See also II.D. 
BASIS OF AUTHORITY.)
13. Contracts for foreign judges and officials should be a minimum of two 
years in duration. The short-term nature of international-expert contracts 
in East Timor, Kosovo, and the DRC meant that international experts were 
frequently more of a burden than a help. And where international judges stay 
for only one year, as some did in Bosnia, they may be unable to sit on cases 
that may not conclude before their contracts are up. Longer contracts may 
not be possible where a leading or partnering international organization has 
problematic internal rules or procedures, or there are funding bottlenecks that 
prevent the issuance of contracts of longer duration. However, even under 
such circumstances, candidates who express a willingness to extend their 
contracts should receive preference over those who do not.
Accountability
14. Mechanisms should have strong codes of conduct and enforcement 
procedures in place for international judges and staff from the beginning, 
with required trainings for new officials. At the time when a senior 
international investigator at the SCSL was accused of raping a child, almost 
two years after the SCSL launched operations, there was still no staff code of 
conduct in place; the allegations and resulting criminal trial divided staff and 
damaged the court’s reputation.151 Such incidents are less likely to occur where 
there are strong codes of conduct that are communicated to staff and there are 
enforcement mechanisms in place. Mechanisms with defined procedures can 
more adeptly react when allegations arise. Enforceable codes of conduct signal 
to international judges and staff that there is still accountability for personal 
behavior, even if there are agreements in place granting them legal privileges 
and immunities. (See also II.I. OVERSIGHT.)
Integration Process
15. In a mechanism embedded in the national justice system, the roles and 
responsibilities of international judges and staff should be clear from the 
outset. To avoid confusion, it must be clear when internationals work within 
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the hierarchies of the domestic system, and when (if at all) they answer to an 
international Registry or administrators.
16. Where applicable, there should be an expectation that international 
judges and staff will participate in trainings by national counterparts 
on the domestic justice system. This has the substantive benefit of 
improving their grasp of applicable criminal procedure and local legal culture. 
Furthermore, it demonstrates respect for local colleagues.
17. There should be a system for national and international colleagues 
to collaborate in identifying what trainings and resources are most 
needed to build national capacity. New accountability mechanisms may be 
inundated with offers of trainings from NGOs, governments, and academic 
institutions. However, often such short-term trainings are repetitive, too 
abstract, and distract officials from the cases that need their attention.  
A process that gives national officials a full say in choosing only the most 
relevant training or mentorship offers, with advice from international officials, 
can make better use of resources and facilitate an atmosphere of collegiality.
Key Questions to Determine the Integration of International Judges 
and Staff
• In light of political circumstances and domestic capacity, which positions need 
to be filled by internationals, and why?
• If the circumstances requiring international participation may change over time, 
how might its scale and form change over time to adapt to new circumstances?
• Are there legal restrictions on the involvement of internationals in the domestic 
system, such that a model with internationals in advisory roles makes sense?
• Even if allowed under the law, are there particular societal sensitivities about 
direct foreign involvement in the justice sector, such that a mentorship model 
might be preferable?
• If international involvement in prosecutions is foreseen, to ensure fairness, how 
will defense and victim representation be granted the same opportunity?
• How will the recruitment process be structured to favor open-minded and highly 
motivated candidates?
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• For the number and types of internationals sought, is there a pool of eligible 
candidates large enough that speak the mechanism’s working language, such 
that fluency can be required of candidates? 
• What steps are possible to ensure a transparent, merit-based recruitment 
process? Is the domestic procedure for judicial appointments independent and 
capable enough to take on the task?
• What pay and benefit levels are absolutely necessary to attract qualified 
international participants, without attracting those mainly interested in high 
salaries?
• Has the recruitment process been designed to achieve gender balance among 
international officials?
• Who will be responsible for ensuring that enforceable codes of conduct are in 
place before international participants are recruited?
• Where a separate Registry or international administration is foreseen, is it 
clear when international participants answer to it and when they answer to 
hierarchies within the justice system they are working?
• What procedures will exist that include national staff to screen external offers 
of training and prioritize capacity-building needs?
H. Financing
Can the mechanism be funded from the domestic budget, or should it rely on the 
international community? Are there disadvantages to receiving reliable budget 
appropriations from the state or assessed funding from an international institution? 
What are the implications of relying on voluntary funding? What are the implications 
of leaving some mechanism functions outside of the mechanism’s core budget?
Experiences to Date
Funding for accountability mechanisms for grave crimes have been fixed (or 
“secured”), voluntary, or some combination of these. The model of a mechanism’s 
financial support has been heavily influenced by decisions about its relationship 
to the domestic system (see II.B.) and its basis of authority (see II.D.). In turn, the 
funding model used has had implications for mechanism structures (see II.F.) and 
how, where applicable, international judges and staff have been recruited (see II.G.). 
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In a domestic system, fixed or secured funding derives from the national budgeting 
process. This has been the case in Argentina, for example. Colombia also funds 
grave crimes proceedings from its national budget, which has also been used 
to provide a majority of the compensation provided to victims (although under 
the Justice and Peace Law, this should be paid from perpetrators’ assets). For 
international or mixed mechanisms, “fixed funding” refers to assessed contributions 
from the UN or another international or regional organization’s member states. 
For example, both the ICTY and ICTR had a secure source of funding through the 
expenses of the UN in accordance with Article 17 of the UN Charter (although both 
also came to rely on voluntary funds for some expenses). 
Mechanisms have relied on voluntary funding when there has been no fixed source 
of funding, though there may be particular interested parties (states or international 
organizations) who have expressed a willingness to contribute funding to the 
mechanism. The SCSL was initially funded through voluntary contributions from 
governments. The ECCC, the EAC, the CICIG, and the SCC for the CAR have 
likewise relied on voluntary contributions of the international community. 
Some domestic mechanisms have also received external, voluntary contributions. 
Most of the Congolese justice system, including the elements involved in grave 
crimes cases, has relied on donor support. In Uganda, the ICD has received  
support from countries including the United States, Denmark, Ireland, The 
Netherlands, Austria, Norway, and Sweden. In Colombia, the U.S. Department  
of Justice and the Inter-American Development Bank have funded significant 
justice-sector-related projects.
In some places, the balance of funding has changed over time. Quite early on, the 
General Assembly established a “Voluntary Trust Fund” for aspects of the ICTR’s 
work. In Sierra Leone, shortfalls in voluntary contributions required the Special 
Court to seek and receive UN subvention grants in 2004, 2011, and 2012. In East 
Timor, the United Nations Mission of Support to East Timor (UNMISET) funded 
both the Special Crimes Unit and the Special Panels through both assessed and 
voluntary contributions, whereas the later-created Special Crimes Investigation 
Team (SCIT) was funded through assessed contributions. 
In relation to the SCSL, private foundations and international agencies have played 
a significant role in funding “non-core functions,” such as outreach and judicial 
trainings. For several years, the Open Society Foundations was the primary funder of 
a mobile court project for gender justice in the DRC. 
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Lessons and Considerations
1. Advantages and disadvantages to fixed and voluntary funding should 
be considered in light of the specific context. Some previous assessments 
of mechanism design and operation have recommended assessed funding 
models and avoidance of voluntary funding.152 However, even if the 
advantages of fixed funding generally outweigh the disadvantages, the totality 
of experiences to date suggests that the question should be examined on a 
case-by-case basis.
 a. Advantages of fixed-only funding and disadvantages of 
voluntary funding: 
  i. A secure stream of funding provides a level of certainty for the 
mechanism, which aids operators in planning. The uncertainty of 
voluntary funding and the vagaries of different donor budget and 
planning cycles can make planning more difficult. 
  ii. Gaps in funding can delay proceedings and lead to other 
inefficiencies, including difficulties in recruiting and retaining staff. 
  iii. Voluntary funding requires senior mechanism administrators to 
invest significant time in fundraising, with associated support 
and travel expenses. 
  iv. Fixed domestic funding can underscore national ownership over 
a mechanism, and fixed international funding (such as assessed 
contributions from UN member states) creates political distance 
between financial backers and judicial operators. By contrast, 
reliance on foreign voluntary donors (for example, U.S. support to 
the Iraq High Tribunal) can harm a mechanism’s legitimacy. 
 b. Disadvantages of fixed-only funding and advantages of 
voluntary funding: 
  i. A mechanism reliant on a state’s regular budget can be more 
prone to political pressure. Where states have demonstrated a 
pattern of executive interference in the judiciary, and/or a strong 
desire for one-sided justice (as in Bangladesh or the proposed 
hybrid court for Darfur), domestic fixed funding can damage the 
mechanism’s real or perceived independence and legitimacy.  
By contrast, external voluntary funding for mechanisms in 
polarized societies may lend greater legitimacy to mechanisms 
(such as those in Bosnia and Kosovo) than they would have 
if primarily funded through the budgets of states strongly 
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associated with one narrative of contentious events (as in Croatia 
and Serbia). 
  ii. Fixed funding from the United Nations and other international 
or regional bodies comes with significant bureaucracy. Attendant 
procedures and regulations exist to ensure that mechanisms 
operate in accordance with such virtues as transparency, 
fairness, and financial responsibility. However, in practice, 
requirements pertaining to recruitment, pay and benefits, and 
oversight can be unwieldy, create perverse incentives in hiring, 
be costly to implement, and significantly prolong the time 
needed for mechanism establishment. (See also II.D. BASIS OF 
AUTHORITY, and II.G. INTEGRATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
JUDGES and STAFF.)
2. If the mechanism is funded through a mix of fixed and voluntary 
contributions, leaving important aspects of the mandate outside of “core 
activities” can lead to non-implementation or delay. Multiple mechanisms 
have relegated aspects of their work, including outreach, victim representation, 
reparations, and legacy to separate “non-core,” voluntary funds. With regard 
to outreach, this has led to damaging delays in the ability of mechanisms to 
generate understanding of their mandates, as has happened with the ICTY, 
ICTR, BiH WCC, and ECCC. Victim representation can make a mechanism’s 
proceedings more relevant to affected individuals and communities; but 
apart from the STL and ICC, mechanisms have generally not foreseen legal 
aid for victim representation. In Bosnia, victim representation is foreseen 
under the criminal procedure code, but funding constraints have led to non-
implementation before the War Crimes Chamber. There has been a similar 
problem in Colombia, where broad victim participation rights are constrained 
by inadequate funding. In Cambodia, the ECCC relied on NGO projects to 
fund victim representation. Reparations are often very important to affected 
communities and could increase prospects for the mechanism’s proceedings to 
contribute to reconciliation; however, in many situations, funds for reparations 
are sparse. Provisions for reparations under Congolese law have never 
received adequate funding; any reparations awarded have usually not been 
implemented.153 This has led some victims to question the utility of the criminal 
process. As of October 2017, the reparations trust fund established for the EAC 
was similarly in danger of disappointing many victims of convicted former 
Chadian President Hissène Habré. For temporary mechanisms, legacy too 
“should be explicitly mandated and receive support from the core budget.”154
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3. Whether funded through fixed or voluntary contributions, funders should 
ensure balance in support for different parts of the judicial process. At the 
outset of serious crimes proceedings in East Timor, the UN provided extensive 
funding for investigations and prosecutions, with only about 10 percent of that 
amount for adjudication and none at all for defense. This resulted in abuses of 
fair trial rights and extensive delay and inefficiency. 
4. Mechanisms that don’t meet international standards will struggle to raise 
voluntary funds. Mechanisms that fail to meet international standards in key 
areas, including judicial independence and fair trial rights, will find it difficult 
to attract voluntary contributions. Continuing concerns about Cambodian 
 government meddling in the proceedings of the ECCC have contributed to that 
 mechanism’s chronic difficulties in raising donor funds. The ICTB has not had 
international support due to violations of fair trial standards and perceptions 
that it is run, in part, to serve a political agenda. Similarly, the European 
Union, many European states, and many civil society organizations refuse to 
assist a mechanism with the death penalty. This left the IHT overwhelmingly 
dependent on the United States for financial and other forms of support. 
5. Where in-country mechanisms receive international assistance, whether 
 assessed or voluntary, consider planning for a shift in funding sources 
 over time, possibly tied to a phase-out of the involvement of international 
 judges and staff (where applicable). Building in a transition from international 
 to national funding can help increase local ownership, ensure integration of 
effort with general justice-sector development, enhance confidence in the 
sustainability of the justice effort in countries where reforms are taking hold, 
and ease donor concerns about open-ended commitments. However, there is 
also potential risk. If national authorities agree to take over funding but then 
do not, the mechanism’s continued proceedings could be imperiled.
Key Questions to Determine Financing  
• In determining how the mechanism should be financed, have all major 
stakeholders been consulted, including victims and others in affected 
communities? 
• For mechanisms integrated into national justice systems, does the state have 
the will and means to provide adequate funding?
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• In such contexts, is there a danger that the state might use financing to 
inappropriately influence prosecutorial and judicial decisions?
• Would state financing of the mechanism enhance or detract from its perceived 
legitimacy among affected communities?
• If the court is authorized or co-authorized by an international or regional body, 
is there support for a stream of assessed funding to last for the expected 
duration of the mechanism’s mandate?
• If so, would funding from the international or regional body in question 
enhance or detract from the mechanism’s perceived legitimacy among affected 
communities?
• If fixed funding from an international or regional body is contemplated, what 
rules and regulations would flow from the decision, including with regard to 
recruitment, remuneration, procurement, and oversight? Where such rules and 
regulations would have undesirable implications for such things as the quality 
of international officials recruited, the time it would take to establish the 
mechanism, or overall expense, would it be possible to negotiate changes that 
mitigate these effects?
• Where voluntary funding is contemplated, are a sufficient number of states, 
organizations, and possibly private donors interested and likely to sustain 
interest for the years it will take for the mechanism to complete its mandate?
• Would contributions from expected donors more likely enhance or detract from 
the mechanism’s legitimacy in the eyes of affected communities?
• Are there existing rule-of-law development projects in the affected country that 
could be adapted to support aspects of the mechanism’s operations?
• How are possible deficiencies in the mechanism’s adherence to international 
standards likely to affect donor interest, and can these deficiencies be avoided 
or remediated?
• Are all aspects of the mechanism’s mandate considered “core”? If not, what 
are the implications for the mechanism’s success if “non-core” aspects are not 
funded or underfunded?
• Where a mechanism is externally funded, could it be possible to transition to 
domestic funding for all or part of the budget over time without compromising 
its mandate or operations?
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I. Oversight
What means of formal oversight should exist, including processes for the appointment 
and removal of judges and prosecutors; ethics guidelines and processes to ensure 
their enforcement; and structures to hold the mechanism accountable for nonjudicial 
decisions and management of its budget? What means of informal oversight are 
needed to hold the mechanism accountable for fulfilling its mandate fairly and 
effectively, including court monitoring, civil society advocacy, and media coverage?
Experiences to Date
Formal Oversight
The means of mechanism oversight has been heavily determined by the 
mechanism’s relationships to the domestic system (see II.B.), basis of authority  
(see II.D.), and structure (see II.F.). Oversight functions may be distributed across 
the different offices and agencies responsible for different parts of the domestic 
judicial chain (as in Argentina and Uganda); special mechanisms within the 
domestic system may have some extraordinary oversight elements (as in Bosnia 
and, to a lesser extent, at the EAC), or be much more consolidated in the case 
of extraordinary, stand-alone international mechanisms. Within this last group, 
mechanism oversight has been defined in primary instruments and might, in part, 
rely on existing oversight agencies and procedures of the international or regional 
authorizing body, including the United Nations (for the ICTY and ICTR), 155 the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (for the GIEI), and the AU (for the 
proposed criminal chamber at the ACJHR). 
Some UN-backed mechanisms have opted-in to some UN oversight functions, as 
was the case at the SCSL. Although the SCSL was not a UN body, it followed UN 
accounting practices by outsourcing its internal audit to the United Nations Office 
for Internal Oversight Services; and its external audit to the United Nations Board of 
Auditors. Both internal and external audits were conducted according to the same 
practices as would apply to audit a UN institution.156
Additionally, at the SCSL, unlike the ECCC that came before it, a management 
committee was created, comprised of representatives of donor states, Sierra Leone’s 
government, and the UN Secretary-General.157 Its functions included oversight of the 
court’s annual budget and other financial matters, and the provision of advice and 
policy direction on nonjudicial aspects of the court’s operations, including questions 
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of efficiency.158 The committee made annual visits to the court. This management 
committee model has been adapted by subsequent mechanisms, including the STL. 
In Uganda, a “Court Users Committee” foreseen for any specialized court in the 
country, provides another model of formal public transparency. Under the ICD’s 
practice directions, the committee is to include key official stakeholders in the court, 
as well as members of the public, and is granted an advisory role. However, funding 
constraints have prevented the committee from convening. The Kosovo Specialist 
Chambers have a novel “Ombudspersons Office” within the Registry. It has a 
mandate to receive and investigate complaints with regard to the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of those interacting with the mechanism.
In Cambodia, oversight functions at the ECCC have been bifurcated: domestic and 
UN procedures, for Cambodian and international officials and staff, respectively. 
And in response to persistent reports of corruption, the UN and Cambodian 
government agreed to the creation of an independent counselor to investigate 
allegations, although reports from that office have never been made public. In 
Guatemala, CICIG has had little formal external oversight, neither from the United 
Nations, nor a management committee; it has relied on internal procedures and the 
performance of one powerful commissioner.159
For situations falling under the potential jurisdiction of the ICC, the principle of 
complementarity provides another formal, external source of oversight. Many 
countries under “preliminary examination” by the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor 
wish to avoid cases being taken to The Hague; these include such states as Colombia 
or the United Kingdom (in relation to alleged crimes in Iraq), and even states 
(such as Israel) that are not party to the Rome Statute but whose nationals could 
be investigated for alleged crimes committed on the territory of a state party. 
These states must show that they are delivering on their obligations to genuinely 
investigate and prosecute crimes under international law in order to prevent the 
OTP from opening a full investigation. And where investigations are already open, 
states can face ICC demands for arrest of senior figures if they are not genuinely 
tried domestically, as has happened in Côte d’Ivoire.
Informal Oversight
Beyond formal oversight mechanisms, informal oversight of accountability 
mechanisms has taken various forms. States, international organizations, civil 
society organizations, and the media have all been important actors in this regard.
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Donors to mechanisms have provided some measure of accountability for budget 
and performance, even where they lack a formal role in a management committee. 
For example, in Uganda, justice-sector donors formed the Development Partners 
Group (DPG), a body that liaises with the national justice-sector coordination 
mechanism. Through the DPG, donors have coordinated in the prioritization of 
assistance to the ICD, allowing them to set some conditions for how their aid is spent.160 
Trial monitoring and the monitoring of institutional developments has been another 
key source of informal oversight. The prospect of having shortcomings in operations 
or proceedings exposed can provide a powerful incentive for mechanism officials to 
keep operations on track. Such exposure can also serve to trigger action by formal 
oversight bodies. The OSCE has monitored domestic proceedings in Bosnia, Kosovo, 
and Serbia. In some locations, international nongovernmental organizations or 
academic institutions have monitored grave crimes trials (for example, Avocats 
San Frontières in the DRC, the Open Society Justice Initiative in Cambodia and 
Guatemala, and the University of California, Berkeley’s War Crimes Studies Center 
in Cambodia and Sierra Leone). Local NGOs have also played important roles  
in trial monitoring in such places as Serbia, Kosovo, Senegal, and Sierra Leone.  
Their ability to play this role depends in part on their capacity, which ranges from 
quite high (as in Serbia and Kenya) to very low, especially where conflict is ongoing 
or has just ended (as in East Timor and the CAR). It can be more difficult for local 
NGOs to act as effective forces for oversight in countries with highly polarized 
societies, as in Syria, Côte d’Ivoire, or Bosnia, or where state repression limits their 
freedom to operate, as in Sudan or Burundi, and to lesser extents in such places as 
Cambodia and Mexico. 
Finally, journalists have provided a vital source of informal oversight by questioning 
mechanisms’ performance and exposing injustices, politicization, corruption, 
and inefficiency. The degree to which they are able to perform this function has 
depended on general levels of media capacity and freedom in the affected country.
Lessons and Considerations
Formal Oversight
1. Ensure that all mechanism officials are bound by enforceable codes of 
ethics. Whether through well-functioning offices of a country’s ordinary 
justice system, ad hoc documents and structures, or long-established policies 
and agencies of an international or regional organization, every judge and staff 
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member at an accountability mechanism for grave crimes should be bound by 
a code of ethics enforced by capable, independent officials. In no case should 
a mechanism fail to have such codes in place at the outset of operations, as 
happened at the SCSL. (See also II.G. INTEGRATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
JUDGES AND STAFF.) The issue of enforceable codes of conduct for judges is 
delicate, with two scenarios that should be avoided: judges with sole discretion 
to oversee “their own,” and judges responding to an oversight body that may 
have (or be perceived to have) a political agenda or bias. 
2. Have clear and strong means of external review of budget, whether 
through capable and independent national auditing offices, existing 
bodies of international organizations, or newly created special structures. 
The absence of clear lines of fiscal accountability for the domestic aspects of 
the ECCC’s operations embroiled the court in corruption scandals, whereas 
in Sierra Leone—a country, like Cambodia, with a history of extensive official 
corruption—the SCSL made use of UN internal and external financial auditing 
procedures and avoided financial scandal. 
3. Avoid shared oversight where this could result in obstruction of the 
mechanism’s work. In some situations, shared forms of oversight can work. 
For example, at the EAC, all senior officials (except the presiding judges on the 
Trials and Appeals Chambers) were Senegalese and nominated by Senegal, 
but formally appointed by the AU. This presented no difficulties because 
both parties supported the EAC’s mission. In Cambodia, however, a similar 
arrangement involving a UN nomination of an international co-investigating 
judge, requiring only formal approval by Cambodia, broke down and triggered 
diplomatic tension when Cambodia refused to grant its assent. 
4. In politicized systems, consider external, specialized, more transparent 
processes for appointments and removals. Mechanisms lose credibility 
when they depend on officials from within politicized justice systems. For 
example, in Uganda, state prosecutors have not scrutinized serious allegations 
of war crimes perpetrated by the national army, threatening to make the ICD a 
mechanism destined to apply one-sided justice. Similar dynamics have reduced 
the credibility of grave crimes proceedings in Côte d’Ivoire and Bangladesh, 
and prevented them altogether in Kenya and Liberia. In Mexico, where federal 
prosecutors similarly refused to investigate indications of military and federal 
police involvement in a large-scale atrocity, it was left to internationally 
appointed experts with the GIEI to develop these leads. 
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5. Require mechanism administrators to report regularly to an oversight 
body. In a domestic system, this may occur in piecemeal fashion, with judges, 
prosecutors, and police investigators reporting to respective management 
officials within the system. Elsewhere, there can be a requirement of regular 
reports to standing international organizations or ad hoc structures. For 
example, IIIM for Syria is required to report to the UN General Assembly 
twice yearly, the SCSL registrar reported monthly to the court’s management 
committee, the STL’s president reports annually to the UN Secretary-General 
and the government of Lebanon, and the proposed criminal chamber of 
the ACJHR would be required to submit an annual activity report to the AU 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government as well as financial reports to the 
AU Executive Council.  
Informal Oversight
6. Ensure that transparency is a key value for the mechanism and that 
it is expressed in founding documents. Informal oversight depends on 
information, and while the mechanism will need to keep some secrets (on such 
matters as judicial deliberations and operational witness protection), it should 
be designed to accommodate requests for information about its proceedings 
and operations, including in the areas of efficiency, finances, and ethics. 
Founding documents should emphasize an ethos of transparency.
 
7. Donors to a mechanism should coordinate their activities to the extent 
possible. Even if this is not through a formal oversight structure, such as 
a management committee, donor coordination not only reduces gaps and 
duplication in support, but allows donors to act as an external source of 
accountability for the mechanism’s use of their funds. Donor coordination in 
DRC has been weak, whereas in Uganda it has been effective. 
8. Identify potential international organizations that could monitor 
proceedings. An international organization that has no role in the 
mechanism’s administration but is operating in the same country can play a 
valuable role in monitoring operations and proceedings. This has been the case 
with OSCE monitoring of proceedings in the former Yugoslavia. 
9. Those who are supporting the creation of a new mechanism should 
help ensure that domestic civil society organizations and journalists 
have the freedom and resources to access the mechanism, to monitor 
its proceedings and operations, and to criticize it. The ultimate utility of a 
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mechanism will depend on the credibility of its work. In turn, that credibility 
hinges on a mechanism’s ability to withstand public scrutiny from civil society 
advocates and monitors, as well as journalists. Where necessary, states and 
international organizations should prioritize diplomatic interventions on 
behalf of civil society advocates and the media, and support their capacity to 
engage with the mechanism being created. 
Key Questions to Determine Oversight
• In determining means of mechanism oversight, have all major stakeholders been 
consulted, including victims and others in affected communities? 
• Are there functioning oversight bodies for the justice system in the affected 
country, including for judges, prosecutors, defense and victim counsel, and civil 
servants?
• Are there strong and enforceable codes of ethics that can be referenced in 
founding documents, whether national or international in origin?
• Are there functioning domestic institutions available to oversee the 
mechanism’s budget, or are there prospects for outsourcing this to an 
international or regional organization?
• Where shared roles in some or all oversight functions are contemplated, are all 
parties supportive of the mechanism, and is that support likely to continue no 
matter what judicial decisions it makes? Are there scenarios that could lead to 
deadlock or the abuse of oversight authority to obstruct implementation of the 
mechanism’s mandate?
• Would use of a particular existing mechanism for the appointment and removal 
of officials enhance or detract from the mechanism’s credibility within the 
affected population? If so, what changes could mitigate or avoid this risk?
• Are mechanism administrators required to report regularly on judicial 
proceedings, operations, and finances to an oversight body?
• How can the value of transparency be reflected in the mechanism’s founding 
documents?
• Where a mechanism receives donor support, are donors coordinating to ensure 
enhanced accountability for the use of their funds?
• Are there national or international organizations working in the affected country 
that could engage in independent monitoring of the mechanism’s proceedings 
and operations?
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• Do civil society organizations and journalists have the freedom and capacity to 
engage with, monitor, and report on the mechanism’s proceedings, operations, 
and finances? If not, what can be done to support them?
 
Notes
13. The source documents for current, past, and emerging mechanisms are generally the 
legislative instruments establishing them (and in some cases, subsidiary instruments). 
In the case of mechanisms at the domestic end of the spectrum, the relevant legislative 
instruments may only add substantive jurisdiction to already-existing courts. In some 
cases, the mandate may even require a constitutional amendment (as was under 
discussion for some time in Kenya, for example). 
14. This is what the OHCHR’s Rule of Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Maximizing the 
Legacy of Hybrid Courts, HR/PUB/08/2 (New York and Geneva, 2008) refers to as its 
“core mandate” (6). Whether the mechanism’s legacy forms part of its core mandate, 
the publication notes, “is a matter of some controversy” (7). 
15. The United Nations defines “legacy,” in the context of international criminal justice, as 
the “lasting impact on bolstering the rule of law in a particular society, by conducting 
effective trials to contribute to ending impunity, while also strengthening domestic 
judicial capacity.” OHCHR, Rule of Law Tools (Hybrid Courts), 4–5.
16. Open Society Justice Initiative, Legacy: Completing the Work of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, 2011, 5.
17. As noted in OHCHR’s Rule of Law Tools (Hybrid Courts), “Ascribing goals of achieving 
a sustainable peace, or reconciliation, to criminal trials should […] be avoided. These 
are very complex objectives that require an approach that goes beyond criminal 
prosecutions” (6n10).
18. The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, 
S/2004/616, para. 46.
19. UNSC Res 1272 (1999) UN Doc S/RES/1272.
20. The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, Act No. XIX of 1973; The International 
Crimes (Tribunals) (Amendment) Act, July 14, 2009 (Act No. LV of 2009), available at: 
parliament.gov.bd/14%20July%202009(5699-5701)(2).pdf. 
21. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia 
Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the 
Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Preamble. See also UNGA Res. 57/228, December 
18, 2002.
22. Few mechanisms mention the concept of “truth” in their founding documentation, 
and those that do are generally in such places as Cambodia and Lebanon, which have 
inquisitorial legal systems. The ECCC mentions “truth” several times in its Internal 
Rules (a subsidiary instrument) though not in its founding instruments (agreement or 
law). See ECCC Internal Rules, Rule 55.5, “In the conduct of judicial investigations, the 
co-investigating judges may take any investigative action conducive to ascertaining 
the truth. … They shall conduct their investigation impartially, whether the evidence 
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is inculpatory or exculpatory.” Internal Rules 60, 85, 87, and 91 also make significant 
mention of the truth as a guiding principle in the collection of evidence (in and out 
of court). Although beyond the scope of this handbook, the Rome Statute of the 
ICC (Article 54(1)(a); which reflects many inquisitorial law aspects) states that the 
prosecutor must (“shall”) “in order to establish the truth, extend the investigation 
to cover all facts and evidence … [and] investigate incriminating and exonerating 
circumstances equally.” In terms of the evidence received by the court, Article 69.3 
gives the court authority to “request the submission of evidence that it considers 
necessary for the determination of the truth” (all emphases added).
23. Constitutive Act of the African Union (Article 4 (h) and (j)).
24. Projet de loi modifiant et complétant la loi organique no. 13/011-B du 11 avril 2013 
portant organisation, fonctionnement et compétences des juridictions de l’order 
judiciaire en matière de répression des crimes de génocide, des crimes contre 
l’humanité, et des crimes de guerre (bill dated May 2, 2014, and on file with author).
25. Civil Society Draft Bill for the Special Tribunal for Kenya (Explanatory Memorandum 
/ Long Title), available at: iccnow.org/documents/Draft_Bill_for_the_Special_Tribunal_
for_Kenya1.pdf. 
26. Civil Society Draft Bill for the Special Tribunal for Kenya (Preamble), available at: 
iccnow.org/documents/Draft_Bill_for_the_Special_Tribunal_for_Kenya1.pdf. 
27. See ICD website at judiciary.go.ug/data/smenu/18/International%20Crimes%20
Division.html.
28. African Union, EX.CL/846(XXV) Annex 5, STC/Legal/Min/7(1) Rev. 1, May 15, 2014, 
Preamble, available at: iccnow.org/documents/African_Court_Protocol_-_July_2014.pdf.
29. For detailed analysis of these issues, see Alison Bisset, Truth Commissions and Criminal 
Courts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); William A. Schabas and Patricia 
M. Wald, “Truth Commissions and Courts Working in Parallel: The Sierra Leone 
Experience,” Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International 
Law), vol. 98 (March 31–April 3, 2004), 189–95.
30. The SCSL had a mandate limited to those bearing “greatest responsibility” for crimes 
perpetrated on the territory of Sierra Leone. See Eric Witte, “Beyond ‘Peace vs. Justice’: 
Understanding the Relationship Between DDR Programs and the Prosecution of 
International Crimes,” in Disarming the Past: Transitional Justice and Ex-combatants, ed. 
Cutter Patel, De Greiff, and Waldorf (ICTJ and Social Science Research Council, 2009), 
99–100 n60.
31. A government’s refusal to pursue particular perpetrators or parties to a conflict will 
often not be overcome by legal drafting; this is more likely to be tackled via political 
wrangling or operational decisions (for example, prosecutorial strategy). However, legal 
language can provide domestic and international stakeholders with additional tools to 
advocate for the mechanism’s impartial operation.
32. Neil Kritz, “Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of Accountability 
Mechanisms,” Law and Contemporary Problems 59 (1996): 127. 
33. If Chapter VII of the UN Charter is the source of power used to establish the 
mechanism, then sustainable (national, regional, international) peace will naturally 
inform the content of the mechanism’s purpose. However, the question of whether 
international criminal prosecutions deter the future commission of atrocities remains 
open and, as such, goals related to peace (expressed as general and/or specific 
deterrence) should be conservatively stated. See David Wippman, “Atrocities, 
THE ELEMENTS OF MECHANISM DESIGN   119
Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice,” Fordham International Law 
Review 23: 488. For a recent, more comprehensive examination of questions around 
the deterrent effect of the prosecution of international crimes, see Jennifer Schense 
and Linda Carter, eds., “Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: The Deterrent Effect 
of International Criminal Tribunals,” International Nuremberg Principles Academy, 
2016, available at: nurembergacademy.org/fileadmin/media/pdf/publications/The_
Deterrent_Effect_of_International_Criminal_Tribunals_.pdf.
34. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights advises against including 
these purposes altogether. “Ascribing goals of achieving a sustainable peace, or 
reconciliation, to criminal trials should […] be avoided. These are very complex 
objectives that require an approach that goes beyond criminal prosecutions.” OHCHR, 
Rule of Law Tools (Hybrid Courts), 6 n10.
35. See Elena Baylis, “Function and Dysfunction in Post-Conflict Justice Networks and 
Communities,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 47, no. 625 (2014).
36. For a useful discussion of these issues, see the publication of the OHCHR, Rule of Law 
Tools (Hybrid Courts), available at: ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HybridCourts.
pdf.
37. See Open Society Justice Initiative, International Crimes, Local Justice: A Handbook for 
Rule-of-Law Policymakers, Donors, and Implementers, 2011. (Also available in French and 
Spanish.)
38. While Rwanda had abolished the death penalty prior to the ICTR prosecutor’s first 
attempts to refer cases to Rwanda, a number of significant legislative amendments 
were made following the first round of unsuccessful attempts, including the passing of 
legislation to do the following: abolish solitary confinement; afford immunity and other 
protections to defense teams and witnesses; provide for alternatives to live testimony, 
in which witnesses were located outside of Rwanda; and review and amend the 
so-called “Genocide Ideology” law. See Complementarity in Action: Lessons Learned from 
the ICTR Prosecutor’s Referral of International Criminal Cases to National Jurisdictions for 
Trial, February 2015, paras. 50–63, available at: unictr.org/sites/unictr.org/files/legal-
library/150210_complementarity_in_action.pdf.
39. For a definition of “hybrid tribunal,” see Rule-of-Law Tools (Hybrid Courts), available 
at: refworld.org/docid/47ea6fbb2.html. The definition used is as follows: “Courts of 
mixed composition and jurisdiction, encompassing both national and international 
aspects, usually operating within the jurisdiction where the crimes occurred” (1). See 
also Sarah Williams, Hybrid and Internationalised Tribunals: Selected Jurisdictional Issues 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012), 249: “There is no comprehensive definition of a hybrid 
or internationalized tribunal. There do appear to be several defining features: (1) the 
tribunal performs a criminal judicial function; (2) the temporary or transitional 
nature of such institutions (or at least the international component); (3) there must 
be at least the possibility of the participation of international judges sitting alongside 
national judges and for international involvement in other organs of the tribunal; 
(4) the provision of international assistance in the financing of the tribunal, although 
this on its own will not internationalize an otherwise national institution; (5) a mix of 
international and national elements in the material jurisdiction of the tribunals, 
or at least that crimes within the jurisdiction are of concern to the international 
community; and (6) the involvement of a party other than the affected state, such 
as the United Nations, a regional organization or another state(s)” (emphases added). 
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40. Coalition Provisional Authority Number 48, entitled, Delegation of Authority Regarding 
an Iraqi Special Tribunal, December 10, 2003, available at: iraqcoalition.org/
regulations/.
41. Amnesty International, Behind a Wall of Silence: Prosecution of War Crimes in Croatia, 
2010, 13, available at: amnesty.eu/content/assets/doc2010/croatia_behindwallofsilence.
pdf.
42. See Human Rights Watch, The Long Arms of Justice: Lessons from Specialized War 
Crimes Units in France, Germany, and the Netherlands, September 2014, available at: 
hrw.org/report/2014/09/16/long-arm-justice/lessons-specialized-war-crimes-units-
france-germany-and. The report notes that, in addition to France, Germany, and the 
Netherlands (whose experiences are explored in the report), Belgium, Canada, Croatia, 
Denmark, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States have specialized war crimes units (2n1).
43. See ICCPR, Article 14.1, generally.
44. Article 14.2.
45. Minimum guarantees are
 (a) to be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of the 
nature and cause of the charge against him;
 (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to 
communicate with counsel of his own choosing;
 (c) to be tried without undue delay;
 (d) to be tried in his presence and to defend himself in person or through legal 
assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, 
of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him in any case where the 
interests of justice so require and without payment by him in any such case if he 
does not have sufficient means to pay for it;
 (e) to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the 
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions 
as witnesses against him;
 (f ) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the 
language used in court; and
 (g) not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt. (Article 14.3)
46. Article 14.5.
47. “Double jeopardy” also known by the French autrefois acquit is a fair trial guarantee 
which—as a legal matter—protects an individual from being twice tried for the same 
offense.
48. Nullum crimen sine lege (along with nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali) is a fair trial 
guarantee that—as a legal matter—protects an individual from being tried and punished 
for an act or omission that was not criminal at the time of the act or omission:
 (a) No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act 
or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or 
international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be 
imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was 
committed. If, subsequent to the commission of the offence, provision is made by 
law for the imposition of the lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby. 
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III. ANNEXES
Annex 1: Mechanisms in Africa
AFRICAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS WITH 
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
Conflict Background and Political Context
The African continent has experienced extensive armed conflict and violations of 
international law and human rights since the mid-20th century. Over the last 25 years, 
this has included the Rwandan genocide, protracted civil war and genocide in 
the Darfur region of Sudan, interethnic conflict and armed violence between 
government forces and militia groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
and the Central African Republic (CAR), postelection violence in Kenya and Côte 
d’Ivoire, Islamic terrorism by al-Shabaab in Somalia, and more recently by the 
militant Islamist group Boko Haram in Nigeria and neighboring countries. 
Since the 1990s, Africa has increasingly paid attention to the prosecution of 
(international) crimes through a variety of international, regional, and local 
approaches. At the same time, the African legal framework for the prosecution of 
international crimes has grown. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(African Charter), adopted in 1981 and entered into force on October 21, 1986, was 
the first legal instrument for the protection of human rights of people on the African 
continent. Beyond the inclusion of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural 
rights, as enshrined in most international human rights instruments, the African 
Charter recognizes a range of collective “group rights” and “third-generation 
rights,” such as the rights to a healthy environment and natural resources—rights 
which are of particular importance to African peoples.161 In the first years of its 
existence, the quasi-judicial African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(African Commission) oversaw the protection and promotion of human rights.162 
Subsequently, the African Union (AU) created the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) to adjudicate human rights cases. A proposal for an African 
criminal court was also considered in the 1980s, but the AU only seriously started 
discussing the creation of a mechanism with jurisdiction to prosecute international 
crimes within the AU structures in 2007–2008.163 Subsequent development and 
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debate of the idea has proceeded in parallel with continued debate over the role and 
actions of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in Africa, especially following ICC 
charges against Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir in 2009 (see text box).
However, AU interest in a regional court with jurisdiction over international 
crimes preceded the charges against Al-Bashir.164 AU member states had already 
been involved in discussions over the use of the principle of universal jurisdiction, 
following numerous European proceedings against senior African officials for crimes 
under international law.165 The momentum for the prosecution of former Chadian 
President Hissène Habré added impetus to the discussion. And the AU faced a 
requirement to implement a provision of the 2007 African Charter on Democracy, 
Elections, and Governance (ACDEG) to hold accountable “perpetrators of 
unconstitutional change of government” before a “competent court of the Union.”166 
This combination of factors galvanized support within the AU to create a criminal 
chamber within the African Court.167 
Africa and the International Criminal Court
At the international level, African support for the creation of the ICC had been 
strong since discussions on the creation of the first permanent criminal court 
commenced. As of October 2017, there were 124 signatories to the Rome Statute, 
34 of which were African states, comprising the largest regional block of states 
parties to the ICC.168 As of October 2017, nine out of 10 ICC investigations 
concerned African situations. In the first years of the ICC’s existence, African states 
were generally supportive of the ICC’s investigation into Uganda and the DRC, 
situations self-referred by African governments and in which the prosecutor mostly 
investigated crimes committed by rebel groups. However, when in March 2009 the 
ICC issued a first arrest warrant for President Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan in relation  
to grave crimes in the Darfur region of Sudan, the relationship between the AU  
and the ICC changed drastically. In the words of scholar Charles Jalloh: “Several 
African states began to perceive the Court not as a court for Africa, but one against 
it.”169 In 2010, the AU rejected “for now” ICC overtures to open a liaison office in 
Addis Ababa.170
ICC proceedings against Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto (by then president 
and vice president of Kenya, respectively) for alleged perpetration of grave crimes 
during the aftermath of the 2007 Kenyan elections greatly exacerbated the already 
difficult relationship between the ICC and the AU. From 2011 onward, in parallel 
with confirmation of charges against Kenyans including Kenyatta and Ruto, the 
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government of Kenya played an increasingly energetic role in pressing for the 
adoption of AU resolutions critical of the ICC. There was also concern within the 
AU that the United Nations (UN) Security Council had not debated or acted on a 
longstanding AU request to defer proceedings against Al-Bashir under Article 16 
of the Rome Statute.171 And states including South Africa were concerned about 
what they regarded as an unwillingness of the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) to 
the Rome Statute to acknowledge that an obligation to arrest an ICC fugitive who 
is a head of state (Al-Bashir) conflicts with obligations not to effect such an arrest 
following previous AU decisions.172 
In January 2016, the AU tasked a ministerial committee with “the urgent development 
of a comprehensive strategy including collective withdrawal [of African states 
parties to the Rome Statute] from the ICC.”173 In 2016, Gambia, Burundi, and South 
Africa filed notifications of withdrawal from the Rome Statute, although Gambia 
and South Africa later reversed course.174 In January 2017, the AU Assembly adopted 
a “Withdrawal Strategy.” Despite the name, the document did not actually entail a 
strategy for collective withdrawal from the Rome Statute. Rather, it set out a number 
of institutional and legal strategies as well as diplomatic and political engagements 
for further pursuit of the implementation of AU policies related to the ICC.175
Existing Justice-Sector Capacity
Africa has seen a rise in justice and accountability for international crimes since the 
1990s. The continent “has been [a] fertile ground for accountability experimentation 
… with approaches ranging from judicial to non-judicial mechanisms like truth 
commissions, reparations and community-based processes.”176 Justice solutions 
in Africa include local accountability mechanisms examined throughout this 
handbook. Among these are the Gacaca mechanism in Rwanda, domestic 
prosecutions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and hybrid and internationalized courts such as the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the Extraordinary African Chambers (EAC) 
in Senegal for the prosecution of former Chadian President Hissène Habré, the 
new Special Criminal Court (SCC) for the Central African Republic (CAR), and 
the proposed hybrid mechanism for South Sudan.177 These experiences and others, 
including the involvement of African states in cases before the ICC, have resulted 
in a significant group of African lawyers, administrators, and experts with deep 
experience in international criminal law and the mechanisms for its implementation. 
Despite positive developments, horrendous crimes continue to be committed on the 
African continent, with little criminal accountability for grave crimes.  
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Existing Civil Society Capacity
African civil society has repeatedly acted to put an end to impunity of international 
crimes in Africa. In its 2013 report on international criminal justice in Africa, the 
Pan African Lawyers Union stressed that “members of African civil society and 
local communities—from Sudan to Kenya to Mali—have been on the front lines 
of embedding and expanding the reach of international justice whether through 
advancing principles and standard-making or engaging directly with mechanisms 
such as the ICC. Many have put their lives on the line for their commitment to 
the transformative promise of equitable global justice.”178 Civil society groups in 
countries under investigation by the ICC have been particularly active in calling 
for accountability for international crimes, monitoring trials, and organizing public 
information campaigns.179 
Civil society has been involved in the creation of the criminal justice component 
of the ACJHR. African civil society organizations and legal experts have made 
recommendations to the AU and its member states,180 and published analysis and 
advocacy pieces in relation to the issue.181 Many African civil society organizations 
have signed on to a series of letters with counterparts from international civil society 
organizations at various points as AU bodies have deliberated over ACJHR issues. 
Ahead of the AU Assembly meeting in July 2012, for example, where adoption of  
the draft protocol on amendments to the African Court was on the agenda,  
47 organizations called upon African states parties to the ICC to consider deferring 
signing endorsement of the draft protocol in order to permit further consultation 
and study on a variety of remaining issues. The letter stressed that the draft protocol 
did not fully comprehend the complexity of the establishment of a regional criminal 
court, that no discussions had taken place on the financial implications of a merged 
court, and that the relationship between the African Regional Court and the ICC 
needed to be further clarified before the Protocol could be adopted.182 Although the 
AU has not taken up these and other civil society recommendations, the adoption 
of the draft protocol was postponed at this time partly because of civil society 
involvement. Since then, international and local civil society groups have continued 
to actively monitor developments and commented on other versions of the draft 
protocol and the creation of a regional criminal court.183
Creation
There have been two related but distinct aspects to creating a court with jurisdiction 
over international crimes. The first has entailed steps to merge existing courts to 
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create an African court with criminal jurisdiction (the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights, ACJHR); the second entails the effort to provide the resultant ACJHR 
with jurisdiction over grave crimes (the Malabo Protocol).
The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights
In 1981, the Organization of African Unity (OAU, the precursor to the AU) created 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to protect and promote 
rights and interpret the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.184 In 1998, 
the OAU created the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights to supplement 
the mandate of the African Commission in the interpretation and protection of 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Their intention was to create 
a judicial body that could issue decisions that would be binding on states. The 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment 
of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted in 1998, entered into 
force in January 2004. The court started operations in 2004, but only became 
fully operational at the beginning of 2006.185 The court issued its ﬁrst decision on 
December 15, 2009.
African Court of Justice
The AU adopted the Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union in 2003, 
and it entered into force in February 2009. The AU envisaged the African Court of 
Justice (ACJ) as its main judicial organ, responsible for adjudicating a range of legal 
disputes, including AU treaty law and “any question of international law.”186 The 
Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union entered into force in February 
2009 when it received the requisite 15 ratifications. However, as the protocol almost 
coincided with the 2004 entry into force of the ACHPR, the idea of merging courts 
gained traction. With the adoption of a new proposal for a merged ACJHR in 2008, 
the AU has not operationalized the ACJ.
African Court of Justice and Human Rights
The 2008 Protocol on the Statute of the ACJHR sets outs that the ACJHR will have 
a general affairs section with the authority to interpret AU treaties and solve legal 
disputes between African states. It will also have a human rights section, which, like 
the ACHPR, would be responsible for the interpretation and the application of the 
African human rights charter and other human rights instruments. As of June 2017, 
30 states had signed and six states had ratified the 2008 Protocol on the Statute 
of the ACJHR.187 While the requisite ratifications are still pending for the merged 
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court to come into force, simultaneously the AU put forward a second proposal for a 
tripartite mandate of the ACJHR: the Malabo Protocol. 
The Malabo Protocol
The Constitutive Act of the African Union, adopted in 2000, suggested the need for 
the creation of a criminal court. It established that the AU has the right “to intervene 
in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave 
circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity,” and 
that “condemnation and rejection of impunity” is a shared principle.188 The proposal 
to give the ACJHR criminal jurisdiction paralleled other AU proposals to establish a 
regional or special court to prosecute crimes committed by Hissène Habré in Chad 
and an inchoate proposal to add human rights jurisdiction to the East African Court 
of Justice.189 Discussions also paralleled the emergence of tensions in the African 
relationship with the ICC and with European states over the application of the 
principle of universal jurisdiction.
During the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in February 2009, 
the AU adopted a resolution tasking the AU Commission, in consultation with the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the ACHPR, “to assess the 
implications of recognizing the jurisdiction of the African Court to try international 
crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and report 
thereon to the Assembly in 2010.”190 With the help of consultants from the Pan 
African Lawyers Association (PALU), a draft protocol amending the Protocol to the 
Statute of the ACJHR was prepared, and then discussed and amended during several 
AU meetings throughout the second part of 2010. Over the course of 2011, three 
meetings on the draft protocol with government experts preceded the November 
2011 provisional adoption of the draft protocol and the amended Statute for the 
ACHPR in Addis Ababa.191 Throughout 2012 and 2013, additional meetings were held 
by the AU Commission to discuss remaining contentious issues, which prevented 
the AU Assembly from adopting the draft protocol in June 2012. These issues were 
the financial implications of a merged court and the definition of the crime of 
unconstitutional change of government.
In June 2014, the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, meeting in 
Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, adopted the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on 
the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (commonly known as 
the Malabo Protocol). The protocol will come into force 30 days after its ratification 
by 15 AU member states. As of October 2017, 10 states had signed the Malabo 
Protocol, but no states had ratified it.192
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Legal Framework and Mandate
Once created, the ACJHR will be the AU’s main judicial organ. It will have 
jurisdiction over “all cases and all legal disputes submitted to it in accordance 
with the present Statute which relate to the interpretation and application” of 
the AU Constitutive Act, legal instruments and decisions of the AU, the African 
human rights charter, the crimes contained in the Statute, and other questions of 
international law.193 Thus the ACJHR will take over the human rights responsibilities 
of the current ACHPR, which has operated since 2006, and will additionally be 
granted the mandate to deal with general legal affairs and the prosecution of 
international crimes under the statute. 
With entry into force of the Malabo Protocol, the ACJHR would also have material 
jurisdiction to try 14 different crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, the crime of unconstitutional change of government, piracy, terrorism, 
mercenarism, corruption, money laundering, trafficking in persons, trafficking in 
drugs, trafficking in hazardous wastes, illicit exploitation of natural resources, and 
the crime of aggression.194 Additionally, there is a provision allowing states parties 
to further extend the court’s jurisdiction.195 The statute’s definition of war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and genocide are taken from the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
The offenses of unconstitutional change of government, mercenarism, and crimes 
relating to the environment are completely new to criminal tribunals. These new 
crimes included in the Malabo Protocol are generally of “particular resonance to 
Africa for which only Africa may be interested in dealing with.”196
Beyond its extended list of crimes, the Malabo Protocol is innovative in its expansion 
of criminal liability to corporations under certain circumstances.197 This is a first for 
an international criminal court.198 Africa is rich in conflicts over natural resources, 
often fueled by the actions of international corporations. Thus, expanding criminal 
responsibility to corporations could present an opportunity for Africa to deal with 
a characteristic sort of conflict within its borders, in a world where multinational 
corporations have been shielded from criminal responsibility for their actions.199 
The territorial jurisdiction of the ACJHR will be limited to crimes committed  
within the territory or by nationals of states parties, and is temporally limited to the 
entry into force of the Malabo Protocol or the specific date of ratification for any 
particular state.200 
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The most controversial aspect of the Malabo Protocol is its provision on immunity 
for sitting heads of state and government. Article 46A provides that “no charges 
shall be commenced or continued before the Court against any serving AU Head of 
State or Government, or anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity, or other 
senior state officials based on their functions, during their tenure of office.”201 Many 
African and international scholars and civil society organizations have criticized 
this provision.202 While head of state immunity is a disputed concept in international 
law, since the 1990s there has been a developing norm that official capacity is no 
bar to prosecution when it concerns international crimes. No other international 
or hybrid criminal tribunal allows for such immunity, and the statutes of many 
even include a provision stating the opposite. The ICTR, SCSL, and EAC have all 
prosecuted African leaders for their involvement in international crimes, which has 
contributed to the global trend in international law policy and practice over recent 
decades. Further, the Malabo Protocol leaves the term “other senior state officials” 
undefined, so the article’s reach in shielding state officials is ambiguous, and 
potentially extensive.
The Malabo Protocol states that the court is complementary to national jurisdictions 
and the courts of regional economic communities, where they are specifically 
provided for by the communities.203 This provision has faced criticism for being 
weaker than the similar complementarity provisions of the Rome Statute.204 
Complicating matters, the Rome Statute makes the ICC complementary to national 
jurisdictions, but makes no mention of regional criminal courts.205 Similarly, the 
Malabo Protocol makes no mention of the Rome Statute or the ICC. If and when the 
ACJHR starts operations, there will be a need for clarity with regard to situations 
under investigation by both, as well as issues of cooperation in the arrest and 
surrender of suspects. Additionally, potentially conflicting legal obligations arising 
for African states who are party to both the ACJHR and ICC need to be resolved.206
Location
The Malabo Protocol provides that “the Seat of the Court shall be same as the Seat 
of the African Court of Human and People’s Rights. However, the Court may sit 
in any other Member State, if circumstances warrant, and with the consent of the 
Member State concerned. The Assembly may change the seat of the Court after due 
consultations with the Court.”207 This means that, at least initially, the ACJHR will 
be based in Arusha, Tanzania, where the ACHPR has been seated since 2007. 
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Structure and Composition
The ACJHR will be composed of three main sections: a General Affairs Section, 
a Human and Peoples’ Rights Section, and the International Criminal Law (ICL) 
Section.208 Beyond these three chambers, the ACJHR will have an independent 
Office of the Prosecutor, an independent Defense Office, and a Registry. 
Chambers 
The ACJHR will have a total of 16 judges, with five judges appointed to the General 
Affairs Section, five to the Human and Peoples’ Rights Section, and six to the of 
the ICL Section.209 The ICL Section will consist of a Pre-trial section of one judge, a 
Trial Chamber of three judges, and an Appellate Chamber of five judges.210 The AU 
Executive Council elects the judges, who are appointed by the AU Assembly, with 
consideration of equitable regional and gender representation.211 The full roster of 
judges elects a president and vice president during the Criminal Law Chamber’s first 
ordinary session, and the appointment is for a period of two years.212 
Some have voiced concerns that the total number of judges of the ACJHR, and the 
number of judges assigned to the criminal law chamber, will not be sufficient for 
the court to carry out its mandate effectively.213 With only six judges available for 
all three stages of trial, it seems inevitable that the ICL Section will face cross-
contamination issues. (Cross-contamination occurs when a judge is later assigned 
to another chamber dealing with the same case in a later stage of the trial.) Based on 
the experience of the ICC—where the Pre-trial and Trial Chambers are composed 
of three judges and the Appeals Chamber of five judges—it seems impossible for the 
ICL Section to cover a full trial with six judges without having to assign the same 
judges to multiple divisions, causing concern about the fairness of the proceedings. 
Furthermore, with the wide range of crimes incorporated in the ACJHR’s mandate, it 
will be difficult to find a roster of judges with expertise in all areas.214
The Office of the Prosecutor
Under the amended ACJHR statute, “The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) shall be 
responsible for the investigation and prosecution of the crimes specified in this 
Statute and shall act independently as a separate organ of the Court and shall not 
seek or receive instructions from any State Party or any other sources.” 215 The OTP 
has the power to question victims and witnesses, to collect evidence, and to conduct 
investigations at the sites of crimes. The AU Assembly appoints the prosecutor 
and deputy prosecutor to nonrenewable terms of seven years and four years, 
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respectively. The chief prosecutor is responsible for the appointment of other staff  
in the OTP.216
To a similar extent as the ICC prosecutor, the ACJHR prosecutor will have propio 
muto powers to initiate investigations into any crime under the statute. Criminal 
law cases and legal disputes may also be brought to the court’s attention by states 
parties, several internal AU institutions including the AU Assembly and the 
Peace and Security Council, and staff members of the AU (in the case of legal 
disputes).217 Regional and national human rights organizations, individuals, and 
nongovernmental organizations may also submit cases to the Human and Peoples’ 
Rights Section with regard to violations of human rights.218 
The Registry 
The Registry fulfills administrative and court management tasks. The court appoints 
a registrar to lead the Registry for a single, nonrenewable seven-year term. Three 
assistant registrars and other staff support the registrar in his or her work. The 
statute provides that the Registry will have a dedicated Victims and Witnesses Unit 
and a Detention Management Unit.219
The Defense Office
The ACJHR Statute provides that “the Court shall establish, maintain and develop 
a Defense Office for the purpose of ensuring the rights of suspects and accused and 
any other person entitled to legal assistance.”220 A principal defender appointed 
by the AU Assembly heads the Defense Office. The inclusion of an independent 
Defense Office in the ACJHR’s structure to help ensure the “equality of arms” 
between the prosecution and defense has not been a feature in most other 
international criminal courts.221
The Victims and Witnesses Unit
The Registry will house a Victims and Witnesses Unit, which shall provide 
“protective measures and security arrangements, counselling and other appropriate 
assistance for witnesses, victims who appear before the Court and others who are at 
risk on account of testimony given by such witnesses.”222 In addition to a specialized 
unit for the protection and support of victims and witnesses, the statute provides 
that the AU Assembly may establish a trust fund to grant legal aid and assistance to 
victims and their families in accordance with court decisions.223
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Prosecutions
As of October 2017, the ACJHR was not in operation. As of late 2017, six states had 
ratified the 2008 “merger protocol” to create the ACJHR, and none had ratified the 
Malabo Protocol.224 The merged African Court will have jurisdiction to adjudicate 
general international law disputes and human rights violations, and if the Malabo 
Protocol enters into force, also to prosecute international crimes. Obtaining the 
necessary ratifications will likely take several years. 
Legacy
The proposal to create the ACJHR has sparked intense debate between proponents 
who emphasize its potential positive impact at local, regional, and international 
levels, and opponents who question the proposal’s feasibility, as well as the 
motivations behind it. 
The Malabo Protocol’s Potential 
As described in the preceding sections, the Malabo Protocol’s innovations include 
expanded jurisdiction over international and transnational crimes, a regional 
approach to criminal justice, the possibility for the prosecution of corporations for 
international crimes, and the court’s structuring to include a designated victim’s 
office and the establishment of a Defense Office with status equivalent to that of 
the Office of the Prosecutor. Thus, a merged African Court could “expand the scope 
and reach of international law, and possibly trigger similar efforts in other regions or 
even at the ICC.”225 In the court’s regional approach to international criminal justice, 
proponents see potential for it to have a positive influence on the development of a 
regional culture of accountability and the development of local justice systems and 
legal norms.226 
Doubts about Feasibility and Motivation 
However, skeptics doubt the wisdom of building a court with such expansive 
jurisdiction, especially in light of experience at the ICC and other international 
tribunals, where complex cases can take years to conclude. “The scope of the court’s 
jurisdictional reach is breathtaking. Even before the International Criminal Law 
(ICL) Section was introduced, the court would have had its hands full. With the ICL 
section added, there must be legitimate questions about the capacity of the court 
to fulfill not only its newfound ICL obligations, but also about the effect that such 
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stretching will have on the court’s ability to deal with its general and human rights 
obligations.”227 There is concern that the merged court will undermine the work of 
the ACHPR, which started operations in 2010. With a small total number of judges, 
it could be difficult for the court to attract judges and staff with requisite skills and 
competences in all aspects of its diverse mandate.228  
Skeptics also question whether there is sufficient political commitment within 
the AU to make the ACJHR an effective institution. Some have argued that “the 
establishment of the Chamber is not motivated by the genuine desire to bring 
to justice the alleged perpetrators of international crimes.”229 Despite a range of 
motives for the ACJHR with criminal jurisdiction, some states (such as Kenya and 
Sudan) first heavily engaged in the diplomatic push for its creation in the context 
of controversial cases at the ICC and European universal jurisdiction cases against 
African leaders. Thus, doubters view the ACJHR as a means for African leaders to 
assert control over international crimes cases and so possibly shield themselves  
from prosecution in other courts.230 The inclusion of a broad official immunity 
provision in the Malabo Protocol feeds this doubt.231 Some commentators fear that 
extending the ACHJR’s jurisdiction would lead to an institutionalized impunity gap,  
“forum-shopping,” and a “regional African exceptionalism to international criminal 
law and international justice.”232
Finally, operating a court of this ambition will require significant financial resources. 
Some civil society groups and observers are skeptical that the African Union would 
commit the resources to dramatically expand and restructure the court, especially 
given that the ACHPR has been underfunded.233
Financing
The AU is responsible for financing the court because it is an AU treaty body.234 
The court’s tripartite jurisdiction means a large budget. During negotiations on 
the creation of the criminal chambers, the AU estimated that in order to properly 
function, the ICL Section of the ACJHR alone would require a minimum annual 
budget of US$4,422,530.235 For the year 2017, the ACHPR had a proposed budget of 
US$11,282,179, which was an almost 10 percent increase over the 2016 budget.236  
By comparison, these numbers represent a small fraction of the ICC’s 2017 budget.237 
This is striking, especially since the ICC’s mandate (albeit pertaining to a much 
broader geography) currently only includes three crimes, while the ACJHR would 
have jurisdiction over a much larger range of crimes, in addition to its general and 
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human rights affairs mandates. Given past experiences with complex international 
crimes cases (e.g., the cost of the relatively inexpensive trial of Hissène Habré trial 
in the EAC was around US$9 million238), “the cost of prosecuting one international 
crime could well outstrip the annual budget of the African Court as a whole.”239
Oversight and Accountability
Under the statute, the AU Executive Council nominates judges, the prosecutor, 
and the deputy prosecutor, who are appointed by the AU Assembly.240 The court 
is required to submit an annual report to the AU Assembly on its investigations, 
prosecutions, decisions, and issues of state cooperation.241 The AU Assembly is 
responsible for oversight of the court’s budget, as well as the enforcement  
of sentences.242
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BURUNDI: PROPOSED SPECIAL CHAMBER 
Conflict Background and Political Context
Colonial powers Germany (until 1916) and then Belgium pursued divide-and-rule 
tactics in Burundi, sharpening tensions between the Hutu majority and a favored 
Tutsi minority.243 From the time of independence in 1962, Burundi has suffered 
waves of ethnic violence between Hutus and Tutsis, as well as armed rebellion, 
political assassinations, and massive internal displacement of people. In 1972, the 
government engaged in “genocidal repression” of Hutus, killing over 100,000.244 
Violence targeting Tutsis in 1993 led to the deaths of an estimated 300,000 people. 
At times, observers have characterized the ethnic violence as genocide.245 In 1996, 
President Pierre Buyoya assumed power through a coup. Years of peace negotiations 
and power-sharing agreements between the Tutsi-controlled government and 
several Hutu rebel groups culminated in the Arusha Agreement of 2000,246 which 
established a five-year transitional government, and along with a 2003 ceasefire 
agreement, contributed to relative peace and stability over these five years. The 
agreement also granted limited immunities to rebel leaders of the National Council 
for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD). 
In 2005, led by President Pierre Nkurunziza, the CNDD-FDD’s political wing won 
general elections. 
Despite periodic outbreaks of violence, after 2005 there were signs of increasing 
stability. The government and the last major rebel group, the Forces for National 
Liberation (FNL) signed a ceasefire in 2006, and the UN ended its peacekeeping 
mission the following year. The FNL transitioned from an armed group to a  
political party in 2009. 
However, in 2010 President Nkurunziza won re-election amid complaints of election 
rigging and a boycott by the main opposition parties, during which time he also 
started showing increasingly authoritarian tendencies. In Nkurunziza’s second 
term, hard-liners within his government sought to erode an ethnic quota system for 
government and military appointments enshrined in the 2000 Arusha Agreement.247 
The government passed a restrictive media law in 2013. In 2014, as the end of 
Nkurunziza’s second term approached, the UN warned that the government was 
forming an armed youth wing and the government jailed an opposition leader for 
slander. In 2015, Nkurunziza ran for a third term, which the Constitutional Court 
approved amid reports that judges faced intimidation. The decision ran counter to 
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a two-term limit in the Arusha Agreement and in Burundi’s 2005 constitution.248 
Despite mass demonstrations against his bid for a third term, opposition from the 
second vice president (who fled the country), mounting violence in April 2015, and a 
failed coup attempt the following month,249 the elections proceeded, and Nkurunziza 
claimed victory in the July 2015 vote. Civil society organizations promptly challenged 
the legality of his third term at the East African Court of Justice.250
As of September 2017, there were reports that from the onset of renewed large-scale 
political violence in April 2015, over 1,200 Burundians had been killed, and (as of 
October 31, 2017) over 400,000 had fled as refugees to neighboring countries.251 
In September 2017, a UN Commission of Inquiry reported to the Human Rights 
Council that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Burundi’s National 
Intelligence Service, police, army, and Imbonerakure (the ruling party’s youth wing) 
had been committing crimes against humanity since April 2015. More specifically, 
the commission concluded that these forces had perpetrated acts of extrajudicial 
execution; arbitrary arrest and detention; enforced disappearance; torture and cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment; and sexual violence.252
From 2000 onward, there has been increased focus on the question of criminal 
accountability for grave crimes in Burundi. That year, the Arusha Agreement 
contained provisions for a possible track leading to an international criminal 
tribunal authorized by the UN Security Council. In 2005, a mission deployed by the 
Secretary-General issued its report (the “Kalomoh Report”), recommending the 
creation of a Special Chamber within Burundi’s judiciary to deal with grave crimes.253 
In December 2004, Burundi’s ratification of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) came into effect. After violence and reports of grave crimes 
increased in 2015, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda announced in April 2016 that 
her office was opening a preliminary examination into the situation in Burundi.254 
In October 2016, the UN Human Rights Council created a commission of inquiry 
to “conduct a thorough investigation into human rights violations and abuses in 
Burundi since April 2015, including on their extent and whether they may constitute 
international crimes, with a view to contributing to the fight against impunity,”  
as well to identify perpetrators of those crimes.255 
In response to mounting pressure, the government of Burundi announced that it 
would withdraw from the Rome Statute, and a parliamentary vote in October 2016 
began the process of withdrawal.256 Reporting to the Human Rights Council in 
September 2017, the UN Commission of Inquiry recommended that the ICC open a 
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full investigation (a significant step beyond preliminary examination).257 By the time 
Burundi’s withdrawal from the Rome Statute took effect on October 27, 2017, there 
had still been no announcement of a full ICC investigation. However, on November 
9, 2017, the ICC announced the unsealing of a decision by a Pre-trial Chamber, 
which approved the opening of an investigation two days prior to Burundi’s 
withdrawal. The judges decided that the ICC may exercise its jurisdiction over 
Burundi for events occurring during its time as a state party to the Rome Statute—
and that Burundi remained obligated to cooperate.258
Existing Justice-Sector Capacity
The Kalomoh Report found that Burundi’s justice sector suffers from a heavy ethnic 
imbalance, executive interference, and a lack of independence; it faces severe 
resource and capacity shortcomings, including minimal infrastructure, a lack of 
qualified judicial personnel, and low salaries.259 Without significant international 
involvement and technical assistance, the Kalomoh Report concluded, the justice 
system’s “capacity to deal with complex cases involving genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes is virtually non-existent.”260 In 2015, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on transitional justice concluded that “the executive branch and the 
governing political party continue to control the justice sector at all levels.”261 In 
2017, the UN Commission of Inquiry found that “pervasive impunity [for serious 
violations of human rights perpetrated in 2016 and 2017] was aggravated by a 
judiciary lacking independence.”262
Existing Civil Society Capacity
Even prior to the worsening violence that commenced in April 2015, donor countries 
and civil society organizations had grown increasingly skeptical about Burundi’s 
commitment to the establishment of a mixed chamber, noting the tightening of 
political freedoms and threats to civil society independence. Accordingly, civil 
society was focused less on calling for accountability for past atrocity crimes than on 
defending shrinking political freedoms. The government continued to crack down 
on civil society organizations, including freezing their bank accounts and cancelling 
activities.263 Following government suspension of several Burundian NGOs in October 
2016, five organizations filed a complaint before the East Africa Court of Justice, citing 
violations of the right to freedom of association as well as other concerns.264 
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Tutsis are prevalent among civil society leaders, and this has fueled government 
hate speech targeting civil society organizations; a “significant number” of civil 
society leaders were among the hundreds of thousands who had fled the country 
by mid-2016.265 The government has banned civil society organizations that have 
documented grave crimes and human rights abuses and spoken out about the  
causes of violence.266 In February 2017, a group of UN experts observed:  
“The situation for human rights defenders has been dramatically deteriorating for 
more than a year and a half. Those who have not yet left the country fear for their 
life and are under relentless intimidation, threat of arbitrary detention, torture  
and enforced disappearance.”267
Creation
The Arusha Agreement of 2000 called for the UN to create an international 
judicial Commission of Inquiry. Should the report of the commission “point to 
the existence of ” acts of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, the 
Arusha Agreement stipulated that the government of Burundi would request “the 
establishment by the United Nations Security Council of an international criminal 
tribunal to try and punish those responsible.”268 
The UN did not create a post-2000 international Commission of Inquiry. Instead, in 
January 2004, following a request by then-President Pierre Buyoya, the Secretary-
General dispatched an assessment mission to Burundi to advise on the added value 
of creating an international judicial Commission of Inquiry, considering the series 
of international and national commissions of inquiries since 1993.269 Buyoya’s 
request came at a critical political period: months before the end of the transitional 
governance period, and ahead of interim elections scheduled for October 2004. 
The assessment mission’s March 2005 report (the “Kalomoh Report”), advised 
against establishing an international judicial Commission of Inquiry. Instead, the 
report recommended a hybrid Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and a 
Special Chamber for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes in Burundi, 
with mixed international and national judges, prosecutors, and registry staff, located 
within the Burundian courts.270 The mission explicitly modeled its recommendation 
on the War Crimes Chamber of the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH 
WCC).271 (See the Bosnian mechanism profile in Annex 4.) 
The Security Council adopted the assessment mission’s recommendations and 
requested the Secretary-General to negotiate the creation of the two mechanisms.272 
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In October 2005, the Secretary-General delivered a brief preliminary report, noting 
that negotiations with the Burundian government had stalled.273 Two more rounds 
of negotiations between the UN and Burundi in March 2006 and March 2007 
both failed to reach an agreement on establishing the mechanisms.274 National 
consultations in 2009 among the government of Burundi, Burundian civil society, 
and the United Nations resulted in recommendations in 2010 for the establishment 
of a hybrid TRC and a hybrid special tribunal.275 The government signaled to the UN 
Human Rights Council that a TRC would be constituted first and a mixed chamber 
would then follow, although other civil society analysts perceived a general lack 
of political will to create a special tribunal.276 The government circulated a draft 
bill for the TRC in 2011, which met with criticism from civil society leaders and 
international NGOs. 
A bill to create the TRC finally passed in May 2014, providing the new body with a 
mandate to cover events from 1962 through 2008.277 In December 2014, the National 
Assembly elected 11 commissioners, whom the president appointed later that same 
month.278 Critics, including Burundian civil society leaders, have sharply criticized 
the TRC, saying that it is dominated by the ruling CNDD-FDD party, claiming 
that three commissioners are themselves suspected of perpetrating grave crimes, 
and noting that the bill to create the commission made no mention of the criminal 
accountability mechanism agreed to at Arusha.279
Since 1993, the UN Security Council’s overall policy toward transitional justice in 
Burundi has privileged peace and stability over judicial accountability. Observers 
have noted the Security Council’s decision to delay the publication of the Kalomoh 
Report’s recommendation for the Special Chamber until after the end of the 
transitional government and elections—at which point the new government stalled 
negotiations. The failure to establish criminal justice mechanisms in Burundi for 
grave crimes can be explained in part by contrasting the post-conflict political 
situation in Burundi to the situation of its neighbor, Rwanda. After the 1994 
Rwandan genocide, “there was a clear winner and a new political regime … in such a 
setting it was much more ‘easy’ [sic] for the international community to establish an 
international criminal tribunal to prosecute those responsible.”280 Unlike in Rwanda 
(where justice mechanisms have been criticized for a failure to examine grave crimes 
committed by the government and its forces), there has been no clear winner in 
Burundi. As the CNDD-FDD has consolidated power since 2010, and especially 
since 2015, it could end up being such a winner, possibly ushering in transitional 
justice mechanisms designed to punish enemies rather than deliver impartial justice.
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Legal Framework and Mandate
The Kalomoh Report recommended that Burundian law form the basis for the Special 
Chamber’s work, “with the necessary modifications introduced to ensure procedural 
guarantees of fair trial and due process of law.”281 The report noted that in order to 
secure UN backing, the Special Chamber should not permit the death penalty, or 
recognize amnesties for international crimes.282 The chamber would have subject 
matter jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes; personal 
jurisdiction over those “bearing the greatest responsibility”; and temporal jurisdiction 
over specific parts of the conflict during the period, “at a minimum,” of 1972–1993.283 
Location
The Kalomoh Report noted that “given the available infrastructure in the Palais 
de justice in Bujumbura, additional premises will have to be provided by the 
Government, and refurbished, if necessary, by the special chamber.”284
Structure and Composition
The mission recommended creating a mixed criminal chamber, “forming part of the 
Burundian court system (a ‘court within a court’), with a view to strengthening the 
judicial sector in material and human resources, leaving behind a legacy of trained 
judges, prosecutors, defense counsel and experienced court managers.”285 
The Kalomoh Report modeled its proposal for the Special Chamber upon the 
BiH WCC, which in 2004 was in the process of being established. The mission 
“examined the variety of UN-based or assisted tribunals, their legal status, financial 
mechanism, efficiency and cost-effectiveness and the legacy they left,” but rejected 
other models because of high cost, lengthy procedures, and reduced impact of 
proceedings not located in situ.286 
The TRC and Special Chamber would complement overall judicial reform, capacity 
building, and rule-of-law initiatives.287 The mission proposed the following structure 
and design for the Special Chambers:288
 • A bilateral agreement between the UN and Burundi would determine 
the modalities of cooperation in the “establishment and operation” of 
the chamber.289 
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 • The chamber would be comprised of a three-judge trial panel or 
panels, and a five-judge appellate panel. 
 • The chamber would have mixed composition, with a majority of 
international judges, an international prosecutor, and international 
registrar. The staff of the prosecutor’s office and court management 
sections would include a “substantial international component.”
Prosecutions
As of October 2017, the Special Chamber had not been created, and there had been 
no proceedings for grave crimes.
Legacy
Twelve years after the UN assessment mission’s recommendation to create a 
Special Chamber in Burundi’s courts, there is no sign of the government acting to 
do so. Rather, violence has worsened, and the UN and others have identified new 
grave crimes perpetrated mainly by government actors. Limited and temporary 
immunities included in the Arusha Agreement of 2000 have grown in scope 
and extended in time, further cementing a lack of accountability.290 Burundi’s 
withdrawal from the Rome Statute suggests that the government is determined 
to avoid any form of judicial scrutiny for its alleged role in extrajudicial killings, 
torture, sexual violence, enforced disappearances, or other grave crimes. 
Financing
The Kalomoh Report stated that while both the TRC and Special Chamber would 
be national entities, “the establishment of any accountability mechanism will have 
to rely in its entirety on international funding, whether in the form of voluntary 
contributions or, in part at least, through assessed contributions.”291 The mission 
reported that relying on voluntary contributions alone, as at the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, would jeopardize the chamber’s impact and continuity.292
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Oversight and Accountability
The Kalomoh Report did not specify how oversight and accountability would work at 
the proposed Special Chambers. However, its recommendation that the government 
of Burundi and the United Nations jointly establish the chamber suggests that a mix 
of national law and UN provisions would determine formal oversight.  
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: SPECIAL CRIMINAL COURT
Conflict Background and Political Context
The Central African Republic (CAR) was ravaged by the slave trade—a rapacious 
form of French colonial rule that pitted CAR’s diverse peoples against each 
other—and a series of brutal dictatorships and foreign interventions following 
independence in 1961.293 France continued military interventions following CAR’s 
independence, and the country has seen involvement by forces from Libya, Sudan, 
Chad, the Lord’s Resistance Army, and various rebel groups from the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC). 
CAR’s leaders increasingly politicized north-south ethnic divisions from the 1980s 
onward, as presidents from the two regions stacked their administrations and 
military ranks with regional loyalists and ethnic favorites.294 Because the country’s 
religious divides roughly parallel regional ones (a largely Christian south and largely 
Muslim north), this politics of favoritism and exclusion increasingly bred resentment 
and armed mobilization along religious lines.295 
After President Ange-Félix Patassé, a northerner, fostered resentment in his own 
region through economic neglect and exclusion of previously favored tribes, his 
erstwhile Army Chief of Staff François Bozizé attempted to overthrow him in 2002 
with the support of northern militias and Chad. Patassé put down that rebellion 
with support from Libya and Congolese rebel leader Jean-Pierre Bemba, but Bozizé 
succeeded in overthrowing Patassé in 2003. Bemba’s forces were widely accused 
of rampant crimes in CAR, eventually leading to his arrest and trial in relation to 
murder, rape, and pillage at the International Criminal Court (ICC). (See text box on 
the ICC, below.) 
Despite peace agreements with several armed groups, instability in CAR continued 
throughout Bozizé’s time as the country’s leader. A coalition of rebel groups from the 
heavily marginalized northeast region of the country banded together as “Séléka” 
(“union” or “alliance” in the Sango language) to overthrow Bozizé in March 2013 
and install their leader, Michel Djotodia, as president.296 Séléka forces went on a 
rampage of killing, rape, and looting that largely targeted Christians; in response, 
mostly Christian “Anti-Balaka” (“anti-machete” in Sango) self-defense groups 
formed, which quickly devolved into vigilante militias that targeted Muslims and 
extensively perpetrated grave crimes.297 Facing criticism for a failure to control 
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his forces, President Djotodia disbanded the Séléka in September 2013, but the 
northeastern militias have since splintered and at times targeted each other.298
Under pressure from France and the Economic Community of the Central African 
States, Djotodia resigned in January 2014.299 A National Transitional Council 
appointed Catherine Samba-Panza as interim leader. She served as president until 
elections were organized under a new constitution. Faustin-Archange Touadéra, a 
former prime minister under Bozizé, won a February 2016 run-off election. 
As of November 2017, violence and the perpetration of grave crimes in CAR were 
continuing, despite the new constitution, a peaceful presidential election, and the 
presence of a UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSCA). Government control barely 
extended beyond the capital, Bangui, and a multitude of armed factions continued 
to fight each other and target civilians, often along religious and ethnic lines.300 
Reliable figures for the number of Central Africans killed are not available. As of 
September 17, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported 




The court system in CAR has a reputation for lacking independence and for being 
corrupt and politicized.302 Significant challenges have long plagued the court 
system.303 The outbreak of armed conflict exacerbated these problems, and CAR’s 
judiciary and prison system were seriously weakened or completely destroyed, 
creating a situation of endemic impunity for grave crimes.304 According to the UN 
Commission of Inquiry, longstanding impunity for grave crimes was a major factor 
in fueling the armed conflict.305
According to the International Legal Assistance Consortium, the justice sector 
lacks even the most basic infrastructure and administrative capacities.306 Amnesty 
International reports that the justice system needs to be rebuilt “almost entirely”  
in order to combat entrenched impunity.307 However, the challenges of such a reform 
are many, including a distrust of the justice system by the local population; lack of 
physical infrastructure; lack of specialized and qualified human resources (judges, 
lawyers, magistrates); insecurity; a dysfunctional corrections system; and a lack of 
financial resources, an issue compounded by a lack of prioritization of  
justice-sector funding by successive governments.308 Moreover, detention centers  
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are often inadequate and the judicial police lack capacity for conducting 
investigations into grave crimes.309 In some cases, prosecutors re-classified cases in 
order to refer them to civil courts, where the charges did not reflect the gravity of 
the crimes.310 In 2015 and 2016, UN partners extended their support to help reopen a 
number of courts and resume basic justice and security services. However, concerns 
remain about the ability of ordinary courts to bolster the accountability efforts 
spearheaded by the SCC.311
Existing Civil Society Capacity
Civil society has played an active role in peacebuilding in CAR and continues to be 
influential in the political transition and in restoring stability. For example, in August 
2015, a group of national and international civil society organizations called for 
financial and technical support to expedite the establishment of the SCC.312 
There are at least 140 organizations actively engaged in peacebuilding, human 
rights, and development work across the country.313 Traditional leaders, as part of 
the broad scope of civil society, also play a role in the peacebuilding process by  
using their influence to stop and prevent violence by communities and armed 
groups.314 However, many of the larger national and international NGOs are based 
in Bangui, the capital, and lack the resources and funding to extend their activities 
to rural regions. In addition, many local organizations are dependent on external 




CAR ratified the Rome Statute on October 3, 2001, and in 2004 referred the 
situation in its territory since July 1, 2002, to the ICC. The ICC prosecutor opened 
a preliminary examination to determine whether he would open an investigation 
into crimes committed in CAR. The ICC is intended to be complementary to 
national jurisdictions. In 2006, the CAR Cour de Cassation (the highest criminal 
court in CAR) held that the CAR judicial system was unable to investigate and try 
those responsible for grave crimes. In May 2007, the ICC prosecutor opened an 
investigation in CAR into crimes allegedly committed in 2002 and 2003. 
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The 2007 investigation led to charges against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo. Bemba 
was a politician, businessman, and former militia leader in the DRC. Patassé 
requested Bemba’s support to counter Bozizé’s forces, and Bemba deployed 1,500 
fighters to CAR in 2002. The ICC prosecutor charged Bemba with five counts of war 
crimes and two counts of crimes against humanity allegedly committed in CAR from 
October 26, 2002, to March 15, 2003. Bemba, who had been living in Belgium, was 
arrested by Belgian authorities and sent to the ICC in July 2008. An ICC Pre-trial 
Chamber confirmed five charges against him: the war crimes of murder, rape, and 
pillaging, plus the crimes against humanity of murder and rape. The trial started in 
November 2010. On March 21, 2016, the judges of Trial Chamber III found Bemba 
guilty of all charges on the basis of command responsibility. The judges found that 
he knew that his Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) militia troops were 
committing or about to commit crimes, but he failed to take reasonable measures to 
deter or punish these crimes. The judges sentenced him to 18 years in prison. As of 
October 2017, Bemba’s appeal of his conviction was still pending.
In 2014, on the basis of another referral from the transitional government of CAR,315 
the ICC prosecutor opened another preliminary examination, and later an investigation, 
into the situation in CAR. The prosecutor is investigating crimes allegedly committed 
in CAR since 2012, including war crimes and crimes against humanity.316
Commission of Inquiry and UNSC Sanctions
In late 2013, the UN Secretary-General established an international Commission of 
Inquiry to investigate the violation of international human rights and humanitarian 
laws in CAR since January 2013.317 The commission started work in April 2014, 
submitting a preliminary report in June 2014 and a final report in December 2014.318 
The commission concluded that all parties to the conflict were involved in serious 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.319 The resolution in 
2013 had also established a sanctions regime, which in January 2017, the Security 
Council extended until 2018.320 The sanctions regime includes an arms embargo as 
well as a travel ban and assets freeze on individuals designated by the commission.321
The SCC
In May 2015, a large grassroots gathering convened in CAR’s capital; the “Bangui 
Forum on Reconciliation” called for accountability mechanisms, including the SCC 
and a TRC.322 Following on the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry, 
CAR’s transitional president, Catherine Samba-Panza, promulgated Act No. 15.003 
of June 3, 2015, which established the SCC.323 The SCC is not an international or 
hybrid court—it is a national court that sits within the national judicial system and 
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will primarily apply domestic laws.324 However, it has both national and international 
judges, an international prosecutor, and an international deputy registrar. It is 
being heavily supported by MINUSCA as explicitly mandated by the UN Security 
Council,325 as well as by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and 
other international partners. 
The SCC has an initial mandate of five years starting from the date of its 
establishment (renewable if necessary) and is being developed in phases.326 As 
of late 2017, the process of establishing and operationalizing the court remained 
slow. A major step forward came with the February 2017 appointment of Toussaint 
Muntazini Mukimapa, a former military prosecutor from the DRC, as special 
prosecutor.327 As of November 2017, five national magistrates as well as an 
international deputy prosecutor (from Canada) and two international investigating 
judges (from Burkina Faso and France) had also been appointed. The Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence were being drafted prior to consultations and adoption, 
and the SCC’s prosecutorial strategy and a witness and victim protection plan for the 
SCC as well as the wider national court system were also under development.328
Legal Framework and Mandate
The SCC legal framework and mandate is grounded in Loi Organique 15.003.  
The SCC has jurisdiction to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate grave violations  
of human rights and international humanitarian law committed on the territory  
of CAR since January 1, 2003. The SCC has jurisdiction over the entire territory of  
CAR and jurisdiction over acts committed in foreign territories where CAR has 
a mutual assistance agreement in place, or in the absence of such an agreement, 
where the rules of international criminal cooperation apply.329 The SCC also has 
primacy of jurisdiction whenever jurisdictional conflicts may arise with other 
national courts,330 although there is a lack of clarity with respect to the jurisdiction 
of military courts over crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide.331 The 
SCC will not compete with the ICC for cases. According to Law 15.003, if the ICC 
and the SCC have concurrent jurisdiction over a case, then the SCC will defer to the 
jurisdiction of the ICC.332
The SCC’s subject matter jurisdiction is based on domestic law.333 International 
substantive norms and procedural rules apply to the extent that there are gaps or 
inconsistencies with the domestic legal framework.334 This raises some concerns about 
divergences between CAR domestic law and the ICC’s Rome Statute, in particular 
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with respect to the definitions of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.335 
The procedural law applicable before the SCC is generally that outlined by CAR’s code 
of criminal procedure, complemented by international procedural rules.336
The court will have 27 judges—14 Central Africans and 13 internationals—plus a 
Central African president and an international prosecutor, as well as an international 
deputy registrar. It will have an Investigations Chamber, a Special Prosecution 
Chamber, a Trial Chamber, and an Appeals Chamber. It will also have an Office of 
the Special Prosecutor, including the Special Judicial Police Unit and a Registry. The 
SCC law does not state whether there will be an office for defense counsel. However, 
a special unit of lawyers will be established in relation to the SCC to serve all parties 
to the proceedings.337
While the SCC law acknowledges the importance of witness protection, there is no 
mention of a witness protection unit. However, with the assistance of the UNDP and 
MINUSCA, as of late 2017, the SCC was developing a witness and victim protection 
plan. Similarly, the SCC was developing an outreach strategy and had already held 
some outreach meetings with civil society organizations.338
Location
The seat of the SCC is Bangui, though exceptional circumstances may allow it to 
transfer its seat to other places within the territory of CAR.339 
Prosecutions
As of October 2017, the SCC was not yet fully operational, and there had not yet 
been prosecutions. In 2017, the UN released a mapping report on serious crimes 
committed in CAR between 2003 and 2015. It outlined 620 incidents that could fall 
within the SCC’s jurisdiction. These included a wide range of serious human rights 
abuses, violations of international humanitarian law, as well as war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. The report recommended that the SCC prioritize cases 
involving the most serious crimes, considering the scale of crimes committed and 
the impossibility of prosecuting all perpetrators.340 The report underscored the need 
for the prosecutor to publicize a clear prosecutorial strategy that would explain to the 
general public and victims the rationale for case prioritization.341
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Domestic Proceedings apart from the SCC
With support from the UN, CAR prosecutors have undertaken some trials for 
crimes related to the armed conflict. For example in 2016, the Court of Appeal of 
Bangui heard 30 cases related to abuses committed during the conflict, mostly 
implicating Anti-Balaka members. Charges, however, were for relatively minor  
crimes such as criminal association, armed robbery, intentional injury causing 
death, and illegal possession of weapons. None were tried for war crimes or crimes 
against humanity.342 Of these cases, judges acquitted 25 accused or convicted 
them of minor charges and released them with credit for time served. In 27 of those 
cases, the trial and sentencing took place in absentia because the accused had 
escaped prison. In general, cases suffered from poor preparation and insufficient 
evidence, exacerbated by witnesses fearing to testify and inadequate witness 
protection mechanisms.343
Two notable cases—against Rodrigue Ngaïbona (aka Andilo), a high-level  
Anti-Balaka leader, and Yanoué Aubin (aka Chocolat), an Anti-Balaka commander—
demonstrated the challenges of prosecutions in the regular domestic courts. 
Ngaïbona’s case was delayed even though his case file was ready for trial and his 
detention exceeded legal limits. Aubin was tried and sentenced to two years in 
prison for relatively minor offenses—forgery and possessing forged documents—even 
though he has been implicated in the commission of grave crimes. He was released 
at the end of his trial when the judge determined that he had served his sentence  
in pretrial detention.344  
 
Legacy
Although the SCC is not yet fully operational, it has the potential to have a positive 
effect on the national judiciary in CAR and on combating CAR’s endemic impunity. 
In particular, the UN and civil society are working to ensure that the efforts to 
operationalize the SCC can also contribute to capacity building in the national 
judiciary more broadly. The SCC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence and its victim 
and witness protection plan can fill gaps in CAR’s legal framework. As of late 2017, 
other aspects of the SCC’s legacy remained aspirational, including its goal of 
fighting impunity at the highest levels and instilling a sense of justice and rule of law 
among CAR citizens, especially victims of grave crimes.
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Financing
According to Law 15.003, the court’s infrastructure is financed through the state 
budget, but the court’s operating budget falls to the international community 
through voluntary contributions.345 International officials of the SCC are not UN 
personnel, but are seconded by their governments to the SCC. As of October 2017, 
the court has raised only US$5 million of the needed US$7 million for its first 14 
months of operations from donors that include the United States, France, and the 
Netherlands, in addition to MINUSCA.346 Additional funding does not appear to be 
forthcoming, suggesting that the SCC may face constant funding crises similar to 
those experienced by the SCSL and the ECCC. This could seriously disrupt SCC 
proceedings and detract from its potential legacy.347 Providing security for the SCC 
premises and personnel will be costly, particularly outside Bangui, and require 
robust support from MINUSCA.
The Reference Group of Member States in Support of the Special Criminal Court 
and the Rule of Law in the CAR is comprised of representatives of Permanent 
Missions in New York and chaired by Morocco (as chair of the Peacebuilding 
Configuration on CAR). The Reference Group meets regularly to mobilize political 
support as well as financial and human resources for the SCC and other rule of 
law initiatives in CAR. DPKO and UNDP jointly serve as the secretariat for the 
Reference Group. The Reference Group first met in May 2015.348
 
Oversight and Accountability
As of late 2017, most details of oversight at the SCC were pending finalization of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The SCC law provides that the CAR minister of 
justice would refer misconduct by international officials to MINUSCA, following an 
approval by two-thirds of the judges on recommended measures in accordance with 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.349 
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CÔTE D’IVOIRE: DOMESTIC PROCEEDINGS 
Conflict Background and Political Context
Following presidential elections held in Côte d’Ivoire on November 28, 2010, the 
incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo refused to step down and concede defeat to 
his opponent, Alassane Ouattara, who was declared the winner of the elections by 
the Independent Electoral Commission.350 During the five months of violence that 
followed, the UN and others documented widespread violations.351 An international 
Commission of Inquiry established by the UN Human Rights Council concluded 
that some 3,000 people may have died and that different parties perpetrated many 
serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, some of 
which might amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes.352 As a result of 
intense fighting in the capital, Abidjan, and in other parts of the country, particularly 
the west, the UN Human Rights Council estimated that up to a million people could 
have been displaced by the violence.353 Brutality was alleged on both sides. Gbagbo 
was alleged to have used forces loyal to him to attempt to crush the opposition 
through killings, arbitrary arrest and detention, enforced disappearances, looting, 
and sexual violence. Forces loyal to Ouattara were accused of killings, rape, and 
burning villages in the course of their military offensive aimed at taking control  
of the country.354 
The international community reacted rapidly and strongly to back the legitimacy 
of Ouattara’s election victory. The ECOWAS and the AU, among others, swiftly 
recognized his election as president. The UN Security Council passed resolution 
1975 (2011), urging Gbagbo to respect the will of the people and immediately step 
aside, and adopted financial and travel sanctions against individuals including 
Gbagbo and his wife. The AU put together a High-Level Panel to work toward a 
political solution. Finally, on April 11, 2011, Gbagbo was arrested following military 
operations conducted by forces loyal to Ouattara, as well as the United Nations 
Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) and French troops. On May 6, 2011, Ouattara 
was sworn in as president. In October 2015, he won another five-year term in 
elections that were considered by the AU and ECOWAS as largely free and fair. 
The 2010 presidential elections had been intended to help bring an end to cycles 
of political violence that were fueled by ethnic divisions largely between northern 
and southern peoples, as well as unresolved rural land issues. A civil war in 2002 
led to the country being divided into two and triggered internationally supported 
ANNEXES   161
peacebuilding efforts. A peace agreement was reached in January 2003, and the 
2010 elections were supported by the international community as part of that 
peace process. The UNOCI, had already been established in 2004 to facilitate the 
implementation of the peace agreement. Its mandate evolved and was extended 
several times until it was finally wound up in June 2017.
Impartial justice is widely seen as a prerequisite for reconciliation in Côte d’Ivoire, 
and perceptions that President Ouattara has been seeking to pursue victors’ justice 
may be hampering progress toward stability.
Existing Justice-Sector Capacity
After more than a decade of intermittent violence and instability in the country, 
the Ivorian justice system was weakened by the time President Ouattara was 
inaugurated in 2011. During the period when the country was divided, many courts 
in rebel-held areas had ceased to operate, and in government-controlled areas 
the courts were overburdened, outdated, and inefficient.355 The sheer number of 
internationally supported projects to strengthen the justice sector is an indication of 
the sector’s needs.356 Freedom House assessed the Ivorian judiciary in 2016 as not 
independent, with judges highly susceptible to external interference and bribes.357
The government has argued that it has successfully restored the country’s justice 
system, including announcing in October 2013 that the Special Investigative Cell 
(Cellule Speciale d’Enquete) was no longer needed because the situation had returned 
to normal (though it quickly backtracked and renewed the Special Cell’s mandate).358 
Arguing before the ICC in September 2013 that Simone Gbagbo should be tried 
before Ivorian courts and not the ICC, the government asserted that while the 
functioning of the judicial system had been seriously affected by the political crisis 
in the country since 2002—for instance, during the 2010–2011 crisis, during which 17 
of the country’s 37 courts were damaged and pillaged—there had been substantial 
improvements, and all the courts and judicial institutions were now reopened. Thus, 
Côte d’Ivoire was now both able and willing to pursue the case itself.359 The ICC 
did not directly consider these assertions, as it found that the case should continue 
before the ICC on other grounds.
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Existing Civil Society Capacity
One UN expert complimented Ivorian human rights organizations for their 
“unfailing vitality,” and civil society in Côte d’Ivoire has been very active in pushing 
for accountability for grave crimes arising out of the 2010–2011 violence as well as 
for other violations both before and afterward.360 There are several leading Ivorian 
human rights organizations, and they work on a number of fronts, which include 
conducting advocacy with national and international actors calling for accountability 
and monitoring national justice efforts, assisting victims in filing criminal 
complaints, campaigning for legislation such as to implement the Rome Statute 
and human rights treaties, and monitoring the trials for grave crimes before the 
ICC and domestically. The technical work in particular is often done in partnership 
with international groups, including publishing reports on the national justice 
mechanisms, filing victims’ complaints together with the International Federation 
for Human Rights (FIDH), and conducting trial monitoring in partnership with a 
Dutch media group, RNW.361 The Human Rights Section of UNOCI has run 
capacity-building projects. Victims’ groups focused on justice and accountability 
are often organized according to ethnic or political affiliation. However, Ivorian 
civil society across the board has been particularly vocal in criticizing the one-sided 
nature of the prosecutions conducted by both the ICC and national authorities 
so far, and in urging that those responsible for crimes on all sides of the conflict 
be held accountable.
Creation
Calls for accountability for the violence arose during the crisis itself: alongside 
efforts to reach a political solution, the UN Human Rights Council on March 25, 
2011, set up the independent international Commission of Inquiry. The commission 
concluded that there could be no lasting reconciliation in the country without justice 
and recommended that the Ivorian government should ensure that those responsible 
for violations are brought to justice.362 
After Ouattara was installed as president, he was under pressure to take steps to 
promote reconciliation and bring perpetrators of the violations committed during 
the crisis to justice. He quickly announced the establishment of three bodies: 
(1) a National Commission of Inquiry (La Commission Nationale d’Enquête); (2) a 
Commission for Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation (La Commission Dialogue, Vérité 
et Réconciliation, CDVR); and (3) a Special Investigative Cell for the post-electoral 
crisis (La Cellule Spêciale d’Enquête relative à la crise post-électorale). 
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The Special Investigative Cell was created in June 2011 by interdepartmental order 
(arrêté interministériel), responding to the need to shed light on crimes committed 
following the announcement of the presidential election results in November 2010.363 
It was initially established for one year, subsequently renewed to the end of 2013.
In December 2013, when its announcement that the Special Cell was no longer 
needed provoked national and international opposition, the government 
backtracked and announced it was not only maintaining the Special Cell but was 
extending its mandate. On December 30, 2013, President Ouattara signed decree 
2013-915, creating the Special Investigative and Examination Cell (Cellule Spêciale 
d’Enquête et d’Instruction, CSEI), to replace the Cellule Spêciale d’Enquête. This decree 
put the new body on a more permanent footing, as its mandate no longer had to be 
renewed every year. 
On July 20, 2016, a government communiqué announced the decision of the Council 
of Ministers to adopt a decree expanding the mandate of the CSEI to include 
terrorism.364 According to the government, this was necessary to enable the country 
to face the new challenge of the threat of terrorism after an attack in March 2015 
that killed 20.
Politically, support on the part of the government for the CSEI’s very existence has 
waxed and waned, and President Ouattara has several times tried to wind down the 
body, only to have to maintain and reinforce it following intense pressure from both 
Ivorian civil society and the international community.365 However, over time, this 
attention and pressure have waned.
Legal Framework and Mandate
According to Article 1 of decree 2013-915, the CSEI is a Special Cell of the Tribunal 
of First Instance in Abidjan. Article 2 provides that it is charged with investigation 
and judicial instruction relating to crimes committed at the time of the crisis 
following the presidential elections of 2010 and any infractions connected to those 
crimes. No further specificity is given as regards its jurisdiction.
Article 12 of decree 2013-915 provides that the CSEI will apply the Ivorian Code of 
Criminal Procedure and the provisions of the decree. As far as can be ascertained, 
in every aspect, the CSEI applies Ivorian law and procedure, and there are no special 
regulations or other relevant dispositions.
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Côte d’Ivoire became a party to the Rome Statute of the ICC in 2013, and in 2014 
the Ivorian Parliament adopted amendments to the criminal code and criminal 
procedure code that allow domestic prosecution of the crimes in the Statute. 
However according to the Coalition for the International Criminal Court, the 
legislation only partially satisfies complementarity since it contains clauses allowing 
immunity based on official capacity and the possibility of presidential pardon.366
The CSEI is a specialized body within the Ivorian justice system created to 
investigate, gather, and hear evidence, including taking statements from victims and 
witnesses, to determine whether a case should proceed to criminal trial. It does not 
itself conduct trials, but under the supervision of an investigating judge, prepares 
cases for trial before the Ivorian civilian criminal courts. Its stated purpose was to 
respond to the need to shed light on atrocities and crimes committed following 
the announcement of the presidential election results in November 2010.367 Its 
establishment represented an effort to create a specialized body that would lead 
efforts to prepare cases to go before the national courts. As Human Rights Watch 
noted, investigations of serious international crimes are complex and require 
specialized expertise and can take years to complete, so consolidating resources, 
expertise, and support into one unit was a promising step.368 
The CSEI has no formal international element other than possible contributions 
toward its budget. In its early days, however, international experts placed in the Cell 
provided advice to its officials.
Location
The CSEI and all its personnel are located in the capital, Abidjan. Public 
communiqués refer to teams of investigators going out to other areas of the country 
affected by the violence to interview victims.369
Structure and Composition
Article 3 of presidential decree 2013-915 provides that the CSEI is composed of 
the following: the public prosecutor of the Tribunal of First Instance of Abidjan, 
a deputy, and two other prosecutors; three investigating judges assigned from the 
Tribunal of First Instance of Abidjan; judicial police from the national police and 
gendarmerie; registrars; and an administrative secretariat. The CSEI is directed by 
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the public prosecutor,370 who works under the authority of the general prosecutor 
of Abidjan.371 The general prosecutor answers to the minister of justice, raising 
concerns that the lines between the executive and judiciary are blurred.
The Special Cell has around 50 personnel and is divided into two entities: an 
administrative entity comprising around 20 administrative and similar staff, and a 
judicial entity of 33 comprising seven judges, 20 judicial police, and six registrars.372 
Personnel are assigned to the Special Cell from other parts of the justice system.  
For instance, Article 8 of decree 2013-915 provides that judicial police will be put 
at the disposal of the CSEI at the request of the public prosecutor, and Article 13 
provides the same for administrative personnel. As regards selection, Article 11 
of decree 2013-915 provides that the minister of justice (Garde des Sceaux) will 
nominate the personnel and will consult with the Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature 
when appointing the judges.
In March 2015, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights specifically called 
on the government of Côte d’Ivoire to take prompt measures to adopt the draft law 
on victim and witness protection, declaring that this will be important once the 
conflict-related human rights violations cases start to come before the courts.373 
In September 2017, the cabinet reviewed and adopted a draft law on witness 
protection in development since 2013; as of October 2017, the next step was a debate 
and vote on the bill in the National Assembly. 
In the Ivorian judicial system, crimes are tried by assize courts. Under the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, an assize court is not a permanent court, but is instead required 
to sit at each Court of First Instance (CFI)374 every three months.375 Cases that go 
forward for criminal trial in the Ivorian criminal courts after being dealt with by the 
CSEI are subject to appeal to the Court of Appeal only on very narrow grounds, in 
accordance with the Ivorian criminal justice system.376  
Prosecutions
The Special Cell started work rapidly after its establishment. According to a 
public communiqué of July 22, 2011, the Special Cell’s investigators were receiving 
complaints from victims and testimonies of witnesses at its offices. Since opening on 
July 12, they had already registered 147 victims.377
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Nevertheless, progress in completing investigations and moving to prosecutions 
resulting from its work has been slow. Until late in 2014, the Special Cell appeared 
understaffed and lacking government support. In 2013, Human Rights Watch 
criticized the CSEI for not having prepared a plan, or mapping out the crimes 
committed around the country, or explaining how it proposed to carry out its work. 
Human Rights Watch also criticized the government for having done nothing to help 
protect witnesses or judges, or otherwise show it was serious about pursuing justice 
for the crimes committed during the post-electoral conflict.378 
The Ivorian proceedings have also been criticized as one-sided justice. While the 
national Commission of Inquiry concluded in July 2012 that violations were carried 
out by both sides, initially only cases against Gbagbo loyalists went forward to the 
courts. The first cases to emerge were all against individuals from the pro-Gbagbo 
camp: a number of senior military officers were tried and sentenced, starting with 
ex-Republican Guard General Brunot Dogbo Blé, who was sentenced to 15 years 
in prison in October 2012. Ivorian human rights organizations have continued to 
be very critical of the fact that the Ivorian national justice system has largely only 
investigated one side to the conflict, the pro-Gbagbo side. 
Three human rights organizations (the Paris based FIDH and two Ivorian partner 
organizations) have been able to follow the progress of the CSEI investigations and 
resulting trials closely, as they were accepted as NGO civil parties in the judicial 
proceedings in several cases, alongside individual victims. In a report issued in 
October 2013, they described how the prosecution had initially decided to open 
three separate investigations, differentiating among attacks on state security, 
“blood crimes,” and crimes against property, even though they targeted the same 
individuals.379 FIDH and its partners reported that since 2011, the Ivorian civil and 
military courts had charged and imprisoned more than 130 people connected to 
former President Gbagbo, but only one person from the pro-Ouattara side, military 
commander Amadé Ouéremi.380 This imbalance occurred despite the CSEI’s having 
taken witness testimonies implicating pro-Ouattara elements in crimes. The human 
rights groups have criticized the CSEI for leaving gaps in its investigations; failing to 
make use of evidentiary materials in its possession, including documents recovered 
from the presidential palace and the results of exhumations; and for lacking consistency 
in charging. They further reported that a number of key members of Gbagbo’s 
movement were released following a political dialogue and appeasement process.
In a report issued in December 2014, FIDH and its local partners reported that 
while two judicial investigations relating to the attacks on civilians were now 
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progressing within the CSEI with multiple accused, out of 150 persons implicated, 
only two belonged to the pro-Ouattara camp.381 They again criticized the continued 
operational difficulties, the slow pace of the proceedings, and the lack of support and 
resources being given to the CSEI, as well as the gaps in the investigations and lack 
of internal coordination and apparent policy. Pointing out that the CSEI seemed to 
be subject to external political influence, they accused the authorities of prioritizing 
crimes against the state over crimes that had targeted civilians.382 Further, they 
reported continued blockages in the investigation of pro-Ouattara elements and 
claimed that even the one case that had been opened in the previous period, against 
Amadé Ouéremi, appeared to have stalled.
Simone Gbagbo, wife of Laurent Gbagbo, was among those put on trial in 2016, 
accused of crimes against humanity during the post-electoral crisis. She had already 
been convicted for crimes against the state, but was acquitted of the new charges 
by the Ivorian High Court on March 18, 2017, amidst civil society concern that weak 
evidence had been presented.383 Fair trial concerns were also raised; notably, her 
lawyers suspended their participation when the president of the court refused to call 
witnesses considered crucial to her defense, namely five senior public officials, one 
of which was the president of the National Assembly. 
Another controversy was that Simone Gbagbo was also wanted by the ICC, which 
issued an arrest warrant for her on February 29, 2012, for four counts of crimes 
against humanity, including murder, rape, inhuman acts, and persecution, allegedly 
committed during the post-electoral violence.384 The ICC Pre-trial Chamber 
confirmed its finding from November 2011 that “due to the absence of national 
proceedings against those appearing to be most responsible for crimes committed 
during the post-election violence, and in light of the gravity of the acts committed,” 
the case would be admissible because it satisfied the ICC’s complementarity 
principles.385 On September 30, 2013, the Ivorian government filed a submission 
challenging the admissibility of the case before the ICC, claiming that in February 
2012, domestic proceedings had been instituted against Simone Gbagbo based 
on allegations similar to those in the ICC’s arrest warrant.386 This was rejected by 
the Pre-trial Chamber on the basis that the government had not demonstrated 
that its domestic authorities were undertaking tangible, concrete, and progressive 
investigative steps for the same conduct as that alleged in the ICC proceedings, 
a decision that was upheld on appeal.387 While the government argued that it 
was taking investigative steps, and that the establishment of the Special Cell had 
permitted the institution of the proceedings but that this was taking time due to the 
complexity and gravity of the case, the Pre-trial Chamber found that the steps taken 
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were “sparse and disparate,” and in 20 months of investigations, they appeared to be 
limited to a single activity: the questioning of Simone Gbagbo.388
Following the renewal and expansion of the Special Cell in 2014, and especially 
during 2015, the Special Cell’s work did seem to gather pace, and it was announced 
that around 20 former military commanders, including some who were pro-
Ouattara, had been summonsed. It is not clear whether they appeared or whether 
any judicial proceedings followed, however.389 In June 2015, human rights 
organizations again reacted to what they considered to be credible information that 
some of the investigations were to be closed, sending a public letter to President 
Ouattara appealing to him to allow the cases to continue.390 The CSEI continued its 
activities, however, including against several high-level commanders from the pro-
Ouattara forces, though it is unclear whether these have progressed to trial.391 In June 
2017, a UN independent expert reported that according to statistics from December 
2016, 17 cases linked to the post-electoral crisis were still pending before the courts, 
while 31 out of 66 cases had already been tried, 29 had been brought before the 
Indictment Division, and six were before the Court of Appeal.392
Outside observers, including the UN, have continued to complain of slow 
progress. In her statement to the UN Security Council in January 2016, the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Côte d’Ivoire encouraged the 
government to ensure the investigations of the Special Cell are completed in order 
to create the conditions for the prosecution of those guilty of serious violations of 
human rights, regardless of their political affiliation.393
The International Criminal Court in Côte d’Ivoire 
The ICC prosecutor opened an investigation relating to the situation in Côte d’Ivoire 
on October 3, 2011, after obtaining authorization from a Pre-trial Chamber of the 
Court. The investigation can cover crimes committed from September 19, 2002, 
onward, but has focused on alleged crimes against humanity committed during 
the 2010–2011 post-electoral violence. The prosecutor announced her intention 
to investigate the actions of both pro-Gbagbo and pro-Ouattara forces, but as of 
September 2017, only two cases had been brought, both against those on the pro-
Gbagbo side: a joint case against Laurent Gbagbo himself and Charles Blé Goudé, 
and a case against Simone Gbagbo. Both cases involve allegations of murder, rape, 
other inhuman acts, and persecution committed during four specific incidents. In 
January 2016, the trial of Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé on four counts 
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of crimes against humanity commenced in The Hague after the Ivorian authorities 
surrendered them to the court in November 2011 and March 2014, respectively. An 
arrest warrant was issued against Simone Gbagbo for the same alleged crimes, but 
as of September 2017, Ivorian authorities had refused to surrender her on the basis 
she has been investigated and prosecuted in the country’s domestic system.
Legacy
It is not easy to ascertain the specific impacts the Special Cell has had on the regular 
justice system or conscious efforts to ensure legacy. However, personnel who work 
at the CSEI, which received support and capacity building from the United Nations 
Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI) and others, and which at least at times has been 
afforded the necessary resources to function adequately, may have benefited from 
the experience of specializing in investigating and prosecuting grave crimes.
As regards the relationship between the CSEI and other transitional justice 
mechanisms, it is not easy to see how the plethora of different institutions 
established to deal with the 2010–2011 crisis relate to each other, if at all, as no 
formal attempt seems to have been made to link them. The CDVR (Commission for 
Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation) collected victims’ accounts of serious violations 
by both Gbagbo and Ouattara forces, and its report was transmitted to President 
Ouattara in December 2014 (though the government has been criticized for not 
making it public until October 2016).394 Although the CDVR was established with 
a truth-seeking and not a judicial mandate, some civil society organizations have 
criticized it for failing to refer to the CSEI the thousands of victims it registered.395 
The National Commission of Inquiry published a summary of its findings in August 
2012, concluding that during the 2010–2011 crisis crimes were committed by both 
sides and stressing the importance of trying all perpetrators. That report was 
transmitted to a CSEI investigative judge, but as of October 2017, it was not clear 
that it had been acted on. In 2015, the government created a National Commission 
for Reconciliation and Compensation for Victims (CONARIV) to oversee a 
reparations program. CONARIV’s final report, presented in April 2016, included a 
consolidated list of victims of the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire between 1990 and 2012, a 
national reparation policy proposal, and a draft reconciliation action plan,396 but it is 
not easy to ascertain whether cases dealt with by the CSEI that result in conviction 
will feed into that program.
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Financing
Presidential decree 2013-915 provides that running costs of the CSEI will come from 
the state budget (Article 16) and that the minister of the Economy and Finance will 
assign an official to be responsible for financial management and accounting. The 
public prosecutor reports to the Ministry of Justice every trimester on the CSEI’s 
activities and budget. 
Details of the CSEI’s budget and sources of funding do not seem to be publicly available. 
Civil society has continued to say that CSEI has insufficient funding, and to claim 
that the lack of political will on the part of the government, particularly the Ministry 
of Justice, to resource it properly has also discouraged potential international funding.397 
While it is not clear whether any international donors contributed to the CSEI’s 
budget as such, contributions of material support for its operations have been 
reported. For instance, ONUCI and the ICRC indicate that they provided equipment 
to the Ivoirian authorities in March 2013 to help with exhumations intended to 
provide evidence in the context of the CSEI’s investigations.398 
Oversight and Accountability
Theoretically, the ICC’s complementarity regime exists as a check on non-genuine 
investigations and prosecutions. This has been put to the test in the case of Simone 
Gbagbo, where the ICC examined the investigative activities undertaken by the 
Ivorian justice system and found that they failed to demonstrate that meaningful 
steps had been taken over a period of two years. If it ever brings charges against 
perpetrators among President Ouattara’s supporters, the ICC may ultimately be the 
only venue for accountability for their crimes.
There are numerous external sources of pressure, including donors, media, domestic 
and international civil society, states, and international organizations, all of which 
have followed the work of the CSEI and ensuing prosecutions, and weighed in at 
moments when political will seemed to be wavering. This appears to have been quite 
effective: for instance, in October 2013 when the government announced that the 
Special Cell was no longer needed, pressure from these many quarters seemed to 
influence the government, leading it to strengthen the CSEI. The ONUCI has been 
among those consistently calling for the investigations to target both sides and to be 
followed through to prosecution,399 so the ending of ONUCI’s mandate in June 2017 
gives some cause for concern.
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DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
This annex covers two approaches to justice in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC): (1) domestic prosecution mechanisms, including internationally assisted 
mobile courts; and (2) a proposal for mixed domestic-international specialized courts. 
Common sections covering background on the conflict and the capacities of the 
domestic justice sector and civil society precede separate detail on each mechanism.
Conflict Background and Political Context
The DRC (previously Zaire) has a long history of violence and impunity. The legacy 
of unpunished violence dates back to the early 16th century with foreign slave raids 
and continued in the 19th and 20th centuries with the appropriation of the Congo by 
King Leopold II and ensuing Belgian colonization.400 Immediately after gaining its 
independence in 1960, Congo became embroiled in the Cold War, with U.S.-backed 
dictator Mobutu Sese Seko ruling through repression and patronage. His rule extended 
over three decades marked by human rights abuses, which became particularly 
acute between 1993 and 1996, and especially in the province of North Kivu.401 The 
situation further deteriorated following the 1994 Rwandan genocide, when hundreds 
of thousands of Hutu civilians, as well as Hutu génocidaires, fled into refugee camps 
in eastern Zaire. The refugee camps served as bases for continued attacks on Rwanda. 
The first Congo war began in November 1996, when Rwandan and Ugandan troops 
backed Congolese rebel forces (the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération 
du Congo, or AFDL) to seize towns and villages in the east, and neighboring 
countries became involved. During the war, the rebel forces not only attacked Hutu 
guerrillas, but also massacred thousands of Hutu civilians. The Congolese army 
collapsed, and Mobutu was toppled. AFDL leader Laurent Kabila came to power in 
1997 and renamed the country Democratic Republic of the Congo.402
The Second Congo War began in August 1998, as Kabila turned against Rwanda, and 
Rwandan and Ugandan forces again supported an invasion by various rebel groups. 
Uganda’s involvement led to proceedings at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
following referral by the DRC government; the court found that Ugandan forces 
committed widespread human rights violations in Congolese territory.403 Laurent 
Kabila sought support from Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe; while rebel forces 
multiplied and side-conflicts developed.404 Atrocities were committed by all sides, 
and the first UN peacekeeping mission (MONUC) was established in 1999.405 Kabila 
was assassinated in 2001 and succeeded by his son, Joseph Kabila, who is currently 
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president. A peace agreement signed in South Africa formally ended the war in 
December 2002.406 An estimated three million Congolese died as a result of the 
conflict, especially in eastern DRC, and massive sexual violence was committed with 
near-absolute impunity.407 A UN mapping exercise documenting the most serious 
violations committed in the DRC during the 1993–2003 period found the following:
This decade was marked by a string of major political crises, wars and 
multiple ethnic and regional conflicts that brought about the deaths of 
hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people. Very few Congolese 
and foreign civilians living on the territory of the DRC managed to 
escape the violence, and many were victims of murder, mutilation, rape, 
forced displacement, pillage, destruction of property or economic and 
social rights violations.408
A transitional government was established in 2003. Joseph Kabila won election as 
president in 2006 and reelection in 2011, although voting irregularities sparked 
protests and violence across the country. Violent conflicts have continued to 
devastate the country, fueled by regional and local dynamics, state weakness, 
ethnic tensions, elite interests, and the lucrative exploitation of natural resources.409 
The conflicts in North and South Kivu and in the Ituri region continue to date, 
amid continuing allegations of Rwandan and Ugandan involvement.410 The UN 
peacekeeping mission (renamed MONUSCO in 2010) was given a more robust 
mandate by the Security Council in 2013, but violence persists.411 As of late 2017, the 
reluctance of President Kabila to relinquish power in accordance with constitutional 
term limits led to severe human rights abuses against opponents, especially in the 
Kasai region, and fear of renewed violence on a national scale. This was despite a 
major political agreement reached on December 31, 2016, between Kabila and the 
opposition that was intended to regulate a smooth transition to the elections of 2017.412
Overall, the repeated conflicts have led to over six million deaths, both as a 
direct result of fighting and indirectly because of disease, displacement, and 
malnutrition.413 The number of internally displaced people has risen to 3.8 million.414 
The conflicts are also characterized by widespread sexual and gender-based violence 
committed against women and girls, with allegations of mass rapes and countless 
sexual assaults.415
Despite the ongoing violence, a weak judicial infrastructure marked by corruption 
and underfunding, as well as limited state presence in vast swathes of the territory, 
the country has several functional processes for the prosecution of international 
crimes. Military courts have prosecuted atrocity crimes since 2002, and the recent 
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adoption of the Rome Statute implementation bill has shifted jurisdiction over war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide to civilian courts. Military courts 
conducting mobile sessions have successfully addressed the prevailing culture of 
impunity in remote areas and conducted a few significant trials. Parliament twice 
considered legislation proposing the establishment of mixed specialized chambers 
to prosecute atrocities, but finally rejected the bill. Beyond domestic initiatives, 
the government referred the situation on its territory to the ICC in 2004, which 
led to two convictions and one ongoing trial for crimes against humanity and war 
crimes (see text box, below). The Congolese government’s genuine commitment to 
accountability, however, remains in serious doubt. Criminal accountability has been 
constrained by meager funding for the justice sector, poor coordination of justice 
initiatives, and political interference in cases involving allegations against senior-
ranking perpetrators. To the extent that the DRC government has allowed and 
facilitated the domestic prosecution of grave crimes, it may have done so to reduce 
the chances of ICC cases against political leaders.
Nearly all of the types of justice mechanisms discussed in this handbook have 
been or could be deployed in the DRC, including an international fact-finding 
commission, prosecutions by the ICC, domestic prosecutions, and proposed mixed 
chambers. These multiple accountability projects make the DRC an incubator of 
international justice approaches and serve as a grim reminder of the vast number of 
atrocity crimes the war-torn country has experienced over the decades. In the DRC, 
“the needs are so great that realizing complementarity … means first focusing on 
basic development of the criminal justice system.”416
UN Investigative Missions in the DRC
(1) Joint Mission Charged with Investigating Allegations of Massacres and Other 
Human Rights Violations Occurring in Eastern Zaire (now the DRC) since 
September 1996 (1997);417 
(2) Secretary-General’s Investigative Team charged with investigating serious 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the DRC 
(1997–1998);418
(3) Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights 
and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the DRC 
between March 1993 and June 2003 (UN Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights [OHCHR], 2007–2010).419
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Creation
In 1997 and 1998, the UN empowered two successive investigations into serious 
human rights violations in the DRC. Both missions faced obstruction from the 
government of Laurent Kabila. The first was stillborn and reconstituted by the 
Secretary-General. However, the government prevented the second mission from 
conducting full-scale investigations.420 
The discovery in 2005 by MONUC of three mass graves in North Kivu, relating to 
crimes committed in the first Congo war, triggered the third mission, or Mapping 
Exercise.421 The OHCHR initiated an investigation into these mass graves and, with 
the support of the UN Secretary-General,422 the investigation was broadened to 
include crimes committed between 1993 and 2003. In 2007, Congolese President 
Joseph Kabila accepted the full deployment of the exercise, and the UN Security 
Council approved the terms of reference for the mission.423 The mapping exercise 
was the first time that the vast crimes committed during the First and Second 
Congo Wars were “comprehensively analyzed, compiled, and systematically 
organized in an official UN report.”424 In addition, the Mapping Exercise emphasized 
the victimization of women and children, and devoted significant attention to sexual 
violence against women.
Mandate 
The creation of the first investigative mission was based on a resolution by the 
Commission on Human Rights, requesting the Special Rapporteur on the situation 
of human rights in Zaire; the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, 
and arbitrary executions; and a member of the Working Group on Enforced or 
Involuntary Disappearances to “carry out a joint mission to investigate allegations 
of massacres and other issues affecting human rights which had arisen from the 
situation prevailing in eastern Zaire since September 1996,” and to report back to 
the General Assembly and the commission.425 This mission was obstructed and 
replaced by the second mission mandated to investigate “serious violations of 
human rights and international humanitarian law alleged to have been committed 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” with a temporal mandate extending 
back to March 1993 in view of the objections of the Congolese government to the 
mandate of the first mission.426 The third investigative mission was mandated to 
map the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law 
committed in the DRC between March 1993 and June 2003, assess the capacity 
of the national justice system to deal with human rights violations, and identify 
appropriate transitional justice options.427
Conclusions and recommendations
The final report of the Secretary-General’s investigative team led to a call for the 
Security Council to create a full-fledged investigative commission and a panel 
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of experts to further study the creation of an ad hoc international tribunal. The 
report issued very qualified, limited, and nonspecific findings about the existence 
of massacres and other grave violations, and about the possible identity of the 
armed forces involved, and stated that “it has not been possible, as a rule, to 
quantify these violations, that is to determine with a reasonable degree of certainty 
the number of victims, or even the number of specific types of violations.”428 The 
report concluded that “the interests of justice can only be served by endowing 
an international tribunal with competence over these crimes.”429 The team 
recommended that the “temporal and personal competence of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda should be expanded” to cover the crimes committed 
in the DRC.430
The period under examination by the Mapping Exercise included multiple and 
overlapping conflicts and the tangled involvement of rebel forces and national 
armies from the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Angola, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and 
Chad.431 The report found significant evidence that crimes under international 
law had been committed, including war crimes and crimes against humanity, on 
a massive scale.432 The report made a qualified judgment as to whether acts of 
genocide against Hutus had taken place, calling for a full judicial investigation 
to resolve whether genocide had been committed.433 The scope of the exercise 
was too broad to adequately conduct investigations into allegations of individual 
criminal responsibility, and the report did not name individual perpetrators, but it 
did identify armed groups allegedly responsible for violations. The Mapping Exercise 
stored information on the identity of alleged perpetrators in a confidential database 
submitted to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.434 A draft of the final 
report of the mapping exercise leaked to the public in August 2010. The ensuing 
furor and sharp criticisms from Rwanda and Uganda led the OHCHR to revise some 
of the language of the report, clarifying the nonjudicial mandate of the Mapping 
Exercise, and to solicit written comments from the countries implicated, but the UN 
stood by the substance of the findings.435 
The mapping report evaluated various options for transitional justice, including 
domestic and military courts, the establishment of an ad hoc international tribunal, 
and the creation of a mixed mechanism. The report recommended the adoption 
of a “holistic policy of transitional justice” based on the creation of diverse 
and complementary mechanisms,436 including a nonjudicial TRC and a hybrid 
prosecution mechanism that could try crimes committed by foreigners, as well as 
a comprehensive security sector reform and a state-run reparations program. The 
report also noted the positive contribution of the ICC to accountability and positive 
complementarity in the DRC. 
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International Criminal Court Investigations in the DRC
The government ratified the Rome Statute in April 2002 and referred the situation 
in its territory to the ICC in April 2004. The ICC Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) 
launched investigations, focusing on alleged war crimes and crimes against 
humanity committed mainly in eastern DRC, the Ituri region, and the North and 
South Kivu provinces, since July 1, 2002.437 The OTP acknowledged that alleged 
crimes were reported before that date, but the ICC’s temporal jurisdiction is 
limited to the statute’s date of entry into force. 438 The investigations led to six 
arrest warrants. Two suspects were tried and convicted, one is still on trial, one is 
awaiting transfer to the court for his trial to start, one was acquitted and released, 
and the Pre-trial Chamber declined to confirm charges against the last suspect.439 
In addition, the court also conducted investigations into Congolese nationals for 
charges stemming from the situations in other African countries. Former Congolese 
Vice President Jean-Pierre Bemba was convicted for crimes against humanity and 
war crimes committed in the CAR during an operation in 2002–2003.440 
Existing Justice-Sector Capacity
The DRC has struggled to establish an effective judicial system throughout its 
history. Under Mobutu, the judiciary served “merely as an extension of executive 
power” and, under Laurent Kabila, judicial officials obeyed the executive’s 
orders.441 Today, under President Joseph Kabila, the justice sector is still subject 
to frequent political interference, and it lacks capacity in all areas needed for 
effective investigations.442 Significant gaps are partly filled by the international 
community, especially by MONUSCO, but this dependency is not a viable solution 
in the long-term.443
The persistent lack of funding, shortage of basic infrastructure and staff, ongoing 
insecurity, and corruption at all levels seriously inhibit the establishment of an 
effective justice sector. Judicial staff and physical infrastructure are rare, and 
existing resources are concentrated in urban areas, leaving rural areas badly 
underserved.444 Low salaries and persistent insecurity for judges and magistrates 
make them prone to corruption and bribery.445 There was no regime for the 
protection of victims and witnesses until the adoption of the Rome Statute 
implementation bill in 2015, and the police and military forces contribute to 
insecurity instead of tackling it.446 Perpetrators often hold positions of power, which 
ANNEXES   177
leads to intimidation and threats when sensitive cases are addressed.447 The capacity 
of detention facilities and prisons is almost nonexistent, and frequent escapes 
seriously undermine the rule of law.448 Lack of funding and staff also impair criminal 
defense and court management.449 Military courts do slightly better in terms of 
capacity and funding, but they are still subject to corruption and political meddling, 
especially when they attempt to address high-level cases.450 In addition to political 
interference in specific cases and circumstances, the government has generally 
resisted institutional reforms that aim to improve judicial independence.451 In the 
words of the UN Mapping Exercise Report:
In summary, given the limited engagement of the Congolese authorities 
in strengthening the justice system, the minimal resources granted 
to the judicial system, the tolerance of interferences by political and 
military authorities in judicial affairs, resulting in the judiciary’s 
lack of independence, the inadequacy of the military justice system, 
bearing exclusive jurisdiction, to deal with the number of crimes under 
international law, many of which were committed by security forces, 
and the fact that judicial practice of military courts and tribunals over 
recent years is poor, not always substantiated in law, and reflects a lack 
of independence, it can be concluded that the resources available to 
the Congolese justice system in order to end impunity for crimes under 
international law committed between 1993 and 2003 are no doubt 
insufficient. Furthermore, given the current state of affairs, Congolese 
military courts, in the eyes of many victims, have neither the capability 
nor the credibility required in order to step up efforts to the fight against 
impunity for the many violations of fundamental rights committed 
against them in the past.452
Existing Civil Society Capacity
International civil society plays a major role in supporting accountability for atrocity 
crimes in the DRC. International organizations including Human Rights Watch, 
Avocats Sans Frontières (ASF), the Coalition for the ICC (CICC), the Open Society 
Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA), and Réseau Citoyens-Citizens Network 
(RCN) have investigated and documented human rights abuses, advocated for 
security and judicial reforms and the passing of new legislation, supported national 
proceedings for international crimes, and helped to build capacity in the justice 
sector. These organizations played a crucial role in the adoption of the Rome Statute 
domestication bill.453
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The capacity of national and local civil society organizations, however, is much 
weaker and varies depending on the region and the type of organization.454 Most 
civil society organizations were created in the early 1990s and focus on social 
and economic development in their communities, providing essential goods and 
services that the state fails to deliver.455 Increasingly, local, regional, and national 
organizations have begun to play a role in accountability efforts, including by 
channeling complaints, facilitating judicial referrals, and providing support to 
victims.456 However, most organizations are constrained by the lack of sustainable 
funding.457 Some local organizations have played an important role as implementing 
partners in multidonor programs (such as EU-led REJUSCO, PARJ, and PARJE) 
and have received substantial funding and training,458 but many suffer from the 
lack of basic infrastructure and means of communication.459 In addition, legal and 
administrative constraints on the freedom association and recent crackdowns on 
criticism have constrained civil society activities.460
Domestic Prosecutions (2005–Present)
Creation
A series of legal developments that unfolded over the past two decades made 
possible the prosecution of international crimes at the national level. Military courts 
began to prosecute international crimes in 2002, and civilian courts initiated such 
proceedings more recently. Key legal milestones include the ratification of the Rome 
Statute in March 2002, the adoption of new military criminal codes in November 
2002, the promulgation of an organic law in 2013 reorganizing the judiciary, and the 
adoption of the Rome Statute domestication bill in 2015. Further detail on each is 
provided in the section on Legal Framework and Mandate, below.
Mobile Courts
Mobile courts have been part of the Congolese legal system since 1979 and have 
been implemented with the assistance of international organizations since 2004.461 
Mobile courts, known as audiences foraines in the Congolese legal system, make 
use of judicial officials sitting in one district who travel to remote areas under their 
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute cases. Internationally backed mobile courts 
have mainly focused on sexual and gender-based violence, but mobile sessions have 
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also included other crimes such as murder and property crimes.462 The first mobile 
courts program with international support in the DRC was implemented in 2004 
by ASF. The organization provided support to “move the Courts of three provinces, 
during short periods of time, from the main cities where they were based to local 
towns under their jurisdiction,” in order to “bring justice closer to the population.”463  
Since then, mobile court programs have been widely replicated with the involvement 
of a number of different implementing and supporting partners—including the 
American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative (ABA-ROLI), RCN Justice et 
Démocratie, the OHCHR, MONUSCO (Justice and Corrections Sections and the 
UNJHRO), as well as national associations and NGOs—and funded by several 
international donors, including the EU, UNDP, DanChurchAid, and the Open 
Society Foundations. Apart from ASF’s initial program, other significant mobile 
court support projects include the EU’s REJUSCO program (programme de la 
réstauration de la justice à l’Est de la RDC), which backed mobile courts in the east 
of the country from 2007 to 2010,464 and its successor projects PARJ and PARJ-E 
(project d’appui au renforcement de la Justice à l’Est de la RDC), which included 
mobile court programming in collaboration with ASF from 2012 to 2016.465 The 
ABA-ROLI is also a major supporting partner of mobile courts in eastern DRC, as it 
coordinated the operation of “gender mobile courts” with funding from the Open 
Society Foundations from 2009 through 2013.466 The UNDP assisted mobile court 
sessions from 2011 to 2012,467 and MONUSCO’s Justice and Correction Section and 
Joint Office for Human Rights (UNJHRO) has also provided technical and logistical 
backing.468 The MONUSCO-organized Prosecution Support Cell program has 
chaired meetings of the Cadres de Concertations, a forum to coordinate efforts of all 
partners involved in supporting investigations and mobile courts.469 
In recent years, national NGOs and associations have become increasingly involved 
in mobile court proceedings, and the state has also begun to assume a greater role.470 
The Superior Council for Magistrates (CSM) adopted a Guide for Mobile Courts in 
2014 (drafted by ASF and PARJE), and some of its principles have become law.471 
The Office of the Personal Representative of the President in charge of the fight 
against sexual violence and the recruitment of children that was created in 2014 has 
also backed some mobile court sessions.472 Since 2015, ASF has organized activities 
to pass on their expertise and transfer the administration of mobile courts to the 
Ministry of Justice.473
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Legal Framework and Mandate
The DRC ratified the Rome Statute in March 2002, and under its monist 
constitution, the treaty can be directly applied, although without domestic 
implementing legislation there were many uncertainties.474 In November 2002, 
the adoption of a new military Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure 
granted jurisdiction to military courts over genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity.475 Military prosecutors initiated investigations and prosecutions on 
this basis, and beginning in 2006, they began applying the Rome Statute directly. 
Civilian courts, however, refrained from applying the Rome Statute due to the 
absence of any mention of international crimes from the Criminal Code and the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, which resulted in the exclusive prosecution of atrocity 
crimes by military courts.476
The exclusive competence of military courts over international crimes was highly 
controversial. Civil society and international organizations were concerned about 
the practice of prosecuting civilians in military courts, in violation of international 
standards; deficiencies in the quality of military investigations and prosecutions; 
provisions that only allowed soldiers to be tried by judges with a higher rank, 
effectively barring the prosecution of senior officers; and inconsistencies in the 
resolution of conflicts between domestic law and the Rome Statute by different 
military tribunals due to the absence of a coherent legal framework (e.g., with regard 
to witness and victim protection, as well as sentencing).477
To address these shortcomings, Congolese civil society and international NGOs 
began a long struggle for the adoption of a Rome Statute Implementation Bill, which 
would shift jurisdiction to civilian courts and include more procedural safeguards.478 
A new Organic Law was adopted in 2013, empowering the civilian Courts of Appeals 
to hear cases of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, but this reform 
was incomplete.479 The Rome Statute domestication law was finally adopted in June 
2015. It is divided into four main parts, respectively amending the Criminal Code, 
the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Military Criminal Code, and the Military Code 
of Criminal Procedure. The law introduced major changes for the prosecution of 
atrocity crimes and significantly reordered the civilian and military justice systems. 
The law removed the exclusive competence of military courts over atrocity crimes 
and created a regime of shared competence between the civilian and military justice 
systems; it added to the Criminal Code the crimes of genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity, as defined in the Rome Statute, as well as offenses against 
the administration of justice; it adopted certain procedural safeguards protecting 
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the rights of the accused, victims, and witnesses; it affirmed the imprescriptibility of 
Rome Statute offenses, the irrelevance of official capacity, and the inapplicability of 
any immunity; it adopted the Rome Statute’s maximum penalties, adding the death 
penalty; and it reinforced the regime of cooperation with the ICC.480
Since the adoption of the bill, civilian courts are competent to prosecute war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed on Congolese territory, 
irrespective of the perpetrator’s official position or any immunity that he/she may 
hold under national or international law. Military courts may still hear cases of 
atrocity crimes, but only when the authors of the crimes are exclusively military.481
Mobile Courts
Under Congolese legislation, courts and tribunals may hold mobile sessions outside 
of their ordinary seat of jurisdiction, when the proper administration of justice so 
requires.482 Mobile sessions may be held by the first-instance and appeals levels of 
civilian and military justice, and the ordinary rules of jurisdiction apply, including 
jurisdiction over international crimes.
International and national organizations have relied on this existing legal framework 
to bring a measure of justice to remote regions of the DRC that have been ravaged 
by the repeated conflicts and widespread sexual violence. Mobile court programs 
designed by international organizations aim to address the problem of lack of access 
to justice in remote areas and the prevailing culture of impunity by reinforcing 
the presence and functioning of judicial institutions.483 Existing programs have 
focused mainly on sexual and gender-based violence in eastern parts of the 
country, but some have adopted a wider focus (e.g., REJUSCO, PARJ, and PARJE). 
These programs generally include the following components: training for judicial 
personnel on international criminal law and sexual violence (for instance, 
ABA-ROLI conducted numerous trainings for investigators, judicial police, 
magistrates, and judges); providing lawyers and legal aid to the victims and the 
defense; assisting in the preparation of cases; providing logistical support; creating 
oversight and monitoring mechanisms; and conducting outreach functions.
Location
Domestic prosecutions for atrocity crimes are conducted within the ordinary 
Congolese court system. In the DRC, each court has jurisdiction over a certain 
territory. Within this territory, they have an ordinary seat fixed by presidential 
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decree, and they may have one or more secondary seats where they may hold 
periodic sessions. By law, civilian and military lower courts are distributed across 
the country, while higher instances are generally seated in Kinshasa. In practice, 
rural areas are seriously underserved, and the limited number of courts that exist are 
concentrated in urban areas.484
Mobile Courts
Military and civilian courts may conduct mobile sessions outside their ordinary and 
secondary seats to access remote areas.485 Most mobile court projects have focused 
on the eastern part of the country, especially North and South Kivu, where most 
of the violence derived from the repeated conflicts has been concentrated. The 
sessions are held in, or close to, the site of the crimes, and they are generally housed 
in temporary structures, such as tents.486
Structure and Composition
The organization of the Congolese judiciary has been in transition since the 
constitutional reform of 2006. The 2006 constitution divides the judicial system 
into three different court systems for judicial matters (both civil and criminal), 
administrative matters, and the military.487 Since the adoption of the Rome Statute 
domestication bill and the Organic Law of 2013, both the civilian and military court 
systems are competent to hear cases of war crimes, crimes against humanity,  
and genocide.488
In the civilian system, the Court of Appeals is the first instance to hear claims 
related to genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.489 According to the 
Organic Law of 2013, the Court of Appeals comprises one first president, one or 
several presidents, judges (conseillers), and one registrar.490 The court is generally 
composed of three members, except for Rome Statute offenses for which it has five 
members.491 Since the 2006 constitutional reform, the appellate court for the Court 
of Appeals is the Cour de Cassation, which will be composed of four chambers for 
its different subject matters, with three members per chamber.492 However, as of late 
2017, the Cour de Cassation had not yet been created. Until its creation, the Supreme 
Court was to remain the highest instance court for criminal matters.493
The military justice system is competent to hear cases of war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and genocide since the 2002 reform of the military criminal 
and criminal procedure codes.494 These crimes are prosecuted according to the 
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ordinary rules of procedure of military justice, composed of the following instances 
in ascending order of jurisdictional reach: tribunaux militaires de police, tribunaux 
militaires de garnison, cours militaires, and hautes cours militaires. Military courts are 
also under the control of the Cour de Cassation.495 Each instance is composed of a 
first president, presidents, and judges, all appointed by the DRC president. They 
comprise five members including a certain number of “career judges” (juges de 
carrière), except for the tribunal militaire de police, which is composed of only one 
career judge.496 Since the 2006 constitutional reform, a Superior Judiciary Council 
(Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature) is responsible for the administration of justice, 
including military justice.497 It was created in 2014.
The military and civilian courts receive significant support from international 
organizations for the prosecution of international crimes, especially from 
MONUSCO, the UN stabilization mission in the DRC. MONUSCO’s Justice and 
Corrections Section supports civilian and military court systems to be more effective 
in delivering justice within its mandate to “support the government in strengthening 
the capacity of judicial institutions.”498 Security Council Resolution 1925 (2010) 
mandated MONUSCO to “support national and international efforts to bring to 
justice, including by establishing Prosecution Support Cells to assist the FARDC 
military justice authorities in prosecuting persons arrested by the FARDC.”499 Its 
main project consists of the creation and operation of five Prosecution Support 
Cells,500 composed of “experienced civilian prosecutors and police investigators” 
who provide technical advice and logistical support to military authorities that 
conduct investigations into war crimes and crimes against humanity; most of that 
work is done in support of mobile courts.501 MONUSCO also provides support 
to the Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature and assists in the implementation of 
reforms to improve the efficiency of the judiciary.502 In addition, a number of other 
international organizations provide training and capacity building to improve the 
capacity of the judicial system in the DRC (e.g., REJUSCO, PARJ, PARJE).
Any outreach initiative in the DRC faces significant obstacles, including a vast 
territory, poor transportation and communication infrastructure, low literacy 
rates, and a diversity of local languages. Combined with the minimal budget 
available to the justice sector, the state has almost no structure or capacity to 
provide information on the work of the judiciary. Most international programs 
providing support to the justice sector contain an element of outreach, such as 
public education about the justice system, which is often implemented through 
international or local NGOs.503
184   OPTIONS FOR JUSTICE
Mobile Courts
Mobile courts are embedded within the domestic legal system and staffed by 
domestic judicial personnel, including magistrates, judges, prosecutors, legal 
representatives of the victims and defendants, police, and investigators. Mobile 
tribunals include both the first instance and appeal levels of military and civilian 
court systems. Military mobile courts generally include one judge, four lay assessors, 
a military prosecutor, and a bailiff. Civilian courts comprise three judges, two 
assessors, one prosecutor, and a bailiff. The mobile team may also include a registrar 
and interpreters.504
The sessions are implemented on an ad hoc basis according to the needs identified 
by the courts or NGOs (generally, serious criminal cases, especially related to sexual 
violence, or clearing backlogs), and require there be a minimum number of cases in 
a particular place before traveling to it. Cases are prepared in advance by judicial 
and military police together with partner organizations, which are then delivered to 
the prosecutor. The mobile court team then travels to the location of the hearing and 
holds sessions that usually last 10 to 14 days. Other conditions may include that the 
perpetrator is in custody and the evidence is prima facie sufficient.505
Victims and the accused are represented by lawyers, mainly from partner 
organizations or members of bar associations. Lawyers also assist victims to achieve 
the implementation of potential reparations, which may be awarded by the courts. 
Security support is provided by the Congolese police or the armed forces with the 
support of MONUSCO, under its mandate to “strengthen the capacity of the judicial 
institutions.”506 As mentioned above, national and international organizations play 
an important role in providing training, assisting investigations, and preparing and 
overseeing cases. In recent years, local NGOs and community networks have formed 
to channel complaints and facilitate judicial referrals.507
International and national organizations have also conducted outreach, including 
through community meetings with students, civil society representatives, and the 
police commissioners. ABA-ROLI has sponsored radio programs, public service 
announcements, and billboards sensitizing individuals about the consequences of 
rape and sexual violence.508 Other outreach efforts and legal awareness programs 
have been conducted by the Congolese Bar Association through Legal Aid Units, but 
these efforts have been limited.509
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Prosecutions
While military courts have been competent to hear international crimes cases since 
2002, and civilian courts gained competence in 2013, many factors have impeded the 
effective prosecution of atrocity crimes (see Legacy section, below). In the military 
justice system, there were around 40 trials in the period 2005–2015 for war crimes 
and crimes against humanity, including some cases of sexual violence.510 Around 
two thirds of the cases implicated members of the FARDC, and the rest involved 
members of armed groups.511 Since 2006, the majority of the judgments invoke the 
Rome Statute. The first conviction by a military court to apply the Rome Statute was 
the Songo Mboyo case in 2006, which led to the conviction of seven FARDC soldiers 
for rape and looting as crimes against humanity.512 
Prosecutions by civilian courts are very limited, with only one conviction for 
atrocity crimes by a civilian court as of November 2016. In September 2016, the 
Court of Appeals of Lubumbashi convicted four defendants for genocide, applying 
the Organic Law of 2013 for the first time. Subsequently, judges in South Kivu also 
initiated investigations.513 As of late 2017, there had not been any prosecutions under 
the 2015 Rome Statute implementing legislation.
Mobile Courts
The number of judicial decisions issued at mobile sessions (mostly within the 
military justice system) significantly exceeds the number typically decided at an 
ordinary session. However, it is difficult to obtain precise figures on the number of 
sessions and convictions achieved by mobile courts. 
The ASF program supported 10 mobile sessions in 2012 that included 82 cases of 
sexual violence, seven sessions in 2014, and four sessions in 2015.514 During their 
first 20 months of operation, the ABA-ROLI-backed mobile courts held 14 sessions, 
disposing 248 cases, 140 of which resulted in convictions for rape and 49 convictions 
for other serious offenses, and 44 acquittals.515 From 2011 to 2012, UNDP provided 
support to 16 mobile sessions, disposing of 206 cases, 60 percent of which related 
to sexual violence, with a conviction rate of 76 percent.516 Numerous other sessions 
have been supported by other national and international organizations, with a high 
conviction rate. Through MONUSCO’s Prosecution Support Cell Program,517 over 
700 case files have been processed since 2012, with a total of 685 convictions and 
sentences. Mid- to senior-level officers have been prosecuted based on command 
responsibility for crimes against humanity. 
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A number of prominent cases have been decided by mobile courts.518 In the Fizi 
trial held in February 2011, one commander and eight of his subordinates were 
convicted for mass rapes committed in the attack on the village of Fizi, South Kivu, 
during the same year. The case established a major precedent as it was “the highest 
commanding officer ever tried and convicted for rape in the DRC.”519 In December 
2014, a lieutenant colonel was convicted in a military mobile session for crimes 
against humanity for his participation in the violence in South Kivu in 2005–2007.520 
Also in December 2014, the former commander of the Democratic Forces for the 
Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), Kizima Lenine Sabin, was convicted for crimes 
against humanity.521 In 2015 and 2016, mobile courts convicted and sentenced  
22 military officers on charges of sexual violence.522
Legacy
These legislative developments and the few prosecutions at the national level 
constitute an important step toward accountability in the DRC. Military courts 
directly applying the Rome Statute have created substantial jurisprudence.523 
However, despite some progress, the reach of proceedings is insufficient compared 
to the magnitude of the grave crimes that have been committed, including 
thousands of cases of murder, mutilation, rape, forced displacement, and 
pillaging.524 The proceedings that have taken place have been plagued by violations 
of fair trial standards, deficient investigations and prosecutions, intimidation of 
victims and witnesses, the absence of proper defense, and, notably, the prosecution 
by military courts of crimes that should fall within the jurisdiction of ordinary courts. 
There has been political interference in sensitive cases, and there have been very 
few cases against senior officers or high-ranking officials. In addition, there are 
serious problems with the enforcement of judgments: the state does not have the 
budget or the will to pay for judicially ordered reparations, and when the accused 
is convicted, escapes are frequent. These shortcomings can be traced back to the 
serious lack of institutional capacity, but also to the absence of political will and 
genuine commitment to accountability.525 
These factors have also caused an excessive dependence on foreign resources; 
the proceedings have often taken place in response to public and diplomatic 
pressure and been possible only because of significant international support. This 
seriously undermines public confidence in the justice system.526 The recent Rome 
Statute domestication law represents significant progress, bringing the legislative 
framework on atrocity crimes closer to international standards. However, as of late 
2017, its impact had been limited due to the absence of implementation.
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Mobile Courts
Overall, mobile court programs have had significant successes. These programs have 
undeniably been successful in their purpose of bringing justice to areas where it is 
absent.527 They have made it possible for people in remote areas to be exposed to a 
functioning justice system and demonstrated that “with good management, proper 
allocation of resources and adequate oversight, the Congolese justice system, even 
if not perfect, could effectively address the justice needs of its communities.”528 In 
that sense, mobile courts have strengthened the rule of law in some communities 
and tackled the prevailing and widespread culture of impunity. In the words of 
Judge Mary Davis, who assessed the mobile courts implemented by ABA-ROLI, 
“The genius of the ABA-ROLI-supported gender mobile courts is that they have 
significantly transformed the prevailing discourse. … Now, punishment is no longer 
theoretical.”529 In addition, by operating through local justice actors, the programs 
have strengthened domestic capacity to tackle crimes, including sexual violence 
and international crimes, and a progressive transfer to national authorities seems 
to be taking place.530 The prosecution of international crimes in mobile tribunals is 
also significant in terms of complementarity with the ICC.531 Finally, mobile courts 
have also had a major impact on the issue of sexual and gender-based violence. 
The majority of cases in mobile courts have been related to SGBV; women and girls 
have been willing to speak out at mobile court sessions, and the prosecution of these 
cases helped spread awareness on the issue.532
The legacy of mobile courts, however, is seriously weakened by the lack of 
enforcement of sentences, with an enforcement rate of between four and eight 
percent.533 The role of the police in the enforcement of judicial decisions is highly 
unpredictable.534 Even though courts often award reparations, they are rarely 
implemented.535 When the accused is convicted, prison conditions are grim and 
escapes frequent.536 There have also been criticisms of the procedural aspects 
of mobile courts. Critics have decried mobile courts’ perverse effects on the 
independence of the judiciary because they generate pressure to convict and 
because NGOs make payments to judicial officials and play a role in the selection 
of cases. Further, the brevity of the sessions may impair the quality of proceedings, 
and this along with a frequent absence of defense counsel can result in abuses of 
fair trial rights. Finally, mobile courts have often lacked appropriate protection 
for victims and witnesses.537 Development officials have raised doubts about 
the sustainability of these programs in view of their ad hoc implementation and 
significant international involvement combined with high costs and the absence of a 
coordinated national strategy.538 Nevertheless, significant improvements have been 
observed since 2014, with a gradual transfer toward domestic judicial institutions, 
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progress in fair trial standards, and the harmonization of supplemental payments to 
participating officials.539
Financing
Financing is a major constraint for domestic prosecutions. The budget allocated to 
the justice sector is minimal, representing 1.98 percent of the total national budget 
in 2015, and 1.79 percent in 2016.540 These budget allocations do not reflect the real 
needs of the judiciary, which are immense considering the large backlog of pending 
and potential cases before civilian and military courts, in relation to atrocity crimes 
and ordinary crimes. Budgetary constraints create obstacles in all areas needed to 
conduct effective investigations and prosecutions, including basic infrastructure and 
equipment, salaries, training, security and policing, witness and victim protection, 
reparations, and detention. Donors have filled the gap in some areas. A number 
of donors, including the EU, USAID, national governments, and international 
organizations, have provided support, training, and infrastructure, even contributing 
to the salaries of ministry officials and magistrates.541 This has created a dependency 
on foreign resources, which is not sustainable in the long-term.542
Mobile Courts
The cost of a mobile court session varies depending on the number of days and 
cases it hears. A typical two-week mobile court session hearing about 15 cases costs 
around US$45,000 to US$60,000, or US$3,000 to US$4,000 per case.543 The 
majority of the budget is allocated to transportation costs, including for judges, 
lawyers, victims, and witnesses. Domestic judicial personnel in mobile courts are 
paid a government salary to fulfill their normal duties. Due to lack of funding for 
the justice sector, mobile courts have had to rely on foreign support to organize 
itinerant hearings, often in the form of logistics support granted by the UN or the EU 
through international NGOs.544 National and international organizations, including 
MONUSCO’s PSC program, provide daily supplements to mobile court staff on top 
of their official salaries, and additionally, they generally pay for the representation 
of victims and the accused. MONUSCSO has also often covered security costs and 
provided transportation.545 The EU has contributed a significant amount to the 
strengthening of justice in the DRC, with a total budget of five million euros for 
the PARJE project in collaboration with ASF from 2012 to 2016 (with contributions 
from Belgium and Sweden),546 and eight million euros for the REJUSCO program 
from 2006 to 2011.547 However, these projects aimed generally at justice-sector 
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strengthening, and only a portion was allocated to mobile court projects. Since 2013, 
the EU has also provided funding for MONUSCO’s PSC program. The Open Society 
Foundations supported the ABA-ROLI mobile court initiative for three years. UNDP 
contributed US$155,000 to the organization of mobile courts from 2011 to 2012.548
Oversight and Accountability
In the civilian justice system, the Cour de Cassation has the right to review the 
decisions of the Court of Appeals, as well as the right of administrative surveillance 
and inspection.549 Until the Cour de Cassation is created, the Supreme Court 
remains the highest instance in criminal matters.550 The Organic Law of 2013 
regulates the removal of civilian judges. Judges can be removed from specific 
proceedings upon the decision of a special bench in case of conflicts of interests. 
The prosecutor’s office attached to each jurisdiction is accountable to the Ministry of 
Justice.551 In the military justice system, the decisions of each court can be reviewed 
by the superior instance and, ultimately, by the Cour de Cassation. Military judges 
are appointed and may be removed by the DRC’s president.552
Mobile Courts
Mobile court sessions are monitored through various mechanisms. Mobile tribunals 
may hear appeals, which are often re-hearings of the cases to address fair trial 
concerns. Judges sitting in mobile tribunals may be removed or recused according to 
the ordinary rules of procedure. 
Partner organizations have also developed monitoring programs that provide 
informal means of oversight. ASF has trained teams of people in the communities 
to “observe the trials and to inquire on the satisfaction of those accessing the 
Courts,”553 and the UNDP has organized court monitoring activities whereby teams 
employed by UNDP ensure that the trials are held in accordance with international 
standards.554 However an assessment of MONUSCO’s Prosecution Support Cell 
program highlighted a lack of adequate monitoring and analysis of proceedings as a 
significant gap. It found little readily available or accessible information regarding 
the quality of justice administered by the military justice system.555
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Mixed Chambers (proposed)
Creation
Proposals for the creation of “specialized mixed chambers” with jurisdiction 
exclusively over atrocity crimes, to be integrated with existing court structures, 
have been repeatedly put forward and rejected over the past few years.556 Local 
organizations from the Ituri district first proposed the establishment of specialized 
mixed chambers in 2004, during an EU-organized audit of the Congolese justice 
sector.557 This proposal was put forward again in 2008 and 2009 by UN Special 
Rapporteurs, Congolese civil society organizations, and Human Rights Watch.558 
These calls finally gained traction and led to a draft legislative proposal in 2010 with 
the release of the OHCHR Mapping Exercise Report. In its proposals for transitional 
justice options, the Mapping Report especially recommended the establishment 
of a “mixed judicial mechanism” comprising national and international judicial 
personnel to try the perpetrators of grave crimes committed in the DRC 
between 1993 and 2003.559 The Congolese legislature and Congolese civil society 
organizations, assisted by Human Rights Watch, Parliamentarians for Global Action, 
and other international organizations, were the main drivers behind subsequent 
specific proposals and consultations.
A draft bill creating “Specialized Chambers for the Prosecution of International 
Crimes” was introduced in parliament in 2011, together with the Rome Statute 
implementation bill. Lawmakers set aside both bills for further consideration. Many 
raised concerns about the bill with regard to: (1) the establishment of an entirely new 
set of courts, which would create two parallel court systems, with one (the mixed 
chambers) receiving more resources than the other; (2) the uncoordinated and 
disorganized way in which the government planned reforms of the justice sector, 
as the Ministry of Justice introduced separate bills with strong overlap for ordinary 
criminal justice, the implementation of the Rome Statute, and the proposal for 
mixed chambers; and (3) the integration of foreign judges in the chambers, which 
sparked concern about national sovereignty. With strong resistance to the bill within 
the Ministry of Justice, a senate committee rejected the bill before it could even get 
to a full vote by the senate.560
The government submitted a revised bill to parliament in 2014, which addressed 
the main concerns raised about the previous version. The revised bill proposed to 
amend the 2013 Organic Law and to create chambers fully integrated into existing 
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court structures, instead of establishing a separate court system based on a  
stand-alone law; and the involvement of foreign judges would be optional rather 
than mandatory.561 Nevertheless, parliament rejected the new bill, citing procedural 
objections.562 Parliamentarians claimed that an ordinary law could not amend an 
organic law and that several provisions of the bill violated constitutional principles 
on immunities and competence over the armed forces. In addition, legislators 
already skeptical of the proposal criticized the minister of justice for being  
ill-prepared to answer questions about it.
In 2015, the Congolese Parliament adopted the Rome Statute implementation  
bill initially proposed alongside the proposal for mixed chambers. An assessment of 
the justice system conducted by the Ministry of Justice in collaboration with other 
Congolese officials and civil society in 2015 included a recommendation  
to create mixed chambers, and a revised version of the proposal was under 
discussion in the Ministry in 2016.563 As of late 2017, there were no public reports  
of further developments.
Legal Framework and Mandate
The proposed specialized chambers were designed “to prosecute and punish 
international crimes efficiently” and address the prevailing impunity for the 
majority of atrocity crimes that have been committed in the DRC.564 Accordingly, 
the material jurisdiction of the chambers was to include genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression.565 The 2011 bill also 
entailed jurisdiction over “smaller offenses” if the chamber could demonstrate 
“the seriousness of the facts,”566 but this provision was removed from the 2014 
bill due to its ambiguity and over-extension of jurisdictional reach. The territorial 
jurisdiction of the proposed chambers was to extend to all crimes committed in 
the territory of the DRC.567 In terms of temporal jurisdiction, the 2011 bill included 
crimes committed since 1990. The 2014 bill advanced this date to 1993,568 a “date 
which should respond to the expectations of the Congolese population.”569 Critics 
questioned the choice of 1993, and it remained unclear what law would apply in the 
case of crimes committed before the Rome Statute’s entry into force. 
The issue of personal jurisdiction in the proposed chambers also raised controversy. 
The competence of the chambers would extend to all perpetrators of international 
crimes, irrespective of immunities or privileges under national law.570 However, 
members of parliament cited the unconstitutionality of this provision as a reason 
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to reject the bill: Article 91.3 gives jurisdiction to the chambers over beneficiaries of 
privileges de juridiction under the Constitution; and Article 91.7 creates competence 
over members of the armed forces, which is exclusively granted to military courts 
under the constitution. In addition, the lack of jurisdiction over military officials for 
acts committed in time of peace was also criticized. The draft legislation subjects 
“legal persons” to liability, a provision presumably aimed at “private companies 
that have benefited from the exploitation of natural resources, or arms sales.”571 
Applicable law for the chambers was to include “the entirety of the principles of 
international criminal law, international humanitarian law and, more generally, 
international law.”572 The chambers would also apply the definitions of the crimes 
as specified in the Rome Statute, but they would employ Congolese rules of 
criminal procedure.573 Some of the key elements of the specialized chambers bill 
and the Rome Statute implementation bill overlap, such as provisions on criminal 
definitions, modes of liability, available defenses, and the rights of the accused.
Location
The draft bill foresaw establishment of three chambers of first instance, each 
attached to an existing Appellate Court, and an Appeals Chamber attached to the 
Cour de Cassation. The three chambers of first instance would be established at the 
seat of the Appeals Courts in Goma, Lubumbashi, and Mbadanka, with competence 
over the northeast, center and south, and west of the country, respectively.574 
The specialized Appeals Chamber would be established at the seat of the Cour 
de Cassation in Kinshasa, which as of late 2017 still had not been created.575 The 
chambers were proposed to be close to the place where the crimes were perpetrated 
to facilitate the referral of cases, and they were envisioned as also being capable of 
holding mobile sessions.576
Structure and Composition
The mapping report, and a follow-up study by Human Rights Watch, examined 
various hybrid structures that could be implemented in the DRC, ranging from a 
SCSL-like structure (involving an agreement between the DRC and the AU or the 
UN) to a chamber fully embedded within the domestic judicial system but with a 
mixed staff (more akin to the BiH WCC or the EAC in the courts of Senegal). Draft 
legislation introduced by the government and reviewed by civil society pursued the 
approach of creating a mixed chamber within the domestic judicial system.
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The establishment of the specialized chambers was presented as an amendment 
to the 2013 Organic Law on the Organization, Functioning, and Competence of the 
Judiciary, integrating mixed chambers with jurisdiction exclusively over genocide, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression within the existing court 
structure. Three chambers of first instance would be attached to the existing Court 
of Appeals, and one specialized Chamber of Appeals would be attached to the future 
Cour de Cassation.577 A specialized Unit for Investigations and Prosecutions (UNEP) 
would be created inside the prosecution for each existing court, to investigate the 
crimes within the competence of the chambers.578
The composition of the chambers has been revised across the different proposals, 
especially as regards the nationality of their members. The last version submitted 
to parliament in 2014 provided for the inclusion of a president and judges in each 
chamber. The proposed Chambers of First Instance comprise five members, and the 
Appeals Chambers comprise seven members, three of whom may be international 
(replacing “should” be international in the previous version).579 The president must be 
Congolese. Judges may be Congolese or international, but they may not come from 
one of the DRC’s bordering countries.580 The Congolese presidents and judges are 
appointed by the DRC president upon proposal from the Superior Judiciary Council 
(Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature).581 The prime minister would appoint foreign 
judges, upon proposal from the minister of justice.582 All judges would be appointed 
for a term of four years, renewable once for Congolese nationals, and renewable upon 
demand from the DRC for third-country nationals.583 The 2011 bill and subsequent 
versions provided for the inclusion of military judges in cases involving suspects who 
are subject to military jurisdiction, but this provision was removed.584 Representation 
of women will be taken into account in the choice of judges and presidents.585 
Each chamber receives the assistance of a Registry that would be created for each 
chamber.586 The investigators of the specialized prosecution unit (UNEP) may 
be Congolese or international, and they must be specialists with the necessary 
knowledge to investigate grave violations of international law, sexual violence, and 
violence against children.587 The government justifies the inclusion of international 
personnel by appealing to the “transmission of international experience” and “a 
useful distance for the judgment of these crimes.”588 The chambers would thus 
constitute “national jurisdictions that may integrate an international element, as 
decided by the state,” rather than “internationalized jurisdictions.”589
The bill also would have established a Unit for the Protection of Victims and 
Witnesses (UNPROVIT) within the Registry in charge of assisting victims, witnesses, 
and informants implicated in the investigations.590 The bill contained no provisions 
on outreach.
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Prosecutions
As of late 2017, mixed chambers had not been created, and there had been no proceedings.
Legacy
Since the last rejection of the Specialized Chambers bill in 2014, the Rome Statute 
implementation bill was adopted, bringing the Congolese legislative framework into 
conformity with international standards. However, there may still be need for the 
establishment of mixed chambers, because as of late 2017, implementation of the 
Rome Statute bill had stalled. The establishment of specialized mixed chambers 
could allow the Congolese authorities to learn from the experience of international 
experts in the prosecution of atrocity crimes and help to reduce political interference 
in the implementation of justice.591 Accordingly, the continuing need to create mixed 
chambers was included among the recommendations of the Etats généraux de la 
justice conducted in 2015.592
Financing
The bill does not specify how the chambers would be funded. However, it states 
that the main personnel are entitled to receive monthly “special allowances” 
determined by decree of the prime minister upon proposal by the minister of 
justice.593 It seems that the chambers would be funded by the state, which is highly 
problematic considering the serious budgetary constraints and the minimal budget 
that is allocated to the justice sector. Some organizations were concerned that the 
establishment of the chambers would draw resources away from other proceedings, 
including the regular court system and the mobile courts.594
Oversight and Accountability
The chambers’ first-instance decisions would be subject to appeal by a specialized 
Appeals Chamber attached to the Cour de Cassation (which, as of late 2017, 
had not yet been established). Judges would be appointed by the DRC president 
upon proposal by the Superior Judiciary Council, with renewable mandates. 
Their mandate could end early in case of resignation, dismissal, “permanent 
impediment,” “incompatibilities,” or death.595
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KENYA: PROPOSED SPECIAL TRIBUNAL
Conflict Background and Political Context
The promise of patronage for ethnic groups aligned with the country’s leader and 
the fear of exclusion for groups out of power have characterized Kenya’s post-
independence politics. Leading politicians have accentuated the tribal stakes of 
elections in order to mobilize popular support, even as their patronage networks 
have only served in-group elites at the expense of the many Kenyans living in 
poverty. In the past, politicians’ calls to tribal loyalty and their demonization of 
others have peaked around presidential elections. There was pre- and post-election 
violence around the multiparty elections of 1992 and 1997, and tensions mounted 
again ahead of the December 2007 presidential elections. When the election 
commission delayed the announcement of results, it aggravated suspicions of 
manipulation. The commission then declared incumbent President Mwai Kibaki 
of the Party of National Unity (PNU) the winner over Raila Odinga of the Orange 
Democratic Party (ODM). Violence erupted between their supporters, much of it 
spontaneous, but in some areas well planned and organized. Violence was especially 
intense in the Mt. Elgon and Rift Valley regions, where ODM supporters, incited in 
some cases by politicians and a popular radio show, targeted Kikuyus, Kisiis, and 
Kalenjins due to their suspected support for the PNU.596 In turn, Kikuyus, including 
members of police and a militia close to Kikuyu politicians, targeted suspected ODM 
supporters, including many in Kisumu and Nairobi’s large informal settlements. 
By the time violence subsided in March 2008, there were 1,133 reported deaths, 
extensive rape and other forms of sexual violence, and at least 350,000 internally 
displaced persons.597 The African Union (AU) and other international actors 
pressured the sides to halt the violence and resolve the political crisis.598 A national 
unity government assumed office in April 2008, with Kibaki as president and 
Odinga as prime minister.599 A national commission recommended the formation 
of a special mixed tribunal to prosecute those most responsible for the 2007–2008 
post-election violence.600 However, elite opposition across ethnic lines ultimately 
defeated the proposal and succeeded in helping to derail cases at the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). As of late 2017, this failure, together with the government’s 
lack of follow-through on other domestic mechanisms for the investigation and 
prosecution of grave crimes, had left communities across Kenya that were affected 
by the post-election violence still waiting for accountability.
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Existing Justice-Sector Capacity
At the time of the 2007–2008 post-election violence, Kenya’s justice system boasted 
many skilled legal professionals but suffered from enormous case backlogs, minimal 
witness protection services, extensive corruption in its lower courts, politicized 
prosecution services, corrupt police, and capacity shortcomings in such areas as court 
management and language services.601 However, furor over the post-election violence 
lent new momentum to legal reform. In 2009, legislators adopted an International 
Crimes Act that domesticated Rome Statute crimes. In 2010, Kenyans voted to adopt 
a new constitution, which among other major reforms, created new safeguards for 
the independence of the judiciary.602 Nevertheless, implementation of justice-sector 
reforms has faced continuous challenge from entrenched interests. In Kenya, the 
obstacles to domestic justice for grave crimes “are more political than technical.”603 
Existing Civil Society Capacity
Civil society in Kenya has been described as “Africa’s bravest and most vocal,” 
a reputation gained through sustained conflict with successive governments.604 
Beyond effectively voicing criticism, civil society organizations have been adept 
in such areas as lending legal expertise to reform debates, providing assistance to 
victims of human rights abuses, documenting grave crimes, monitoring trials, and 
analyzing election irregularities. Engagement with the legal and judicial reform 
process mounted following the 2007–2008 post-election violence. Approximately  
30 organizations formed a new coalition, called Kenyans for Peace, Truth, and 
Justice, as a platform to address the crisis and spur the reform agenda. This 
engagement strengthened civil society’s fluency in legal and transitional justice 
issues. The effectiveness of many civil society organizations and their willingness to 
challenge state authorities has resulted in fierce criticism, government accusations 
of national betrayal, and outright intimidation.605 
Creation
Despite domestic and international pressure and extensive debate, as of late 2017, 
the Special Tribunal for Kenya (STK) has not been created.
A national “Commission to Investigate Post-Election Violence” (called the “Waki 
Commission,” after its chairperson, Judge Philip Waki of the Kenyan Court of 
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Appeals) was formed in October 2008. Its final report recommended a temporary 
STK with exclusive jurisdiction over “persons bearing the greatest responsibility for 
crimes, particularly crimes against humanity, relating to the 2007 general elections 
on Kenya.”606 The Waki Commission handed over names of high-level suspected 
perpetrators to the African Union Panel of Eminent African Personalities, with 
instructions that if no Special Tribunal was created, the panel would disclose the list 
to the ICC prosecutor, which it did in July 2009. 
The Waki Commission proposed a mixed tribunal comprising international 
and national judges, a head international prosecutor, and a head international 
investigator.607 It recommended that both main political parties sign an agreement to 
adopt a statute for the tribunal. The four organs of the Special Tribunal—chambers, 
prosecution, Registry, and defense—would apply both Kenyan and international 
law. A three-judge Trial Chamber and a three-judge Appeals Chamber would both 
have a majority of international judges. The international judges, as well as the 
prosecutor, would be “non-Kenyans from Commonwealth countries, identified by 
the AU Panel of Eminent African Personalities,” and appointed by the president. The 
national judges would chair each chamber and would be appointed by the president, 
in consultation with the prime minister, with the advice of the chief justice. The head 
of investigations and at least three staff investigators would also be non-Kenyan.
In December 2008, President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga signed an 
agreement stating that a cabinet committee would draft a Special Tribunal bill. 
Instead, the minister of justice proposed a draft statute to parliament, outlining 
a domestic chamber of mixed composition to prosecute serious violations that 
occurred in the context of the elections.608 In 2009, five attempts to pass a Special 
Tribunal bill in parliament all failed. Opponents of the bill, many of whom would 
later oppose ICC intervention as an exercise of “neo-colonialism,” argued against 
it by touting the ICC’s role, using the rallying cry, “Don’t be vague, go for The 
Hague.”609 By November 2010, “a bill on the establishment of a Special Tribunal had 
been indefinitely shelved.”610 
In rejecting both the ICC and the creation of a Special Tribunal, in mid-2010 the 
government declared that it would prefer a reconciliation approach, carried out by 
the long-stalled and scandal-plagued Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission 
(TJRC).611 In December 2010, after the ICC prosecutor revealed the names of the 
six individuals against whom his office was seeking to bring charges, the Kenyan 
Parliament passed a motion calling for Kenya’s withdrawal from the Rome Statute. 
In January 2012, following the confirmation of charges by the ICC (see text box), the 
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government announced its intention to establish a national mechanism.612 President 
Kibaki also called for the transfer of the ICC cases to the African Court of Human 
Rights or East African Court of Justice, although both lacked any mandate to try 
such cases.613 Much of civil society and the public saw the new push for domestic 
proceedings as a ploy to support an admissibility challenge to the ICC based on the 
principle of complementarity.614 After ICC judges rejected admissibility challenges, 
critics viewed the government’s continued statements in favor of domestic 
proceedings, in absence of genuine steps to implement them, as little more than 
talking points to justify non-cooperation with the ICC.
Legal Framework and Mandate
The 2009 bill would have provided the Special Tribunal with a mandate to 
investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate cases involving “persons responsible for” 
a range of grave crimes. These included genocide, gross violations of human 
rights, “other crimes committed in Kenya in accordance with the provisions of this 
Statute,”615 and related prior or subsequent offenses.616 The bill granted the Special 
Tribunal exclusive jurisdiction over these crimes.617 The bill relied heavily on the 
ICC in defining the elements of crimes618 and modes of liability.619 
Location
The bill provided flexibility with regard to location, leaving decisions about the 
location of hearings to the discretion of the head of the Appellate Chamber.620
Structure and Composition
The first draft statute of the STK considered in 2009 was introduced by then 
justice minister Martha Karua (and is the version described here). The Karua 
bill bore strong similarity to the Waki Commission’s proposals in key areas: Trial 
and Appellate Chambers with majorities of international judges, an international 
prosecutor, and appointment procedures with international and African 
participation. However, unlike the Waki Commission’s proposal, the 2009 bill 
did not address investigations. The bill foresaw a tribunal comprised of Trial and 
Appellate Chambers, a prosecutor’s office, a Registry, and a defense office. It also 
would have established four “Special Magistrates Courts,” with panels of three 
national judges, to exercise jurisdiction over lower-level defendants.
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Chambers
The bill foresaw a single Trial Chamber and a single Appellate Chamber. The 
president, with concurrence of the prime minister and AU Panel could create 
additional Trial Chambers if necessary.621 The president, with the prime minister’s 
agreement, could also expand on the four initial three-judge Special Magistrates 
Courts responsible for lower-level cases.622
The Trial Chamber was to consist of three judges: a Kenyan chair appointed by 
Kenya’s president with concurrence of the prime minister and two international 
judges appointed by the same procedure following their nomination by the AU 
Panel of Eminent African Personalities.623 The Appeals Chamber was to consist of 
five judges: a Kenyan chair and a second Kenyan judge appointed in accordance 
with the same procedures as the chair of the Trial Chamber, and three international 
judges appointed in accordance with the same procedures as international judges of 
the Trial Chamber.624 All judges were to be appointed for terms of three years, with 
some flexibility to extend these terms.625 Special magistrates would be appointed  
to a renewable, three-year term.626
The bill set forth qualifications for judges, requiring that they: (1) possess the 
qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest 
judicial offices; (2) have extensive experience in criminal law and practice; (3) be of 
recognized professional competence; (4) be of good character and integrity; and  
(5) be impartial.627 It further required that the process take into account gender 
equality, as well as the judges’ experience in criminal law, international criminal  
law, and international human rights law.628
Prosecutor
The bill tasked a prosecutor’s office to investigate and prosecute cases against 
persons responsible for crimes falling within the tribunal’s jurisdiction, based 
on its own information and that from other sources.629 The prosecutor would 
be an international official appointed by Kenya’s president with the agreement 
of the prime minister, based on a list of nominees submitted by the Panel of 
Eminent African Personalities.630 The legislation required the prosecutor to meet 
the same qualifications as the tribunal’s judges,631 and once in office, to act with 
independence.632 The bill specified that the prosecutor’s office would consist of 
prosecution and investigation divisions.633
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The Registrar
Under the bill, an international registrar would be responsible for the tribunal’s 
administration and management. Kenya’s president would appoint the registrar, who 
would be required to possess nearly the same qualifications as the prosecutor and 
judges,634 following the same procedure as that for the prosecutor.635 The president, 
with the prime minister’s agreement, would also appoint a Kenyan deputy registrar
from a list of individuals nominated by the Parliamentary Committee.636 The legislation 
specifically tasked the registrar with establishing a victims and witnesses unit.637
Defense Office
The bill would have created a defense office led by a Kenyan chief defense counsel 
appointed through the same procedure as the prosecutor.638 The head of office, 
assisted by a deputy,639 would be required to meet qualifications similar to those of 
the registrar.640 The defense office would be responsible for assuring protection of 
the rights of the accused and, more specifically, supporting defense counsel and 
indigent accused through providing legal research and advice, collecting evidence, 




The failure of the proposal to establish the STK, together with the collapse of the 
Kenya cases at the ICC (see text box) has meant that, as of late 2017, there had been 
almost no criminal accountability for the postelection violence. There had been no 
prosecutions at all of mid- or senior-level figures implicated in the crimes, and no 
prosecution of extensive crimes of sexual violence.642 This impunity persisted even 
as Kenyan institutions developed laws and institutions ostensibly meant to end it. 
At the end of 2008, parliament passed the International Crimes Act, which granted 
jurisdiction over Rome Statute crimes to the High Court.643 However, it remained 
unclear whether the act could ever be applied retroactively to cover the period of the 
postelection violence.644 In October 2013, lawmakers opposed to the ICC proposed 
repealing the act as part of their broader initiative to withdraw Kenya from the  
Rome Statute.645
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On May 9, 2012, Kenya’s Judicial Service Commission (JSC) set up a working 
committee mandated to study and make recommendations on the viability of 
establishing an International Crimes Division (ICD) in the High Court of Kenya. 
After visiting several countries to study various approaches to domestic prosecution 
of international crimes, the committee produced its first report in October 2012. 
The report acknowledged Kenya’s obligations under the Rome Statute and noted 
that the ICC could not handle all postelection violence cases. In recommending the 
establishment of the ICD, it also took note of the failure to establish the STK.646
 
The JSC proposal suggested that the ICD have a mandate beyond the crimes 
defined in the International Crimes Act. Beyond genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity, the JSC proposed that the ICD mandate should also include such 
transnational crimes as terrorism, piracy, human trafficking, drug trafficking, money 
laundering, and cybercrime.647 Kenyans for Peace and Truth with Justice criticized 
this proposed expansion, arguing that it would distract the ICD from dealing 
with Rome Statute crimes, thus giving “the illusion of movement in the search of 
justice for post-election violence crimes while in reality the situation would remain 
unchanged.”648 The JSC proposal included a call for the establishment of a special 
prosecution division for international crimes, independent of Kenya’s director of 
public prosecutions (DPP), but the DPP questioned the constitutionality of such an 
action.649 As of 2017, government officials continued to reference the creation of the 
ICD as a pending matter.650
In April 2012, the DPP established a “multi-agency task force,” made up of officials 
from the DPP, the Attorney-General’s Office, the police, and other government offices. 
The task force had a mandate to review all post-election violence cases and facilitate 
prosecutions.651 In the course of its work, it reviewed 6,000 cases and identified 1,716 
suspects and 420 potential witnesses. The cases included 150 files on sexual and 
gender-based violence. However, the task force’s work ended with an announcement 
that the criminal files were being closed because there was insufficient evidence 
to support prosecution.652 In sworn testimony in 2017, a senior Kenyan prosecutor 
testified that there was an active ICD within the DPP’s office, but there remained no 
clear public indications of progress on post-election violence (PEV) cases.653 
The prosecutor’s testimony came in a constitutional reference case before Kenya’s 
High Court brought by survivors of sexual violence challenging the failures of state 
officials and institutions to prevent or punish crimes committed during the 
post-election violence. Similar litigation before the High Court was being pursued 
in two other cases: on behalf of those internally displaced during the PEV and on 
behalf of police-shooting victims.654
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The Kenya Cases at the International Criminal Court
In March 2010, ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo opened investigations into 
Kenya’s post-election violence, and in December 2010, he announced that he 
sought summons against six high-profile individuals in Kenya: William Ruto, Henry 
Kosgey, and Joshua arap Sang (all of the ODM party); and Francis Muthaura, 
Uhuru Kenyatta, and Hussein Ali (all of the PNU party). The ICC Pre-trial Chamber 
confirmed charges against four of the suspects in January 2012, but dropped 
charges against Henry Kosgey and Hussein Ali.655 In May 2012, the ICC rejected final 
admissibility challenges by the defendants, but the prosecutor dropped all charges 
against Muthaura after a key witness recanted his testimony. 
Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto were elected as president and deputy president in 
April 2013, in a partnership variously seen as one of ethnic reconciliation or a pact born 
of shared opposition to the ICC. The election campaign was marked by attacks on the 
court as a neocolonialist institution. The joint trial of Ruto and Sang began in 
September 2013, while prosecutors sought delays to the start of the trial of Kenyatta, 
citing a lack of state cooperation. Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda ultimately withdrew 
charges against Kenyatta in 2014, and the court later dropped the case against Ruto 
and Sang in 2016, finding insufficient evidence to proceed. Prosecutors blamed 
the unwillingness of Kenyan authorities to cooperate and cited alleged government 
tampering and intimidation of witnesses. In 2013 and 2015, ICC judges approved 
warrants of arrest against a total of three Kenyan individuals for obstructing the 
administration of justice, but as of late 2017, Kenya had failed to enforce these warrants.
Financing
The 2009 legislation provided that the STK would be funded through appropriations 
from parliament, “such monies or assets as may accrue to the tribunal in the course 
of the exercise of its powers or the performance of its functions,” and grants or 




The bill did not provide for an oversight body for the STK. However, it did include 
procedures for removing and replacing judges in cases of misconduct, conviction, or 
infirmity.657 
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LIBERIA: PROPOSED EXTRAORDINARY CRIMINAL COURT
Conflict Background and Political Context
 
Liberia experienced two brutal civil wars between 1989 and 2003 that caused the 
deaths of some 250,000 Liberians and displaced over a third of the population. 
Armed conflict began in 1989 after decades of tension between the indigenous 
majority and the Americo-Liberian minority that had historically ruled the country. 
In 1990, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), led by Prince 
Johnson, captured and killed President Samuel Doe, who had taken control of 
the government in a 1980 coup. Johnson’s INPFL then began to fight the National 
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor. These and other armed 
factions signed as many as 15 peace agreements in the following years, as they 
battled for control over natural resources and territory.658 In 1997, following the 
1996 Abuja Peace Agreement, Charles Taylor won presidential elections, amid 
chants from his supporters: “He killed my pa, he killed my ma, I’ll vote for him.”659 
A fragile peace held for two years, but fighting broke out again in 1998. New armed 
rebel movements, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and 
the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), backed by Guinea and Côte 
d’Ivoire, respectively, put increasing pressure on the Taylor regime. In 2003, the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) charged Taylor with war crimes and crimes 
against humanity for his role in Sierra Leone’s war. (See the separate profile on 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone, later in this annex.) In August 2013, mounting 
international pressure combined with armed opposition caused Taylor to agree to 
a comprehensive peace agreement with LURD and MODEL, resign the presidency, 
and go into exile in Nigeria. 
Liberia held national elections in October 2005, bringing Ellen Johnson Sirleaf 
to power as Africa’s first female president. She was re-elected in late 2011. UN 
peacekeeping forces (UNMIL) were deployed in 2003, and at the end of 2011, 
nearly 10,000 troops and personnel remained in Liberia. In 2006, Charles Taylor 
was arrested in Nigeria and transferred to the SCSL. Even after Taylor’s departure 
and eventual conviction, however, many of his wartime allies and leaders of other 
factions implicated in war crimes and crimes against humanity maintained senior 
positions in the Liberian Senate, House of Representatives, and political parties. 
The joint self-interest in impunity across otherwise rival factions has made it 
politically difficult to gain momentum for any domestic prosecution mechanism 
for wartime atrocities.
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Powerful elites from the civil war maintain their influence in Liberia. After serving 
two six-year terms in power—the constitutional limit—Johnson Sirleaf ’s tenure 
ended in 2017. Twenty candidates ran for president in the 2017 elections. Jewell 
Howard Taylor, Charles Taylor’s ex-wife, was the running mate of leading candidate 
George Weah. In October 2017, Weah was headed to a run-off election against 
Liberian Vice President Joseph Boakai after no candidate was able to gain 50 percent 
of the vote in the October 10, 2017, election.660 Charles Taylor, speaking from his 
prison in the United Kingdom, showed keen interest in the presidential elections, 
telling supporters to avoid people who would betray his party—which is in a coalition 
with George Weah’s Congress for Democratic Change.661 
Existing Justice-Sector Capacity
Liberia’s gutted justice sector has made significant capacity improvements since 
the end of the civil war, including mobile court projects, paralegal community 
resolution programs, constitutional reforms in 2011, and the establishment of an 
anticorruption judicial framework. The general infrastructure of the country remains 
limited, and the judicial sector is severely under capacity, especially outside the 
capital. A 2011 report found that “the justice sector suffers from a lack of public 
defenders, case backlogs, prolonged pretrial detention, and prison overcrowding. … 
Security at correctional facilities is inadequate, and prison breaks are common.”662 
The current assessments call into question the capacity of the justice sector to 
effectively prosecute even lower-level perpetrators, as called for by the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC). 
Existing Civil Society Capacity
Civil society was instrumental in establishing peace in Liberia. Some sections of 
civil society participated in peace talks in Accra. However, civil society faced many 
challenges in the immediate post-conflict period. In particular, there was a lack of 
leadership and organizational development capacity; gaps emerged when some 
civil society leaders joined the government; and there was a general lack of funding. 
Funding and skills were often focused on urban areas, leaving outer regions of the 
country underserved. Moreover, civil society work became funding-driven as groups 
competed for funding from international NGOs and donors. Organizations struggled 
to mature and increase their influence as they shifted from political advocacy to 
promoting citizen interests and ensuring government accountability.663 
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In the years since, civil society has adapted to support new challenges facing 
Liberia, such as prosecution for grave crimes and monitoring the extractive industry. 
Civil society has strongly advocated for the creation of a special tribunal to try grave 
crimes in Liberia. The Global Justice and Research Project has documented crimes 
committed during Liberia’s civil wars and supported extraterritorial prosecutions 
in several cases, working together with the Geneva-based legal organization 
Civitas Maxima.664 
Despite advancements, challenges for civil society persist, such as the rural–urban 
dichotomy and struggles for funding. Organizations based in the Monrovia still tend 
to have more access to funding and skilled staff, translating to more capacity for 
program implementation and monitoring and evaluation. Urban-based civil society 
organizations continue to rely on international donors for funding, putting them at a 
risk when international attention shifts away from Liberia.665
Creation
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC, see text box) proposed in a draft 
statute that the Extraordinary Criminal Court for Liberia (ECCL) be created as 
a fully domestic legal body under Liberian law, composed of international and 
national judges and prosecutors (similar to the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia, but without an underlying bilateral agreement between  
Liberia and the UN).666 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission
The peace agreement called for the creation of a TRC, but wrangling over the 
appointment of commissioners, and funding delayed its implementation. A TRC 
selection panel, established by the TRC Act,667 screened more than 150 candidates 
nominated by the Liberian public and generated a short list of 15 names. In 
February 2006, President Johnson Sirleaf appointed nine commissioners and 
inaugurated the commission. The TRC was mandated to investigate Liberia’s conflict 
history from 1979 to 2003 and required to issue recommendations on prosecution 
mechanisms.668 The authorizing TRC Act required the government to act on and 
implement the TRC’s recommendations, stating that the president must “show 
cause” for noncompliance.669 
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The TRC released its final report in December 2009, igniting a fierce debate in 
Liberian society and politics about the proper means to address the past.670 The 
report recommended political leaders, including Senator Prince Johnson and 
President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, be banned from holding public office for 30 years.671 
The government largely ignored the calls for lustration, and in January 2011, 
Liberia’s Supreme Court ruled this recommendation unconstitutional.672 The direct 
naming of key members of the ruling political class led some former warlords to 
publicly threaten a return to violence.673
The report named 116 perpetrators to be prosecuted for the violence. High-level 
prosecutions would be carried out by an Extraordinary Criminal Court for Liberia 
(the ECCL), a mixed chamber within Liberia, while domestic courts would try 
58 lower-level perpetrators.674 The TRC’s report included a detailed draft statute 
for the mixed chamber. 
Since Liberia’s civil war, various civil society groups have advocated for a special 
war crimes court, but the TRC’s recommendation was by far the most detailed and 
comprehensive call for one. Because the temporal and territorial jurisdiction of the 
SCSL did not cover international crimes committed by Charles Taylor (or anyone 
else) on the territory of Liberia, observers decried the impunity gap and called for 
the creation of a Special Court for Liberia, or alternatively, the expansion of the 
SCSL’s jurisdiction.675 The Liberian government postponed serious discussions about 
prosecutions until after the completion of the TRC’s work (an approach shared by 
the TRC’s chairman),676 but has made little progress in seriously considering the 
TRC’s recommendations. 
The recommendations in the report met with mixed reactions from the public and 
the international community. A coalition of 36 Liberian civil society organizations 
voiced strong support for the accountability proposals and some groups called for 
the resignation of President Johnson Sirleaf and other government officials.677 Other 
civil society actors were more circumspect, fearful that prosecutions would unravel 
Liberia’s postwar economic development and political stability, and suspicious 
that calls for Johnson Sirleaf ’s resignation were motivated by political revisionism 
and opportunism among former Taylor supporters rather than genuine appeals for 
accountability.678 A 2011 population-based survey on perceptions about transitional 
justice approaches found that a minority of Liberians supported criminal trials for 
perpetrators.679 The fractious and politicized debate in civil society around the 
proposals for an international court mirrors the fractious nature of Liberian politics.  
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Legal Framework and Mandate
The ECCL’s proposed subject matter jurisdiction included “gross violations  
of human rights, serious humanitarian law violations and egregious domestic  
crimes and any other relevant crimes.”680 Existing domestic courts would prosecute 
crimes “lesser than” gross violations. The ECCL’s broad jurisdiction over such 
domestic crimes as “official oppression” and financial offenses could serve  
to expose the nexus between the perpetration of grave crimes and financial  
crimes and exploitation, but some observers noted that it could also overburden  
the prosecution.681 
The ECCL would use international definitions of crimes, standards of proof, and 
modes of individual criminal liability. Definitions for domestic crimes within the 
ECCL’s mandate—including some forms of sexual violence—would be supplied 
by national law. Critics identified shortcomings in some of the criminal modes of 
liability and definitions in the proposed statute, as these were not in accordance with 
international norms, particularly provisions relating to sexual violence.682 
The court’s temporal jurisdiction would encompass January 1979 to October 14, 
2003. Personal jurisdiction excluded minors under 18 years of age. The ECCL would 
have concurrent and primacy jurisdiction with national courts, “except with respect 
to gross violations of human rights and serious humanitarian law violations,” and the 
ECCL would have the power to “remove and transfer proceedings to any national 
court in Liberia.”683
Location
The court would be seated in the Liberian capital, Monrovia, and could “establish 
alternative sites to conduct hearings as it deems necessary.”684 
Structure and Composition
The ECCL would comprise three organs—a two-tiered chambers, a prosecution 
office, and a Registry.685 Foreign attorneys could be admitted to practice before the 
court under special procedures established by the court’s internal rules of evidence 
and procedure.686 
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Each chamber would contain a majority of internationally appointed judges. The 
Appeals Chamber would have five judges—two appointed by the president of 
Liberia, and one each by the UN Secretary-General (UNSG), the president of the 
EU, and the chairman/president of the African Union (AU). The Trial Chamber 
would have three judges: one appointed by the president of Liberia and two by 
the Secretary-General (with two alternate Liberian judges). At least one-third of 
all judges were required to be women, and foreign judges would be granted full 
diplomatic privileges and immunities. All judges would be appointed for five-year 
terms and could only be removed from office by the Liberian legislature after a 
request “by the court itself.”687 A majority of the judges would elect the court’s 
president and vice president. 
The Liberian president, in consultation with the UNSG, would appoint the head 
prosecutor; prosecutorial staff would be international and national, with “special 
consideration” to the appointment of gender-crime and juvenile justice specialists. 
The registrar and two deputy registrars would be foreign nationals appointed by a 
majority of the judges. The registrar would be required to have “over 10 years of 
legal experience including work with international courts and/or internationalized 
domestic courts.”688 Interpreters and transcribers would be required to be provided 
when requested by one of the parties. The TRC-proposed statute is unclear as to 
whether the ECCL would be mandated to appoint and retain defense counsel for 
indigent accused.
 
While the TRC report called for the enactment of a national witness protection 
statute, witness protection is not mentioned in the draft statute.689 Nor does the 
draft statute envision a specific outreach or communications office; it only provides 
that the president would be responsible for “representing the court in its external 
relations with state bodies and organizations” (although such an office could be set 
up internally by the court).690 
Two special features were included in the TRC’s draft statute. The court, in consultation 
with the president, would be authorized to enter into extradition agreements with 
foreign states (and allow for judgments in absentia); and the court could “conduct 
proceedings in foreign courts” in cases that posed national security risk as 
determined by the Liberian president and “with the consent” of the court’s president.
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Prosecutions
As of late 2017, the ECCL had not been created, and there had been no domestic 
prosecutions for grave crimes committed during Liberia’s civil wars. The TRC report 
did, however, make recommendations with regard to prosecutions.
The TRC report premised prosecutions on conditional amnesties, at times 
inconsistently. While its draft statute expressly rejects amnesties, elsewhere the TRC 
report recommended that nearly 40 individuals, “though found to be responsible,” 
not be prosecuted because “they cooperated with the TRC process, admitted to 
the crimes committed and spoke truthfully before the Commission and expressed 
remorse for their prior actions during the war.”691 This approach most resembles 
that of the South African TRC model, which granted partial immunity from 
criminal liability in exchange for full and truthful testimony. The report named 120 
individuals for prosecution by the ECCL, including persons associated with all major 
warring factions.692
 
Human Rights Watch criticized this number of recommended prosecutions as being 
overly broad and unrealistic, recommending that any specialized tribunal target only 
a select number of high-level perpetrators and that the prosecutorial mandate allow 
for flexibility, given likely resource and capacity constraints.693 
Procedimientos extraterritoriales para crímenes graves en Liberia
Despite a lack of prosecutions for grave crimes within Liberia, there have been 
some proceedings for crimes committed during Liberia’s civil war in other domestic 
jurisdictions. The United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands have all sought prosecution of individuals suspected of committing 
grave crimes in Liberia. 
In the Netherlands, legal proceedings began in 2005 against Guus Van 
Kouwenhoven, a Dutch businessman accused of selling arms to Liberia and being 
involved in war crimes committed there. In April 2017, after a protracted legal battle 
reaching all the way to the Supreme Court of the Netherlands (de Hoge Raad), a 
Dutch appeals court convicted and sentenced Van Kouwenhoven to 19 years in 
prison for his complicity in war crimes and his involvement in arms trafficking for 
Charles Taylor.694
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In October 2017, Mohammed Jabbateh, aka “Jungle Jabbah,” stood trial in the 
United States on charges of immigration fraud and perjury.695 A federal court in 
Philadelphia found him guilty on two counts of immigration fraud and two counts 
of perjury stemming from statements he made in connection with an application for 
asylum and permanent residence in the United States. According to the indictment, 
he provided false information about his wartime activities in Liberia. During the 
first civil war, Jabbateh was a commander in the United Liberation Movement for 
Democracy (ULIMO) and later ULIMO-K after the group split into two factions. He 
was accused of committing or ordering his troops to commit atrocity crimes but was 
never held to account for his role in Liberia’s civil war. Although the U.S. charges 
did not directly relate to these grave crimes, the prosecutor had to prove that he 
committed, ordered, or oversaw the commission of war crimes in order to establish 
that he committed fraud and perjury. 
Similar charges were brought by U.S. prosecutors against former Liberian Defense 
Minister Jucontee Thomas Smith Woewiyu in 2014696 and rebel leader George Boley 
in 2012.697 U.S. prosecutors convicted Chuckie Taylor, Charles Taylor’s son, under 
the Alien Tort Statute for crimes he committed in Liberia. In 2009, a U.S. federal 
court sentenced Taylor to 97 years in prison for torture and summary executions 
committed while he was head of the Anti-Terrorist Services while his father was 
president of Liberia from 1997 to 2003.698
Other accused await trial in other jurisdictions:  
• In June 2017, U.K. authorities arrested Agnes Reeves Taylor, former wife of 
Charles Taylor, for her alleged role in torture committed during Liberia’s first 
civil war. She allegedly committed torture while working with the NPFL.699 
• In 2014, Swiss police arrested Alieu Kosiah and charged him with war crimes. 
Kosiah was a former commander of ULIMO and is being held on suspicion of 
having committed war crimes between 1993 and 1995. A group of nine Liberians 
filed a complaint against him with the Swiss prosecution.700 
• Belgian authorities arrested Martina Johnson in 2014. Johnson was a 
commander in Taylor’s NPFL during Liberia’s first civil war. She is suspected 
of having participated in many different crimes, including in relation to the 
notorious “Operation Octopus” attack on Monrovia in 1992.701 
Legacy
As of late 2017, Liberia had made almost no progress in implementing the 
recommendations of the TRC report, including with regard to the establishment 
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of a mixed international chamber in the domestic courts to prosecute serious 
crimes. Several commissioners distanced themselves from the report in the political 
firestorm following its release. In March 2010, President Johnson Sirleaf requested 
that the Ministry of Justice and the Law Reform Commission review the TRC 
report.702 In May 2010, the International Center for Transitional Justice called for 
investigations to be carried out by an independent national commission and for an 
assessment mission to examine the readiness of the domestic judicial system for war 
crimes prosecutions.703 A Universal Periodic Review of Liberia for the UN Human 
Rights Council in January 2011 reported, “Liberia stated that, owing to financial 
constraints, the final report of the Commission had yet to be broadly distributed 
and explained to the average citizen, and thus that any discussion regarding the 
establishment of an extraordinary criminal court might prove to be premature.”704 
In 2017, it appeared likely that for the foreseeable future, the only prosecutions for 
grave crimes in Liberia would continue to be in jurisdictions outside the country.
Financing
The TRC recommended that the Liberian government fund the ECCL, supported 
by voluntary contributions from donor states, international institutions, NGOs, 
and individuals.705 The court would institute a two-tiered remuneration system, 
with international staff salaries “commensurate with international standards as 
decided by the entirety of the Court and the President of the Republic of Liberia.”706 
For local staff, the “Registry will determine a salary scale … commensurate with 
professional staff of the Supreme Court of Liberia or as otherwise determined by 
the President of the Court.”707 
Oversight and Accountability
The TRC-recommended statute included no explicit provisions on oversight or 
accountability mechanisms for the ECCL. The draft statute did provide for some 
oversight into the appointment of personnel. For example, the statute states that the 
ECCL prosecutor should be appointed “in consultation with” the UNSG, although 
this would not be sufficient to prevent an appointment based solely on political 
allegiance. The statute also provides that staff could be excluded from working at 
the ECCL on the basis of “public perception of involvement in abuses,” which is a 
relatively low threshold that could potentially lead to political abuse, as happened 
with the de-Baathification laws in the Iraq High Tribunal. (See the separate profile 
of the Iraqi High Tribunal in Annex 5.)
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RWANDA
The Rwandan genocide of 1994 resulted in the killing of up to one million people 
in around 100 days, as well as the rape and other forms of sexual violence against 
tens (or reportedly up to hundreds) of thousands of women and girls. This annex 
covers two of the main approaches to accountability for grave crimes in Rwanda. 
The first, established in 1994, is the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR). The second is a more traditional, “grassroots” form of justice 
known in Rwanda as Gacaca. Common sections covering background on the conflict 
and the capacities of the domestic justice sector and civil society precede separate 
detail on each mechanism. Also included in the annex is an overview of proceedings 
for grave crimes in Rwanda’s national courts.
Conflict Background and Political Context
On April 6, 1994, a plane carrying Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana and 
President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi was shot down on its approach to Kigali 
airport, killing all onboard.708 Following the deaths of the two presidents, widespread 
killings, marked by both political and ethnic dimensions, began in Kigali and 
spread to other parts of Rwanda.709 Over the course of about 100 days, somewhere 
between 800,000 and one million men, women, and children—the vast majority 
of them of Tutsi ethnicity, or Hutus thought to be sympathetic toward Tutsis—were 
slaughtered. In 2006, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTR determined that during 
these 100 days there was a genocide in Rwanda against the Tutsi ethnic group, and 
that this fact is—from a legal perspective—one of common knowledge, such that it is 
beyond dispute.710 Estimates put the percentage of Tutsis killed during the Rwandan 
genocide at about 75 percent of Rwanda’s Tutsi population at the time.711
Decades of intercommunal Tutsi–Hutu violence in Rwanda were exacerbated by 
colonial-era divide-and-rule tactics. By 1994, an extremist Hutu government was in 
power and actively stoking popular fears of a return to oppressive rule of the country 
by a privileged Tutsi minority. The attack on the plane carrying Habyarimana 
and Ntaryamira triggered implementation of the Rwandan government’s plans to 
exterminate Tutsis in the country. 
The international community failed to halt the killings or to prevent the genocide.712 
A UN peacekeeping mission called the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda 
(UNAMIR), led by Major-General Roméo A. Dallaire, had been in Rwanda since 
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October 1993 to monitor the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement.713 The 
small UN force was ill equipped to halt the violence, and the UN Headquarters never 
responded to a request from Dallaire to allow the mission to use force in response to 
crimes against humanity and other abuses. The Security Council withdrew nearly all 
of its peacekeepers during the height of the violence.714 
In May 1994, the Security Council increased the number of UNAMIR troops to 
5,500 (“UNAMIR II”),715 although it took almost six months for Member States to 
provide troops. UNAMIR II’s mandate expired in March 1996. Pending the arrival of 
UNAMIR II troops, France deployed its military in a UN Security Council-authorized 
operation (“Operation Turquoise”) to create a humanitarian assistance corridor.716 
Tutsi rebel forces, known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and led by Paul 
Kagame, made their way to the capital city of Kigali in early July 1994. 
After the genocide, one to two million Rwandan Hutus fled across the border into 
the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The majority of the refugees were 
civilians, but interspersed among the population were thousands of armed members 
of the former Rwandan army (FAR) and security forces. Hutu paramilitaries 
known as Interahamwe and ex-FAR forces posed a serious threat to Rwanda’s new 
government and led to Rwanda’s invasion of eastern DRC in 1996.
Despite initially requesting the Security Council to establish an international 
criminal tribunal, the Rwandan government has had a sometimes-difficult 
relationship with the court. During negotiations to establish the tribunal, the 
Rwandan government objected to several points: the location in Tanzania (rather 
than in Rwanda), the limited temporal jurisdiction (the government wanted it to 
begin earlier to cover atrocities committed before 1994), the tribunal’s primacy 
over Rwandan courts, and its exclusion of the death penalty.717 Relations were 
intermittently fraught, with the result that cooperation on the transfer of witnesses 
from Rwanda was sometimes interrupted. In April 1997, “relations with the Tribunal 
reached an all-time low when there was a demonstration in Kigali … against the 
Tribunal by Rwandese organizations representing survivors and victims of the 1994 
genocide.”718 In 1999, the Rwandan government severed diplomatic relations with 
the tribunal, although later reinstated them. Relations improved somewhat after the 
court began transferring cases to Rwandan domestic courts for prosecution in 2011.
The most important bone of contention between the Rwandan government and 
the ICTR throughout the life of the tribunal regarded crimes alleged to have been 
committed by the RPF in the course of overthrowing the government to end the 
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genocide. President Paul Kagame’s government consistently resisted attempts 
to investigate actions of the RPF in ending the genocide in 1994. In her memoir 
published in 2008, former ICTR Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte revealed that in 
2000 she had opened an investigation into possible RPF crimes, which her office 
had initially conducted secretly, knowing the government would oppose it.719 
In 2003, the UN Security Council decided not to renew Del Ponte’s appointment  
as chief prosecutor of the ICTR when her term expired,720 though she continued  
as chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY). Del Ponte viewed this as a forced exit due to pressure from the Rwandan 
government.721 Her successor, Hassan Jallow, denied that investigations against 
RPF members had been delayed due to threat of noncooperation from Rwanda 
and maintained that work continued on those files. He asserted that his office dealt 
with those cases just like any other and decisions whether to indict were taken 
solely on the basis of evidence and the law and “not on extraneous considerations 
or feelings of maintaining ‘balancing acts’ by indicting ‘all sides’ to the Rwandan 
armed conflict.”722
Existing Justice-Sector Capacity
Many judges, lawyers, and other judicial staff were killed during the genocide, 
and much of the country’s infrastructure was destroyed.723 Nevertheless, from the 
late 1990s, the Rwandan authorities arrested thousands of people suspected of 
involvement in the genocide and beginning in 1996 started bringing them to trial. 
By 2001, more than 100,000 persons were still detained, as it proved impossible 
to conduct proceedings effectively while at the same time recruiting new staff 
and rebuilding the infrastructure of the judicial system.724 The government sought 
to speed up trials by establishing the Gacaca courts (see below) and introducing 
streamlining and other reforms of the justice system. However, in 2008, Human 
Rights Watch assessed that despite improvements, judges were subject to pressure 
from the executive, and fair trial rights, equal access to justice, humane conditions 
of detention, and other basic conditions were not guaranteed.725 Not until December 
2011 did the ICTR agree to transfer the first case to Rwanda to face trial, determining 
for the first time that the Rwandan judiciary had the capacity and independence 
to conduct national prosecutions.726 Some states followed suit, but as late as 2017, 
the tribunal refused to extradite four genocide suspects to Rwanda on the basis 
there was still a real risk they might suffer a flagrant breach of fair trial rights, citing 
concerns about independence of the judiciary and its vulnerability to political 
pressure as a key reason.727
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Existing Civil Society Capacity
Commentators have labeled Rwandan civil society as primarily focused on service 
delivery and characterized by heavy state dependency and lack of independence.728 
Human rights organizations, the media, and lawyers who criticize official actions 
or policy face intimidation and interference.729 In 2008, Human Rights Watch 
reported that members of the Rwandan Human Rights League that monitored 
and reported on genocide trials and lawyers who defended persons accused of 
genocide in the Rwandan courts felt threatened in Rwanda, and several were 
forced to leave the country.730 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Creation
The UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted resolution 955 on November 8, 1994, 
creating the ICTR. It was the second instance where the UNSC invoked Chapter VII 
to create an ad hoc international criminal tribunal, imposing a binding obligation 
on all UN Member States to cooperate fully with the new entity. 731 Its creation grew 
from initiatives launched in the midst of the ongoing genocide.
After the failure of the international community to prevent the genocide, and amid 
its ongoing failure to halt it, the UN acted quickly to deploy two human rights and 
investigative missions. The UN Human Rights Commission appointed a Special 
Rapporteur in May 1994,732 and the Secretary-General appointed a Committee 
of Experts four days before the RPF took Kigali. The UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights Jose Lasso also visited Rwanda in May and produced a preliminary 
report.733 As early as July 1994, the UN discussed creating an ad hoc tribunal on 
the model of the ICTY, with the United States using back-channel diplomatic 
engagement to convince the fledgling Rwandan government to issue a request 
to the UNSC.734 
The UN gave its Commission of Experts on Rwanda four months to report, but the 
United States pressured the commission to issue an interim report “recommending 
the establishment of an international tribunal as soon as possible.”735 The commission 
submitted its report to the Security Council in early October, recommending that 
the council amend the ICTY Statute to include the Rwandan conflict.736 
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The permanent five members of the Security Council initially proposed several 
structures for an international tribunal for Rwanda. Russia proposed creating a 
“separate international entity patterned on the Yugoslav court.”737 The U.S. proposal 
was to “use the Statute, infrastructure, and staff of the Yugoslav court to initiate 
prosecutions of Rwandan war crimes.”738 The resulting compromise, proposed by 
New Zealand, created “a separate entity but with ‘bridges’ between the Yugoslav 
and Rwandan Tribunals in a common appellate chamber and a common chief 
prosecutor.”739 (In 2003, the UN appointed separate prosecutors for the ICTY 
and the ICTR.) Despite having initially signaled its support for an international 
criminal tribunal, Rwanda voted against Resolution 955, in part because of its 
opposition to the exclusion of the death penalty and the temporal mandate of the 
tribunal, which included the period after the RPF assumed control of the country 
in July 1994. Nevertheless, roughly six months after the genocide, the UNSC had 
established the ICTR.
In February 1995, the Security Council resolved that the tribunal would be located in 
Arusha, Tanzania, with a prosecutor’s office located in Kigali, Rwanda.740 The first 
two years were marked by serious administrative problems and exceedingly slow 
preparations. The UN Security Council and General Assembly directly handled the 
appointments of judges and other personnel, contributing to lengthy delays. The 
court faced a one-year delay in occupying its premises in Arusha.741 The General 
Assembly did not elect judges until May 1995, and by mid-1995, the UN had still not 
approved a budget. In addition, “the politically ideal locations—Arusha as a seat for 
the Tribunal and Kigali as the location of the Prosecutor’s office—had turned into 
administrative nightmares. … Both lacked basic infrastructure, adequate buildings, 
computers, furniture, telephone services, and transport connections to the outside 
world. … Conditions in both made it difficult to recruit competent staff.”742 In 1996, 
the UN ordered an audit and investigation, which found major deficiencies and 
mismanagement in the ICTR’s Registry and Office of the Prosecutor.743 The report 
triggered the resignation of the registrar and the deputy prosecutor as well as other 
personnel changes. Following the report, the UN redoubled efforts to operationalize 
the tribunal. In 1998, Amnesty International published a study noting ongoing 
deficiencies in the court’s operation, including long delays in commencing trials for 
detained suspects, a weak witness protection program, and poor outreach.744  
The tribunal closed in December 2015, having delivered its final judgment on appeal 
the same month. It handed over its residual functions to the UN Mechanism for 
International Criminal Tribunals (MICT), established in 2010.745 These functions 
include tracking remaining fugitives, conducting any further proceedings (such as 
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review, retrial, or appeal), referring cases to national jurisdictions, protecting victims 
and witnesses, and supervising enforcement of sentences.
Legal Framework and Mandate
The tribunal exercised jurisdiction over “persons responsible for serious violations 
of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and 
Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed in the territory of 
neighboring States responsible for such violations committed in the territory of 
neighboring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.”746 A plenary 
session of judges adopted Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the tribunal in June 
1995, and the judges amended these numerous times until 2015.747 
The Security Council established the ICTR under Chapter VII authority, obligating 
UN Member States to comply with the court’s orders. The Chapter VII authority 
gave the tribunal a powerful tool in obtaining cooperation from third party states,748 
but also meant that the administration of the tribunal was subject to onerous and 
bureaucratic UN rules and regulations. 
The Security Council designed the ICTR’s temporal jurisdiction so that it would 
include the “planning stages” of the genocide. However, Rwandan authorities 
wanted the jurisdictional start date to begin in 1990, so as to include massacres 
in 1991, 1992, and 1993. The end date conveyed the council’s determination to 
include violations that reportedly continued after the RPF seized power in July 1994 
(the Rwandan government, for the same reasons, opposed the jurisdictional end 
date). The ensuing compromise meant that the ICTR did not have an open-ended 
mandate like the ICTY. The territorial jurisdiction—including crimes committed 
outside of Rwanda—was most likely included “as a deterrent to activities of refugee 
camp leaders in neighboring countries or as a set up for the arrest and extradition of 
genocide planners.”749 
The ICTR Statute expanded provisions of international humanitarian law by 
defining “crimes against humanity” in the Nuremberg Charter as applicable in 
times of peace, international armed conflict, and non-international armed conflict. 
In addition, by incorporating the “prohibited acts” under Common Article 3 and 
Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions into the Chapter VII–endowed statute, the 
Security Council arguably extended the reach of those provisions even to states that 
had not ratified Protocol II. 
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The UN Security Council adopted a statute for the MICT in 2010. The MICT was 
to comprise two branches, one for the ICTR, which commenced functioning on 
July 1, 2012, and the other for the ICTY. The statute provided that the mechanism 
will continue the material, territorial, temporal, and personal jurisdiction of the 
ICTR and ICTY.750 Transitional provisions were included in Annex 2 to the Security 
Council resolution. The judges of the MICT adopted Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence for the mechanism on June 8, 2012.751
Location
The Security Council established the seat of the tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania.752 The 
Appeals Chamber, shared with the ICTY, sat in The Hague. The MICT has a branch 
in Arusha and another in The Hague.
The ICTR did not occupy its premises until November 1995. The facilities included 
four courtrooms equipped with modern technology and large public galleries that 
can accommodate up to 100 persons. Suspects were initially held in the ordinary 
Tanzanian prison in Arusha. A 56-cell United Nations Detention Facility (UNDF) 
within the Arusha prison was constructed to house ICTR detainees.
The choice of Arusha reflected a compromise between those arguing for  
proceedings to be located in The Hague, and the Rwandan government, which 
argued for the court to be located in Kigali. Arusha was chosen as an African seat 
and was thought to afford advantages based on close proximity to Kigali, which 
was hoped would lead to more resonance with victim communities. The Appeals 
Chamber of the ICTR was located in The Hague. An ICTR outreach office and 
information center was located in Kigali. 
Structure and Composition
The three main organs of the ICTR were chambers, prosecution, and Registry. 
A defense liaison unit was housed within the Registry. The ICTR shared an Appellate 
Chamber with the ICTY, and until 2003, shared a common chief prosecutor with 
the ICTY.753 An internal coordination committee of the president, prosecutor, and 
registrar met regularly to discuss issues affecting the court. The permanent judges 
elected a president and vice president from among the judges.754 The structure 
changed after the establishment of the MICT, which has a single president, 
prosecutor, and registrar. 
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Chambers
The tribunal had three Trial Chambers and one Hague-based Appeals Chamber.755 
The statute initially provided that chambers would have a maximum of 16 
permanent judges and a maximum of nine ad litem judges.756 (Between 2008 and 
2009, the Security Council temporarily allowed 12 ad litem judges.)757 No two judges 
in any chamber could be nationals of the same state, which ensured a broad diversity 
of nationalities among the ICTR’s benches. Seven of the permanent judges were 
members of the Appeals Chamber.758 The UN General Assembly elected 11 of the 
permanent judges and all of the ad litem judges.759 In its early years, the tribunal 
faced difficulties in setting up operations, appointing judges, and commencing trials 
for accused in custody. The General Assembly did not elect the inaugural judges of 
the tribunal until May 1995. In May 2012, two permanent judges and eight ad litem 
judges served at the ICTR.760 
Under the MICT Statute, chambers comprise a Trial Chamber for the former ICTR 
branch and one for the ICTY, with a common president. There is one common 
Appeals Chamber. The UN established a roster of 25 judges, including the president, 
from which judges can be appointed to compose a Trial or Appeals Chamber 
for either branch when needed. The president can also appoint a single judge to 
consider matters at first instance.
Office of the Prosecutor
The Security Council appointed the ICTR prosecutor on nomination by the 
Secretary-General, for renewable four-year terms.761 The council intended the 
ICTR to share a common prosecutor with the ICTY as a resource- and time-saving 
measure, but over time the burgeoning caseloads of both tribunals made the 
arrangement untenable. Under the MICT Statute, the Security Council appoints a 
common prosecutor for both branches.
Registry 
The UN Secretary-General appointed the ICTR registrar after consultation with 
the court’s president.762 The Registry maintained a head office in Arusha and a 
sub-office in Kigali. The Registry’s two principal divisions handled judicial matters 
and administrative issues. The Court Management Section provided administrative, 
judicial, and logistical support to the chambers, which included maintaining 
judicial records and archives. Three teams supported each chamber of the court. 
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The registrar was responsible for negotiating bilateral agreements with countries 
regarding legal assistance, detention of convicted defendants, and other legal 
matters. The Registry was also responsible for promulgating certain internal rules 
of the tribunal, including directives on the assignment of defense counsel, codes 
of professional conduct for defense counsel, and directives for the Registry.763 The 
negotiation of these bilateral agreements took significant time and effort on the part 
of principals in the Registry. The ICTR also encountered difficulties in relocating 
three acquitted defendants, prompting the court to plea in its annual report for the 
creation of a “formal mechanism to secure the support of Member States to accept 
these persons within their territories.”764 There is now a common registrar for 
both branches of the MICT, still appointed by the Secretary-General. The registrar 
maintains a roster of qualified staff to allow rapid recruitment if required.
Court Management Section
The Court Management Section (CMS) provided administrative, judicial, and 
logistical support to the tribunal, including managing courtroom schedules and the 
parties’ document submissions. The ICTR CMS was divided into four teams, each 
one supporting a Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber. 
Defense Counsel & Detention Management Section
The Defense Counsel and Detention Management Section (DCDMS), established 
within the registrar’s office, maintained a list of over 200 qualified defense counsel. 
At both the ICTR and the ICTY, the legal aid offices “serve to coordinate all the 
functions involving those lawyers appearing for the defense, but do not provide 
legal representation directly.”765 Rather, the DCDMS acted as a liaison between 
the Registry and defense counsel teams.766 Similarly, the MICT maintains a list of 
counsel fulfilling the required qualifications to practice before the mechanism.
Once counsel were chosen for the list, DCDMS conducted trainings on ICTR 
jurisdiction and rules.767 The Registry promulgated a “Directive on the Assignment 
of Defense Counsel” in 1999, which was amended at least five times up until 2008:768 
Originally, the accused could choose counsel from the entire list of 
lawyers who have requested to defend counsel. Then the accused was 
given no choice and the Registrar assigned a counsel of his choice. Later, 
a list of six counsel selected by the Registrar was being presented to the 
accused to choose from.769
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In 2001, abuses of the legal aid system came to light, leading to changes in 
procedures. It emerged that several persons accused by the ICTR had entered 
so-called fee-splitting arrangements with their counsel, whereby the counsel had 
agreed to split the fee they received from the tribunal’s legal aid funds with the 
accused or his family members. After several such cases were exposed in 2001, the 
registrar announced that his office was taking measures including investigating all 
such allegations, amending the Code of Conduct of Defense Counsel to specifically 
prohibit fee-splitting, and requesting a post of investigator in the next budget.770 
Following an investigation, the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services issued 
recommendations for structural changes and in 2002 stated that the ICTR and  
ICTY had implemented most of the safeguards it had recommended to prevent  
such abuse taking place.771
The procedure for the assignment of defense counsel for the ICTR and subsequently 
the MICT requires the registrar to determine whether the accused is indigent. The 
ICTR registrar assigned counsel to the accused, after consulting with an advisory 
panel.772 ICTR counsel were remunerated either according to a fixed hourly rate, or 
a fixed lump sum fee. The MICT legal aid system harmonized and built on ICTR 
and ICTY practices, and is based on a lump-sum payment system. Provision is also 
made for legal support for accused persons who choose to represent themselves. In 
the ICTR, if counsel did not have independent offices, they could be provided with 
“reasonable facilities and equipment such as photocopiers, computer equipment, 
various types of office equipment, and telephone lines.”773 
Witness and Victims Support Section
The Witness and Victims Support Section (WVSS) of the ICTR had a main office in 
Arusha and a sub-office in Kigali. Its three main functions were to provide logistical 
support for witnesses appearing before the court, to assist prosecution and defense 
during trial phases, and to ensure witness safety in court and in the post-trial phase. 
The section was divided into two units, one for prosecution witnesses and the other 
for defense witnesses.
Initially, voluntary contributions covered costs relating to the protection of victims 
and witnesses, before staff posts were included in the regular annual budget. In 
its report on resource requirements for 2000, the tribunal highlighted the need 
for projects to assist victims and witnesses, including to help witnesses find their 
way through the complex processes at the tribunal, and an officer focused on 
gender-sensitive issues in this regard.774 While it came in for much criticism early 
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on, the tribunal made significant improvements in both witness support and 
witness protection during its lifetime. In 1998, Amnesty International examined 
the tribunal’s witness protection scheme and criticized the Victims and Witnesses 
Unit for, among other things, not having staff with experience in witness protection, 
and urged it to: negotiate better procedures with the Rwandan government to 
enable witnesses to travel to and from the tribunal without exposing their identities, 
relocate witnesses to other countries who would be at risk if returned to Rwanda, 
and improve security measures in Arusha and the courtroom.775 By 2010, one 
commentator noted that while things had improved, inadequate funding and state 
cooperation meant assessment of threats and application of protective measures 
were often inadequate and greater psychological support for witnesses before, 
during, and after testimony was required.776 
Under the MICT, each branch has an independent Witness Support and Protection 
Unit, which took over the functions of the WVSS, and the unit for the former ICTR 
based in Arusha assumed its functions in July 2012.
Trust Fund for the Support Program for Witnesses
The trust fund established a health clinic in Kigali to provide “physical and 
psychological care to witnesses residing in Rwanda, in particular those living with 
HIV/AIDs as a result of sexual violence suffered during the genocide.”777  
By mid-2011, the trust fund was nearly depleted, but was replenished through  
a voluntary contribution by the government of Spain. 
Outreach
The ICTR initially established a small press and information unit but had no 
dedicated staff for outreach to affected communities. In 2000, five years after  
its launch, the ICTR opened an Information and Documentation Center in Kigali 
and subsequently opened at least 10 provincial information centers across  
Rwanda. The activities of these centers “are intensifying as part of the Tribunal’s 
completion strategy and legacy. … The main centre in Kigali … alone receives 
approximately 100 visitors per day.”778 In 2014, the ICTR handed over these 
centers—containing libraries, documentary screening rooms, and internet access—
to the Rwandan government.
The ICTR was heavily criticized for its slow start in developing outreach and public 
information programs, with a 1998 report by Amnesty International alleging, 
“There is a disturbingly and sometimes dangerous lack of competent or coherent 
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strategy for the dissemination of public information.”779 A 2002 study found that 
more than half of Rwandans interviewed were “not well informed” about the 
tribunal.780 Nonetheless, after early stumbles the ICTR placed significant emphasis 
on outreach programs, including developing a cartoon book, radio documentaries, 
traveling plays, youth education programs (begun in 2005), programs for 
prisoners, and community dialogues. In the spring of 2012, the court reported that 
“awareness-raising programmes for lessons learned from the genocide of 1994 were 
successfully conducted in 15 secondary schools with students totaling 12,000. … The 
programme is planned to continue with the major prisons in Rwanda where about 
20,000 inmates are to benefit from this activity.”781 The ICTR sought voluntary 
contributions to support its outreach program.
The MICT Registry has recruited staff to develop public information and outreach 
campaigns and projects, and considers “disseminating information to the public” 
and increasing public awareness of the activities of the mechanism to be part of its 
external relations and communications functions.782
Prosecutions
The ICTR issued indictments against 93 accused. As at October 2017, the ICTR had 
sentenced 62 individuals, acquitted 14 more, and referred 10 of those 93 indictments 
to national jurisdictions for trial. Three accused persons remain at large, two 
accused died prior to judgment, and two indictments were withdrawn before trial.783 
An especially high number of countries—over a dozen, mostly African states—have 
arrested and transferred suspects to the ICTR. 
Judges confirmed the first indictments in November 1995. The first three ICTR 
detainees, Jean-Paul Akayesu, Georges Rutagana, and Clement Kayishema, were 
transferred to the ICTR in May 1996. The first trial, against Akayesu, began in 
January 1997 and appeals judges rendered their decision on June 1, 2001.784 Initial 
delays in setting up the tribunal and initiating prosecutions—combined with high 
levels of cooperation from states in arresting and transferring suspects—led to 
lengthy detention of suspects before commencement of trial in the first several 
years. This issue continued throughout the course of the tribunal’s operations such 
that even some of those tried by the ICTR and acquitted on appeal had spent well in 
excess of a decade in detention. Further compounding this issue is that even those 
acquitted by the tribunal remain—still as of late 2017—in “safe houses” in Arusha, 
Tanzania, as the ICTR had significant problems finding states willing to accept them.
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Some observers leveled extensive criticism at the ICTR for its inadequate inclusion 
of crimes of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in its docket. This did 
result in the ICTR eventually turning more attention to these crimes, such that the 
prosecutor’s later indictments tended to be more likely to include such crimes. The 
tribunal also took other steps to approach such investigations and prosecutions 
with specialized and sensitive resources. Nonetheless, there remained significant 
gaps in its prosecution record in this respect. Despite these gaps, the ICTR made 
groundbreaking jurisprudence in this area. Judges recognized rape as a constituent 
crime of genocide (in the case against Jean-Paul Akayesu). And they found that 
senior political leaders during the genocide were criminally liable—via extended 
form joint criminal enterprise theory—for crimes of sexual violence committed 
throughout the Rwandan territory.785
Transfers to the Rwandan National Courts under Rule 11bis
In December 2011, the ICTR confirmed on appeal the transfer of defendant Jean 
Uwinkindi to Rwanda to face trial, determining that the Rwandan judiciary had the 
capacity and independence to conduct national prosecutions.786 This was the first 
case transferred to Rwanda under Rule 11bis, a rule change introduced in 2004 as 
part of the tribunal’s completion strategy that allowed the tribunal to refer a case to 
a state that is willing to prosecute, if it has satisfied itself the accused will receive a 
fair trial. The ICTR transferred two other accused to Rwanda in 2012 and 2016. The 
ICTR transferred two further apprehended suspects to face trial in France under 
Rule 11bis.787 In addition, the Office of the Prosecutor transferred around 55 case 
files to Rwanda of persons investigated but not indicted by the tribunal. The MICT 
statute has retained the option to refer a case to national jurisdictions.
Previous requests for transfer to Rwanda of four detainees were denied in 2007 due 
to concerns about fair trial capacity, independence of the judiciary, lack of witness 
protection, and sentencing provisions incompatible with international human rights 
law, including “life imprisonment in isolation,” which replaced the death penalty 
in Rwandan law. The completion strategy required the ICTR to appoint a regional 
organization to monitor Rule 11bis trials in Rwanda to ensure that its proceedings 
meet fair trial standards. Several international human rights organizations continued 
to express skepticism about the possibility of fair trials in Rwanda. 
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Trials in Rwanda’s National Courts
In parallel with the ICTR proceedings and Gacaca hearings, Rwanda’s national 
criminal justice system investigated and prosecuted genocide suspects from 1996 
onward. Initially, progress was slow as the government worked to rebuild and reform 
the judicial system at the same time.788 In the absence of sufficient numbers of 
defence lawyers, NGOs such as Avocats Sans Frontières provided legal assistance 
through a pool of lawyers, though it could not meet the demand. It was clear it 
would take decades to try all of the approximately 130,000 persons who had been 
detained by 1998. This provided the impetus for the creation of the Gacaca courts, 
to which most genocide cases were shifted by 2002. By that point, conventional 
courts had tried around 7,000 cases.789 From then onward, the regular court system 
only tried top leaders and those referred to Rwanda from other jurisdictions.
The ICTR had the option to transfer genocide suspects to national courts for 
prosecution under Rule 11bis of its Rules of Procedure and Evidence as part of its 
completion strategy (see above). As the ICTR drew to a close, it considered this 
option more frequently. Several times, however, the ICTR denied requests to transfer 
suspects to Rwanda due to witness intimidation and fair trial concerns. Not until 
December 2011 did the ICTR agree to transfer the first case to Rwanda to face 
trial, determining for the first time that the Rwandan judiciary had the capacity 
and independence to conduct national prosecutions.790 Reforms introduced by the 
Rwandan government included abolition of the death penalty in 2007. 791 Before 
it closed at the end of 2015, the ICTR transferred three indictees to the Rwandan 
courts under Rule 11bis. Courts in several other countries have also transferred 
genocide suspects to Rwanda after the ICTR and then the European Court of 
Human Rights both decided in 2011 that it was safe to transfer suspects for trial 
in Rwanda.792 In 2017, however, a UK High Court upheld a decision of a senior 
district judge refusing extradition of four genocide suspects on the basis there was 
a real risk they might suffer a flagrant breach of fair trial rights, thus rejecting an 
appeal by the Rwandan government.793 Some human rights organizations continued 
to express concerns about the opportunity for suspects to receive a fair trial in 
Rwandan domestic courts.794
Critics have expressed concern over political interference and the lack of 
independence of Rwandan courts, in particular with respect to trials of RPF 
suspects. The ICTR transferred files of RPF suspects to the Rwandan authorities 
from 2008. In 2008, domestic courts tried four RPF officers for war crimes for the 
1994 killing of 15 civilians. Human rights organizations called the proceedings a 
“political whitewash and miscarriage of justice.”795
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Legacy
Jurisprudence
The jurisprudence and case law of the ICTR has been influential and 
groundbreaking. The ICTR, along with the ICTY and the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), has expended significant efforts to produce a publicly available, 
comprehensive judicial database to be used as a reference tool, enhancing the 
practical value of its extensive jurisprudence.796 The conviction of three media 
personalities for direct and public incitement to genocide, conspiracy, and crimes 
against humanity was a landmark case in defining the scope of responsibility 
for grave crimes.797 Additionally, in 1997 the prosecutor added charges of sexual 
violence to the indictment against Jean-Paul Akayesu798 after a prosecution witness 
spontaneously testified to witnessing rape in the vicinity of the Taba commune 
office. The case established jurisprudence expanding the definition of rape as a 
crime against humanity under international law and represented the first application 
by an international court of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crimes of Genocide.799 The ICTR’s focus on crimes of sexual violence would 
comprise one of its signature achievements in international criminal jurisprudence, 
including its conviction of a former head of state for such crimes and its conviction 
of a woman (Pauline Nyiramasuhuko) for the same.
Impact on Rwandan Society
Criticisms of the ICTR center on the cost of the tribunal, the length of trials, the 
effectiveness and relevance of proceedings to ordinary Rwandans, and the lack of 
prosecution of crimes allegedly committed by the forces that ended the genocide 
and formed the new government. The latter could create a sense of impunity and 
victors’ justice, as well as a feeling of persecution among Hutus. Nonetheless, one 
commentator compiled an impressive list of its accomplishments: the ICTR created 
a factual account of the genocide, confirmed the genocide against the Tutsi ethnic 
group in Rwanda, established individual—rather than group—criminal responsibility, 
put on trial almost the entire government of the genocide era, validated the 
experience and suffering of the victims, and promoted respect for human rights 
and the rule of law in Rwanda.800 One study based on field research found that 
while ICTR outreach did increase the level of knowledge of the tribunal’s activities 
among those surveyed, this did not create more positive perceptions of the tribunal 
or its role in promoting reconciliation.801 Another study surveyed respondents on 
the tribunal’s deterrent effect, finding mixed results. While respondents were less 
satisfied with the severity of punishment and speed of proceedings at the ICTR, they 
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viewed it as fairly successful in obtaining and prosecuting suspects, especially high 
profile leaders.802
The ICTR’s perceived legitimacy has suffered among Hutu victims because it never 
prosecuted members of the RPF, despite findings by the UN Commission of Experts 
in 1994 and an Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Mapping 
Exercise in 2010 that the RPF had likely committed atrocity crimes in the eastern 
Democratic Republic of the Congo.803 (See the annex on Democratic Republic of 
Congo for more detail.) In 1994, the ICTR prosecutor transferred the case of an RPF 
soldier for prosecution by Rwandan military courts.804
Impact on the Rwandan Judicial System
The tribunal’s statute allowed for both concurrent and primacy jurisdiction over 
national courts. National courts in Europe have tried alleged perpetrators of the 
Rwandan genocide, but until 2011, the ICTR opposed the transfer of suspects to 
Rwandan national courts under Rule 11bis. 
Recognizing the need to bolster national judicial capacity in light of transfers of 
cases under Rule 11bis, the ICTR increased capacity-building exercises and training 
activities during its last several years. These targeted national judicial authorities, 
including judges, law clerks, and witness protection officers. The ICTR also 
conducted trainings on witness protection issues for Tanzanian judicial authorities 
in 2010. Earlier training programs for Rwandan legal librarians in 2005 focused on 
research and library management skills on ICTR jurisprudence and case software. 
Capacity-building activities in 2011 and 2012 included training senior Rwandan 
prosecutors and holding workshops for Rwandan law students on “online legal 
research methodology, [and] learning how to access legal information and materials 
including the Tribunal’s jurisprudence.”805 
Completion Strategy
The ICTR began holding formal planning meetings on completion strategy and the 
transfer of cases as early as 2004. The initial completion strategy called for a final 
closing date in 2010, which was extended until 2014. A study to devise an archiving 
plan for the ICTY and the ICTR was launched in 2007. The court developed a range 
of legacy projects, including two best practice manuals: one on the referral of cases 
to national jurisdictions for trial and one on the prosecution of sexual violence. 
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While the ICTR was slower to start planning and to implement its completion 
strategy than the ICTY, and the completion date did have to be postponed several 
times, the ICTR did nevertheless manage to complete its cases and hand over 
residual functions to the MICT by December 2015. The court’s downsizing process 
began in 2008–2009 and accelerated dramatically. In 2006, the tribunal had over 
800 staff members. In July 2011, the tribunal reported a total of 666 staff members; 
it proposed retention of just over 400 posts for 2012–2013. Steep staff attrition made 
it more difficult for the tribunal to complete its mandate. 
After January 2012, the ICTR engaged in significant preparations for the residual 
mechanism in areas ranging from transfer of archives to staff recruitment.806 
Digitizing audiovisual recordings of over 16 years of trial proceedings was an 
enormous task. Between 2013 and 2016, the ICTR transferred all of its physical and 
digital records to the MICT.  
Financing
The Security Council mandated that the ICTR budget would not be drawn from 
voluntary contributions but from assessed contributions from UN Member States, 
as apportioned by the UN General Assembly.807 Initial budgeting for the ICTR was 
assessed and split with the peacekeeping funds for UNAMIR. 
The size of the ICTR budget has drawn criticism.808 For the two-year period of 2012–
2013, the ICTR submitted gross resource requirements of US$174 million to the UN 
Secretary-General. In 2010–2011, the UN approved initial appropriations of US$245 
million. Failure of some member states to pay their assessed contributions on time 
ultimately led to staff freezes in 2003–2004; this led the UN’s Advisory Committee 
on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to raise concerns of a negative impact 
on the completion strategy schedule. 
Despite the Security Council’s decision that the ICTR’s core budget would be 
funded from assessed contributions, the ICTR did rely significantly on voluntary 
contributions and gratis personnel, particularly in its early years. In 1995, the UN 
General Assembly invited member states to make voluntary contributions through 
direct funding and in-kind services. These were to support activities then considered 
“extra budgetary,” including training for national judicial authorities, witness 
support programs (including psychosocial services and medical care through a trust 
fund–supported program for witnesses), and outreach initiatives.  
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An External Relations and Strategic Planning Section of the tribunal was tasked 
with raising voluntary contributions. Key donors included the United States, France, 
Spain, the European Union, and the European Commission. A donor group called 
Friends of the ICTR, including representatives from Europe and the United States, 
periodically met with the ICTR and its members serve as interlocutors in wider 
fundraising activities. By the end of 1998, the Voluntary Trust Fund for the ICTR had 
received about US$7.5 million in funds, and by October 2007, around US$11 million. 
As the core budget of the tribunal increased, the proportion of funding coming 
from voluntary contributions decreased. Over time, functions including witness 
protection came to be covered by the core budget. According to an audit report 
linked to the completion, the ICTR had 18 projects under its general trust fund over 
its lifetime, of which the tribunal transferred two to MICT: one project on support to 
witnesses and another to monitor the transfer of a case to Rwandan national courts.809
Oversight and Accountability
As a body established by the UN Security Council, the ICTR and subsequently the 
MICT have been subject to regular reporting to and scrutiny by the Security Council, 
including approval of budgets. The UN Office of Internal Oversight Services carried 
out a number of audits.
The ICTR has also been subject to external monitoring by civil society. Hirondelle, 
a news agency based in Arusha, monitored the ICTR throughout, including 
reporting on trial and institutional developments in French, English, Kinyarwanda, 
and Kiswahili, and was the only media outlet reporting regularly on the tribunal. 
International human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch as well as independent researchers and commentators conducted 
research on various aspects of the tribunal’s operations.
Gacaca Courts (2002–2012)
Creation
Between 2002 and 2012, over 12,000 community-based Gacaca courts in Rwanda 
tried between 1.2 million and 2 million cases of genocide and other serious crimes.810 
Begun as a pilot program in 2002, the government implemented Gacaca nationally 
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in 2005. In 2010, the government closed Gacaca for new cases and announced 
that the process was completed, but soon reopened the process to handle appeals. 
Gacaca courts officially closed in June 2012. 
Gacaca courts were “one of the most ambitious transitional justice experiments 
in history, blending local conflict-resolution traditions with a modern punitive 
legal system to deliver justice for the country’s 1994 genocide.”811 They were not 
a formal criminal justice mechanism, but were overseen by a national criminal 
justice institution. Gacaca was Rwanda’s imperfect solution for handling hundreds 
of thousands of individual perpetrators, given the inability of domestic courts or 
the ICTR to prosecute such a caseload. The post-genocide situation in Rwanda 
presented overwhelming judicial challenges. More than half a million people had 
died in the genocide, and the judicial infrastructure lay in ruins. 
After the genocide, Rwanda detained thousands of alleged perpetrators for 
prosecution within the formal criminal justice system, but the massive numbers 
of detainees—nearly 130,000 prisoners by 1998 housed in overcrowded prisons—
caused policymakers to search for an alternative approach. 
Legal Framework and Mandate
While modeled on traditional reconciliation approaches, the government adapted 
and formalized modern Gacaca (Kinyarwandan for “a bed of soft green grass”), 
in part to address concerns that traditional rituals were not meant to address such 
grave offenses as genocide. The Rwandan government established an institution, 
the National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions (SNJG), to oversee implementation of a 
series of laws. Traditional justice was thus “intimately linked to the state apparatus 
of prosecutions and incarceration.”812 Gacaca courts followed written Rwandan law. 
Lawmakers amended the legal and statutory framework of Gacaca trials several 
times in an effort to build a process consonant with international fair trial standards, 
to achieve procedural conformity, and to place the model under the oversight of 
state institutions and the formal justice sector. 
Initially, Gacaca courts exercised jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes committed between October 1, 1990, and December 31, 
1994. Parliament passed legislation in 2001 creating Gacaca courts and amended 
the law four times, “usually to simplify and accelerate the way in which the courts 
process cases.”813 Parliament amended the statutory framework in 2004 to remove 
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war crimes from the courts’ jurisdiction. The move was interpreted as intending to 
avoid classifying crimes committed by RPF soldiers as genocide or war crimes. 
Rwanda’s 1996 Genocide Law defined four categories of genocide perpetrators, 
from “planners” to those who committed “offences against property.”814 The 
categories were “repeatedly modified and Gacaca courts [were] charged with 
hearing increasingly serious types of crimes.”815 A 2008 amendment sought to 
alleviate genocide case backlogs in the formal courts, by transferring “category 1” 
and “category 2” genocide crimes to Gacaca courts. The same year, the government 
placed genocide-related rape cases under Gacaca jurisdiction, with special 
confidentiality provisions for victims. Beginning in 2007, Gacaca courts could 
impose punishments up to life imprisonment.
Location
Gacaca hearings took place in public spaces in towns and villages throughout Rwanda.
Structure and Composition
Communities elected over 250,000 lay judges to preside over Gacaca courts. Judges 
were required to be over 21 years of age, non-partisan, and non-participants in 
the genocide. Rwandan authorities conducted judicial trainings, often funded by 
international donors. In 2002, judges underwent an initial six-day training, followed 
by shorter trainings in 2006 and 2007. Rwandan authorities issued several editions 
of judges’ manuals, which were unevenly applied. By 2008, the government had 
removed over 50,000 judges for incompetence or corruption. 
Gacaca trials did not involve a prosecutor. In the pilot phase of Gacaca, victims 
or relatives of victims brought accusations before the judges, often in community 
meetings, and the community debated the accusations. In the revised national 
phase, an information-gathering stage was added, whereby the SNJG authorized 
local officials to “collect information … by assembling small groups or by going  
door-to-door.”816 The officials then presented written accusations to the community 
for verification. 
Community attendance and participation in the trials was initially quite high. 
However, for various reasons, attendance steadily decreased over the course of 
the process. The government used increasingly compulsory measures to ensure 
232   OPTIONS FOR JUSTICE
attendance, including threatening community members with fines and sending 
militia members door-to-door in some villages. 
Defense lawyers were excluded from Gacaca courts, as it was thought this would delay 
the process and create an imbalance between professional lawyers and lay judges. 
Proponents touted community participation in the proceedings as a limited guarantee 
against false accusations and unfair proceedings. However, there were numerous 
instances of community members abusing the process to settle personal scores.  
Prosecutions
Gacaca courts heard more than a million cases in as many as 12,000 jurisdictions 
across Rwanda. Although not prosecutions as such, government statistics indicate 
findings of guilt in 86 percent of the 1.9 million cases heard.817 These cases fell into 
three categories: category one was planners, organizers, and those who committed 
rape or sexual torture; category two was perpetrators of murder, serious violence 
against individuals, and other acts of serious violence without the intention to kill; and 
category three was damage to property. According to government statistics, a Gacaca 
appeals court dealt with over 178,000 appeals (around nine percent of all cases), with 
findings of guilt in 74 percent of those. Property crimes were not subject to appeal.
Legacy
Opinion is divided on the legacy of Gacaca. For supporters, the most significant 
achievement of Gacaca courts has been the widespread community participation in 
a justice process that exacted accountability, and the hearings brought significant 
benefits to Rwandans in the spheres of justice, truth, and democratic participation.818 
Gacaca represented a form of justice amidst extremely difficult post-conflict conditions. 
Human rights organizations, which consistently opposed the use of Gacaca for 
genocide cases, highlighted significant flaws: 
These courts have been given extensive decision-making and punitive 
powers, yet they are constituted by no legally trained judges or lawyers, 
and operate without reference to the rule of law. Defence rights are 
negligible and there is no protection for victims or witnesses. There are 
no rules of evidence and no guidance as to what is required in order to 
prove an offence.819
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Gacaca courts also operated within an increasingly authoritarian political environment 
in Rwanda. The increasing politicization of Gacaca led to perceptions among some 
Rwandans that the Rwandan government used the process to promote selective justice 
and build a narrative about the genocide in which its own crimes were absent. The 
participation of local lay leaders and judges sometimes led to political bias, and certain 
design features, such as the lack of salary for judges, incentivized corruption.
In addition to the deficiencies in fair trial rights recounted by many observers, the 
Gacaca courts also had several design flaws that limited their ability to positively and 
sustainably influence the broader rule of law and domestic justice system, including: 
 • appellate procedures that were partially located within the formal 
criminal justice system, but did not strengthen the overall appellate 
court system; 
 • minimal opportunities for skills and capacity building that were 
transferable to the formal criminal justice system; and 
 • lack of attention to legacy planning, documentation activities, 
outreach, and public information sharing.
Financing
International assistance, monitoring, and involvement in Gacaca courts were 
integral to the process. The largest international donors included Belgium, the 
Netherlands, the European Union, Austria, and Switzerland.820 Several of the 2008 
judicial trainings on sexual violence cases were conducted with the assistance of the 
Dutch-funded Institute for Legal Practice and Development.
Oversight and Accountability
Avocats Sans Frontières, Penal Reform International, and Human Rights Watch 
conducted extensive trial monitoring of Gacaca courts and compiled case law. 
National NGOs also monitored the process, including the Human Rights League of 
the Great Lakes and the Rwandan League for the Promotion and Defense of Human 
Rights. Gacaca has been the subject of vigorous legal scholarship and debate. 
Human Rights Watch notes that international donors raised some concerns during 
the process, through local monitoring groups or embassy officials, but “rarely used 
their influence to address the more fundamental and systemic problems.”821
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SENEGAL: EXTRAORDINARY AFRICAN CHAMBERS 
(IN RELATION TO CHAD)
Conflict Background and Political Context
Hissène Habré assumed power in Chad in 1982 and ruled until deposed by a coup 
in 1990. Supported by the Reagan administration through military aid, training, 
and political support, as part of a U.S. regional strategy for containing the power of 
Colonel Muammar Qaddafi of neighboring Libya, Habré’s regime was responsible 
for “thousands of cases of political killings, torture, disappearances, and arbitrary 
detentions.”822 In the 1980s, Chad fought several wars with Libya, as well as 
against the Libyan-backed Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) 
rebels (largely members of the previous Chadian regime, led by former President 
Goukouni Oueddei). Inside Chad, Habré “persecuted different ethnic groups whose 
leaders he perceived as posing a threat to his regime.”823 He was ousted from office 
in 1990 and fled to Senegal, which granted him political asylum.824 A 1992 Chadian 
Truth Commission estimated that Habré’s regime carried out 40,000 political 
assassinations, often through a secret police group called the Documentation 
and Security Directorate (DDS), which instituted a pervasive climate of fear 
and surveillance, turning neighbors and family members against each other.825 
The DDS maintained a network of detention centers, where torture was a common 
tool of interrogation.826 
Habré’s successor, President Idriss Déby, wrested power from Habré in a coup 
and has ruled since 1990. He was a military general under Habré and retained 
institutional links to the former regime, appointing key security agency officials to 
posts within his administration. Many of these officials were allegedly implicated in 
the repressive policies of the Habré era.827
Beginning in the early 1990s, while Habré was living in Dakar, a coalition of 
victims’ associations, human rights lawyers, and international NGOs, including 
Human Rights Watch, sought to find a forum to prosecute Hissène Habré. They 
brought complaints against Habré in Chad, Senegal, Belgium, and before the 
UN Committee Against Torture. The African Union (AU) appointed a special 
commission to examine the issue and passed several resolutions recommending 
venues for prosecuting Habré. The AU preference for an “African solution” preceded 
the development of significant African antipathy toward the International Criminal 
Court (ICC).828 But in addition to attempting to provide a regional African justice 
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process for atrocity crimes committed by an African perpetrator, it may also have 
reflected a more general caution about external intervention on the continent. This 
long process culminated in the creation of the Extraordinary African Chambers 
(EAC) in Senegal in 2013 to try the crimes committed during Habré’s rule, pursuant 
to an agreement between the AU and Senegal.829
The Habré case touched on multiple major issues of international criminal justice 
over the past decades: the use of universal jurisdiction; the role of national, 
regional, and international courts in prosecuting international crimes; the obligation 
to prosecute international crimes under customary international law; the AU 
preference for African-designed justice; and finally, the persistent, and politically 
inconvenient, demand for accountability by victims.
Existing Justice-Sector Capacity
After Hissène Habré’s fall, the 1992 Truth Commission recommended the 
prosecution of Habré and officials who participated in crimes under his rule.830 
A 1993 law provided for the creation of a special tribunal to judge them.831 In 
2000, a group of victims filed complaints against former DDS agents in Chad. 
However, the complaint stalled for many years, and the special tribunal was 
never established.832 The judicial system in Chad was weak and corrupt, many 
leading officials of the Habré era retained important administrative and political 
positions, and investigating judges lacked the financial resources and protection 
required to carry out such politically sensitive investigations.833 Nevertheless, the 
Chadian government supported international efforts to bring Habré to justice, as 
demonstrated by its full cooperation with Belgian authorities investigating the case 
and the waiver of Habré’s immunity in 2002.834 In 2013, a Chadian court sentenced 
Habré to death in absentia for war crimes and crimes against humanity; several rebel 
leaders were sentenced as well.835 However, the government never sought Habré’s 
extradition, and the trial was criticized for its unfairness and secrecy.836 President 
Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal threatened to expel Habré to Chad in 2011, but he 
backtracked in the face of “an international outcry over the risk that Habré would be 
mistreated or even killed” in Chad.837
Existing Civil Society Capacity
Victims and victims’ associations played a crucial role in bringing Hissène Habré 
to justice. Their remarkable quest for justice has been widely acknowledged. It has 
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been said that “without his victims’ collection of evidence, testimony and relentless 
fight for justice, it is unlikely that the case would ever have made it to trial.”838 After 
Habré’s fall in 1990, victims of his regime started to organize into associations, 
including the Chadian Association of Victims of Political Repression and Crime, 
the Chadian Association for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights, the 
International Federation of Human Rights Leagues, and the Chadian League for 
Human Rights.839 These associations collected evidence and gathered testimonies 
against Habré. In 1999, some groups sought the help of Human Rights Watch in  
their search for accountability and, inspired by the arrest of former Chilean 
President Augusto Pinochet in the United Kingdom, they filed a complaint in 
Senegal. After that, they had recourse to a multiplicity of national, regional, and 
international forums in their battle for accountability, which finally led to the 
creation of the EAC in 2013.
Creation
The creation of the EAC was the outcome of a saga that involved multiple countries, 
regional and international organizations, and international judicial and quasi-judicial 
bodies. In January 2000, several Chadian nationals and an association of victims 
filed a complaint with a Senegalese judge in Dakar against Habré for the crimes 
committed during his presidency.840 Habré was indicted and placed under house 
arrest, but the decision was overturned on appeal because while Senegalese 
law provided for universal jurisdiction, the law failed to designate which precise 
court within the Senegalese court system had jurisdiction over such matters.841 
Subsequently, in 2000 and 2001, a group of Chadians and dual Belgian–Chadian 
nationals filed a complaint against Habré with a Belgian investigating judge under 
the 1993/1999 Belgian law of universal jurisdiction and the Convention Against 
Torture, which had been ratified by both Belgium and Senegal.842 The Belgian judge 
sent international rogatory letters to Chad and Senegal, and Chad declared that it 
officially lifted all immunity from the former president.843 After several investigative 
steps, Belgium issued an international arrest warrant against Habré for crimes 
against humanity in 2005 and sent its first extradition request to Senegal.844
In 2005, a Senegalese court held that it was not competent to rule on Belgium’s 
extradition request,845 and Senegal referred the issue to the AU. The AU created the 
Commission of Eminent African Jurists (CEAJ) to consider the most appropriate 
venue for trying Habré.846 CEAJ’s 2006 report recommended an “African solution,” 
namely that Habré should be tried by an African state, with Senegal and Chad 
having first preference.847 The commission also considered other options, including 
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the creation of a special ad hoc or mixed, AU-backed tribunal. In light of the CEAJ 
report, the AU Assembly passed a decision mandating Senegal to “prosecute and 
ensure that Hissène Habré is tried, on behalf of Africa, by a competent Senegalese 
Court with guarantees of fair trial” and decided to provide Senegal with “the 
necessary assistance for the effective conduct of the trial.”848
Meanwhile, in April 2006 several Chadian victims sent a communication to the UN 
Committee Against Torture alleging violations by Senegal of the Convention Against 
Torture.849 In its nonbinding decision, the committee found Senegal in violation of 
the convention for failing to prosecute or extradite Habré to Belgium.850
In 2007 and 2008, Senegal implemented a number of legislative reforms in order 
bring its domestic law into compliance with the Convention Against Torture and 
permit the prosecution of Habré in its domestic courts.851 Following these reforms, 
several Chadian and Senegalese victims filed a complaint in Dakar accusing Habré 
anew of torture and crimes against humanity.852 Nevertheless, the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Court of Justice issued an important 
decision in 2010 that would determine the nature of the future proceedings against 
Habré. Ruling on the application filed by Habré against Senegal following the 
legislative reforms, the court decided that Senegal was prohibited from prosecuting 
Habré based on the principle of nonretroactivity.853 The court held that only an “ad 
hoc or special tribunal” could try Habré without breaching international obligations. 
As this decision was binding on Senegal, it effectively foreclosed national 
prosecutions and left two options for Senegal: (1) extradition to Belgium, or (2) 
negotiations with the AU to set up an ad hoc or special court. Senegal opted for the 
second option, and a long process of consultations began between Senegal and the 
AU on the establishment of a special court.854
Meanwhile, Belgium repeated its extradition requests. In 2009, after four extradition 
requests and no definitive answer from Senegal, Belgium issued proceedings against 
Senegal before the International Court of Justice, alleging violations of Senegal’s 
obligations under the Convention Against Torture. In 2012, the court ruled that 
Senegal violated its obligations under the Convention Against Torture by failing to 
prosecute Habré, and thus, Senegal “must, without further delay, submit the case of 
Mr. Hissène Habré to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, if it 
does not extradite him.”855
The negotiations between Senegal and the AU on the establishment of a special 
court were leading nowhere, despite efforts by the AU to press the Wade 
government.856 It was not until the election of Macky Sall as president of Senegal 
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in 2012 that the AU and Senegal finally reached an agreement. The two parties 
signed the agreement creating the EAC in August 2012, and the court opened 
in February 2013.
Legal Framework and Mandate
The EAC were established by agreement between the AU and Senegal to create 
a special court to try the crimes committed under the Habré presidency. The 
agreement and the statute were signed by the AU and Senegal, and Senegal 
adopted the necessary legislation to establish the EAC within its judicial system.857 
The purpose of the EAC was “to implement the decision of the AU concerning 
the Republic of Senegal’s prosecution of international crimes committed in 
Chad between 7 June 1982 and 1 December 1990, in accordance with Senegal’s 
international commitments.”858 As the ruling of the ECOWAS Court of Justice 
precluded purely domestic prosecutions, the agreement created a special ad 
hoc international jurisdiction embedded within the Senegalese judicial system 
to prosecute these crimes.859 However, the EAC feature minimal international 
elements: their legal basis lies in Senegalese law, and there is little international 
involvement in personnel and oversight.860 The EAC are governed by the founding 
statute, adopted on July 20, 2013, by Senegal and the AU, and the Senegalese Code 
of Criminal Procedure. The statute stipulates that the EAC shall apply primarily 
international law; however, “for cases not provided for in this Statute,” Senegalese 
procedural and substantive law will apply.861 In that sense, the EAC is a hybrid 
court but it lies at the limit of that category of internationalized criminal tribunals: 
“It most closely resembles those courts established under national law, but with 
substantial international participation.”862
The EAC is also the first court of its kind to be based on universal jurisdiction, 
instead of territoriality or nationality.863 The EAC has jurisdiction to “prosecute 
and try the person or persons most responsible for crimes and serious violations of 
international law, customary international law and international conventions ratified 
by Chad, committed in the territory of Chad during the period from 7 June 1982 to 
1 December 1990.”864 Its powers are thus exclusively based on the serious nature 
of the crimes, although these were committed in Chad, by Chadian nationals, and 
against Chadian victims.
The material jurisdiction of the EAC includes war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
genocide, and torture.865 Unlike other hybrid tribunals, it does not judge any 
ordinary or domestic crimes, but it applies Senegalese procedural law to resolve 
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any issues “not provided for in the Statute.”866 Although he is the only accused to 
have been tried, the personal jurisdiction of the EAC extends beyond just Hissène 
Habré. Articles 3 stipulates that the chambers have the “power to prosecute and 
try the person or persons most responsible” for international crimes committed in 
Chad during Habré’s rule. The territorial jurisdiction of the EAC is limited to crimes 
committed in Chad, and its power is temporally limited to the period of Habré’s rule 
from June 7, 1982, until December 1, 1990.867 Finally, once all judgments are final, 
the EAC will be dissolved.868
Location
As the EAC are integrated within the Senegalese court structure in Dakar (see 
the Structure and Composition section, below), Hissène Habré’s trial took place 
in Dakar’s ordinary court facilities, using existing infrastructure and resources. 
Hearings were public, and measures were taken to guarantee access to all parties 
concerned, as well as press representatives, international and AU observers, and 
representatives of civil society.869 The proceedings were recorded, streamed live 
on the internet, and broadcast on Chadian television.870 Once the final decision on 
appeal was affirmed in April 2017, the chambers were dissolved, and the ordinary 
courts continued with their normal functioning.871
Structure and Composition
The EAC were created inside the Senegalese court structure. As noted above, they 
resemble domestic courts established under national law with significant international 
participation more than they do an international tribunal. Accordingly, the main 
organs of the chambers are integrated into the existing court structure in Senegal.
The Chambers
The EAC consist of four levels, embedded within the Senegalese judicial system.872 
The EAC Investigative Chamber is integrated within the Tribunal Regional Hors 
Classe de Dakar, and it is composed of four Senegalese judges.873 The EAC Indicting 
Chamber, the Trial Chamber, and the Appeals Chamber are all attached to the 
Dakar Court of Appeals.874 The Indicting Chamber comprises three Senegalese 
judges. The Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber both consist of two  
Senegalese judges and a president from another AU member state, thereby 
integrating an international element into the composition of the EAC.875 All 
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judges are nominated by the Senegalese minister of justice and appointed by the 
chairperson of the AU Commission.876 
The appointment of international judges in international tribunals is generally 
intended to guarantee independence and impartiality, assist in the application 
of international law, and facilitate the development of national capacity through 
training and mentoring. However, none of these were pressing concerns in this 
context.877 In addition, there was no international participation in other important 
aspects of the EAC, such as the Office of the Prosecutor or the Registry.
The comparative absence of international elements in the design of the EAC can 
be explained by various factors, including the willingness of the AU to enhance 
the legitimacy of the EAC and thereby deflect external intervention. However, the 
determining factor was certainly the decision of the ECOWAS Court, which was 
interpreted by the AU and Senegal as requiring some level of internationalization 
of the mechanism to avoid a violation of the principle of non-retroactivity. Since 
the jurisdictional basis of the EAC was to exercise universal jurisdiction, Senegal 
would traditionally not have been concerned with the introduction of international 
elements. Hence, the integration of international features into the design of the 
EAC was not driven by the usual concerns of ensuring independence and fostering 
national capacity, but rather by compliance with a binding judgment, however 
flawed it may have been.878 It has been said: “In fact, until the decision of the 
ECOWAS Court, there was no expectation that Senegal should internationalize its 
national courts for the trial.”879 The rationale for the appointment of non-Senegalese 
judges served to underscore the African nature of the court and its proceedings.
Office of the Prosecutor
The Office of the Prosecutor is the only body that can initiate prosecutions before 
the EAC.880 Its powers are provided by the Senegalese Code of Criminal Procedure. 
The Office of the Prosecutor is represented by the chief prosecutor and three deputy 
prosecutors, all of Senegalese nationality. As with the judges, the prosecutors are 
nominated by the Senegalese minister of justice and appointed by the chairperson  
of the AU Commission.881
Registry and Administration
The administrative tasks of the EAC are conducted by the registrar and the 
administrator, both appointed by the minister of justice of Senegal. The Registry is 
composed of one or several clerks whose duties are determined by the Senegalese 
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Code of Criminal Procedure.882 The EAC also include an administrator responsible 
for the nonjudicial aspects of the court’s work. His/her functions include 
the management of human resources, public relations with the international 
community, directing the outreach program and awareness-raising, witness and 
victim protection and assistance, and judicial cooperation between Senegal and 
other countries.883
Victim Participation and Witness Protection
Victim participation in the proceedings of the EAC is governed by the general 
principles of participation as parties civiles, in accordance with the Senegalese Code 
of Criminal Procedure.884 The code permits the appointment of lawyers registered at 
foreign bar associations, and foreign lawyers did participate in victim representation 
in the Habré case. The government of Senegal is responsible for the protection of all 
parties and witnesses during the entire duration of the proceedings.885 Protection for 
the acts performed during the course of the proceedings is governed by the initial 
agreement between the AU and Senegal;886 and the administrator is responsible  
for directing, assisting, and protecting the witnesses and victims who appear  
before the court.887
The Trust Fund for Victims
The Statute also establishes that the EAC may order reparations to victims, to be 
awarded by the intermediary of a trust fund.888 The trust fund is established for 
the benefit of “victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the EAC and of the 
beneficiaries of such victims,” and it is financed by voluntary contributions.889
Outreach
The EAC’s outreach program is viewed as particularly successful. Outreach activities 
and awareness-raising were recognized at the outset as an integral part of the 
EAC’s work, and so included in the statute.890 The importance given to the outreach 
program was unprecedented in the history of international justice, with 10 percent of 
the initial budget of the EAC devoted to outreach activities.891 
The EAC benefited from prior engagement of civil society actors from Chad and 
Senegal around the Habré case. By the time the court was formed, there had already 
been extensive debate in both countries around the facts of the case, the individuals 
involved, the merit of prosecution, the role of Western actors, and the alleged crimes.
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Nevertheless, following its creation, the EAC faced the challenge of reaching 
communities in distant Chad, as well as in Senegal itself. To address this, 
it developed a new, more decentralized approach to outreach that relied on 
organizations already rooted in those communities. The court’s administrator, 
responsible for entering into necessary agreements to carry out outreach activities 
and awareness-raising, launched an international tender for the outreach campaign. 
A consortium of three organizations was selected: a Senegalese organization, a 
Chadian organization, and a Belgian organization with expertise on the rule of 
law.892 The consortium trained journalists, organized public debates, created a 
website, and produced materials to explain the trials in both countries.893 In addition, 
the trial was recorded in its entirety, streamed on the internet, and broadcast 
on Chadian television.894 This model maximized the program’s effectiveness, 
implementation, local credibility and proximity, and cost-effectiveness.895 The 
outcome of the outreach efforts was even better than anticipated, benefitting from 
the field knowledge of the local organizations, combined with the monitoring of 
international experts.
Prosecutions
The Indicting Chamber of the EAC charged Hissène Habré with the crimes against 
humanity of murder, summary executions, kidnapping followed by enforced 
disappearance, and torture; the crime of torture; and the war crimes of murder, 
unlawful transfer and unlawful confinement, and violence to life and physical well-
being.896 The chief prosecutor requested the indictment of five additional officials 
from Habré’s regime, and international arrest warrants were issued against them 
in 2013, but none of them was brought to the court. Two of the five were convicted 
in Chad, and Chad refused to extradite them to Senegal; another two are subject to 
international arrest warrants issued both by Chad and the EAC, but their location 
remains unknown;897 and the last one is reportedly in Chad but not in custody.898
Habré’s trial began on July 20, 2015, and lasted for eight months, with 56 days of 
hearings. The Trial Chamber heard the testimony of 93 witnesses. Importantly, the 
powerful testimony of rape victims led the judges to amend the charges to include 
sexual and gender-based violence.899 The trial closed on February 11, 2016. Habré 
was convicted for the crimes against humanity of rape, sexual slavery, murder, 
summary execution, and inhumane acts; torture; and the war crimes of murder, 
torture, inhumane treatment, unlawful detention, and cruel treatment.900 He was 
sentenced to life imprisonment, to be served in Senegal or in another AU member 
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state, and he was ordered to pay substantial reparations to victims.901 Although 
Habré was totally uncooperative and remained silent throughout the trial, he 
appealed the judgment in June 2016.902 On April 17, 2017, the Appeals Chamber 
upheld the conviction for crimes against humanity, torture, and war crimes, but 
acquitted Habré of rape.903
Legacy
Hissène Habré’s trial is notable for its lengthy quest for justice involving multiple 
local, national, regional, and international actors, finally culminating in the successful 
and efficient prosecution of a former head of state through a unique international 
justice mechanism. Importantly, the EAC were a tailored solution to a particular 
problem, and their creation was influenced by the (much criticized) judgment of the 
ECOWAS Court.904 Nevertheless, this model demonstrated significant successes and 
could set an important precedent for international criminal justice.
It is the first time that a former head of state was convicted for international crimes 
by the courts of another state (if one considers the EAC a Senegalese rather than 
an African court), constituting the first successful application of the Pinochet 
precedent.905 In addition, the judgment is notable for its focus on sexual violence 
and the charging of a head of state with personally perpetrating rape while in 
office.906 However, Habré’s eventual acquittal on this charge has been criticized. 
Although the Appeals Chamber explained that the acquittal for rape was purely 
based on procedural grounds as the testimony had come too late, the decision is 
seen as reflecting deeper flaws in criminal justice with regard to the investigation 
of sexual violence. Legal processes do not encourage victims of sexual violence 
to come forward, and international tribunals still have not improved their practices 
to support them.907
The EAC was unprecedented in its grounding in universal jurisdiction. Hitherto, 
internationalized tribunals have always been based on territorial jurisdiction. 
The EAC, apart from being located outside the state in which the crimes were 
committed, relied upon the gravity of the crimes as its jurisdictional basis, 
irrespective of the territory in which they were committed or the nationality of the 
authors or victims.908 
The EAC had a unique structure that made it an efficient, cost-effective, and 
valuable mechanism. The combination of its grounding in universal jurisdiction, its 
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integration into the ordinary court structure, and its minimal international elements, 
together with the involvement of the AU, allowed it to be established relatively easily 
and closer to the victims, while upholding fair trial rights and benefitting from the 
legitimacy of the international community.909
The EAC represents a historic instance of an African justice mechanism prosecuting 
international crimes. Since the early discussions in the AU, a recurring aim was to find 
an “African solution” for an African impunity problem.910 Especially in the current 
context of animosity toward the ICC and a perception of bias against African states, 
for many this hybrid model offers an appealing alternative to fill the impunity gap.911 
In addition, this model could also be used to fill gaps in situations where the ICC 
does not have jurisdiction and where prosecution at the national level is not conceivable.
Finally, the judgment is a crucial achievement for the victims of Habré’s rule. 
After years of effort, they were rewarded with a historic conviction and substantial 
reparations, to be awarded both to direct and indirect victims and with special 
recognition of the victims of sexual violence.912 Habré was ordered to pay 
reparations, and the EAC seized his assets, but it is unlikely that this will cover 
the full reparations order.913 It is the role of the court’s trust fund to ensure the full 
implementation of the order and to work with international donors to ensure that all 
victims are fairly compensated.914
In sum, the EAC represents a “new mechanism in the toolbox of international 
justice, but it remains to be seen whether a tribunal of this specific nature can be 
used in the future.”915
Financing
Funding was a contentious issue since the outset, as Senegal repeatedly claimed 
that the trial of Hissène Habré “require[d] substantial funds which Senegal cannot 
mobilize without the assistance of the international community” and that “the 
only impediment … to the opening of Mr. Hissène Habré’s trial in Senegal [was] a 
financial one.”916 Accordingly, a donors’ round table was held in Dakar in November 
2010, involving a number of donor countries and international organizations. At 
the event, donors agreed to a budget of 8.6 million euros to cover the trial, with 
costs distributed according to the following: Republic of Chad 35.5%; European 
Union 23%; Kingdom of the Netherlands 12%; African Union 9%; United States 8%; 
Belgium 6%; French Republic 3.5%; Federal Republic of Germany 2%; Grand Duchy 
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of Luxembourg 1%.917 In addition, the Netherlands provided additional funding for 
outreach, and technical assistance was provided by Canada, Switzerland, and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross.918 The agreement between Senegal and 
the AU on the creation of the EAC, as well as the Statute of the EAC, state that the 
“Chambers shall be financed in accordance with the budget approved by the Donors’ 
Round Table held on 24 November 2010” and that additional supplementary 
financial resources can be sought at a suitable time if necessary.919
Oversight and Accountability
The EAC’s statute states that appeals can be filed with the Appeals Chamber by 
persons convicted by the Trial Chamber, the prosecutor, or civil parties, pursuant 
to the Senegalese Code of Criminal Procedure. Appeals can be filed on a number 
of grounds: procedural error, an error concerning a material question of law 
invalidating the decision, and an error of fact which has occasioned a miscarriage 
of justice.920 The decision of the Appeals Chamber is “final and unappealable to 
anybody, however exceptional.”921
As mentioned above, the judges and the prosecutor are nominated by the Senegalese 
minister of justice and appointed by the chairperson of the AU Commission, while 
the registrar and the administrator are directly appointed by the Senegalese minister 
of justice.922 The accused and the victims may elect their own counsel and, “where 
the interests of justice so require” or when required by the Senegalese Code of 
Criminal Procedure, the EAC may appoint legal assistance for the accused.923 
A steering committee may extend the mandates of the judges and of the prosecutor.924 
According to the Senegalese Code of Criminal Procedure, judges can be removed 
by the minister of justice through the decision of a disciplinary council.925
The funds provided by the donors’ round table were managed by a management 
committee (Comité de Gestion), created pursuant to the Donor’s Round Table Final 
Document of November 2010, together with the United Nations Office for Project 
Services (UNOPS).926 In addition, the Joint Financial Agreement signed by the AU, 
Chad, Senegal, and other partners created a steering committee (Comité de Pilotage) 
responsible for the financial oversight of the EAC. The steering committee receives 
and approves reports from the administrator, approves the budget, may extend the 
mandate of the judges and the prosecutor, and is responsible for the appointment of 
defense counsel.927
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Finally, national and international NGOs played an important role of informal 
oversight through the monitoring of proceedings. Trust Africa supported a group 
of Senegalese law students to monitor the trial and provide an “independent 
platform of informed actors who can provide accurate and timely analysis of the 
proceedings, and share this information with a wide audience.”928 Human Rights 
Watch also assumed an important role by supporting the victims in their demand 
for accountability and also by monitoring and communicating about the trial 
throughout the proceedings.929
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SIERRA LEONE: SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
Conflict Background and Political Context
Between 1991 and 2002, a brutal war in Sierra Leone ravaged the country and 
resulted in many thousands of deaths (by some estimates, 75,000) and displacement 
of at least a third of the population. Various factions perpetrated numerous grave 
crimes, including amputations and the mass recruitment and use of child soldiers.930 
A rebel group, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor, 
invaded northern Liberia in 1989 and overthrew President Samuel Doe. Two years 
later, in March 1991, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led by Foday Sankoh 
and backed by Charles Taylor, invaded Sierra Leone from Liberia. Civil Defense 
Force militias, dominated by the Kamajor militias of the Mende tribe, came to the 
support of the government. From about 1997 onward, the RUF was generally allied 
with the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, which briefly came to power in a 1997 
coup before being ousted by Nigerian-led West African forces. In 1999, the signing 
of the Lomé Peace Agreement,931 led to an unsteady peace. Fighting resumed in 
2000 and it was not until January 2002, following limited intervention by British 
forces, that the civil war in Sierra Leone officially ended. In October 1999, the UN 
deployed the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which at its height 
in 2001 had a force strength of 17,500 military personnel. UNAMSIL’s mandate 
expired in December 2005.932
The Special Court for Sierra Leone and the National Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission 
The Lomé Peace Agreement of 1999 called for the creation of a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) for Sierra Leone.933 A national statute creating 
the TRC was passed by parliament in February 2000, but it did not become fully 
operational until November 2002.934 In October 2004, the TRC released its final 
report of over 5,000 pages, covering human rights violations beginning in 1991. The 
report includes the names of responsible individuals.935 The TRC’s mandate allowed 
it to investigate atrocities before 1996, unlike the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(SCSL), and established “in a non-prosecutorial manner, the accountability of many 
of the ‘small fry’ perpetrators, while the Court plays a necessary punitive role with 
respect to the accountability of the ‘big fish.’”936
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There was no formal relationship between the SCSL and the TRC, despite the urgings 
from a UN Group of Experts, the UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, and the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs that “the modalities of 
cooperation should be institutionalized in an agreement … and where appropriate, 
also in their respective rules of procedure.”937 When the TRC began hearings in late 
2002, “the SCSL Prosecutor had already given assurances he would not use evidence 
collected or heard by the TRC.”938 This de facto arrangement not to use TRC 
evidence was cemented by two realities: (1) the TRC’s minuscule budget compared 
to the SCSL’s meant it did not gather evidence unavailable to the prosecutor, and 
(2) testimony to the TRC was mostly given by victims, not perpetrators whose inside 
testimony would be a rarer commodity for prosecutors building a case. 
Despite the prosecutor’s assurances, the trial of defendant Sam Hinga Norman 
underscored the complications engendered by the lack of a formal agreement 
between the two institutions. Norman, facing trial before the SCSL, requested 
that he be allowed to testify before the TRC. The SCSL and the TRC drew up draft 
practice directions to deal with defendants who wished to testify before both 
institutions, but could not ultimately agree. The TRC believed that the policies 
in the practice directions “undermined the confidentiality … for testimony and 
presented the risk of an Accused incriminating himself, because the registrar could 
forward testimony to the Prosecution.”939 A revised practice direction created by 
the registrar “allowed limited confidentiality and stipulated that the SCSL would 
grant requests [to testify before the TRC] if the detainee gave informed consent, and 
unless granting access would be against the ‘interests of justice’ or would denigrate 
‘the integrity of the proceedings of the SCSL.’” Ultimately, the SCSL Trial Chamber 
denied Norman’s request on the grounds that it would be incompatible with his right 
to be presumed innocent. In affirming the decision, the Appeals Chamber found 
that testifying before the TRC was unnecessary and would create a “spectacle.”  
A proposed compromise—that Norman submit his testimony to the TRC in the  
form of a legal affidavit—was not implemented before the TRC’s mandate expired.  
A codified arrangement between the SCSL and the TRC—rather than a  
personality-driven process—may have clarified the accountability framework  
and improved the functioning of both institutions, avoiding the kind of legal 
proceedings that arose in the Norman case.
Existing Justice-Sector Capacity
After a ravaging civil war, the justice sector in Sierra Leone was in disrepair and rife 
with corruption.940 Writing in 2001, one expert observed: “The judicial system is 
largely decimated as a result of the war.”941 Many lawyers, judges, magistrates, and 
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prosecutors fled during the conflict, and low salaries made the few that remained 
easy targets for corruption.942 Much of the country’s infrastructure was destroyed 
or suffered serious damage.943 The High Court was the only functional court in 
Freetown, while many lower courts in the provinces had been shut down during 
the conflict.944 In the courts that remained open, legal processes were cumbersome 
and open to corruption. These conditions led to lengthy delays, a huge backlog in 
cases, and many cases being dismissed or abandoned.945 In addition, the blanket 
amnesty granted by the Lomé Agreement barred national courts from conducting 
prosecutions against any of the combatants for crimes committed during the 
conflict;946 and prosecutions against the RUF were unlikely in many areas of the 
country where they retained control.947 In these circumstances, accountability in 
the domestic legal system for the atrocities committed during the civil war was 
not possible without international assistance. There were efforts in early 2000 
to prosecute rebel forces for crimes committed outside the period covered by the 
amnesty, but they failed due to the national justice system’s lack of capacity.948
However, despite these deficiencies, the UN Secretary-General observed that the 
local system for the administration of justice was “perceived to be an administration 
capable of producing a fair trial,” and some local resources could be used in the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL)—for instance, there were enough local 
barristers to act as defense counsel.949
Existing Civil Society Capacity
Sierra Leonean civil society played an important role in the peace process and in 
the establishment of the Special Court. NGOs participated in the peace talks and 
were behind the conception of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a 
counterbalance to the amnesty granted to all parties.950 Civil society organizations, 
including the Campaign for Good Governance, also played a crucial role in calling 
for prosecutions after the conflict and urging the government to request United 
Nations assistance in establishing a hybrid tribunal.951 Sierra Leonean organizations 
especially advocated for national ownership of the proposed tribunal, in light 
of the contributions it could make to post-conflict accountability efforts.952 In 
the discussions with the Secretary-General on the establishment of the Special 
Court, the NGO community favored a national court with international assistance 
rather than an international tribunal.953 They also strongly advocated for domestic 
prosecutions, and there were discussions among local lawyers about challenging the 
constitutionality of the amnesty law. However, fears of causing unrest in the country 
overtook these notions.954
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Following the Special Court’s establishment, a “proliferation of local human rights 
organizations” started to engage with the court’s processes through its Interactive 
Forum and outreach initiatives, and they played an important part in sensitization 
and awareness-raising activities that helped to ensure the court’s national relevance.955
Creation
In May 2000, civil society organizations—among them labor organizations and 
women’s rights organizations—marched to the home of RUF leader Foday Sankoh. 
His bodyguards shot and killed protestors in a chaotic scene in which Sankoh 
was captured.956 In response to the events, the government of Sierra Leone under 
President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah formally requested the assistance of the United 
Nations in establishing a hybrid court in Sierra Leone to prosecute atrocities 
committed by the RUF and its allies.957 Civil society in Sierra Leone, backed by 
the United States and the United Kingdom, strongly supported the creation of an 
international tribunal to hold those most responsible to account.958 The United 
Nations Security Council considered creating an international ad hoc tribunal, but 
the option was rejected, in part due to President Kabbah’s opposition.959 In June 
2000, the Security Council passed a resolution requesting the Secretary-General 
to negotiate an agreement with Sierra Leone’s government to create a hybrid 
tribunal.960 The Secretary-General sent a fact-finding mission to Sierra Leone 
to investigate the feasibility of creating a tribunal.961 RUF leader Foday Sankoh 
had been taken into government custody, but the legal and political system was 
inadequate to prosecute serious crimes, and leading politicians feared retaliation 
and destabilization.962 Consequently, the UN experts focused on technical issues 
that would arise in creating a hybrid or mixed court. In October 2000, the Secretary-
General submitted a report to the Security Council recommending the creation of 
the SCSL.963 Whereas the government had initially requested a court that would only 
deal with RUF crimes, the UN-recommended body would have no such restriction.
The agreement between the UN and Sierra Leone establishing the SCSL was signed 
in January 2002 and contained the SCSL Statute.964 The agreement was subsequently 
ratified into the domestic law of Sierra Leone.965 The SCSL was partially operational 
by August 2002 and fully operational by mid-2004, when the first two trials began. 
Based in Freetown, the SCSL was the first international criminal tribunal located 
within the country where the crimes had been committed, as well as the first 
hybrid court to be created by a bilateral treaty between the United Nations and 
the host country.
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Legal Framework and Mandate
The SCSL was mandated to prosecute persons who “bear the greatest responsibility 
for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law 
committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996, including those 
leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the establishment of and 
implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.”966 The start date of temporal 
jurisdiction was chosen as a “non-politically biased date, which provided a time-
frame that ensure[d] the Court would not be overburdened while it still addresses 
the most serious atrocities committed during the war.”967 However, political 
compromises meant the territorial jurisdiction of the mandate left unpunished any 
crimes committed in Liberia by many of the same forces during the same period. 
This impunity gap has intermittently led to proposals for a hybrid or international 
criminal court to be established in Liberia. (See the separate profile on Liberia.) 
The court’s statute also limited personal jurisdiction to those bearing “the greatest 
responsibility” and expressly prohibited jurisdiction over those under the age of 15 at 
the time of the commission of the crime.968 
The governing legal instruments of the SCSL were the agreement between the 
government and the UN, which contains the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, drawn up by the judges and modeled on the rules of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).969 In addition, the legal framework included 
secondary instruments, such as bilateral detention agreements with states and codes 
of conduct for counsel.970
The SCSL was a treaty-based court, rather than a subsidiary organ of the UN, and 
not directly administered by the UN or the government of Sierra Leone. However, 
the SCSL had primacy and concurrent jurisdiction over national courts, which 
mostly have not exercised their jurisdiction over grave crimes (see Prosecutions, 
below, regarding domestic prosecutions).971 The government of Sierra Leone, as a 
party to the court, is required to enforce and carry out the court’s decisions; and in 
fact, national authorities carried out arrest warrants and enforced orders. However, 
because the SCSL was not created under the UN Security Council’s Chapter VII 
powers, the SCSL lacked enforcement powers over third-party states.
Although the SCSL was mandated to have a hybrid legal jurisdiction, in practice, the 
court’s application of law was almost exclusively international. The statute and the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence provided that the court be guided by international 
and domestic law in interpreting humanitarian law;972 and guided by the decisions of 
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the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone in interpreting Sierra Leonean law. Additionally, 
judges should be guided by the Sierra Leone Criminal Procedure Act when amending 
the court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence.973 However, in practice, the SCSL’s 
jurisprudence only referred to international law. Similarly, although the court’s 
mandate allowed for prosecution of “crimes under relevant Sierra Leonean law,”974 
the first SCSL prosecutor chose to apply only international law in drafting indictments. 
Location
By 2004, modern court facilities had been constructed in Freetown on a site provided 
by the government, including a detention center,975 offices, and a library. Many of 
the facilities were “accommodated in a simple prefabricated block, with little scope 
for expansion.”976 All of the SCSL trials were held in Freetown except for the trial of 
Charles Taylor, which used courtrooms rented from the ICC and the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon (STL) in The Hague, and detention space from the ICC.977 The Appeals 
Chamber, for much of the court’s lifespan, was located in The Hague, creating a 
“challenging and expensive … logistical exercise in bringing all the judges together.”978 
In its early years, the Special Court faced extreme difficulties in putting in place 
basic operations and infrastructure, and expended significant efforts to attract 
qualified personnel, locate suitable housing for staff members, procure basic office 
supplies and functional communications systems, and set up the basic functions 
of a court. That in itself was a significant achievement in the context of post-war 
Freetown’s gutted physical infrastructure.
However, the SCSL campus was criticized as being inaccessible, in part because of 
strict security measures. It was “widely reported that many residents of Sierra Leone 
were hesitant to visit the Special Court’s facilities during the trials because they 
considered access to the court a cumbersome and intimidating process.”979
Structure and Composition
The SCSL comprised a Chambers, Registry, and Office of the Prosecutor. An 
external management committee engaged in fundraising and non-judicial policy 
formation. The Defense Office formed an unofficial “fourth pillar” of the court. The 
three core organs were staffed by national and international personnel. Even without 
formal requirements for a ratio of national to international personnel, the Special 
Court “managed to achieve a geographical representation across 37 countries over 
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and above its predominantly Sierra Leonean representation, albeit that many Sierra 
Leoneans were not necessarily in senior positions.”980
The Sierra Leonean government selected and appointed the national judges and 
deputy prosecutor. However, some critics charged that the court did not “embrace 
true hybridity at the highest level,” citing the lack of a requirement that the deputy 
prosecutor be Sierra Leonean.981 Nonetheless, the court maintained a balance of mixed 
staff, even as it sharply downsized from about 350 at its height to around 80 by the end 
of 2011, divided between Freetown and The Hague. As early as 2005, the court drew 
up a personnel policy paper to address the need to downsize national and international 
staff.982 In 2006, about 150 of 250 staff members were nationals; in March 2011, about 
half of the 100 staff members were nationals.983 The court also instituted an internship 
program to recruit recent Sierra Leonean graduates and legal associates. 
Chambers 
The SCSL comprised two three-judge Trial Chambers and a five-judge Appeals 
Chamber. International judges, appointed by the Secretary-General, made up a 
majority of each chamber. National judges, a minority in each chamber, were 
appointed by the government of Sierra Leone. The president and vice president of the 
Special Court, as well as the presiding judge of the Appeals Chamber, were elected 
by a majority of the judges on the Appeals Chamber.984 At the request of the court’s 
president, one alternate judge could be appointed by the government of Sierra 
Leone to each Trial or Appeals Chamber. Chambers were served by legal officers, 
assistant legal officers, and interns. The second Trial Chamber was added in January 
2005 to provide for the commencement of the SCSL’s third trial in March 2005. 
Office of the Prosecutor 
The prosecutor was appointed by the Secretary-General in consultation with  
the government of Sierra Leone. The deputy prosecutor was to be Sierra Leonean 
and appointed by the government of Sierra Leone, in consultation with the 
Secretary-General. In practice, the deputy prosecutor was not always Sierra 
Leonean. The prosecution office was assisted by “Sierra Leonean and international 
staff as may be required.”985 
Registry
The Registry housed a range of administrative and legal functions, including the 
Defense Office, outreach, public affairs, and Witnesses and Victim Support. A legal 
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unit within the Registry handled matters related to court management, detention of 
accused, personnel and staff, library and archiving, security, procurement, and other 
administrative functions. The court management section especially faced challenges 
in the language services unit, which had to contend with Sierra Leone’s “23 different 
languages, a number of which are non-codified, standard languages that make it 
difficult to find interpreters who can interpret accurately.”986 
The registrar was a UN staff member appointed by the Secretary-General after 
consultation with the president of the Special Court.987 The statute did not specify 
the nationality and appointment procedure for the deputy registrar, who from the 
beginning of the Taylor trial also served as the head of the office in The Hague. The 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence provided that the registrar appoints the deputy 
registrar and other staff as necessary.988
Defense 
The Defense Office, headed by the principal defender, was located within the 
management structure of the Registry989 but functioned independently. The 
arrangement was an “innovation in the structure of international courts … [as] none 
previously was vested with a permanent internal institution entrusted with ensuring 
the rights of suspects and accused.”990 Defense counsel were required to have 
practiced criminal law for a minimum of five years and to be licensed by a state.991 
The principal defender was required to maintain a list of “duty counsel,” who must 
have at least seven years’ experience. Controversially, the SCSL used legal services 
contracts, which capped fees paid to defense attorneys, “beyond which payments 
ha[d] to be certified by the defense office in consultation with the lawyer(s) 
concerned.”992 The arrangement was meant to signal to lawyers that “assignment to 
a defendant did not result in a ‘blank check.’”993
Witnesses and Victims Section
The duties of the Witnesses and Victims Section (WVS) were outlined in the SCSL 
Agreement, the SCSL Statute, and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.994 The WVS 
was established by the registrar. The statute required the WVS to include “experts in 
trauma, including trauma related to crimes of sexual violence and violence against 
children.”995 WVS also ran extensive witness protection and support programs, 
including a medical clinic on the court grounds, and provided psycho-social 
counseling. In 2007, “52 national staff and five international staff were employed in 
supervisory positions in the witness protection and victim support section … [and] 
the arrangement worked well,” notwithstanding security concerns, because “every 
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step was taken to gather information on potential staff members.”996 Some tension 
arose between the WVS and the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) after the latter 
created an internal Witness Management Unit that had some overlap in mandate 
with the WVS. 
Outreach 
The outreach program at the SCSL was widely regarded in the field of international 
justice to be well designed and run. The SCSL’s designers and leadership placed 
value on outreach, having seen the costs to the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and ICTR of failing to do so. However, the SCSL’s 
reliance on voluntary funding presented difficulties (see Financing, below). The 
outreach programs engaged a broad section of society. Innovations included 
interactive forums between the public and the SCSL (tapping into an established 
Sierra Leonean means of communication), weekly radio broadcasts summarizing 
proceedings, trainings for local media on producing audio and video materials, 
trainings for local government leaders, and video screenings in Liberia’s capital, 
Monrovia, as well as Freetown and towns in each of Sierra Leone’s districts, funded 
by the European Commission and the MacArthur Foundation. The outreach 
program established student Accountability Now clubs at high schools and tertiary 
institutions in Sierra Leone and Liberia, which are now generally self-sufficient and 
focus on broader issues of peace, justice, and accountability. The outreach program 
also carried out population-based surveys measuring perceptions of the court. 
During the Charles Taylor trial in The Hague, the outreach unit facilitated the travel 
of civil society representatives, local chiefs, parliamentarians, and members of the 
Sierra Leone judiciary to observe the trial. 
Special Court Interactive Forum
The SCSL created an interactive forum to “provide civil society groups, international 
NGOs and other groups with the opportunity to meet regularly [monthly] with senior 
officials of the court to receive briefings on the court’s activities.” Participants were 
encouraged to “pose questions and put recommendations and concerns to high-level 
court officials,” which were then taken back to the court “with a commitment by 
the court to report back on any action promised.”997 In addition, the court organized 
regional conferences to collect opinions and perceptions of its work. These 
empowered civil society groups to engage with the court.998 
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Prosecutions
The SCSL completed three major trials in Freetown and a fourth trial against Charles 
Taylor, held in The Hague. A fifth trial, for contempt proceedings, was held in 
Freetown.999 The court issued indictments against 13 high-level members of the RUF, 
the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), and the Civil Defense Forces. 
Nine accused persons were convicted, three died before trial or judgment, and the 
fate and location of former AFRC leader Johnny Paul Koroma are unknown.1000 
The court could refer Koroma’s indictment to the Residual Court (see below) or to 
another national jurisdiction, as allowed for in Rule 11bis of the SCSL Statute.1001 
Amnesty, National Prosecutions, and the Lomé Peace Accord 
The Lomé Agreement of 1999 granted blanket amnesty to all fighters in order 
to secure the signature of RUF leader Foday Sankoh. However, the Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary-General appended a disclaimer to the 
agreement, and the Statute of the Special Court expressly rejected domestic 
amnesty for atrocity crimes.1002 Despite the SCSL’s success in prosecuting high-
level perpetrators, “no national proceedings have been conducted for crimes 
committed by mid- and lower-level perpetrators during the conflict … although there 
were efforts to prosecute rebel forces for crimes committed outside the period 
covered by the Lomé Amnesty.”1003 No legal challenges to the blanket amnesty in 
the Lomé Agreement have been mounted domestically, and the domestic judicial 
system retains significant capacity gaps.1004 In those trials of low- and mid- level 
perpetrators, “many arrested persons were detained for long periods without 
trial, the government had problems gathering evidence, there were challenges in 
transporting detained persons to court, there were insufficient courtrooms to hold 
trials, and the detained persons themselves could not find legal representation.”1005 
Calls from civil society for prosecutions, and discussions among lawyers about 
challenging the constitutionality of the amnesty, “have been overtaken by political 
considerations, because the government does not want to be seen as responsible 
for any backlash if such prosecutions cause unrest in the country.”1006
The Exile, Arrest, and Transfer of Charles Taylor
When the SCSL prosecutor made public the indictment of Charles Taylor in June 
2003, Taylor was attending peace talks in Ghana and subsequently fled to Liberia. 
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A “deal between the United Nations, the United States, the African Union, and 
ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States)” led to his exile in 
Nigeria.1007 While in Nigeria, civil society groups and others challenged Taylor’s 
asylum, but it was not until 2006—following a formal request from newly elected 
Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf—that Nigerian President Olusegun 
Obasanjo stated Liberia was “free to take former President Charles Taylor into its 
custody.”1008 Taylor fled, but was captured by Nigerian authorities in March 2006 
while attempting to cross into Cameroon. He was transferred to Monrovia and 
handed over to the SCSL. Liberian President Johnson Sirleaf, fearing instability in 
Liberia and the region if Taylor’s trial were held in Sierra Leone, requested that his 
trial be moved to The Hague. Following Security Council Resolution 1688, passed 
on June 16, 2006, Taylor was transferred to The Hague. His trial began in January 
2008 on the premises of the ICC and later moved to a courtroom at the STL. 
Despite security concerns, many civil society organizations in Sierra Leone were 
disappointed that his trial was moved out of the region.
On April 26, 2012, the Trial Chamber convicted Charles Taylor on all 11 counts in 
the indictment: aiding and abetting the commission of crimes against humanity 
and war crimes, including murder, rape, and use of child soldiers by RUF and AFRC 
rebels between 1999 and 2002. Taylor was also found guilty of planning rebel 
attacks against Freetown and two other towns in late 1998. He was sentenced to 
50 years in prison. His sentence was confirmed on appeal in 2013. Taylor’s was the 
first conviction of a former head of state by an international criminal tribunal since 
the Nuremburg trials in 1946 convicted the titular head of state for the Third Reich, 
Admiral Karl Dönitz.1009 
Legacy
The legacy of the SCSL includes the establishment of a Residual Special Court, the 
establishment of a Peace Museum, and the development of capacity at the national 
level, including among Sierra Leonean professionals who worked at the court. In 
2005, the SCSL registrar set up a Legacy Working Committee,1010 focusing on five 
key areas: 
 1) developing the capacity of the national legal profession;
 2) promoting the rule of law and accountability in Sierra Leone; 
 3) promoting human rights and international humanitarian law; 
 4) promoting the role of civil society in the justice sector; and 
258   OPTIONS FOR JUSTICE
 5) assisting the government of Sierra Leone in assessing possible uses 
for the site of the court beyond the lifespan of the trials.1011
Impact of Jurisprudence on the National Legal System
The SCSL has contributed to the development of novel jurisprudence in 
international law, including pronouncing forced marriage to be a crime under 
international humanitarian law. However, the court’s jurisprudence has rarely been 
invoked and applied at the national level; the utility of the SCSL’s jurisprudence 
to national courts has been limited.1012 The Taylor appeal judgment provided “the 
opportunity for national Sierra Leonean law officers to meet on a peer-to-peer basis 
under the auspices of the national Bar Association, and with the assistance of former 
national SCSL staff, to conduct peer-to-peer sessions to identify strategies for 
utilizing SCSL jurisprudence in national cases.”1013  
Trainings 
The Special Court has “continually offered trainings on a wide range of subjects, both 
internally for national staff of the SCSL and externally for members of the national 
legal system.”1014 These included trainings of national police on witness protection 
issues, training of local prosecutors by the OTP (nearly 100 trained between 2010 and 
mid-2011), and archive management training for national archival institutions. 1015
However, the impact and value of the SCSL in building knowledge and practice in 
the national system has been limited, in part because of the “disparity in resources, 
the differences in the crimes prosecuted, and the enormous chasm between 
conditions of service at the national level and at the SCSL.”1016 The training scheme 
has been criticized for the lack of formalized interaction and training between 
international judges and prosecutors and their national counterparts. In a post-
colonial context, poorly paid local legal professionals often resented receiving 
lectures from overpaid SCSL staff and judges who did not treat them as peers. One 
Sierra Leonean judge noted that “at the practitioner level, people don’t want to be 
seen as being trained by the Special Court.”1017 This highlights the difficulties of 
holding trainings and underscores the need for well-designed information exchange. 
Sierra Leone Legal Information Institute (Sierra LII)
In February 2009, the OTP of the SCSL developed the Sierra LII to “provide online 
access to Sierra Leone primary legal materials and related information,” with seed 
money provided by the Open Society Foundations and the SCSL Legacy Program.1018 
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International Prosecutor’s Best Practices Project 
The project, funded by the Canadian government, brought together prosecutors 
from various international and hybrid tribunals, including the SCSL, the ICTR, the 
ICTY, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), and the 
STL, to “document the recommended practices from each of the offices for use of 
practitioners of international criminal and humanitarian law at the international 
level and by national prosecuting authorities.”1019 
Police Training
In Sierra Leone, “extensive efforts were made to train the national police service 
at middle to senior management level. … The aim was to make them understand 
their role and responsibility in ensuring that witnesses returning to the various 
districts were monitored, and action taken if there was any evidence that a witness 
or his or her family was under threat.”1020 In 2011, the national police established 
a National Witness Protection and Assistance Unit, following engagement with 
the Special Court’s Registry. The unit provides support to SCSL witnesses after the 
completion of its mandate, as well as support for threatened witnesses in national 
cases involving corruption, gender-based violence, and organized crime.1021 In 
2011, security duties at the SCSL were handed over from a remnant Mongolian 
detachment of UNAMSIL peacekeepers to the Sierra Leone police.1022 
Archives Management 
The original archives of the SCSL were transferred to the Dutch National Archives 
in December 2010, while copies and electronic versions of the court’s archives were 
made available at the Peace Museum in Freetown.1023 The court maintained that 
current facilities and procedures for upkeep in Sierra Leone are not adequate to 
provide for safe and secure storage.
Transfer of Infrastructure
The SCSL convened a coalition of national stakeholders to discuss possible uses 
of the SCSL facilities after the closure of the court. Initial proposals included 
using the facilities as the seat of the Sierra Leonean Supreme Court or an African 
regional court, as an international judicial training center, or as a memorial to 
the civil war. In 2012–2013, stakeholders agreed to the establishment of the Peace 
Museum, funded by the UN Peacebuilding Commission. It houses exhibition and 
memorial space, a law library for public research, and paper and electronic archives 
of the SCSL to “assist the national legal system to use the Court’s jurisprudence in 
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national cases.”1024 The archives also house the records of the TRC and the National 
Commission for Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration.
The SCSL’s modern detention facilities were no longer needed after transferring 
all convicted persons in the first three trials to Rwanda in October 2009. They 
were devolved into national prison authorities in May 2010 and now house female 
prisoners and children born in custody.
Completion Strategy and the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone
In August 2010, the government of Sierra Leone signed an agreement with the 
United Nations, creating the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone (RSCSL).1025 
The agreement was ratified by parliament in December 2011. The SCSL initially 
planned to complete its judicial mandate by mid-2012 and then transition to a 
residual mechanism. However, delays in the Charles Taylor trial postponed the 
completion strategy. The court closed down operations following the delivery of the 
appellate judgment in the Charles Taylor case in September 2013. In the final years 
of its operation, staff size at the SCSL was sharply reduced. The RSCSL’s primary 
seat is in the Netherlands and it also has a sub-office in Sierra Leone, focusing 
on witness protection. The RSCSL retained key posts of president, prosecutor, 
and registrar. The statute of the Residual Special Court states that the body will 
“maintain, preserve, and manage its archives, including the archives of the Special 
Court; provide for witnesses and victim protection and support; respond to requests 
for access to evidence by national prosecution authorities; supervise enforcement 
of sentences; review convictions and acquittals; conduct contempt of court 
proceedings; provide defense counsel and legal aid for the conduct of proceedings 
before the Residual Special Court; respond to requests from national authorities 
with respect to claims for compensation; and prevent double jeopardy.”1026
Financing
The SCSL was funded through voluntary contributions from governments. The 
court’s management committee, along with the UN Secretary-General, was 
responsible for raising funds. Although the SCSL received generous in-kind and cash 
contributions from over 40 states and several private foundations, the voluntary 
contribution model resulted in “constant financial shortfalls.”1027 The largest 
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contributing countries to the court were the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Canada, the Netherlands, and Nigeria. The completion budget approved for the 
SCSL required just over US$20 million (US$16 million in 2011 and US$4 million for 
2012),1028 and the court faced significant challenges in raising the funds necessary 
for a smooth transition to the residual court. Shortfalls resulting from the voluntary 
contribution model required the Special Court to seek and receive UN subvention 
grants in 2004, when the UN subvention grant of US$33 million was desperately 
needed to fully operationalize the court in its incipient stages, as well as in 2011 
and 2012.1029 The General Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to provide 
nearly US$10 million in supplementary funding to the court in 2011 and authorized a 
further subvention, if necessary, of US$2.3 million for the 2012 budget.1030 
Private foundations and international agencies played a significant role in funding 
non-core functions, such as outreach and judicial trainings. These included the Open 
Society Foundations, the European Commission, the UN Peace Building Fund, the 
Ford Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, the Oak Foundation, the Rockefeller 
Foundation, and the Gordon Foundation. The silver lining of the voluntary funding 
arrangement was that it required the court to engage with and seek the ad hoc 
support of international NGOs, which assisted “in lobbying for financial or political 
support; providing opportunities to get the institution’s message across to a wider 
audience; partnerships in training and outreach programs, and so forth.”1031 
The court’s library holdings, including the “vast majority of books, periodicals and 
other materials, … were donated to the court by a variety of sources. … Had that not 
been the case, the court would have had to work with an extremely limited library 
facility, as there was little funding available from the regular budget.”1032 Legacy 
initiatives were not contemplated in the founding documents of the SCSL and 
therefore not included in the core budget.1033 
The necessity of pursuing these targeted grants for non-core functions posed risks 
for the SCSL’s operation and its legacy. Outreach is a prime example. Even though 
“the need for an outreach capability was identified at an early stage, the [SCSL] 
could not fully use the opportunity afforded by its location in-country. … Those 
monitoring the court’s budget were extremely reluctant to approve significant 
resources to that process. … In addition, the limited funding allocated in the regular 
budget had to be significantly ‘topped up’ year by year by funding obtained from 
elsewhere other than the court’s main sources of funding.”1034 
Although the voluntary contribution arrangement allowed for “more flexibility both 
in the budgetary process … and the reporting or control mechanisms,”1035 ultimately 
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the arrangement severely taxed the SCSL’s resources, continuously threatened the 
smooth function of the court, and presented a significant challenge.1036
The RSCSL is also funded through voluntary contributions and does not have 
guaranteed UN funding. This raises concerns that the problems and difficulties 
faced by the Special Court will be repeated and exacerbated by the lack of  
dedicated personnel at the Residual Special Court with the time or mandate to 
engage in fundraising.1037
Oversight and Accountability
The Management Committee consisted of representatives from the Sierra Leonean 
government, the Secretary-General, and “important contributors to the Special 
Court.” The committee coordinated and sought funding for the court. It was chaired 
by a donor state representative and received a monthly written progress report 
from the registrar.1038 The management committee “provide[d] advice and policy 
direction on all non-judicial aspects of the operation of the Court, including 
questions of efficiency, and to perform other functions as agreed by interested states.”1039
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SOUTH SUDAN: PROPOSED HYBRID COURT
Conflict Background and Political Context
South Sudan gained its independence following protracted civil wars within the 
state of Sudan from 1955 to 1972 and 1983 to 2005. Those wars generally pitted the 
northern Muslim and Arab government against a coalition of southern peoples 
who practiced traditional religions and Christianity, although alliances were often 
complicated and cross-confessional. In the course of fighting, fueled in part by 
competition for control of the south’s oil resources, President Omar al Bashir and 
his predecessors encouraged infighting among southern rebels along tribal lines. 
Notably, his government provided support to Riek Machar, an ethnic Nuer, who split 
from the main Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, led by a Dinka, John Garang. 
Under international pressure, the parties to the conflict signed a Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement in 2005, which granted broad autonomy to the south and included 
provision for a referendum on independence within six years.1040
South Sudanese voters opted for independence in a January 2011 referendum, 
and South Sudan became an independent country in July 2011. After two years of 
rising tension and regular and serious violent clashes, especially in rural areas, 
President Salva Kiir, an ethnic Dinka, accused Vice President Riek Machar of 
plotting to overthrow him.1041 When Kiir dismissed Machar and arrested a number 
of his ministers in December 2013, clashes erupted in the capital, Juba.1042 Fighting 
along ethnic lines has continued amidst broken ceasefire deals, power-sharing 
arrangements, and a proliferation of rebel factions. A UN peacekeeping mission, 
United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), has faced criticism for failure  
to protect civilians.1043
Tens of thousands of people have been killed since the conflict began at the end of 
2013; by 2016, estimates ranged from 50,000 to as many as 300,000.1044 By the end 
of 2016, nearly two million South Sudanese were internally displaced or living as 
refugees.1045 In February, the UN declared famine in parts of South Sudan, warning 
that “war and a collapsing economy have left some 100,000 people facing starvation 
[in South Sudan] and a further one million people are classified as being on the  
brink of famine.”1046 
There have been numerous reports of serious international crimes perpetrated 
during the course of the conflict. The combatting factions have perpetrated rape 
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and other sexual and gender-based violence on a massive scale.1047 An African 
Union Commission of Inquiry in 2015 found cases of forced cannibalism, gang 
rapes, and death by burning.1048 The report suggested that crimes against humanity 
had been perpetrated, finding “the existence of a state or organizational policy to 
launch attacks against civilians based on their ethnicity or political affiliation.”1049 
However, the commission stopped short of concluding that the crimes amounted 
to genocide.1050 In November 2016, the UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of 
Genocide warned of a “potential for genocide” in South Sudan.1051 In March 2017, 
the UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan concluded: 
Warning signs and enablers for genocide and ethnic cleansing 
include the cover of an ongoing conflict to act as a “smoke screen,” 
several low-level and isolated acts of violence to start the process, the 
dehumanization of others through hate speech, economic volatility 
and instability, deliberate starvation, the bombardment of and attacks 
against civilians, forced displacement and the burning of villages. The 
targeting of civilians on the basis of their ethnic identity is unacceptable 
and amounts to ethnic cleansing.1052 
In April 2017, the UK International Development Secretary described the ongoing 
interethnic violence as genocide.1053 
Existing Justice-Sector Capacity
The 2011 Transitional Constitution established South Sudan’s judicial structures.1054 
Customary courts form part of the system, alongside statutory courts.1055 The 
Constitution stipulates that the judiciary is comprised of the Supreme Court, 
Courts of Appeal, High Courts, County Courts, and “other courts or tribunals 
as deemed necessary to be established in accordance with the provisions of this 
Constitution and the law.”1056 Within the institutional structure of justice, traditional 
authorities and courts also play an important role, though the relation between 
both is characterized as complicated by public perceptions of the two systems.1057 
Customary courts are administered under 2009 Local Government Act, and as such, 
chiefs are primarily answerable to county commissioners.1058
Upon independence in 2011, South Sudan’s justice sector already lacked technical 
capacity across the board, and conditions only worsened with the outbreak of the 
large-scale conflict in 2013. An assessment by the American Bar Association Rule of 
Law Initiative in 2014 found unanimous views among interviewees that the national 
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justice system was incapable of holding proceedings for high-level perpetrators “in 
the current or near term.” Some of those interviewed for the assessment thought 
the national system also incapable of credible proceedings for low- and mid-level 
perpetrators, while others saw some capacity among military prosecutors.1059 The 
assessment listed three main reasons for South Sudan’s current inability to deal with 
grave crimes: a lack of competence, a lack of judicial independence, and a lack of 
public trust. At the end of 2016, the chair of the Commission on Human Rights in 
South Sudan said, “Based on the interviews we have conducted, South Sudan’s legal 
system is currently in shambles.”1060
The U.S. government has provided extensive support for the justice sector. The U.S 
State Department has provided training for law enforcement and the judiciary, and 
sought to build the capacity of prisons and correction institutions.1061 USAID and 
UNDP have worked directly with the South Sudanese government to provide 
rule-of-law assistance.1062 UNMISS, too, has provided justice-sector assistance.1063
Existing Civil Society Capacity
Civil society groups in South Sudan face extraordinary danger in the context of 
ongoing war. Limited capacity, reliance on donors, and political division have also 
limited their effectiveness.1064 Nevertheless, some groups have tried to bridge 
divides. A civil society platform in January 2014 appealed to the government and 
rebels to hold accountable the perpetrators of grave crimes under their command.1065 
Beginning in 2014, several South Sudanese human rights organizations formed 
the Transitional Justice Working Group “to promote understanding about the 
transitional justice process; to coordinate civil society support to the transitional 
justice mechanisms in the peace agreement; and to support victims and other 
persons affected by the conflict to have their voices heard.”1066 Civil society 
organizations’ assertion of independence has led to attempts by the warring factions 
to exclude them from participation in the peace process.1067 In 2016, a number of 
South Sudanese civil society organizations joined regional and international NGOs 
in urging the African Union (AU) to establish a hybrid court.1068
Creation
Kiir and Machar entered into a peace agreement in 2015, pledging them to form a 
united transitional government.1069 The section of the agreement on “Transitional 
Justice, Accountability, Reconciliation and Healing,” included the proposal for 
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a Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS). The HCSS would have a mandate “to 
investigate and prosecute individuals bearing responsibility for violations of 
international law and/or applicable South Sudanese law,” in particular war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and genocide.1070 
In 2015, the AU’s Peace and Security Council met at the level of heads of state 
and government. It authorized the chairperson of the AU Commission “to take 
all necessary steps towards the establishment of the HCSS, including providing 
broad guidelines relating to the location of the HCSS, its infrastructure, funding 
and enforcement mechanisms, the applicable jurisprudence, the number and 
composition of judges, privileges and immunities of Court personnel and any  
other related matters.”1071
Although the agreement stipulated that the HCSS should be established within 
one year, the parties quickly distanced themselves from the proposal. An op-ed 
appearing in the New York Times in June 2016 bearing the byline of Kiir and Machar 
argued that peace and accountability should take precedence over the attempt at 
criminal accountability embodied in the HCSS proposal.1072 Machar quickly denied 
any role in writing the article.1073 
The United Nations has expressed support for the proposed court and a willingness 
to provide technical assistance in its establishment.1074 In the face of repeated delays, 
at the end of 2016, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights urged the AU to 
quickly establish the HCSS.1075 Speaking before the Human Rights Council in March 
2017, a member of the UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan criticized 
both South Sudan and the AU for failing to establish the court.1076 In August 
2017, officials from the AU Office of the Legal Counsel met with South Sudanese 
justice officials to agree on drafts of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) and 
statute for the hybrid court. The draft would need to be signed by South Sudan’s 
government and the AU Commission.1077
Legal Framework and Mandate
The 2015 peace agreement states that the HCSS should have a mandate to 
“investigate and prosecute individuals bearing the responsibility for violations 
of international law and/or applicable South Sudanese law, committed from 15 
December 2013 through the end of the Transitional Period.”1078 Its investigations 
could rely on findings of the AU Commission of Inquiry or documents from any 
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other body.1079 The HCSS would have primacy over national courts.1080 It would 
have jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, as well as 
“other serious crimes under international law and relevant laws of the Republic of 
South Sudan including gender-based crimes and sexual violence.”1081
With regard to these crimes, the HCSS would have personal jurisdiction over any 
person “who planned, instigated, ordered, committed, aided and abetted, conspired 
or participated in a joint criminal enterprise in the planning, preparation or 
execution of a crime.”1082 Immunities and amnesties, grants of pardon, or statutes of 
limitation would not apply at the HCSS.1083 
The agreement specifies that the HCSS have a mandate to award reparation and 
compensation.1084 The court would be empowered to order the forfeiture of the 
property, proceeds, and any assets acquired unlawfully or by criminal conduct for 
return to their rightful owner or the state.1085
Location
Under the 2015 peace agreement, the chairperson of the AU Commission shall 
decide the seat of the HCSS. One commentator has argued that the premises of 
the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals in Arusha could be used as a 
permanent tribunal housing hybrid mechanisms, including the HCSS.1086 
Structure and Composition
The 2015 agreement provides limited details on the HCSS’s structure and 
composition. It states that the court shall be “independent and distinct from 
the national judiciary in its operations.”1087 The agreement leaves it to the AU 
Commission to establish broad guidelines for many aspects of the HCSS’s design, 
including the “number and composition of judges.”1088 Under the statute, a majority 
of judges on all panels, and the prosecutors, defense counsel, and registrar must 
all be from African states other than South Sudan. The judges would elect a court 
president from among their members.1089 The agreement states that senior court 
officials shall be “persons of high moral character, impartiality and integrity, and 
should demonstrate expertise in criminal law and international law, including 
international humanitarian and human rights law.”1090 
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Prosecutions
As of October 2017, the HCSS had not been established, and there had been  
no prosecutions.
Legacy
The 2015 agreement states that the HCSS is intended to leave a permanent legacy for 
South Sudan,1091 but it does not specify what kind of legacy is intended. A continued 
failure to establish the court could instead leave a legacy of further hollowing out a 
peace accord that has already failed to end the conflict.1092 
Financing
The 2015 agreement provides no detail on the financing of the HCSS, but notes that 
the AU Commission should issue broad guidelines on the matter.1093
Oversight and Accountability
The chairperson of the African Union Commission would select and appoint the 
HCSS’s judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, and the registrar.1094 There is no 
mention of a process for removals. The agreement provides no other information on 
means of oversight or codes of ethics. 
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SUDAN: PROPOSED HYBRID COURT FOR DARFUR 
Conflict Background and Political Context
Peoples in the Darfur region in western Sudan long coexisted in relative peace. 
Ecological degradation, increasing population, and chronic neglect from the 
government in Khartoum gradually led to increased tension between pastoralists 
and farmers over land use, leading to large-scale violence beginning in the 1980s.1095 
Conflict increasingly became defined by ethnicity, with Arab pastoralist groups 
forming loosely organized armed groups, which came to be known as “Janjaweed,” 
to take on settled, non-Arab groups.1096 
In 2003, two insurgent groups, the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) 
and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) attacked the main military airbase in 
Al-Fashir, the capital city of North Darfur.1097 The central government responded by 
mobilizing the Janjaweed and providing resources enabling them to attack civilians 
perceived as providing a support base for the rebels. The Janjaweed and Sudanese 
military forces attacked whole non-Arab villages in Darfur, killing many civilians and 
forcibly displacing entire communities. The fracturing of rebel groups complicated 
the conflict. From 2005 onward, armed groups have proliferated, split, merged, and 
taken various positions on negotiations with the government.1098 In addition, well-
armed Arab groups have increasingly fought each other. 
The government increasingly integrated Janjaweed into various regular forces: first 
its Borders Intelligence Brigade1099 and most recently the Rapid Support Forces 
(RSF). Together, the Sudanese security forces and Janjaweed have perpetrated 
extensive murder, sexual violence, mass forced displacement, and other grave 
crimes in Darfur.1100 
African Union (AU) peacekeepers first deployed in 2004, and from 2007, the AU and 
UN have conducted joint peacekeeping through a hybrid force, the African Union 
United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).1101 However, throughout the 
conflict, peacekeepers have come under repeated attack, and affected populations, 
rebel groups, and human rights organizations have criticized UNAMID for its 
inability to protect the civilian population.1102 
From the start of the conflict in 2003 until 2016, mortality rates have not been 
well established, but estimates suggest that perhaps 300,000 or more people have 
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been killed in Darfur.1103 One observer calculates that direct and indirect deaths 
attributable to the conflict, as of late 2016, amounted to well over 500,000.1104 As of 
April 2016, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that approximately 
2.6 million Darfuris had been internally displaced within Sudan.1105 Approximately 
350,000 Darfuris had fled as refugees to Chad.1106 Sexual violence has been a 
significant feature of the conflict, including documented cases of mass rape by 
Sudanese military forces.1107 While rebel forces have also perpetrated grave crimes, 
the Sudanese government and Janjaweed have perpetrated the preponderance of 
crimes, explicitly targeting non-Arab civilian populations in villages across Darfur. 
Beginning early in the conflict, in 2004, some analysts and policymakers around the 
world began characterizing these crimes as a campaign of genocide.1108 
In September 2004, the UN Security Council established a UN Commission of 
Inquiry in Darfur. The Council mandated it to “investigate reports of violations of 
international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to 
determine also whether or not acts of genocide have occurred, and to identify the 
perpetrators of such violations with a view to ensuring that those responsible are 
held accountable.”1109 In its January 2005 report, the commission found that the 
government of Sudan and the Janjaweed were responsible for “serious violations 
of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting to crimes under 
international law.”1110 These included the killing of civilians, torture, enforced 
disappearances, destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, 
pillaging and enforced displacement, throughout Darfur, against a number of 
ethnic groups,1111 which may amount to crimes against humanity. The commission 
concluded that the government of Sudan had not “pursued a policy of genocide.”1112 
However, it identified a number of suspects and recommended that the Security 
Council refer the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC).1113
Darfur cases at the International Criminal Court
The Security Council referred the Darfur situation to the ICC in March 2005.1114 From 
2007 through 2012, the prosecutor developed cases involving seven individuals. 
Judges approved charges against five, rejected charges against one, and charges 
against a seventh were withdrawn following credible reports of his death.1115 
Most prominently, judges approved charges and issued an arrest warrant against 
Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in March 2009 on charges of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. In July 2010, they issued a second warrant to add charges 
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of genocide. The al-Bashir warrants followed arrest warrants in April 2007 against 
former Interior Minister Ahmad Harun and Janjaweed leader Ali Kushayb. In March 
2012, the court issued an arrest against Sudanese Defense Minister Abdel Raheem 
Mohammad Hussein. As of October 2017, all four men remain at large.
In 2009, the court issued summonses to appear for three rebel leaders suspected 
of attacking AU peacekeepers: Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Abdallah Banda, and 
Mohammed Jerbo. However, the Pre-trial Chamber ultimately rejected charges 
against Garda, citing a lack of evidence. Although it confirmed charges against 
Banda and Jerbo, the court later withdrew the case against Jerbo following evidence 
of his death. And, although he appeared voluntarily for hearings in 2010, Banda  
did not return to The Hague following the confirmation of charges against him in 
2011. The court issued a warrant for his arrest in 2014, but as of October 2017,  
he remained at large.
Despite the warrant against him, and a binding obligation on all states to enforce 
the ICC warrants (because the Security Council referred the situation to the ICC 
under Chapter VII authority), Omar al-Bashir has remained in power in Sudan. The 
AU called on the Security Council to suspend investigations against al-Bashir under 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute and, in light of the refusal of the Security Council 
to do so, called on its member states not to cooperate with the arrest warrant. 
The Mbeki Report (for background on the report, see Creation, below) did not take 
a position on the AU’s request for deferral. The warrant against him has limited 
al-Bashir’s travel, but some states have allowed him to visit. This has led the ICC  
to issue several noncooperation findings against states.1116
Multiple attempts at a negotiated settlement of the war in Darfur have failed.  
A UN-backed Darfur Peace Agreement negotiated in May 20061117 failed because it 
was rejected by two main rebel factions. The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur 
(DDPD),1118 signed in July 2011, failed for similar reasons. Conflict and grave crimes 
have continued in the years since.1119
Existing Justice-Sector Capacity
The Sudanese legal system was largely rooted in Common Law until 1986, when 
the government introduced Islamic law (Sharia) as a main source of legislation.1120 
In 2005, the UN Commission of Inquiry report noted concerns about executive 
interference in the judiciary, laws in contravention with human rights standards, 
insufficient definitions of international crimes in domestic criminal law, and a 
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lack of popular trust in impartial justice before Sudanese courts.1121 The report 
acknowledged certain steps taken by the government, but stated that it constituted 
“window-dressing” rather than a “real and effective response to large scale 
criminality linked to the armed conflict.”1122 Rebel groups had failed to “take 
any investigative or punitive action whatsoever.” Shortcomings in the Sudanese 
criminal justice system led the commission to recommend that other mechanisms 
were required for justice to be done. In 2009, Sudan incorporated definitions of 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in its domestic criminal code; 
however, critics pointed to inconsistencies with Rome Statute definitions and the 
maintenance of problematic immunities and amnesties.1123
Existing Civil Society Capacity
Civil society in Sudan operates under severe government restrictions, and groups 
within Darfur have little capacity and operate in dire security conditions.1124  
In response to the ICC’s application against President Omar al-Bashir, the 
government increased restrictions on civil society. In 2009, the government  
revoked the registration of three national NGOs and expelled 13 international 
NGOs.1125 In the ensuing years, the government has banned more groups,1126 while 
Sudanese activists who persisted have faced arrest, ill-treatment, and unfair trials.1127 
Civil society involvement in the development of the proposed hybrid court for 
Darfur was limited.
Creation
In October 2009, a report by the African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur, led  
by former South African President Thabo Mbeki (the “Mbeki Report”), 
recommended creating a hybrid criminal court in Sudan to prosecute crimes 
committed in the Darfur region of Sudan, noting the absence of credible national 
prosecutions.1128 The “Hybrid Court for Crimes in Darfur” would serve as a 
“complementary and intermediary tier between the domestic Sudanese judicial 
system … traditional forms of Sudanese justice and dispute resolutions, and the 
International Criminal Court.”1129 
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The Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur and Special 
Court for Darfur Crimes
In 2004, the Sudanese government established a national Commission of Inquiry 
into the events in Darfur. The commission reportedly faced pressure from the 
government, and concluded its mission denying the existence of “widespread 
or systemic crimes.” In June 2005, the chief justice issued a decree for the 
establishment of the Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur (SCCED). 
The SCCED has jurisdiction over (1) acts that constitute crimes in accordance with 
the Sudanese Penal Code and other penal codes; and (2) any charges submitted to 
it by the committee that were established pursuant to the decision of the  
Minister of Justice No. 3/2005 of January 19, 2005, concerning investigations  
into the violations cited in the report of the Sudanese government’s Commission  
of Inquiry.1130 An amendment later extended its jurisdiction to include violations  
of “international humanitarian law.”1131 The SCCED had three permanent seats 
in Darfur.1132 
In 2006, the ICC prosecutor noted that those courts “appear to remain relatively 
inaccessible, with judges performing other duties in Khartoum, awaiting the start of 
trials in Darfur. Limited resources and specialized expertise with reliance on existing 
infrastructure for investigations is also hampering progress.”1133 Human Rights Watch 
has criticized the SCCED for its acceptance of immunities, absence of command 
responsibility as a mode of liability, the non-incorporation of international crimes in 
applicable laws, and its focus in practice on ordinary crimes and crimes committed 
by low-level perpetrators.1134 For example, in May 2013, the SCCED sentenced three 
rebels to death by hanging and crucifixion after finding them guilty of murder  
and other charges.1135
In 2012, the government of Sudan and insurgent groups agreed to establish a 
Special Court for Darfur Crimes as part of the broader DDPD.1136 The court would 
have “jurisdiction over gross violations of human rights and serious violations 
of international humanitarian law committed in Darfur, since February 2003.”1137 
Although the court would not have any direct international participation, the 
agreement included provision for observation by experts from the AU and UN.1138 
Critics point to problems at the Special Court for Darfur Crimes, including a lack of 
judicial independence, a low number of cases handled, poor observation of fair trial 
rights, application of the death penalty, and the fact that the court has not handled 
cases involving the most serious crimes within its mandate.1139
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The AU endorsed the Mbeki Report,1140 and international human rights 
organizations, as well as a consortium of Sudanese political parties, supported the 
proposal.1141 However, the 2004 UN Commission of Inquiry on Darfur had advised 
against establishing a mixed court in Sudan, recommending only the ICC as a 
venue for prosecution. Noting that hybrid courts elsewhere had mixed success, 
but nonetheless might be a viable alternative to fully international proceedings 
in certain contexts, the commission drew a distinction in Sudan. Its objections 
to a hybrid court in Darfur were fourfold: (1) the financial implications; (2) the 
inadequacy of Sudanese laws to prosecute international crimes; (3) the existence of 
the ICC, which could exercise jurisdiction in the Darfur situation (unlike pre-2002 
situations addressed by other hybrid courts); and (4) the lack of independence in 
the Sudanese judiciary to properly investigate and prosecute senior leaders of the 
regime accused of crimes, including President Omar al-Bashir.1142 
Sudan has resisted implementation of the Mbeki Report’s broader recommendations 
and rejected outright the hybrid court proposal and “any proposal involving foreign 
experts.”1143 The AU appointed a High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) to 
follow up on the Mbeki Report, again headed by Mbeki, but as of October 2017,  
there had been no further significant development relating to the establishment  
of a hybrid court.
An International Criminal Tribunal for Darfur?
In 2005, the United States suggested creating an ad hoc International Criminal 
Tribunal for Darfur, as an alternative to the UN Commission of Inquiry on Darfur’s 
proposal for referral of the situation to the ICC.1144 The United States proposed 
the tribunal be authorized by the UN Security Council; be based in Tanzania; be 
administered jointly by the UN and the AU; and share facilities, personnel, and 
infrastructure with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). UN 
member states rejected this approach. The UN Commission of Inquiry had already 
recommended against using accountability mechanisms other than the ICC. The 
commission cited the lack of political will in the international community to finance 
an ad hoc international criminal tribunal, given the availability of the ICC and the 
unwieldiness of expanding jurisdiction and infrastructure at the ICTR.1145
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Legal Framework and Mandate
The Mbeki Report proposed the establishment of a “Hybrid Criminal Court which 
shall exercise original and appellate jurisdiction over individuals who appear to bear 
particular responsibility for the gravest crimes committed during the conflict in 
Darfur and to be constituted by judges of Sudanese and other nationalities.”1146  
The court’s geographical scope would include the Darfur region. The proposal 
however did not define “gravest crimes.” However, it did urge that investigations 
“reflect the full pattern of crimes and abuses committed during the conflict in 
Darfur, and should pay attention to sexual crimes.”1147 
Under the Mbeki Report’s proposal, the Hybrid Court for Darfur would serve as a 
“complementary and intermediary tier between the domestic Sudanese judicial 
system … traditional forms of Sudanese justice and dispute resolutions, and the 
International Criminal Court.”1148 It would apply national laws and, as far as  
possible, be integrated into the Sudanese system. In practice, this could have 
presented significant obstacles. Sudanese law has no provision on command 
responsibility. Further, under the Sudan Armed Forces Act 2007, it is not a crime  
if the act of an officer or soldier took place with good intention or while executing  
an order from a superior.1149 
The proposal does not specify whether creation of the Hybrid Court would require 
AU resolution, government authorization, or both. The Sudanese system authorizes 
the chief justice to establish special courts as necessary, as was the case with the 
SCCED (see text box, above) and the Special Court in Darfur (see the section 
on Legacy, below). To facilitate international involvement, the Mbeki Report 
recommended that the government of Sudan pass legislation to allow non-nationals 
to serve in the judiciary.1150 
Location
The Mbeki Report does not specify the Hybrid Court’s location, but its emphasis 
on integration with the national system and criticism of the remoteness of ICC 
proceedings strongly suggests that the panel intended that the court be located 
within Sudan. 
276   OPTIONS FOR JUSTICE
Structure and Composition
The Mbeki Report’s proposal is not highly detailed. The panel noted that during 
its consultations “few proponents of a hybrid court in Sudan spelt out in any detail 
what they hoped the new arrangement would look like, or how the labour would be 
divided between national and international actors. These are questions of detail, and 
it seemed to the Panel that the demand for a Hybrid Court was being driven by the 
deeply felt concern that the Sudanese national justice system would not, or could 
not, deal adequately with the crimes of Darfur.”1151 
The Mbeki Report recommended creating a body for “overseeing and coordinating 
comprehensive investigations relating to the entire conflict in Darfur … to avoid 
duplication of investigations.”1152 This investigations body would be composed 
of mixed personnel, appointed by the AU.1153 The hybrid court would consist of a 
“Hybrid Criminal Chamber, which should be composed of panels of highly qualified 
and suitable individuals of Sudanese and other nationalities,” with the nomination 
and appointment procedures of judges, prosecutors, and investigators to be 
proposed by the AU.1154 The court would be composed of prosecution, investigation, 
and registry units. International staff and legal personnel would be nominated by 
the AU and serve alongside Sudanese nationals. The panel urged the AU to create 
a transparent, consultative process to nominate qualified international jurists and 
personnel, and not to restrict nominations to Africans.1155 
The Hybrid Court would “operate within the national criminal justice system of 
Sudan … [and] … its functions would be additional and linked to the system of special 
courts.”1156 The panel recommended that the “special courts” or panels (distinct from 
the “Hybrid Court”) also comprise AU-appointed, non-Sudanese judges either as 
“observers or members of the bench.”1157
Prosecutions
As of October 2017, the Hybrid Court had not been created, and there were no 
prosecutions.
Legacy
Soon after its unveiling, the proposal for a Hybrid Court for Darfur lost momentum. 
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Sudan’s government quickly rejected the proposal. The Sudanese bar association, 
which is aligned with the ruling party, denounced the proposal as being 
unconstitutional.1158 Already in late 2009, Thabo Mbeki himself suggested that there 
was a need to understand the Sudanese government’s rejection of foreign judges 
sitting on trials related to Darfur.1159 Mbeki’s distancing from the proposal drew the 
ire of some in opposition and rebel groups.1160 In the course of peace negotiations in 
2011, a rebel faction revived the idea of a Hybrid Court, but the government rejected 
it out of hand as being unconstitutional.1161
However, the DDPD, signed in 2011, included a provision for a Special Court for 
Darfur (SCD) as part of a larger package on transitional justice. The agreement 
stated that the SCD “shall have jurisdiction over gross violations of human rights 
and serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Darfur, 
since February 2003.”1162 Differentiating it from the previously created SCCED 
(see text box, above), the agreement provides for UN and AU experts “selected 
in consultation with the government of Sudan” to have an observer role in the 
SCD proceedings.1163 Sudan’s justice minister issued a decree appointing a special 
prosecutor for Darfur crimes in 2011.1164 As of March 2016, it appeared that the 
special prosecutor had only pursued low-level cases and cases targeting rebels; there 
had been no prosecution of senior government or security officials.1165
Financing
The Mbeki Report provided no detail on how the Hybrid Court for Darfur should  
be financed. It emphasized, however, that its creation should not bring about  
a two-tier justice system featuring an over-resourced hybrid court amidst an  
under-resourced justice system.1166 
Oversight and Accountability
The Mbeki Report provided no detail for oversight and accountability for the 
proposed Hybrid Court. It did note that the ICC would continue to have an external 
oversight role through the principle of complementarity enshrined in the Rome 
Statute: “Should Sudan  make  genuine  efforts  to  address  the  crimes  in  Darfur,  
the judges of the  ICC  would  be  required  to  evaluate  those  steps  to  consider  
whether they meet the requirements of Article 17.”1167 
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UGANDA: INTERNATIONAL CRIMES DIVISION
Conflict Background and Political Context
In 1986, President Yoweri Museveni assumed power after a civil war against 
President Milton Obote. Museveni and Obote had been former allies, launching an 
attack in 1979 from Tanzania against the brutal dictator Idi Amin. The mass killings 
and human rights abuses during Amin’s rule from 1971 to 1979 remain largely 
unaddressed in Uganda, with the exception of two truth commissions, one appointed 
by Amin in 1974, and the second appointed by Museveni in 1986.1168 
The fledgling government of Uganda immediately confronted several armed 
conflicts with rebel groups across the country, including a group of former army 
officers and Obote supporters in northern Uganda. The Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA), led by Joseph Kony, initiated a brutal insurgency in northern Uganda in 
the late 1980s, committing atrocities against civilians in Uganda, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan. The LRA is 
now absent from Uganda, but still active in the region. In 2000, Uganda passed an 
Amnesty Act, inducing thousands of rebels from the LRA and other armed groups 
to surrender. The act has been repeatedly extended; most recently, in May 2017, the 
minister for internal affairs extended it for another two years.1169 
The development of an International Crimes Division (ICD) in Uganda traces 
back to the opening of investigations in the country by the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) in 2004. Uganda itself referred the situation to the ICC and, as of late 
2017, ICC proceedings have exclusively concerned crimes committed by the LRA 
in northern Uganda. In 2005, the ICC issued arrest warrants for five of the LRA’s 
leaders: Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Raska Lukwiya, and Dominic 
Ongwen. Lukwiya, Otti, and Odhiambo are believed to be dead,1170 while Ongwen 
was transferred to The Hague for trial in 2015. As of November 2017, only Kony 
remains at large. 
Against the backdrop of the ICC’s investigations, peace negotiations between 
Uganda and the LRA began in 2006; they led to a series of peace agreements, 
collectively known as the Juba Agreements. Although Kony refused to sign the 
final agreement on behalf of the LRA, the government nevertheless expressed its 
intention to sign and implement provisions of the accountability and reconciliation 
agreement, which had been signed in June 2007.1171 An annex to the agreement 
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outlined a variety of accountability and reconciliation measures, including the 
creation of a specialized division of the High Court (now called the ICD).1172 While 
other transitional justice measures were included in the framework agreement as 
well, the government has implemented these unevenly, if at all. As of September 
2016, a draft transitional justice policy was before the cabinet for approval.1173 
Uganda’s political situation is characterized by a strong executive, a parliament 
firmly controlled by President Museveni’s National Resistance Movement party 
(NRM), and a fractured and weak opposition movement. President Museveni 
has increasingly entrenched his grip on power, pushing through a constitutional 
amendment in 2005 that abolished presidential term limits; in 2016, he was elected 
to a fifth, five-year term in office. The national security forces and military have 
also been implicated in widespread use of torture and arbitrary detention, as well as 
serious human rights abuses committed against civilian populations during the fight 
against the LRA.1174 
Despite the tightening of political freedoms, Uganda has experienced stability and 
significant economic growth in recent years, especially since the departure of the 
LRA from northern Uganda. The country is a strong military partner of the United 
States, which has used Uganda as a staging ground for military assistance in the 
regional effort against the LRA. Joint forces made up of Ugandan, U.S., and South 
Sudanese troops have, however, recently withdrawn from the Central African 
Republic, a move the UN fears may breed further regional insecurity by the LRA.1175 
Uganda receives significant international development aid and donor funding in all 
areas, including the judicial and transitional justice sectors.  
Existing Justice-Sector Capacity
A 2008 report by the UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) on judicial independence found a generally high level of judicial 
independence, with corruption more prevalent among lower-level and magistrate 
judges, who are often politically appointed. The higher levels of the judiciary—
comprising the High Court, the Constitutional Court, Court of Appeals, and 
the Supreme Court—are generally considered impartial and independent. The 
OHCHR report found that these upper branches acted “with professionalism and 
court proceedings usually respect fair trial requirements.”1176 In recent years the 
higher courts have issued judgments cutting against the executive branch on issues 
regarding political freedoms, civil liberties, and interference in elections. There 
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have also been “instances of serious political interference in high-profile cases in 
Uganda’s higher courts, which observers say occur when Museveni has perceived 
that the proceedings affect his grip on power.”1177
In the fall of 2010, at the behest of the government, the Public International Law and 
Policy Group (PILPG) facilitated a needs-assessment of the domestic judicial sector 
in regards to war crimes prosecutions, led by independent experts. The assessment 
produced a comprehensive report and recommendations for the government of 
Uganda, covering all aspects of the ICD, including composition, rules of procedure, 
outreach structure, and fair trial rights.1178 The assessment also recommended 
improvements to the legal aid system; the development of outreach initiatives; 
building a victim and witness protection framework; and training professional court 
interpreters, among other areas.1179 
Existing Civil Society Capacity
Ugandan civil society, while hardly monolithic, is strongly engaged on issues 
of transitional justice, international criminal law, and human rights issues. In 
part, this sophistication stems from the long-standing involvement of the ICC’s 
engagement and the contentious debate that followed within Ugandan society 
about accountability and reconciliation.1180 Ugandan civil society organizations 
have worked closely with the ICD, including the Ugandan Coalition for the ICC, 
the Justice and Reconciliation Project (JRP), and the Refugee Law Project (RLP). 
However, substantive capacity gaps among civil society organizations remain,  
and their political space is increasingly constricted. The RLP and the JRP have 
been the lead Ugandan organizations monitoring the ICD’s trial of former LRA 
commander Thomas Kwoyelo and have released summaries and commentaries  
on the proceedings. 
International nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and development agencies 
also have a long-standing involvement with transitional justice and domestic judicial 
sector development in Uganda. The International Center for Transitional Justice 
(ICTJ) and Avocats Sans Frontières (ASF) maintain offices in Uganda and assist in 
civil society capacity-building and advocacy campaigns. ICTJ, ASF, and PILPG have 
also provided technical assistance, trainings, and advice to the ICD. 
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Creation
In July 2008, a War Crimes Division of the High Court of Uganda (WCD) was 
created by judicial decree of the principal judge of the High Court.1181 Official 
practice directions were later signed by the chief justice and gazetted, but not until 
May 2011.1182 Those directions changed the name of the court to the International 
Crimes Division of the High Court of Uganda, and expanded the court’s subject 
matter jurisdiction to include other international crimes such as terrorism, human 
trafficking, and piracy.1183 As a specialized division of the High Court of Uganda, 
the ICD is a fully domestic tribunal; however, it has received significant technical 
assistance from international law organizations, and funding from a coordinated 
group of donor countries. This funding has been given both directly to the court and 
indirectly through the Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS; more on JLOS below).
Legal Framework and Mandate
The 2011 practice directions, promulgated by the judiciary under the authority of 
the chief justice, prescribe the ICD’s mandate, general composition, and its rules 
of procedure. The ICD is mandated to prosecute genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, terrorism, human trafficking, piracy, and any other international 
crime defined in Uganda’s 2010 International Criminal Court Act, 1964 Geneva 
Conventions Act, Penal Code Act, or any other (domestic) criminal law.1184 
The court’s personal jurisdiction is derived from general applicable law in Uganda 
and, therefore, is not specifically limited to any category of group or individual. This 
is important to many in Uganda, who seek prosecutions of military and government 
officials for alleged human rights abuses. In public statements, judicial officials 
underscore that the court may exercise jurisdiction over military officials, but have 
also argued these cases are best handled by military tribunals, which human rights 
organizations have criticized as inadequate and flawed.1185 
The ICD was created through judicial decree, meaning that any Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence for the division cannot conflict with statutory law. Ugandan judges 
have thus approached the task of drawing up dedicated rules and procedures for the 
ICD cautiously and with deference to primary legislation, even though, as Human 
Rights Watch noted, “several aspects of Ugandan legal practice and procedure—
which pose challenges for all criminal cases in the country—are ill-suited to serious 
crimes cases.”1186 These include certain fair trial guarantees, such as defense counsel 
selection and remuneration, procedures for victim and witness protection, and 
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operational and case management procedures (which are often governed by internal 
rules at international tribunals). 
The 2011 practice directions provide that the ICD shall apply the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence applicable to criminal trials in Uganda, but left an opening for the 
application of rules and procedures developed under unwritten law. The rules state 
that “where no express provision is made under any written law, the Court shall 
adopt such other procedure as it considers to be justifiable and appropriate in all  
the circumstances, taking into account relevant provisions of Ugandan law.”1187  
On management procedures, the practice directions also provide that the ICD may 
“from time to time adopt practice directions for the better management of cases 
and for the orderly and timely disposal of cases,” thus eliminating the cumbersome 
requirement that Uganda’s chief justice approve all revisions.1188 
Special Rules of Procedure and Evidence have since been adopted to guide the 
handling of all matters and proceedings under the ICD’s jurisdiction. The rules 
have, among other things, introduced pretrial proceedings, an element of victim 
participation, general provisions on protective measures, and the award of 
reparations and compensation.
Amnesty Act of 2000
One issue that has confronted the ICD’s subject matter jurisdiction is the 
applicability of Uganda’s Amnesty Act. In September 2011, in a challenge brought 
in connection with the Kwoyelo proceedings (see Prosecutions, below), Uganda’s 
Constitutional Court upheld the constitutionality of the act, ruling that it did not 
offend Uganda’s international treaty obligations and that Kwoyelo—in having been 
denied amnesty—had been unfairly discriminated against. In April 2015, however, the 
Ugandan Supreme Court reversed the Constitutional Court’s decision, holding that 
the act only covers “crimes committed in furtherance of war or [armed] rebellion,” 
not attacks against civilian populations. The judgment specifically noted that crimes 
committed under Article 8(2)(e) of the Rome Statute and grave breaches under 
Article 147 of the Geneva Convention would not qualify under the Amnesty Act.1189 
The Amnesty Act has been renewed for another two years, starting May 25, 2017.1190 
Although there has been no amendment to the act since this Supreme Court 
decision, according to an official of the Amnesty Commission, the Directorate of 
Public Prosecutions (DPP) now works very closely with the commission to ensure 
that persons who commit serious offenses do not receive amnesty.1191
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Location
The ICD staff and judges sit in a dedicated courthouse in Kololo, an upscale 
neighborhood in Uganda’s capital city, Kampala. The ICD shares grounds with 
another specialized judicial division, the Anti-Corruption Division of the High 
Court, housed in a separate building. The ICD building has a small courtroom. 
However, the ICD, in accordance with provisions in practice directions, is allowed 
to sit where it deems necessary. Since July 2011, several preliminary hearings in 
the Kwoyelo case have been held at the High Court building in Gulu in northern 
Uganda. The main reason the ICD holds these sittings in Gulu is for better visibility 
and communication and, most importantly, the fact that affected communities have 
easier access to the court and can therefore attend the proceedings and also interact 
with the different parties working on the case.1192 
Structure and Composition
The ICD is staffed by Ugandan nationals; early suggestions to include international 
judicial staff were not pursued. ICD prosecutors, judges, investigators, and 
even judicial clerks are not dedicated staff, but maintain ongoing caseloads in 
the ordinary court system. The ICD has been significantly assisted by JLOS, a 
governmental body that coordinates justice-sector institutions and transitional 
justice policies, and channels donor input.1193 JLOS staff have been significantly 
involved with the ICD, at times undertaking core staff functions, such as outreach 
(see below). 
Chambers 
At least three High Court judges must sit on the ICD.1194 There is no formal 
requirement for experience in international criminal law (or the northern Uganda 
conflict). The head judge of the ICD, along with the registrar, is responsible for 
overall court administration. At the moment, three permanent judges handle cases 
at the ICD. The judges are supported by legal assistants who are recruited on a 
contract basis1195 and also assist the judges with their High Court criminal dockets. 
These legal assistants often participate in various capacity-building and advocacy 
events organized by local and international organizations on international crimes. 
Occasionally, the ICD also recruits volunteers and interns from universities to 
support its work.1196
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Prosecutors and Investigators 
As of August 2017, about 10 prosecutors have been assigned to handle cases before 
the ICD. Five prosecutors (who do not ordinarily prosecute the types of crimes 
falling under the ICD) have been assigned to the ICD on special duty to handle the 
Kwoyelo case. These form the War Crimes Prosecutions Unit (WCPU), a specialized 
unit of the DPP, which is responsible for bringing cases before the ICD. In the 
WCPU, a senior DPP attorney supervises up to five prosecutors trying cases before 
the ICD. Given that cases involving war crimes are infrequent, these prosecutors 
also maintain a docket before the ordinary criminal courts.1197 
The DPP/WCPU works closely with the War Crimes Investigation Unit, led by 
a senior police officer and deputy assisted by investigators from the police and 
the Criminal Investigations Directorate (CID). This unit plays an active role in 
investigating the cases brought before the ICD by the DPP and also participates in 
any JLOS/ICD-organized outreach events on the Kwoyelo case. The investigators 
maintain a high level of communication and coordination between the DPP and the 
CID. In assigning members to both the prosecution and investigations teams, gender 
is a serious consideration, particularly because female prosecutors and investigators 
are perceived to be better placed to interrogate witnesses on issues related to sexual 
and gender-based crimes.1198 
Defense 
Defendants in Ugandan courts have the right to appoint their own counsel, or to 
receive state-appointed counsel under the “state brief ” system, which is severely 
underfunded.1199 The ICD initially proposed that any privately retained counsel must 
be selected from a list of competent counsel maintained by the ICD, although this 
rule is not in effect, and the practice directions are silent on the selection of defense 
counsel.1200 Thomas Kwoyelo’s current legal team is constituted by four lawyers (two 
lawyers on state brief and two privately appointed by Kwoyelo himself.)
 
Some of the challenges faced by the legal team include threats, a lack of funds to 
maintain guards, and the court’s failure to provide the team with funds to investigate, 
gather, and present witnesses and evidence for the accused as provided for by law.1201  
Victim Participation
Although the new ICD Rules of Procedure and Evidence recognize the role and 
participation of victims, the text did not provide clear information on how this 
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will work in reality.1202 This clarity was only provided in September 2016 when the 
ICD ruled in the Kwoyelo case that victims would be allowed to participate in the 
trial in a manner similar to how victims participate under the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence at the ICC.1203 The ICD directed victims to apply formally to the ICD 
registrar for participation and that each application could be considered on its 
own merit. The ICD also ruled that victims’ lawyers could provide evidence to the 
prosecution and the defense, but the manner and extent of participation at different 
stages of the trial would be subject to determination by the Trial Chamber. This 
departs from the practice in ordinary courts in Uganda, which only allows victims to 
participate at the sentencing stage of a criminal trial. 
Registry 
The registrar manages “day to day operations of the Division.”1204 In some matters, 
such as case management, personnel issues, and budgeting, the ICD registrar carries 
the same duties as registrars at ad hoc tribunals. 
The registrar is also in charge of organizing outreach activities and, with the 
introduction of victim participation under the new Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, is also tasked with undertaking a victim’s mapping in coordination 
with the prosecution team, coordinating with NGOs that can link the court to 
victim representatives and also recruiting victims’ counsel.1205 As per the Pre-
trial Chamber’s September 2016 ruling, the ICD Registry is also responsible for 
determining the status of each victim that applies to participate in a trial.1206 This will 
determine who participates in proceedings and eventually be entitled to reparations. 
It is, however, important to note that the ICD faces a serious human resource gap, 
and therefore, carrying out some of these tasks maybe an uphill challenge.1207
At the reparations’ stage of the case, it is envisaged that the registrar will also take 
on the additional role of preparing a victim’s index and implementing the court’s 
reparation order.1208 
Since its creation, the ICD has had five registrars. Early in its establishment, high 
turnover in ICD registrars—three between 2008 and 2011—caused a lack of long-
term planning and poor coordination of support staff and legal assistants. Registrars 
rotated into the ICD and required training on international law and practice, and 
then were transferred to another court. Frequent rotation of core staff is common in 
Ugandan courts. The ICD registrars were often granted more time at the ICD than 
at a normal post. Additionally, the ICD’s development coincided with an aggressive 
national plan to reduce case backlogs, and ICD registrars were seen to be more 
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useful elsewhere, especially as the ICD effectively only had one case. Nonetheless, 
the high turnover in registrars caused donors to be skeptical about funding trainings 
for ICD staff without assurances that those skills would stay within the ICD. 
However the high turnover challenge is not only limited to the position of registrar 
but cuts across the ICD. The decision to transfer staff is at the discretion of the 
Judicial Service Commission and therefore the ICD is not in a position to exercise 
any control over the location of its staff.1209 Such transfers are seen as an opportunity 
to curb corruption within the judiciary since any individual does not spend a long 
period of time at the same duty station.1210
Outreach
The practice and concept of “outreach” is relatively new to the Ugandan judiciary. 
No firm outreach unit or structure was in place by the opening of the Kwoyelo trial 
in July 2011. Ultimately, the ICD registrar and JLOS transitional justice officers 
undertook outreach activities. These officers conducted community meetings 
and disseminated informational materials in Kampala and northern Uganda. 
Certain outreach activities during the preliminary hearings were well executed and 
represented a significant advancement within the domestic judicial sector. The 
July 2011 court proceedings and several subsequent proceedings have been held 
in Gulu, allowing many of the affected population in northern Uganda (including 
Kwoyelo’s family) to attend. Approximately 100 members of the public attended the 
very first Kwoyelo proceeding in the courtroom, and an additional 100–150 viewed 
the proceeding outside the courthouse.1211 It has now become common practice to 
fully equip the courtroom with court recording equipment and also provide for an 
overflow courtroom with video link for people outside the court to watch what is 
happening in the main courtroom.1212 This is however not unique to the ICD; it has 
been applied in other select High Courts across the country.1213 
Interpreters
Uganda’s judicial system has no formal interpretation program, although specialized 
trainings were held in mid-2011 for judicial interpreters and translators (in part, 
these trainings were held to fill the need at the ICD, although the trainings benefited 
the broader judicial system as well).
Interpreters have been available at each stage of the Kwoyelo trial. The court, 
however, relies on its own staff to assist with this role.1214 These are usually court 
clerks who work with the judges. This is done because of the need to ensure the 
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accuracy of any information shared.1215 The judiciary needs to rely on people who 
are exposed to everyday court work, court language, and court procedures.1216 In the 
event that no court staff can provide interpretation, the court then relies on someone 
from the police, and thereafter, prisons.1217 
Assessors
Under Ugandan criminal procedure, all trials before divisions of the High Court 
must include two or more citizen “assessors,” appointed by the court1218 and subject 
to limited voir dire. The duty to select assessors lies with the registrar who then 
shares their names with the trial parties. 
At the conclusion of a criminal trial, assessors are required to state their opinion of 
the case, although these opinions are not binding on the judges. However, judges 
must state their reasons for departing from the opinion of the assessors. Assessors 
are a holdover from the British colonial era: they functioned to relay local customs 
and procedures to the court as a form of Common Law. This colonial legacy may 
explain why assessors cannot be members of professional classes (lawyers, military 
officers, police, or doctors).1219 Despite the origins and the nonbinding role of the 
position, assessors are seen as a useful means to build citizen involvement with the 
ICD. During the ICD Kwoyelo hearings in Gulu in July 2011, the judges, prosecutor, 
and defense attorneys selected three assessors, all from northern Uganda, through  
a voir dire process.1220 
Prosecutions
The ICD is currently prosecuting a number of cases, including the one against 
Thomas Kwoyelo. Other cases currently being prosecuted before the court concern 
terrorism and human trafficking charges.1221 In the near future, the DPP intends 
to bring other cases, including one against Caesar Achellam, a former LRA 
commander1222 and another concerning trafficking of ivory.1223 
On May 26, 2016, the court found guilty eight of 13 individuals accused of having 
masterminded the July 2010 Kampala bombings;1224 the court sentenced five of these 
to life imprisonment.1225
A case involving the trafficking of Ugandan women to Iraq was initially brought 
before the ICD as well, but was subsequently transferred to another court.1226 The 
ICD prosecutors have not fully developed an overall war crimes prosecutions 
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strategy. In part, this may reflect the uncertain legal context of war crimes cases in 
Uganda, and the small number of cases envisioned by the ICD prosecutors.
The Case against Thomas Kwoyelo
The DPP charged Kwoyelo with 12 counts of violations of the Geneva Conventions 
Act and 53 alternate counts of ordinary crimes, including murder and robbery, under 
Uganda’s Penal Code Act.1227 In March 2017, the ICD approved an amended version 
of Kwoyelo’s indictment,1228 which charged him with 93 counts of crimes,  
59 of which are covered under customary international law. The remaining  
34 charges fell under the Geneva Conventions Act or the Penal Code Act. Several 
sexual violence charges have also been included in the indictment. The acts were 
allegedly committed between 1993 and 2005 in northern Uganda. The case is the 
first war crimes prosecution in Uganda and the first prosecution of a former LRA 
member in any jurisdiction. 
Legacy
International assistance to the ICD can be seen to have strengthened the overall 
domestic judicial sector. Many reform initiatives were already being addressed as 
part of broader justice-sector assistance by donor countries, but the needs of the 
ICD lent urgency and a specific vehicle to drive implementation. For example, a 
long-standing plan to train professional judicial interpreters and translators was 
realized just before the first hearings in the Kwoyelo case. The Kwoyelo court 
proceedings have featured overflow seating, outdoor screens, microphones, 
mounted cameras, and recording devices. International organizations’ attention to 
the ICD also contributed in less tangible ways to a shift in attitudes among Ugandan 
legal professionals toward more transparency and a view that public engagement 
was part and parcel of their work, as well as familiarization with the norms and 
practice of international criminal law. 
The Kwoyelo Constitutional Court reference has clarified the legal position on 
amnesties in Uganda. The court clarified that persons who commit grave crimes 
are not entitled to amnesty.1229 This has settled the national debate on amnesties 
and prosecutions. The Kwoyelo case has also pushed national reflection on the 
enactment of a witness protection bill, which is currently before the Ministry of 
Justice and Constitutional Affairs as well as the planned review of other criminal 
legislation, such as the Evidence Act, Trial on Indictments Act, and others.1230
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Financing
For the 2016–2017 fiscal year, the Judiciary received Shs116.55 billion for recurrent 
and capital expenditure.1231 This compares favorably to Shs93.2 billion received in 
2015–2016; Shs83.06 billion for 2014–2015; and Shs84.493 billion for 2013–2014.1232
The justice system in Uganda relies heavily on donor support. JLOS, which is 
tasked with supporting the ICD’s work, has a consortium of countries and agencies 
that provide financial support for its work, and these include Austria, Denmark, 
Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UNDP, OHCHR, UNICEF, 
ICRC, UNWOMEN, UNFPA, and USAID.1233 The United Kingdom and the European 
Union Delegation participate as noncontributing members.1234
In 2009–2010, donors provided around US$41.5 million in sector budget support. 
In late 2011, the donor group underwent a significant reorganization into the 
“Democratic Governance Facility” (DGF), formed by Austria, Denmark, the 
European Union Delegation, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom. Most, but not all, of the DGF members provide sector budget 
support, and some countries in the donor group have switched to sector support 
because of accountability concerns.1235 In addition to direct support for the ICD, 
PILPG, ICTJ, OHCHR, and donor groups have facilitated numerous trainings 
and study trips for ICD judges, prosecutors, investigators, defense attorneys, and 
Registry staff on war crimes law and practice issues, outreach, victim and witness 
protection, and Registry management. PILPG also facilitated an expert workshop on 
international criminal law and amnesties for the judges of the Supreme Court, prior 
to its ruling on the constitutionality of the Amnesty Act. Although early trainings 
and study trips to international criminal tribunals were more generalized, later 
assistance has been increasingly specialized and targeted to specific capacity gaps 
within the ICD.1236 
Although national NGOs have not provided funding to the court, they have 
supported the work of the ICD by linking it to victim communities, organizing 
advocacy events concerning the work of the court, and also providing 
recommendations on issues such as the development of effective ICD outreach 
strategies and the transitional justice policy more broadly. 
Despite significant technical assistance from international NGOs and the 
coordination of justice-sector development among foreign donors, the development 
of the ICD has suffered from a lack of coordination within the overall justice-sector 
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framework and a lack of formalized linkages with other transitional justice 
mechanisms (such as the Amnesty Commission). This highlights the need for any 
domestic prosecutions framework for serious crimes to receive political priority 
from domestic and international actors, in addition to technical assistance. The 
ICD, however, also had some drawbacks on the overall justice sector; for such 
a small court with a small caseload, it consumed an outsized share of available 
time, resources, and funding. The challenge to both domestic and international 
professionals in Uganda remains in ensuring that the resources allocated to the ICD 
have a broader effect on the overall judiciary, when possible. 
Oversight and Accountability
Parties aggrieved by a decision of the ICD can appeal to the Court of Appeal.1237 
The power to appoint judges to the High Court, including specialized divisions 
such as the ICD, lies with the president, who is advised by the Judicial Service 
Commission.1238 According to the Ugandan Constitution, a judicial officer may 
only be removed from office for inability to perform the functions of his or her 
office arising from infirmity of body or mind, misbehavior or misconduct, or 
incompetence.1239 Due process is followed prior to making the decision to remove 
a judge from office.1240 In the course of executing their duties, judicial officers are 
guided by the Judicial Code of Conduct.1241 
Prosecutors are assigned to particular divisions by the DPP, who is the head of office. 
The DPP will therefore determine the assignment and transfer of any prosecutor 
stationed at the ICD. The same applies to investigators and police officers assigned 
to the ICD; their placement and redeployment will be determined by the Inspector 
General of Police.1242 A Disciplinary Code of Conduct highlighting the circumstances 
under which a police officer may be penalized for indiscipline and other infractions 
is annexed to the Police Act of Uganda.1243
Court staff appointed by the Public Service are subject to the Public Service Code 
of Conduct and Ethics, which lays down their duties and responsibilities.1244 Some 
of the sanctions listed therein for misconduct include a warning or reprimand; 
suspension of increment; withholding or deferment of increment; stoppage of 
increment; surcharge or refund; making good of the loss or damage of public 
property/assets; interdiction from duty with half pay; reduction in rank; removal 
from the Public Service in public interest; and dismissal.1245
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Court Users’ Committees
The ICD practice directions establish a “court users’ committee,” an institution 
peculiar to Uganda’s judicial system and present in other specialized courts in 
Uganda. The committee is meant to act as an “advisory body” to the ICD.1246  
It is comprised of the president of the Uganda Law Society (the defense bar), ICD 
judges and registrar, and representatives from the offices of the police, attorney 
general, public prosecutions, and criminal investigations. Up to seven members of 
the public are appointed to the committee for three-year terms by the principal  
judge of the High Court and the head judge of the ICD. (At least three of these must 
be women.) This committee has, however, not met this stipulation to date, due to  
a lack of funding.1247 
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ANNEX 2: MECHANISM IN THE AMERICAS
ARGENTINA 
Conflict Background and Political Context
In 1976, a military junta deposed President Isabel Perón, beginning a military 
dictatorship that lasted until 1983. The collapse of the economy, coupled with 
Argentina’s military defeat by Great Britain in the Malvinas-Falklands War, led to 
democratic elections in 1983. During its rule, the military junta engaged in enforced 
disappearances, widespread killings, systematic torture, and abductions by death 
squads. These crimes were perpetrated within the larger context of Operación 
Cóndor, a coordinated effort implemented by the right-wing dictatorships of 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay to combat alleged terrorists 
and subversives.
 
In the name of rooting out left-wing ideology among opposition groups, the military 
often gave abducted children, as well as children born to imprisoned women, to 
families with links to the military or security forces to raise as their own. The regime 
operated over 300 secret detention centers throughout the country; thousands of the 
disappeared have never been fully accounted for. A truth commission, the Comisión 
Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas (CONADEP) investigated the atrocities 
committed between 1976 and 1983 during the military junta. In its report Nunca Más, 
it stated there were 8,960 reported disappearances but estimated the real numbers 
to be around 10,000 to 30,000 cases, attributing underreporting to fear of reprisal.1248
Existing Justice-Sector Capacity
Argentina has a well-developed judicial system. At the federal level, it traditionally 
had an inquisitorial system of criminal prosecution. A 1991 reform introduced a 
mixed system, which combined an initial inquisitorial phase (in writing and before 
an investigating judge) followed by a trial phase (before an oral tribunal).1249  
In 2014, Argentina introduced a new fully accusatorial system,1250 whose 
implementation has been gradual. Most of the crimes against humanity cases have 
followed the 1991 procedure.
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Argentina fully relied on its existing justice-sector capacity to undertake crimes 
against humanity cases. However, the judicial system did not have experience 
investigating and prosecuting mass atrocities. For example, judicial operators and 
the system as a whole did not have experience in grouping multiple incidents for 
joint prosecution.
In addition, there is no prioritization of criminal prosecutions according to the Argentine 
legal tradition. Any attempt to select or prioritize cases would not have been well 
received by human rights activists and victims’ associations who backed the cases. 
However, a strict application of the principle according to which all cases must be 
prosecuted (ejercicio obligatorio de la acción penal) has led to overlaps and a big backlog.
Existing Civil Society Capacity
As early as 1977, civil society began reacting against the military dictatorship. 
Argentinian mothers trying to find their missing children formed the Asociación 
Madres de Plaza de Mayo (Mothers of Plaza de Mayo). These women, who have 
used public marches to bring attention to disappearances, outlasted the military 
dictatorship despite brutal suppression tactics. Another group, the Asociación Civil 
Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo (Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo), was formed to track 
down illegally adopted children, and their efforts have seen the prosecution of 
kidnappers and complicit adoptive parents.1251 
The Argentine nongovernmental organization Center for Legal and Social Studies 
(CELS) was created in 1979 and became active in the last years of the military 
dictatorship. Its goals of preserving memory, seeking prosecution, and increasing 
public awareness of the human rights violations committed in Argentina aligned 
with those of Mothers and Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo. Both actively pushed for 
accountability and devoted resources to providing evidence. CELS was instrumental 
in the effort against the Full Stop (Punto Final) and Due Obedience (Obediencia 
Debida) laws, which were intended to shield junta members from criminal 
accountability, filing lawsuits that would help find them unconstitutional.1252
The violence in Argentina and reaction against it led to a paradigm shift within 
local human rights that carried through to seeking justice against the military 
governments (juntas) and had an international impact. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
international human rights organizations were concerned with immediate physical 
harm or rectifying imprisonment, influenced by the UN’s division of rights between, 
on the one hand, the civil and political and, on the other, the economic, social, and 
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cultural spheres. Argentine organizations such as the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo felt 
that scope had to broaden to include truth, justice, and accountability. The rallying 
cry, jucio y castigo a todos los culpables, or “justice and punishment for all those 
culpable,” led to trials of junta members, and in the early 2000s, overturned the 
amnesty laws that thwarted accountability.1253
Creation
Argentina did not create a separate structure to prosecute crimes committed during 
the 1976–1983 military dictatorship. Instead it used its existing judicial structure. 
The road to justice took over 30 years, partly due to the initial instability of the 
democratic governments that followed the military dictatorship and partly due to 
a series of legal measures (e.g., the amnesty laws) that were adopted in the early 
days of democracy that took a long time to overturn. Persistent advocacy by victims, 
victims’ associations, and human rights activists played a central role in making the 
trials possible.
After the fall of the military dictatorship in 1983, the democratic government 
proved unable to sustain prosecutions of crimes committed by the military junta.1254 
However, important prosecutions did take place, complemented by an innovative 
truth commission.
Three days after his inauguration, President Raúl Alfonsín issued a decree ordering 
the prosecution of nine top officials of the three juntas that governed the country 
between 1976 and 1983. The decree ordered trial for the crimes of murder, illegal 
detention, and ill-treatment.1255 The trial began in the Consejo Supremo Militar, 
the military court, with provisions that, should it fail to come to a verdict within 
six months, either prosecution or defense could appeal to the Cámara Federal. 
The Cámara, a civilian court, could then either grant an extension or decide to 
try the case de novo. The military court found that all orders issued by the junta 
leaders were unobjectionable, so they could only be tried for their failure to 
control their subordinates. The Cámara subsequently took over the case and a 
landmark trial against key junta officials began 18 months after the fall of the 
regime. The “Trial of the Juntas” received intense national attention, and over 800 
witnesses were presented.1256 The defendants were charged with “various crimes, 
including torture, illegal detention, robbery, and murder, but not genocide or 
crimes against humanity.”1257 Nine members of the military juntas were convicted 
of gross violations of human rights in 1985.1258 Evidence for the prosecutions was 
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drawn in part from the investigations of a national truth commission, CONADEP, 
a quasijudicial body that was required to refer cases with sufficient judicial 
information to the courts for prosecution.1259 
These early prosecutions provoked several military uprisings against President 
Alfonsín’s democratic government. In 1986, Alfonsín issued a law imposing a 
deadline for bringing charges against military officers, known as the Full Stop 
law.1260 In 1987, the president issued an amnesty, known as the Due Obedience law 
because it was “founded on the premise that personnel of the lower ranks were 
following orders” and therefore immune from prosecution.1261 In 1989, the military 
leaders convicted in the Trial of the Juntas received presidential pardons from 
President Carlos Menem, “under the alleged need of pacification.”1262 
Throughout this turn away from accountability beginning in the mid-1980s, 
Argentinian human rights activists, jurists, and civil society organizations 
became increasingly sophisticated and coordinated at the national, regional, and 
international levels. When domestic politics stymied their efforts for accountability, 
they turned outward and brought actions before the Inter-American Commission of 
Human Rights (IACHR), which ruled in 1992 that the impunity laws and presidential 
pardons violated the American Convention on Human Rights.1263 The ruling 
prompted Argentina’s Congress to grant victims the right to reparations, leading to 
thousands of petitions in the early 1990s.1264 In 1996, victims filed cases in Spanish 
courts under universal jurisdiction, leading to arrest warrants and extradition 
requests.1265 (In 2012, Argentinian human rights lawyers reversed the roles and 
brought lawsuits in Argentinian courts, under universal jurisdiction laws, for crimes 
committed in Spain during the civil war and the 1939–1975 Franco dictatorship).1266 
Argentine rights groups also brought domestic actions in the 1990s regarding the 
military regime’s abduction of children of imprisoned mothers1267 and increasingly 
also directly challenged the Due Obedience and Full Stop laws. Argentinian federal 
courts conducted “truth trials” throughout the early 1990s, a “judicially created 
procedure to obtain official information about the fate of victims before criminal 
courts in the absence of the legal possibility to impose criminal sanctions.”1268 
Legal Framework and Mandate
 
The development of international legal norms during this period, through regional 
human rights mechanisms and universal jurisdiction, “played an important 
role in enabling [Argentina] to overcome otherwise insurmountable barriers to 
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prosecution.”1269 These efforts at the regional and domestic level slowly bore fruit. 
A lower federal court ruled in 2001 in the Simon case that the Full Stop and Due 
Obedience laws were unconstitutional.1270 Congress annulled both laws in 2003.1271 
In 2005, federal judges struck down pardons issued by President Menem in 1989–
1990 as unconstitutional, a decision upheld by the Appellate and Supreme Court in 
2006 and 2007.1272 The Supreme Court also upheld the Simon case in 2005, opening 
the door for the most recent wave of prosecutions, including some annulled cases 
that have been reactivated. In 2004, the Supreme Court, citing jurisprudence of the 
AICHR on the state’s responsibility to prosecute and punish serious human rights 
violations, ruled that the statute of limitations was inapplicable to crimes against 
humanity cases.1273
Political developments in the country also had an impact on enabling prosecutions. 
In 2003, Néstor Kirchner was elected president of Argentina and ruled from 2003 
to 2007. His wife, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, succeeded him and was the 
president between 2007 and 2015 (Néstor Kirchner died in 2010). The Kirchners 
actively promoted prosecution of crimes committed during the military dictatorship, 
as part of their progressive human rights policy.1274 Since President Mauricio Macri 
took over the presidency in late 2015, he has been criticized for not providing such 
significant political support to the cases.1275
Location
Federal District and Appellate Courts across Argentina have heard grave crimes cases. 
Structure and Composition
According to Argentina’s Constitution, the judiciary is composed of the Supreme 
Court and such other lower tribunals as established by law.1276 The Supreme Court is 
composed of five judges appointed by the president.1277 Other tribunals established 
by national law are “federal tribunals” and they have jurisdiction over matters 
concerning the constitution, federal laws, international law, relationships with other 
countries, and disputes between provinces.1278 In addition to the federal tribunals, 
provinces can establish other (called “ordinary”) tribunals. The crimes against 
humanity cases fall under federal jurisdiction.
Since the higher court decisions between 2005 and 2007 paved the way for 
prosecutions, serious crimes have been prosecuted in ordinary criminal courts, 
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with support from specialized units created within the Attorney General’s Office. 
Those included a unit for assistance on cases concerning human rights violations 
committed during the military dictatorship (created in 2004) and a unit for 
coordination and follow-up on human rights violation cases (created in 2007). The 
latter worked with federal prosecutors to “analyze strategic problems, propose 
general guidelines for advancing the cases and to ensure that links in connected 
cases are made”1279 and was upgraded to a procuradoría (Procuradoría de Crímenes de 
Lesa Humanidad) in 2013.1280 In addition, a special unit on child kidnapping (Unidad 
especializada para casos de apropiación de niños durante el terrorismo de Estado) was 
created in 2012.1281 The Supreme Court established a “superintendence unit”1282 and a 
commission to “coordinate policies with the other branches of government.”1283
No specialized chamber has been granted jurisdiction over the prosecution of 
crimes during the military dictatorship; rather, the cases can be heard by any of 
Argentina’s federal District or Appellate Courts.1284 However, a specific federal court, 
the Federal Oral Criminal Tribunal No. 1 for La Plata, “has jurisdiction over a large 
number of … cases because the military juntas conducted a disproportionate amount 
of their repressive activities in its [territorial] jurisdiction.”1285 This tribunal has 
conducted many of the proceedings and has played a significant role in developing 
atrocity crimes jurisprudence in Argentina, through specific cases discussed in the 
Prosecutions section, below. Cases have also been brought before tribunals in Mar del 
Plata (Buenos Aires), Rosario (Santa Fé), Paraná (Entre Ríos), Córdoba (Córdoba), 
and Tucumán (Tucumán), among other jurisdictions.1286
Granting general jurisdiction to ordinary courts, rather than forming a specialized 
tribunal or even a dedicated domestic chamber along the lines of, for example, the 
Bosnian War Crimes Chamber, has inevitably led to delays. The Argentine judiciary 
must keep up with advances on crimes against humanity cases from 1976 to 1983 at 
the same time as it carries out its functions with respect to any other cases within 
its jurisdiction. The dictatorship crimes caseload has outstripped the capacity of the 
judicial system, as a prosecutor within the specialized unit noted: 
The justice process currently underway … is very ambitious … to 
prosecute an enormous quantity of crimes committed throughout 
the country. … Furthermore, this is occurring in the same courts 
responsible for investigating other types of crimes. Argentina chose 
not to create special tribunals to judge these types of crimes, which 
has been important because it grants these trials unquestionable 
legitimacy; special tribunals can always be suspected of bias. But this 
also presupposes the additional difficulty of involving a large number of 
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legal figures in trials taking place all over the country; managing that is 
no simple task.1287 
Argentina’s legal system permits limited participation by autonomous victim-
plaintiffs, or querellantes. This has allowed Argentine human rights organizations, 
as querellante lawyers, to push for the charges to be characterized as grave crimes, 
rather than ordinary crimes under the criminal code.1288 Querellantes are represented 
by their own attorneys and may intervene in proceedings1289 to “present their own 
witnesses, make motions, and cross-examine any witnesses presented by the defense.”1290
Prosecutions
A large number of cases and prosecutions have been brought before Argentine 
courts, although human rights and victims’ organizations decry the slowness of the 
proceedings. In March 2017, the Procuradoría de Crímenes de Lesa Humanidad 
stated that 593 files had been opened for crimes committed during the military 
dictatorship: 175 (29%) had reached a judgment, 16 (3%) were at the trial phase, 
118 (20%) had been committed to trial, and 284 (48%) were at the investigation 
phase.1291 The same report informs that those cases concern 2,780 defendants, of 
whom 750 (27%) have been convicted and 77 (3%) acquitted. As of March 2017, 411 
(14.5%) had been charged and 794 (28%) were facing trial.1292 
Some argue that the prosecutorial strategy was articulated early on as seeking to 
“achieve the highest number of ‘significant trials’ in the shortest period of time 
possible.”1293 However, initial cases focused on specific incidents and perpetrators, 
and lacked a comprehensive approach to prosecution of mass atrocities, which has 
been one of the reasons for a significant caseload and delays.1294
Other reasons for delays included slow proceedings before Appeals and Cassation 
Courts, a problem which congress sought to address through a legal reform.1295 The 
nature of the criminal proceedings in Argentina also explains slow progress on cases: 
a slow and extremely formal investigation process providing plenty of opportunities 
for delaying tactics.1296 Finally, some have pointed to a shortage of judicial and 
prosecution staff possessing the specific expertise needed to deal with crimes 
against humanity cases.1297
In 2012, the head of the specialized prosecutions unit indicated that prosecutions 
would also proceed by grouping incidents at detention centers: 
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Our basic goal at the Attorney General’s Unit is to concentrate the 
investigations by common denominators. For example, all the acts 
committed in the same detention center would be investigated in a 
single inquiry, and this inquiry would produce one trial. This method 
obviously has its strengths and weaknesses, and these trials showcase 
the best and the worst of the justice system.1298
More recently, cases for crimes committed in the same detention center have been 
grouped into megacausas (mega-cases).
In a document with instructions to prosecutors, the Procuradoría de Crímenes de 
Lesa Humanidad acknowledged a need to prioritize cases. In doing so, it recognized 
that the law might not favor any type of prioritization but that establishing priorities 
is necessary in practice, considering the huge number of facts and perpetrators 
and the broad temporal and geographical span. It also recalled that many of the 
defendants are aging and that some have died before cases reached a judgment. 
Initial lack of guidance in this respect led to some accused, who have been tried 
several times and sentenced to the maximum penalty, continuing to face other 
prosecutions, while other alleged perpetrators have not been investigated. Mindful 
of the need to maximize available resources, the Procuradoría offered some basic 
“rational criteria” to prioritize cases, namely: to prioritize cases against accused 
who have not been convicted, or who were not convicted to the maximum penalty; 
or against elderly accused who have not yet been tried; or relating to victims who 
have not yet accessed justice for the crimes they suffered (the Procuradoría keeps 
a registry of victims whose cases have been heard, which can be accessed by 
prosecutors for reference).1299
The convictions in 2006–2007 for crimes against humanity against police official 
Miguel Etchecolatz and priest Christian Von Wernich established important judicial 
precedents for the prosecution of other “Dirty War” criminals. The court stated in 
dicta that “these crimes were ‘committed in the context of genocide,’” but did not 
answer whether the Dirty War was in fact genocide.1300 The judgments marked “a 
beginning of a shift in Argentine courts toward greater reliance on international law 
in prosecuting Dirty War crimes.”1301 However, most of the judgments considered 
that the crimes were crimes against humanity, not genocide. Argentina did not have 
a provision covering crimes against humanity in its Criminal Code at the time of the 
commission of the crimes.1302 The courts, therefore, tried the accused for ordinary 
crimes (kidnapping, torture, and murder) and relied on customary international 
law1303 to establish that those had been committed as crimes against humanity.1304 
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Prosecutors have steadily expanded their scope to target not only military officers, 
but “civilians who contributed in diverse ways to the crimes, including priests, 
judges, and former ministers.”1305 In March 2011, a federal court sentenced an army 
general to life imprisonment in the first case against participants in Operación 
Cóndor, suggesting a broader direction for prosecutions.1306 In 2015, CELS presented 
a report on corporate responsibility for crimes committed during the military 
dictatorship.1307 To date, there have been no prosecutions against corporate actors.1308
Crimes committed at a clandestine detention and torture center operating at 
the Navy Mechanics School (ESMA) received intense attention in Argentina and 
abroad.1309 The ESMA mega-cases concern 12 investigations, which have been 
committed to trial in four parts. In November 2011, in the second ESMA case, a 
federal court convicted 16 of the officers of crimes against humanity after a two-
year trial that included testimony from over 150 witnesses.1310 Another prominent 
complex investigation involved crimes committed in Campo de Mayo,1311 a military 
area 30km outside Buenos Aires that hosted the largest clandestine detention center. 
That investigation has been committed to trial in five parts.1312
An April 2010 conviction of former military president General Reynaldo Bignone 
for kidnapping and torture stands as one of the highest-profile cases against 
top leadership of the military juntas.1313 Bignone has also been tried in other 
cases, including a significant one concerning Operación Cóndor, resulting in 
convictions.1314 Jorge Rafael Videla, another top military commander and former 
president, was one of the co-accused in the same case, but he died before the case 
was completed. Videla had been convicted in other cases, including for systematic 
kidnapping of babies and children.1315
Matters related to fair trials and balancing the rights of the accused against the 
gravity of the crimes have also attracted significant attention. One such matter 
has been the right of the accused to home detention or home imprisonment due 
to advanced age or illness. Considering the time elapsed since the crimes were 
committed and age of the accused, the matter has given rise to a significant 
number of requests and reviews, including before the Supreme Court. The court 
has balanced two opposing arguments: the exceptional nature of crimes against 
humanity and nonapplicability of benefits afforded to those accused of ordinary 
crimes as opposed to equality before the law and humanitarian considerations 
for accused persons whose health conditions may deteriorate significantly if 
imprisoned. Some judgments have also considered the accused persons’ capacity 
to exert pressure on others despite their advanced age and the state’s international 
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obligations to ensure investigation, trial, and punishment of those accused of crimes 
against humanity and human rights violations.1316
In addition, there has been debate around the application of an old law that allowed 
convicted persons to have the time spent in pretrial detention count double for the 
purpose of sentence execution.1317 This so-called “2-for-1” law had been passed 
in 1994 and was repealed in 2001. But in 2017, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
benefit was applicable to an individual who had been in detention since 2007 on 
grounds of application of the law most favorable to the defendant and equality 
before the law (no specific exception had been established in law for those convicted 
of crimes against humanity).1318 The judgment brought society into turmoil, as it 
potentially opened the door for hundreds of convicted persons to apply to have 
their sentence significantly shortened, a benefit that some considered equal to a 
“virtual amnesty.”1319 In the days following the judgment, activists and human rights 
organizations issued statements condemning application of the 2-for-1 benefit to 
those convicted of the most serious crimes.1320 Hundreds of thousands of Argentines 
demonstrated against the judgment.1321 After just two days of debates and only nine 
days after the judgment, congress almost unanimously passed a bill that barred 
application of the 2-for-1 benefit in any other grave crimes case.1322
Legacy
Some observers have criticized Argentina’s court system for delays in processing 
the burgeoning atrocity crime caseload.1323 In part, delays reflect a judicial under-
capacity to handle the sheer number of cases, including, for example, a lack of 
courtrooms in Buenos Aires.1324 While policymakers have taken measures to address 
delays and backlogs, problems persist due to the sheer number of crimes, victims, 
and perpetrators. In some respects, courts are racing against time to complete 
investigations.1325 As of March 2017, over 450 people accused of crimes committed 
during the dictatorship had died before being brought to justice.1326 Argentina can 
be commended for having handled cases through its existing judiciary mechanisms 
and without creating a separate structure, although it would have been important to 
consider establishing prioritization guidelines from an early stage. Some have also 
raised concerns about gaps in witness protection and security, noting, for example, 
the disappearance of a former torture victim before the final days of a trial.1327 
Victims’ and advocates’ persistence in their quest for justice made the trials possible. 
The Mothers and Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo played a central role, and their 
360   OPTIONS FOR JUSTICE
legacy extends beyond Argentina. They are known and respected worldwide, and 
their actions have inspired movements in other parts of the globe. In addition, the 
Mothers of Plaza de Mayo association has been active on human rights issues other 
than those related to crimes committed during the military dictatorship.
Committed to find their grandchildren, the Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo 
contributed to the creation of a National Genetic Data Bank in 1987. They have 
conducted impressive outreach campaigns to sensitize those who were abducted 
and given to other families. Victims abducted at such a young age may have been 
oblivious to their family background for several decades, as they grew up with  
a false identity. To date, more than 120 cases of stolen children have been resolved—
most through DNA tests via the Genetic Bank—but several hundred remain 
unaccounted for.1328 
Finally, CONADEP, the truth commission established very shortly after the military 
dictatorship, was one of the first of its kind. In addition to collecting and recording 
evidence used in trials 30 years later,1329 and which might have otherwise been lost, 
it served as a reference for other truth commissions created in Latin America and 
around the world.
Financing
Given the lack of a specific discrete structure, resources for the crimes against 
humanity cases were provided along with the other resources for the judiciary in 
the public sector budget. The material and human resources assigned to the cases 
have been insufficient to process a very large number of cases in a timely manner, as 
shown by delays and backlogs. Both the Attorney General’s Office and the Supreme 
Court took targeted measures to address some of the structural shortcomings, 
including creation of specialized units, appointment of judicial officials and limited 
expansion in the number of staff. Other limitations included insufficient courtroom 
availability and limited digitalization of proceedings.1330
Donor funding has enabled civil society groups’ involvement in the cases, including 
their provision of support and legal representation to victims, as well as in 
monitoring and advocacy.
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Oversight and Accountability
There have been two forms of oversight in Argentina: first, a formal oversight built 
into the country’s judicial system, and second, an informal mechanism via domestic 
and international civil society and social pressure.
The Council of Magistrates (Consejo de la Magistratura),1331 which is involved in the 
selection of judges, has oversight functions with regard to judges’ performance and 
can undertake administrative proceedings for misconduct.
Cases have been heard in Trial and Appeals Courts. Access to an Appeals Court is 
granted through ordinary appeal proceedings and Appeals Courts can review both 
the determination on the facts and application of the law. In addition, the parties  
can apply to have proceedings reviewed by a Court of Cassation, which can be 
accessed only via extraordinary applications seeking an interpretation of the law. 
Finally, in even more limited circumstances, and after a ruling by the Court of 
Cassation, the parties may be granted access to the Supreme Court, Argentina’s 
highest judicial body.
National and international civil society organizations have made a significant 
contribution to informal forms of oversight. CELS, in particular, has consistently 
conducted research, advocacy, and monitoring of proceedings related to crimes 
committed during the military dictatorship for almost 40 years.1332 The Argentinian 
section of Amnesty International has also done research and conducted specific 
advocacy campaigns in relation to topics of interest.1333 The International Center for 
Transitional Justice published a series of briefing papers between 2005 and 2009,1334 
and has regularly reported on the trials since 2011.1335
Finally, Mothers of Plaza de Mayo and Argentinian society have contributed to an 
informal system of checks and balances through peaceful demonstrations and social 
pressure.1336 
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COLOMBIA 
Conflict Background and Political Context
Colombia has faced prolonged internal armed conflict among paramilitary groups, 
guerrilla groups, and the national army for over 50 years. The conflict has been 
marked by extreme violence committed by all parties, including massacres, torture, 
forced disappearance, forced displacement, sexual violence, and other grave 
crimes. In recent years, Colombia has adopted a transitional justice strategy to help 
bring an end to the conflict and provide justice for victims. In 2016, the Colombian 
government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC) signed a historic peace agreement, bringing 
a formal end to the conflict with that guerrilla group. As of October 2017, peace 
talks with another armed group, the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación 
Nacional, or ELN), were ongoing.
The Colombian conflict originated in an era known as La Violencia, a violent struggle 
between liberals and conservatives during the 1950s. In 1958, in an attempt to 
resolve the conflict, Colombia established a power-sharing agreement called the 
National Front. However, far-left groups were excluded from the political process 
and formed small armies of guerrilla soldiers in remote regions of the country. The 
largest of these groups included the FARC and the ELN.1337 In the 1970s, to protect 
their interests from expropriation by the guerrillas, wealthy landowners and drug 
lords formed their own private armies with the assistance of the government and 
military.1338 Eventually, these paramilitary groups joined forces under the umbrella 
organization of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de 
Colombia, or AUC).1339 
The conflict evolved into a battle for land, money, and control over drug routes. 
Although all parties committed grave crimes, paramilitary groups—often working in 
close cooperation with the state and military—are responsible for a large majority of 
the human rights abuses committed during the conflict.1340 
During the height of the conflict, the government inconsistently fluctuated between 
offers of amnesty and use of military power to fight the leftist guerrillas, with very 
limited success.1341 Colombia signed the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) in December 1998 and deposited its instrument of ratification in August 
2002, triggering its entry into force in November 2002. The state has been under 
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preliminary examination by the ICC Office of the Prosecutor since June 2004.1342 
Since then, the Colombian government has actively developed transitional justice 
legislation to pursue justice and has begun conducting national trials for grave crimes. 
In spite of the various peace agreements signed by Colombia in recent years, 
violence and serious human rights abuses by state and nonstate armed groups 
remain a problem. “Successor” organized armed groups, known variously as bandas 
criminales (BACRIM), organized crime groups, or “post-demobilization paramilitary 
groups,” emerged following the demobilization of the AUC and FARC. They 
frequently target civilians and engage in narco- and human-trafficking, as well as 
other criminal activity.1343
A number of the recent developments in Colombian transitional justice legislation 
have been subject to intense political debate. In particular, the approach of President 
Juan Manuel Santos toward the peace process with the FARC has been widely 
criticized by his predecessor, former President Álvaro Uribe. Uribe has mobilized 
significant political power against Santos’s efforts, to the extent that a public 
referendum on the peace agreement failed in October 2016.
External pressure for accountability has come from the Inter-American system, the 
UN, and the ICC. For example, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights 
(IACHR) has issued findings that security forces committed or collaborated in the 
commission of human rights violations, including torture, disappearances, and 
extrajudicial killings.1344 The UN Commissioner for Human Rights and the ICC 
Office of the Prosecutor have characterized extrajudicial killings perpetrated by the 
Colombian security forces as possible crimes against humanity.1345 The UN’s Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights also has a monitoring and technical 
assistance program in Colombia and is closely involved in monitoring the FARC 
peace process.
The Role of the United States in Colombia
The United States has a long history of involvement in the Colombian conflict, 
from training counter-insurgents in the 1950s and 1960s to a massive military 
and counternarcotics program launched in 2000, called Plan Colombia. America 
invested some US$10 billion in Plan Colombia over the course of 16 years and has 
proposed additional funding to help secure peace.1346 Some credit Plan Colombia 
as marking a turning point in the conflict.1347 The United States has been the largest 
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and most active donor to the domestic judicial system since the early 1990s. 
The U.S. Department of Justice has provided legal advisers, investigators, and 
prosecutors through the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance 
Program (ICITAP) and the Office of Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and 
Training (OPDAT). These advisers also provided limited assistance on human rights 
prosecutions to the Human Rights Unit of the Colombian Prosecutor General’s 
Office and the Prosecutor’s Justice and Peace Unit.1348 Top drug traffickers and 
paramilitary leaders are sometimes extradited to the United States, a controversial 
practice among Colombian jurists and civil society. 1349 
Existing Justice-Sector Capacity
Since the adoption of the 1991 constitution, the Colombian justice sector has undergone 
significant reforms, including the passage of a revised criminal procedure code in 
2004. The 1991 constitution introduced important reforms to the institutional judicial 
framework, including creating a separate Public Prosecutor’s Office with oversight 
over investigations and enshrining “the right to a subsidized defense, setting the 
basis for the creation of a Public Defender’s Office.”1350 The rule of law and domestic 
judicial-sector capacity in Colombia is still weak overall, especially in conflict areas, 
but has made enormous improvements since the height of the insurgency in the 1990s. 
The judiciary is persistently overloaded, infamously slow, and historically 
underresourced and understaffed.1351 In remote areas, which make up the large majority 
of the state, the judiciary has been weak and either unwilling or unable to enforce 
legal contracts.1352 Judges, witnesses, and prosecutors have faced bribery, threats, 
and attacks. According to the World Justice Project’s May 2016 Rule of Law Index, 
Colombia ranked 19th out of 30 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
and 71st out of 113 countries globally. With respect to its criminal justice system, it 
ranked 20th of 30 in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 91st of 113 globally.1353
However, according to some, Colombians’ “level of confidence in their justice 
system is among the highest in the region” and has been increasing in recent 
years.1354 A 2010 USAID report noted that caseloads are “modest, if fairly unevenly 
distributed, but clearance and congestion rates remain poor.”1355 Colombia’s 
Constitutional Court has gained a strong reputation around the world.1356
Nevertheless, the judiciary faces significant hurdles. Colombia’s already strained 
judiciary faces an entrenched criminal nexus among drug traffickers, armed 
paramilitary groups, and corrupt political elements, all of which contribute to 
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widespread human rights abuses. In addition, Colombia still has thousands of 
internally displaced peoples from the decades of conflict. Colombia’s legislature 
continues to pass laws and reforms to address the crimes committed during the 
conflict and provide some form of justice and restitution to victims. The judicial 
sector’s willingness to tackle these interrelated problems and entrenched  
politico-criminal elements reflects its increasing independence and technical 
capacity, but the rule-of-law framework is severely stressed. 
Existing Civil Society Capacity
Colombia’s civil society is strong and technically proficient on justice issues. 
Organizations have been active despite facing significant threats, including 
persecution by the state intelligence service. Especially when faced with political 
blockages in prosecuting military abuses, civil society organizations have engaged 
in domestic litigation and sought the opinion of the IACHR concerning Colombia’s 
obligations under the American Convention on Human Rights.1357 A number 
of civil society organizations closely monitor and conduct advocacy in relation 
to transitional justice issues in Colombia, including legislation and trials. The 
Movimiento de Victimas de Estado (MOVICE) has been one of the organizations that 
has been effective in organizing victims.
Colombia has also received support from a number of international human rights 
organizations, who have applied pressure, written amicus briefs for the Constitutional 
Court, provided capacity building, and assisted in peace negotiations with the FARC.
Creation
The complex legal framework for transitional justice in Colombia has developed in 
stages and is still evolving. Colombia’s transitional justice efforts began in earnest 
with the demobilization of the paramilitaries and passage of the Justice and Peace 
Law (JPL) in 2005. In 2011, the Santos government passed comprehensive legislation 
on victims’ reparations, the right to truth, and land restitution. The following year 
the government and FARC began peace talks, which culminated in the 2016 peace 
agreement and resulting transitional justice legislation. The peace agreement with 
the FARC added significant new elements, including the Special Jurisdiction for 
Peace (SJP). In October 2017, the Constitutional Court made a landmark decision 
guaranteeing the legal stability of the peace agreement until 2030 and approving the 
constitutionality of the resulting transitional justice legislation.1358 
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Justice and Peace Law
After a number of failed peace agreements, the Colombian government and the 
paramilitary groups signed the Santa Fe de Ralito Accord in 2003.1359 In 2005, in an 
attempt to provide accountability for crimes committed by paramilitary leaders, 
the Colombian government passed Law 975 of 2005, also known as the Justice and 
Peace Law.1360 The Constitutional Court modified the text of the law through a series 
of rulings, in particular Sentence C-370 of 2006. Congress reformed the law in 2012 
with Law 1592.
The Ralito Accord provided for collective demobilization for the AUC as well as 
other armed groups. The JPL, in turn, established a legal framework for integrating 
combatants into civilian life and offered a reduced criminal sentence for those 
who disarmed and confessed to human rights abuses. According to the Colombian 
government, by 2016, approximately 58,161 combatants had demobilized.1361 By 2015, 
some 4,410 paramilitaries had applied for benefits under the JPL.1362 
Relatedly, Law 1424 of 2010 establishes the framework for reintegrating demobilized 
paramilitary members who were not covered by the JPL process. Under Law 1424, 
members of illegal armed groups accused of low-level crimes, such as simple 
or aggravated conspiracy or illegal possession of arms, receive judicial benefits, 
including suspension of arrest warrants and the conditional suspension of sentences, 
in exchange for contributing to the truth.1363 
The process established by the JPL is ongoing. Members of paramilitary groups 
who have demobilized fall under the jurisdiction of the JPL or ordinary courts, and 
thus will not be subject to the jurisdiction of the SJP. However, the SJP will have 
jurisdiction over those who collaborated with or financed paramilitary groups.
Accountability for Military and Other State Actors
The JPL did not specifically provide accountability for military and state actors 
who committed or facilitated the commission of grave crimes related to the armed 
conflict. Colombia has made various attempts to reform the military justice system 
for crimes related to acts of military service and expand military jurisdiction.1364 
Some suggest that these attempted reforms aimed to transfer cases from civilian to 
military courts, although the language that would have allowed this was eventually 
removed from the proposed reform.1365 The government passed a reform in 2015 
modifying the constitution to specify that the investigation and prosecution of 
crimes committed by the armed forces in the context of an armed conflict would be 
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judged according to international humanitarian law.1366 Accountability for members 
of the armed forces was also part of the peace agreement signed with the FARC and 
will be part of the new SJP. 
Victims’ and Land Restitution Law
In 2011, the Colombian government passed Law 1448, or the “Victims and Land 
Restitution Law,” a historic development for victims of the Colombian conflict. The 
law focuses on providing truth, justice, and reparations for victims.1367 Under the law, 
victims of disappearances, murder, displacement, and other human rights violations 
can receive damages, restitution, social services, and legal protection. For those who 
have been displaced, the law created a special land restitution program. 
Law 1448 also provides for the creation of a national day of memory and the 
collection of victim testimony. The Victims’ Law in turn created the National 
Commission of Reparation and Reconciliation and the National Historic Memory 
Center. It also established the Victim Assistance and Reparations Unit, responsible 
for coordinating the National System for Assistance and Reparations for Victims as 
well as the Victims Registry, humanitarian aid efforts, victim compensation, and 
individual and collective reparations plans. 
The Land Restitution Unit, which began work in January 2012, is charged with 
creating a registry of stolen or abandoned land, reviewing victims’ claims for land 
restitution, and presenting their cases to a land judge. If restitution of land is not 
possible, the state will pay due compensation for land theft and displacement. In its 
first five years, the law provided for the compensation of 590,000 victims. However, 
the law has faced significant implementation challenges.1368
Legal Framework for Peace
In mid-2012, the Colombian government passed legislative Act 01 of 2012, 
the Legal Framework for Peace. This framework, included in a constitutional 
amendment, lays out various transitional justice measures, including the creation 
of extrajudicial justice mechanisms, as well as criteria for prioritizing and selecting 
cases, suspending sentences, and dropping cases, including those of state agents 
and guerrillas convicted of atrocities. Human rights groups widely condemned the 
framework as providing impunity for grave crimes.1369 The prosecutor of the ICC 
also sent a letter to the Constitutional Court saying that suspending sentences for 
crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction would violate Colombia’s international law 
obligations.1370 The Constitutional Court altered the amendment in 2013,1371 helping 
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to set the stage for an agreed approach to criminal justice mechanisms during peace 
negotiations with the FARC.
Peace Negotiations with FARC and Other Guerrillas
Peace negotiations with leftist guerrillas have been a contentious issue in Colombia. 
Talks with the FARC started in November 2012, and talks with the ELN began 
in February 2017. After nearly four years of negotiations with the FARC, the 
government and the FARC signed a comprehensive peace agreement on August 
24, 2016. The agreement included terms for a bilateral ceasefire, a process for the 
FARC to lay down arms and integrate into society, and justice processes for victims 
of the conflict. It also included agreements on comprehensive rural reform, battling 
the illicit drug trade, and the political participation of the FARC. In particular, the 
agreement provided for the establishment of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (SJP), 
a system designed to provide justice for the crimes committed during the conflict 
by guerrillas as well as members of the armed forces and others who financed or 
collaborated with armed groups. 
After months of vehement protest from members of the political opposition, the 
agreement narrowly lost a nationwide plebiscite in October 2016. With only a 37 
percent turnout for the vote, the “yes” vote lost by only one-half of one percent. 
The government and FARC renegotiated a new agreement, which was passed 
by congress at the end of November 2016. The new agreement included many 
proposals put forth by the opposition and significant revisions, including regarding 
the SJP. However, the new agreement lacks a stable political base, and in late 2017, 
it appeared that its implementation could depend on the results of presidential 
elections in 2018.
Integral System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-repetition
In April 2017, as part of the fast-track legislation passed to implement the peace deal 
signed with the FARC, Colombia passed amendments to the constitution creating 
the Integral System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-repetition (the “Integral 
System” framework).1372 As of October 2017, the Constitutional Court was reviewing 
the legislation, and it was subject to change. Many national and international groups 
expressed criticism of the law and concerns about its implementation.1373
The framework is intended to focus less on retribution and more on establishing the 
truth about the past, creating mechanisms for victims’ reparations, and guaranteeing 
nonrepetition. It involves several components, including the SJP, the Unit for the 
ANNEXES   369
Search of Missing Persons, and a Truth Commission. It is innovative in that it 
incorporates both restorative and retributive goals, including penalties as well as 
repairing damage to victims caused by the conflict.1374
Legal Framework and Mandate
Justice and Peace Law
In 2002, President Álvaro Uribe’s administration began negotiations with an 
umbrella group of paramilitary organizations, the AUC, in a process that culminated 
in the JPL of 2005. The JPL includes provisions for prosecuting international crimes 
with the possibility of reduced sentences within the domestic criminal system. 
Design flaws of the JPL, criticized by justice advocates as providing only partial 
justice, have been compounded by poor implementation and underfunding. 
The JPL offers a range of legal immunities and benefits in exchange for surrender 
by individual members of armed groups. These immunities are conditioned on 
the individuals’ contribution to national peace, collaboration with the justice 
system, reparation for victims, and the persons’ adequate resocialization.1375 In 
specially created JPL courts, magistrates hear voluntary confessions of demobilized 
paramilitaries (postulados). Other steps of this legal process include an indictment, 
investigations, formalizing charges, a reparations hearing, and reading the sentence 
against the accused. Those who are found guilty under a JPL prosecution receive 
full sentences, which are then suspended and substituted with reduced conditional 
sentences of between five and eight years.1376 Everyone who participates in the JPL 
process is eligible for a reduced sentence; it is not predicated on the gravity, context, 
quantity, or scale of crimes committed nor on the rank or role of the accused.1377 
Under the normal legal framework, sentences for similar crimes run from 50 to 60 
years of imprisonment.1378 The Colombian Constitutional Court has held that the 
large gap between “normal” and JPL sentences does not violate the right to justice 
and should not be considered an amnesty or pardon because the normal sentences 
are merely suspended, not replaced, by the reduced sentence.1379 Although the JPL 
sentences are “less rigorous,” the court noted that they depend on the cooperation of 
the accused with the justice system and victims, making the sentences conditional.1380 
If individuals decide not to participate in the process of voluntary confessions,  
they may face full criminal charges. Prosecutions under ordinary criminal 
jurisdiction are brought under provisions of the Rome Statute, which were 
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domesticated in the Colombian criminal code in June 2002, but are procedurally 
conducted under the JPL.1381 
The procedural features of prosecutions under the JPL law are significantly different 
from ordinary criminal proceedings in Colombian law.1382 It is based on an inquisitorial 
model and relies on the confession of the accused. Under the JPL, investigations and 
prosecutions should focus on patterns of war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
structural and organizational aspects of the paramilitary groups, and external support 
provided to the paramilitaries. According to an October 2012 directive from the 
attorney general, investigators must prioritize investigations of crimes committed by 
large criminal organizations and individuals most responsible for the crimes.1383 
A December 2012 reform of the JPL echoed the prioritization of investigating 
those “most responsible” for crimes,1384 leading to an increase in investigations of 
paramilitary leaders.1385 This reform also made it more difficult for demobilized 
paramilitaries to be released from jail. This reform provided that if the state 
determined that the accused had not told the complete truth, cooperated with 
the judicial system, or compensated their victims by 2014, their case would be 
transferred to the normal court system, where their conditional sentence could be 
lifted. This reform also required victims to seek reparations under the new Victims 
Law, rather than under the JPL.1386
The JPL also included provisions for victim participation and restitution. To 
participate, victims were granted the right to attend all stages of the criminal 
proceedings, to directly question the accused about crimes that affected them, 
and to demand reparations. Reparations include restitution, compensation, 
rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition. Decree 1290, which 
entered into effect in 2009, set out the administrative compensation for victims of 
illegal armed groups. Under this decree, some 18 million pesos have been awarded 
to victims of violations of the rights to life, physical integrity, physical and mental 
health, individual freedom, and sexual freedom. The decree does not provide 
compensation measures for victims of state agents. 
Integral System of Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Non-Repetition
Part of the Integral System framework adopted in 2017 involves the establishment 
of the SJP. The SJP will have exclusive jurisdiction over those who have directly or 
indirectly participated in the armed conflict, including members of the FARC, state 
agents, and third parties who have financed or collaborated with armed groups, 
among others. Paramilitary fighters who have demobilized or participated in the JPL 
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process or whose cases are being heard in the ordinary judicial system are not within 
the jurisdiction of the SJP. The SJP will also have exclusive jurisdiction over crimes 
committed in relation to the armed conflict, especially crimes against humanity, 
genocide, and war crimes. It will have one Justice Chamber and one Tribunal for 
Peace. The SJP establishes three tracks: an amnesty for political crimes, judgment 
and reduced sentencing for those who confess, and trials for those who fail to 
confess. The SJP has a 10-year mandate, with a possible extension of five years.
The SJP includes the possibility of an amnesty or pardon for political or politically 
related crimes (such as rebellion, sedition, and illegal possession of arms or military 
uniforms).1387 Military and state agents are not eligible to benefit from the amnesty. 
However, the peace agreement provides that all parties must receive comparable 
treatment, leaving open the possibility of commuted sentences for those who are 
ineligible for amnesty. 
As of July 2017, some 7,400 former FARC members had received amnesty: 6,005 
by decree and another 1,400 were released from jail by the judiciary.1388 The 
amnesty is part of the process of reintegration for those who identify members of 
the organization; lay down their arms; sign an agreement that they will not rise up 
against the government and will comply with the Integral System; and are accredited 
by the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace. The accreditation is also 
necessary for these former combatants to benefit from other reintegration programs.
Those who confess their crimes are eligible for reduced sentences as long as 
they lay down their arms and reintegrate into civilian life (in the case of FARC 
combatants); recognize their responsibility; and contribute to victims’ rights to 
truth, reparation, and nonrepetition. Those who confess early in the process will be 
eligible for reduced sentences involving a restriction of liberty for five to eight years 
in the most serious cases, or two to five years in other cases.1389 This “restriction of 
liberty” requires residing in a designated demobilization zone, but not necessarily 
a prison. They may also face additional penalties including reparations to victims 
or restorative measures. Those who confess later during a trial, but before a final 
judgment is delivered, may be sentenced to five to eight years in prison. Those who 
fail to confess can be sentenced to 15–20 years in prison. 
Individuals within the SJP jurisdiction cannot be subject to extradition for crimes 
within its jurisdiction. Being sanctioned by the SJP does not prohibit participation in 
Colombian politics, including while serving a sentence. (This had been a contentious 
issue during the peace negotiations.) The accused have the right to a defense and to 
appeal any decisions of the SJP.
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The Office of the Prosecutor is currently tasked with collecting evidence to pass on 
to the SJP and is grouping potential cases according to gravity and symbolic value. 
Priority crimes include sexual violence, mass murder, displacement, enforced 
disappearances, use of child soldiers, and environmental crimes.1390
The Integral System law also provides measures for reparations. It creates explicit 
incentives for members of the FARC to declare their assets to the government to be 
used for reparations. Offenses related to any assets discovered later that were not 
declared by FARC combatants will be subject to normal criminal prosecution. 
According to the Integral System, crimes committed by members of the armed 
forces will be subjected to a separate regime based largely on Colombian law. The 
Integral System rules are considered lex specialis. International observers have 
expressed concern about rules pertaining to military prosecutions, in particular 
about the Integral System’s narrower definition of command responsibility than 
that provided for in Article 28 of the ICC Rome Statute.1391 Some argue that under 
the Colombian construction of command responsibility it will be difficult, if not 
impossible, to convict commanders based in Bogotá for crimes committed by their 
subordinates on the ground in remote regions of the country.1392
The Integral System’s Other Transitional Justice Provisions
Truth Commission
The Truth Commission aims to contribute to the narrative of the conflict, including 
with a recognition of the victims and the responsibility of those who contributed 
to the conflict. It will be an extrajudicial body with a six-month preparation period 
and a three-year mandate. It will be tasked with holding public hearings throughout 
the country, where those impacted by the conflict can be heard, including those 
who participated or contributed to the conflict. The Truth Commission will create a 
final report and undertake outreach programs to distribute it. It will also create an 
oversight body to ensure its recommendations are implemented.
Unit for the Search for Disappeared Persons
This is a high-level and independent extrajudicial unit charged with establishing 
the truth about what happened to persons disappeared during the conflict. It will 
present its findings to other units, including the Truth Commission and Tribunal 
for Peace, if requested. However, the information produced by this unit cannot be 
transferred to judicial authorities for the purpose of assigning responsibility or as 
evidence in trials.
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Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Measures
All parties to the conflict will participate in formal public acts that recognize their 
responsibility and apologize for crimes committed during the conflict. The FARC 
will also undertake infrastructure construction projects and programs including 
removing land mines, searching for missing persons, coca crop substitution 
programs, and reforestation programs. The Colombian government will also 
undertake rural development programs, collective reparation programs, measures for 
psychosocial rehabilitation, processes for the return of displaced persons, and the 
restitution of land and programs to help facilitate political participation for victims. 
Location
The Higher Tribunals of Bogotá, Barranquilla, Bucaramanga, and Medellín have 
Justice and Peace courtrooms to implement the JPL legal framework. The military 
tribunal is located in Bogotá. As of October 2017, it was not yet clear where the SJP 
courtrooms would be located.
Structure and Composition
Prosecutions are brought by a specialized Justice and Peace Unit within the Prosecutor 
General’s Office, and another unit at the Attorney General’s Office. The Justice 
and Peace Unit of the Attorney General’s Office is responsible for investigating 
and charging demobilized paramilitaries. In 2012, the attorney general created 
a special unit for analysis and context (Unidad de Análisis y Contexto),1393 whose 
primary purpose was to help build cases involving systemic and organized crime, but 
which has also been relevant to establishing the contextual elements of war crimes 
and crimes against humanity.1394 The Justice and Peace section of the Inspector 
General’s Office is tasked with representing society and ensuring the respect of 
fundamental constitutional rights. In addition, the National Ombudsman’s Office’s 
free legal aid section provides demobilized paramilitaries with public defenders and 
legal representation for victims. The sub-committee for the protection of victims 
and witnesses was charged with witness protection and support issues. This was 
eventually superseded by the creation of the National Protection Unit.1395 
To help implement victims’ rights, the JPL created the National Commission 
for Reparation and Reconciliation (CNRR). It was composed of government 
representatives, oversight bodies, and civil society organizations. Created in 2005,  
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it was tasked with designing and implementing a victims’ reparation model. Under 
this mandate, it held workshops for victims on their rights and JPL procedures, 
published reports, and designed an outreach strategy. The CNRR closed in 2011 after 
passage of the Victims Law.
Related to the CNRR, the Historical Memory Group (HMG) was created in 2005 to 
develop a narrative of the Colombian conflict. Composed primarily of academics 
from Colombian universities, the HMG wrote several reports on how the conflict 
was experienced in various parts of the country. After the Victims Law was passed in 
2011, the HMG’s mandate was passed on to the National Historical Memory Center.
Special Jurisdiction for Peace
The SJP, adopted in 2017, will be composed of five judicial bodies and an Executive 
Secretariat:
 1. The Chamber for the Recognition of Truth and Responsibility 
and Determination of Facts. This chamber will be responsible for 
receiving all information and confessions. It will decide whether the 
case is within the jurisdiction of the SJP, identify the most serious and 
representative cases, and present its findings to the other units.
 2. The Chamber for Amnesty and Pardon. This unit manages the 
amnesty provisions of the Integral System law. 
 3. The Chamber for the Definition of Legal Situations. This chamber 
defines the legal status of those who are not subject to an amnesty 
or pardon or other SJP special processes. This chamber can decide to 
terminate proceedings or waive judicial action against these persons.
 4. The Investigation and Indictment Unit. This unit investigates and 
charges those individuals who do not confess. It also decides on 
victim and witness protection measures. It will have a technical 
forensic research team and special investigation team for cases 
involving sexual violence. 
 5. The Tribunal for Peace, which will be composed of five sections: 
  (i) First-instance section for cases involving confessions; 
  (ii) First-instance section in the cases without confessions;
  (iii) Appeal section; 
  (iv) Review section; and 
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  (v) Stability and efficacy section, which will follow up on cases and 
sentences upon the conclusion of Tribunal for Peace proceedings.
The Executive Secretariat will be in charge of the administration and management 
of the SJP under the guidance of the Presidency of the SJP.
The SJP will be staffed by primarily Colombian magistrates who are chosen through 
a comprehensive and public selection process.1396
Prosecutions
According to the Colombian government, by 2015, some 4,410 paramilitaries had 
applied for benefits under the JPL.1397 The JPL process resulted in 47 sentences 
condemning 195 accused, about eight percent of the paramilitaries who attempted 
to participate in the JPL process. The sentences deal with 5,401 criminal acts and 
26,788 recognized victims, representing only 6.65 percent of the 82,114 crimes 
attributed to the paramilitaries and 12.7% of the 211,013 associated victims.1398 
Moreover, nearly all of the compensation ordered for victims was paid for from the 
national budget as opposed to the assets of the accused—a breach of the conditions 
of participating in the JPL process.
Overall, the special process for prosecutions under the JPL has yielded few convictions 
for human rights violators and war criminals, including those falling within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC. Between 2008 and 2009, 29 high-level paramilitary leaders 
were extradited to the United States on drug-related charges.1399 This extradition 
came just after they had started to reveal close links between the paramilitaries and 
state agents, including elected officials.1400 In 2014, some 400 former paramilitary 
members were released from detention without having gone through the JPL process 
because they had already been detained for longer than the maximum eight-year 
sentence.1401 Indeed, the process suffered from a critical backlog of cases, which 
prosecutors tried to alleviate with collective confession hearings.1402
During confessions of some paramilitary leaders participating in the JPL process, 
details emerged of crimes committed by state agents. In what became known as 
the “parapolitics” scandal, congressional representatives, public officials, military, 
police, and private entities were implicated in colluding with paramilitary groups to 
commit grave crimes. The Supreme Court, which is empowered to investigate public 
officials, opened over 500 investigations.1403 Courts convicted some public officials 
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on charges of committing violent crimes such as murder, enforced disappearances, 
kidnapping, and torture, and others on conspiracy charges related to their links  
with paramilitaries.1404 As of early 2017, more than 60 members of congress had 
been convicted.1405 
Other trials have proceeded against members of the military, in particular in relation 
to the “false positives” scandal. Between 2002 and 2008, members of the military 
killed civilians and counted them as combat deaths in exchange for rewards such 
as vacation time, medals, and promotions.1406 These extrajudicial killings left over 
4,000 victims.1407 As of 2016, prosecutors had investigated over 2,000 cases of 
extrajudicial killings allegedly committed by military personal and had convicted 
961 members of the armed forces, most of them low-ranking soldiers.1408 
However, human rights groups argue that there is significant evidence that senior 
military personnel were responsible for many killings.1409 The ICC has reportedly 
warned the Colombian government that it must open cases against 29 military 
commanders—23 generals and six corporals—for the extrajudicial killing of over 
1,200 civilians. If they are not tried by national authorities, the ICC could open its 
own investigations into the military leaders.1410
Legacy
In practice, the JPL has meant that many former combatants have received low 
sentences (of between five and eight years) in low-security prisons, with little 
emphasis on full prosecution even for those who fail to confess fully and accurately, 
as required by the law.1411
Moreover, victim participation was generally low. As of November 2016, some 
537,861 victims had submitted petitions under the JPL. However, participation in the 
judicial confession procedures was low, with only 94,461 victims able to participate, 
due in part to the difficulty of accessing the trials.1412 Hundreds of thousands of 
victims who lived in remote areas of the country—where most victims are located—
lacked the resources to travel to attend the trials and therefore could not participate in 
the versiones libres (the confession hearings under the JPL) and question the confessor.1413
According to a study done by the Contraloría of Colombia, the poor outcomes 
are the result of the limited capacity of the judicial system, which had no time to 
adequately prepare and adjust its investigation, trial, and judicial procedures for a 
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transitional justice model, especially considering the extremely high numbers of 
victims and criminal acts falling under the JPL process.1414 
Financing
In order to help reduce congestion and facilitate judicial processes related to the new 
transitional justice legislation, in 2017 the government transferred 5 billion pesos 
(approx. US$1.7 million) to the judiciary budget, transferred some 110 civil servants 
to judicial offices, and announced additional training for judges and prosecutors.1415
Key donors have provided justice-sector assistance. Beginning in 2009, the 
Inter-American Development Bank funded three large projects to reorganize the 
Prosecutor’s Office, modernize the Inspector General’s Office, and improve court 
management at the high courts.1416 The World Bank has also supported court 
administration projects, and the European Union runs a program for strengthening 
the rule of law, victim protection frameworks, and investigative capacity.1417
According to a study done by the Contraloría of Colombia, as of 2015 the JPL had 
cost $11.1 billion pesos (approx. US$2.9 million). The reparations fund for victims 
was also partially financed by recovering illegal assets and from donations from 
individuals. It is estimated that the SJP could cost as much as 2 billion pesos  
(approx. US$667,000).1418 
President Santos has said that he expects the international community to donate 
$3.3 billion pesos to the peace process.1419 The High Counselor for Post-Conflict, 
Human Rights and Security is hoping to create a fund for peace in Colombia to 
receive international donations to support the peace process. The largest donors to 
Colombia are Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Canada, Germany, the EU, the United 
Kingdom, the World Bank, and the United States.1420 
Oversight and Accountability
The magistrates of the JPL courtrooms are elected by the Plenary Chamber of 
the Supreme Court of Justice. Lists of candidates are sent by the Administrative 
Chamber of the Superior Council of the Judiciary; a Constitutional Court decision 
from 2013 required that candidates be subject to a public and objective selection 
process based on their merits.1421 The selection of magistrates for the SJP was 
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conducted through a public process wherein all sectors of society, including victims’ 
organizations, were able to nominate candidates. A five-person selection committee 
evaluated these nominations and elected 51 magistrates. As with all judicial 
mechanisms in Colombia, the legal framework that shapes the JPL, and the SJP in 
Colombia is subject to oversight by the Constitutional Court. 
There is also significant informal oversight on the work of the JPL tribunals 
and the SJP. Colombian civil society is very active in monitoring proceedings 
and developments, as are many international organizations. There is additional 
oversight from the UN and the IACHR. In addition, the ICC has actively overseen 
developments in Colombia’s transitional justice legislation, including by highlighting 
crimes or prosecutions that remain unaddressed by the domestic judiciary, naming 
certain officials it considers should be investigated, and providing guidance on 
interpreting provisions of the Rome Statute.1422
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GUATEMALA: INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION AGAINST 
IMPUNITY IN GUATEMALA
Conflict Background and Political Context
Guatemala is an elite-dominated state that as of 2017 was more than 20 years into 
a process of political change. The economic and political elite’s disproportionate 
control of economic resources and a regime of state discrimination against the 
indigenous population that makes up a majority of citizens were underlying causes 
of Guatemala’s 36-year armed conflict (1960–1996).1423 The armed forces backed 
the elites and reinforced the system by repressing dissident political forces. In a 
Cold War environment that instinctively labeled movements for political change as 
“communist” and “revolutionary,” the United States threw its support behind this 
systemic repression.1424
After a U.S.-supported coup ousted a democratically elected leftist government in 1954, 
a succession of right-wing military governments ruled Guatemala for more than  
40 years. Civil war began following a failed leftist uprising in 1960, with military 
regimes seeking to crush armed leftist groups emerging from impoverished 
indigenous and peasant communities.1425 By 1981, the conflict had escalated to an 
alarming degree, as the military systematically targeted entire indigenous communities, 
causing vast loss of life.1426 The rule of General Efraín Ríos Montt from March 1982 
to August 1983 marked the bloodiest period in Guatemala’s history, resulting in 
thousands of civilian deaths, rampant sexual violence, and enforced disappearances. 
Overall, estimates indicate more than 200,000 civilians died during the conflict.1427 
Following the Cold War’s end, UN-led peace negotiations finally resulted in a peace 
accord in 1996. However, neither the end of armed conflict nor the efforts of the UN 
and donor organizations resulted in immediate amelioration of state weakness. 
Institution building proved difficult, and organized crime groups—many emerging from 
right-wing paramilitary organizations—expanded their already-extensive influence. 
At the urging of Guatemalan human rights organizations, the UN responded to the 
renewed security crisis in 2003, when it proposed the creation of the International 
Commission against Illegal Groups and Clandestine Security Organizations 
(CICIACS). The proposal collapsed in 2004 as a result of widespread opposition in 
Guatemala and unfavorable constitutional review. However, CICIACS was reborn 
at the end of 2006 as the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala 
(CICIG) with a more constitutionally and politically palatable model. 
380   OPTIONS FOR JUSTICE
Guatemala remains a state of concern for its high-level corruption and violence, 
drug-trafficking, and street gangs.1428 However, following its establishment, CICIG 
successfully conducted investigations that helped to establish its credibility, while 
also focusing on facilitating systemic reforms and strengthening the capacity of the 
Attorney General’s Office.1429 An empowered Attorney General’s Office increasingly 
collaborated with CICIG on combating organized crime. Then in 2012, the Attorney 
General’s Office brought genocide charges against Ríos Montt and his then-military 
chief of intelligence for atrocities committed in the early 1980s.1430 This paved the 
way for additional grave crimes trials. 
In 2015, under the leadership of Commissioner Iván Velásquez, CICIG’s 
investigation into a multimillion-dollar customs fraud resulted in the arrests of  
some 200 people and brought down the government of then-President Otto Pérez 
Molina. Other high-profile cases have started to erode Guatemala’s system of 
impunity and organized crime. Ongoing investigations have also implicated the 
brother and son of the current president, Jimmy Morales, who have been arrested 
and are awaiting trial on corruption charges.
CICIG’s renewed vigor did not come without consequences.1431 President Morales 
began a campaign to oust Velásquez and debilitate CICIG after Velásquez and 
Attorney General Thelma Aldana announced an investigation into illegal campaign 
contributions related to an opposition party. In August 2017, Morales complained to 
the UN that Velásquez was overstepping his mandate and should be investigating 
gang-related crimes instead of corruption. Morales then ordered Velásquez’s 
expulsion from Guatemala. Citizens rallied in support of Velásquez, and the 
Constitutional Court ruled in favor of Velásquez, ordering state agencies to desist 
from attempts to remove him from the country.
At the same time, Velásquez and Aldana began efforts to lift Morales’s presidential 
immunity in order to proceed with an investigation against him for illicit campaign 
contributions during the 2015 presidential campaign. Congress voted on two 
separate occasions against lifting his immunity. In September 2017, congress 
passed legislation altering the criminal code so that accountants, rather than 
general secretaries of political parties, are liable for illicit campaign contributions. 
The new legislation also commuted prison sentences for 400 different crimes, 
including extortion. Critics claimed that this was an attempt to legalize impunity in 
Guatemala. Massive citizen protests led congress to revoke the legislation  
the following day. 
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Existing Justice-Sector Capacity
Alarming levels of corruption, violence, and clientelism dominated Guatemala’s 
post-conflict justice system. Following the 1996 peace accords, the UN attempted 
to help rebuild and restructure the state. However, even the large donor endeavors 
proved futile: organized crime groups continued to expand their influence.1432 
The commencement of CICIG’s work brought a degree of hope for the country. 
After several years of struggling against entrenched impunity structures and 
corruption, CICIG has spurred significant progress within the justice sector. 
This has been critical to Guatemala’s ability to conduct credible proceedings for 
grave crimes and grand corruption cases.1433 First, CICIG helped to ensure a more 
credible process for the election of magistrates and the attorney general, which 
strengthened the independence of the justice system and the rule of law. Second, 
CICIG has strengthened the Attorney General’s Office’s independence and technical 
capacity to conduct complex investigations. Third, CICIG proposed the creation of a 
centralized system of high-risk courts to adjudicate especially sensitive cases related 
to organized crime and corruption in order to provide greater safety for magistrates 
and their families, as well as witnesses and the lawyers litigating these cases. All of 
these efforts have empowered reformers within Guatemala’s justice institutions and 
given them the tools to tackle the illicit parallel power structures that have so long 
dominated the country.
Existing Civil Society Capacity
Civil society actors have been actively engaged in the developments taking place 
in Guatemala. The initiation of peacebuilding activities commenced with NGOs 
publicizing military atrocities at the national and international level. Organizations 
such as the Myrna Mack Foundation, established shortly after the conflict, aimed 
to target impunity and lobby for social change; the conservative business lobby, 
called the Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial and Financial 
Associations (CACIF), has at times joined the effort to support CICIG in tackling 
entrenched corruption.1434
Civil society advocated for the creation of an investigatory commission, which 
ultimately resulted in CICIG’s establishment. Additionally, civil society played a 
critical role in bringing Ríos Montt and his military intelligence director Mauricio 
Rodríguez Sánchez to trial. The Center for Legal Action on Human Rights in 
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Guatemala (CALDH), together with the Association for Justice and Reconciliation 
(AJR), a victims’ group, were the first to press charges of genocide in the Guatemalan 
courts. These and many other legal and victim organizations have played key roles  
in advocacy and victim representation in relation to the grave crimes cases.  
Massive youth-led citizen protests helped bring down the Pérez Molina government 
in 2015 and push congress to revoke controversial legislation concerning campaign 
finance in 2017.
Creation
In the years following the peace accords, Guatemala saw the number of reported 
threats and attacks against human rights defenders mushroom to 374 (including 
49 killings); a period of intense political turmoil following the release of the truth 
commission reports; the failure of the 1999 peace accords referendum; and the 
election of a populist, anti-elite President Alfonso Portillo.1435 In response, NGOs 
began to discuss the possibility of setting up an ad hoc investigatory commission, 
capable of investigating the structures menacing human rights defenders and 
threatening to capture the state. The NGOs persuaded the United States and 
other international embassies to support the initiative, which the Human Rights 
Ombudsman announced in January 2003. International pressure, corruption 
scandals, criminal violence, and an economic crisis eventually lead the Portillo 
government to support the proposal.1436
After evaluating the proposal, the UN concluded that it focused on a set of war-
related dynamics (intelligence structures harassing NGOs) that had been superseded 
by a greater hazard to the state (political-criminal networks tied to transnational 
organized crime) and was too weak to effectively address the issues. Thus, the 
UN proposed the creation of an autonomous UN-run prosecutorial agency with 
the capacity to carry out investigations and prosecute cases in Guatemalan courts 
independent from the Guatemalan attorney general.1437 The negotiations with the 
Portillo government ended in January 2004, and the parties signed an agreement 
to create the International Commission against Illegal Groups and Clandestine 
Security Organizations (CICIACS).1438
However, this process coincided with a period of political turmoil as well as both 
presidential and congressional elections. The newly elected president, Oscar 
Berger, and a majority of the conservative congressional parties were skeptical 
about CICIACS. Two congressional committees, Human Rights and Interior, 
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recommended its rejection on the basis that it unconstitutionally usurped the 
attorney general’s authority in prosecuting crimes and undermined Guatemala’s 
sovereignty. Then, the Constitutional Court—still controlled by appointees 
elected under the Portillo government—concluded in an advisory opinion that the 
agreement did not constitute a human rights treaty. Therefore, the court concluded, 
it would be unconstitutional to grant CICIACS independent investigative and 
prosecutorial powers and privileges or grant immunities to Guatemalan citizens.1439
In the end, ratification of the CICIACS failed for two substantial reasons.1440 
First, the agreement enjoyed only a narrow national support base of human rights 
NGOs, the Human Rights Ombudsman, a handful of deputies and administration 
ministers, and a few media outlets. Second, Guatemalan conservatives portrayed the 
involvement of the U.S. embassy and other international actors as another attempt 
to maintain international control over Guatemala, and this successfully entrenched 
opposition to CICIACS among Guatemalan elites.
In late 2005, the Berger administration initiated renewed talks about international 
assistance. Observing the scale and severity of political corruption and criminal 
violence, the government saw a definite need for international assistance.1441 In 
December 2005, Vice President Eduardo Stein turned to the UN with a proposal 
to create a new model of CICIACS, taking account of the Constitutional Court’s 
objections to that model. Discussions with the UN focused on four primary issues: 
(1) the ability of a new CICIACS to retain a prosecutorial role, even if modest or 
in support of the attorney general; (2) the inclusion of organized crime within the 
CICIACS mandate; (3) providing Guatemalan staff with privileges and immunities 
protections; and (4) the status of the commission as an independent or UN body. 
The parties agreed to the following: (1) allow a prosecutorial role and preserve a 
human rights–focused mandate; (2) include a government guarantee to protect 
Guatemalan staff but without privileges and immunities; and (3) create the 
commission as a UN body (although it ended up as a UN-backed independent 
entity).1442 The parties called it the International Commission against Impunity in 
Guatemala (CICIG) and provided it with a budget fully financed by donors with a 
small, in-kind contribution from Guatemala. 
On December 12, 2006, the United Nations and the government of Guatemala 
signed the Agreement to Establish the International Commission against Impunity 
in Guatemala.1443 After the Constitutional Court issued a favorable advisory opinion 
in May 2007, congress ratified the agreement on August 1, 2007. As a result, 
CICIG was established as an independent, international body designed to support 
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the Attorney General’s Office, the National Civil Police (PNC), and other state 
institutions in the investigation of crimes committed by members of illegal security 
forces and clandestine security structures.1444
The initial mandate of the commission entailed two years of work; however, the 
Secretary-General extended it four times at Guatemala’s request. First, in March 
2009, Guatemala’s minister of foreign affairs requested, through a personal letter 
addressed to the Secretary-General, the extension of CICIG’s mandate for an 
additional two years; the extension was confirmed on April 15, 2009. The second 
extension was granted by the Secretary-General on January 13, 2011, the third 
extension was granted in April 2015, and the fourth in February 2017. As of late 2017, 
CICIG’s mandate was set to expire in September 2019.
Legal Framework and Mandate
CICIG is a hybrid criminal justice mechanism created through a bilateral agreement 
between the UN Secretary-General and the government of Guatemala. The UN 
Secretary-General appoints the CICIG commissioner. However, the commission 
itself is not a UN body. Its general mandate entails promoting individual 
prosecutions and institutional reforms in Guatemala.1445 The commission differs 
from UN hybrid tribunals through its mandate to dismantle organized crime and its 
ability to conduct criminal proceedings in national courts.1446
The objectives set out in the agreement include three categories of jurisdiction. 
First, CICIG should investigate the existence of illicit security forces and clandestine 
security organizations that commit crimes affecting the fundamental human rights 
of the citizens of Guatemala. It should identify the structures of these illegal groups 
as well as their activities, operating modalities, and sources of financing.
Second, CICIG should help the state to disband clandestine security structures and 
illegal security groups, and promote the investigation, criminal prosecution, and 
punishment of the crimes committed by the members of such groups.
Third, CICIG should make recommendations to the State of Guatemala regarding 
public policies to be adopted—including necessary judicial and institutional 
reforms—to eradicate and prevent the re-emergence of clandestine security 
structures and illegal security forces.
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In order to implement these duties, CICIG can investigate any individual, official, 
or private entity. It is authorized to promote and carry out criminal investigations by 
filing criminal charges with the relevant authorities.
Location
The CICIG office is located in Guatemala City; however, individuals willing to 
address the commission are expected to submit their application to the Oficina 
de Atención Permanente del Ministerio Público (Assistance Bureau of the Attorney 
General’s Office). 
Structure and Composition
The first year of CICIG’s work was completely dedicated to start-up tasks and 
challenges, namely, identifying and organizing the mission’s organizational and 
management structures. The effort to install administrative systems, recruit staff, 
and obtain specialized equipment and supplies hit an unanticipated obstacle. 
Because CICIG had been formally established as a non-UN organ, the UN 
concluded that the Secretariat had no legal basis to provide security, administration, 
finance, or security resources for the start-up phase.1447 Thus, CICIG was forced 
to build its administrative systems largely from scratch. However, by mid-2008 
a functioning core of professional staff was in place, enabling the commission to 
commence its work. 
CIGIG is composed of a commissioner, who is appointed by the UN Secretary-
General and is the legal head and representative of the organization. The 
commissioner is also responsible for recruiting international and national personnel 
and submitting periodic reports of CICIG’s activities to the Secretary-General.1448
The commission is structured around six functional units: Political Affairs; the 
Department of Investigations and Litigation, including police, legal, and financial 
investigation sections; the CICIG Department of Information and Analysis; the 
Department of Administration; the Department of Security and Safety; and the 
Press Office. The commission’s secretary is in charge of everyday administrative and 
executive functions.1449
386   OPTIONS FOR JUSTICE
As of 2013, the commission was comprised of 162 national and international 
officials, 72 of whom performed substantive tasks (45%), 62 worked in security 
(38%), and 28 performed administrative duties (17%).1450 In compliance with the 
commission’s mandate, CICIG signed a bilateral cooperation agreement with the 
Attorney General’s Office that created the Special Prosecutor’s Office (originally 
known as the Special Prosecution Unit Assigned to CICIG, or UEFAC; now called  
the Special Anti-Impunity Prosecutor’s Bureau, or FECI).1451 FECI investigates  
high-impact cases selected by CICIG and the Attorney General’s Office. Cases 
falling within CICIG’s mandate are transferred to FECI by the attorney general, 
based on whether they fulfill the requirements in the CICIG mandate and the 
agreement of the attorney general. The office has four main functions: case 
investigation, coordination of prosecutors and auxiliary prosecutors’ work and 
activity, institutional strengthening, and training. 
Case Investigation
The initial case selection for transfer to FECI is conducted through a mutual 
agreement by the attorney general and CICIG’s commissioner. FECI’s main function 
is to support investigation on those preselected cases.1452
Coordination of Prosecutors and Auxiliary Prosecutors 
FECI Coordinator’s Office provides legal and logistical support to investigations 
carried out by FECI’s prosecution offices. The Coordinator’s Office is involved in 
monitoring personnel from the Attorney General’s Office, the Criminal Investigation 
Office, and the National Civilian Police who serve within FECI.1453
Institutional Strengthening  
The Coordinator’s Office also cooperates with the Attorney General’s Office in 
the development of special investigative methods to enable it to more effectively 
combat crimes, especially those committed by organized criminal organizations. 
This includes supporting the definition, implementation, training, launching, and 
assessmentof the wiretap system and other special investigative methods.
Training
In this area, the FECI Coordinator’s Office sets up trainings to strengthen criminal 
investigation and train staff in specific investigative tools, as well as establish a 
general normative and legal framework. FECI also participated in broader trainings 
provided for the Attorney General’s Office, the National Civilian Police, judges, 
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and magistrates on issues ranging from wiretapping to the right to privacy and due 
process in criminal investigations.1454
Prosecutions
The Agreement between the UN and the government of Guatemala leaves it up to 
the commission to determine the criteria for selection of cases with due regard to 
CICIG’s general mandate. Selection criteria used early in CICIG’s mandate included: 
the likelihood of links with illegal groups and clandestine security organizations; the 
short and long-term political impact of the case on the fight against impunity; and 
the probability of success in advancing the case in the criminal process.1455 Initially, 
CICIG faced criticism for lacking a coherent case-selection strategy.1456 
The first investigations included events only tangentially related to the mandate 
—a shootout between two narco-trafficking groups in Zacapa, a band of police 
extortionists (Mariachi Locos), the death of the child of a human rights defender, 
the drugs-related killing of 15 riders on a bus from Nicaragua, an epidemic of 
femicides—and much more relevant cases pointing to parallel security structures 
inside the PNC and Interior Ministry (Parlacen, Victor Rivera) and obstruction of 
justice in the Public Ministry (Matus).1457 
From 2009, CICIG took on cases that were more prominent. That year, it solved the 
bizarre case involving the death of the high-profile lawyer Rodrigo Rosenberg Marzano, 
who left behind a YouTube video implicating the sitting president in his purported 
murder.1458 CICIG established that Rosenberg had arranged for his own killing in 
order to bring down the government, and thus defused a major political crisis. 
Commissioner Carlos Castresana’s public, detailed description of the forensic techniques 
used to solve the crime silenced most doubters, and CICIG’s public profile grew.1459
On July 15, 2010, nine individuals were convicted of murder, illicit association, and 
possession of firearms. As a result of CICIG’s work with the Attorney General’s Office, 
two organized criminal networks were dismantled in Escuintla and Guatemala 
departments, composed of active and retired members of the PNC and ex-soldiers.1460
CICIG investigated former Guatemalan President Alfonso Portillo Cabrera for 
alleged corruption. Although Guatemalan trial and appeals courts acquitted Portillo 
of the charges,1461 he was extradited to the United States, where he pled guilty to 
related charges and was sentenced to nearly six years in prison.1462 
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A CICIG investigation of 2006 killings at a prison resulted in allegations against 
former senior government officials who allegedly ran a parallel security structure 
within the Interior Ministry that carried out extrajudicial killings, “social cleansing” 
operations, money laundering, drug trafficking, extortion, and drug thefts.1463 
The case ultimately resulted in several acquittals, but also seven convictions in 
Guatemala, as well as the conviction and life sentence of former Guatemalan 
national police chief Erwin Sperisen, following his trial in Switzerland.1464 
Despite these and other significant successes, some observers noted a lack of 
strategy in CICIG’s early cases.1465 This changed significantly in 2015, when CICIG 
and the Attorney General’s Office announced bombshell accusations against 
officials including Guatemala’s sitting vice president, Roxana Baldetti, and the case 
grew to directly implicate the sitting president, Otto Pérez Molina. Known as the La 
Linea (“The Line”) case, the investigation revealed an enormous alleged corruption 
scheme in the Customs Service involving the tax administration and National Civil 
Police. CICIG, with the attorney general’s support, discovered a network of low-level 
“fixers” trading drastically reduced customs duties to importers in exchange for 
“commissions.” The CICIG investigation revealed a large, hierarchical structure 
reaching the vice president’s office. In August 2015, the public prosecutor announced 
that evidence showed that Pérez Molina and Baldetti were “without a doubt” the 
leaders of the scheme. When CICIG went public with the results of its investigation 
in early 2015, protests erupted calling for the resignation of the vice president 
and then the president. In May 2015, Baldetti resigned. Pérez Molina resigned on 
September 2, 2015, and was arrested, arraigned, and imprisoned the following day. 
Following extensive pretrial proceedings that included the presentation of evidence, 
in October 2017 a judge sent the case to trial.1466
The La Linea case was a watershed moment for CICIG and the Attorney General’s 
Office. The commission later brought allegations implicating many other senior 
administration officials, including the new president’s son-in-law, and ex-vice 
minister of energy, the former head of the tax administration, members of the PNC, 
and members of congress.1467
CICIG and Domestic Grave Crimes Trials
Beyond cases directly related to its mandate, CICIG has had a profound impact 
on Guatemala’s willingness and ability to pursue grave crimes cases related to 
the 36-year armed conflict. It has played a role in ensuring the appointment of 
conscientious attorneys general, emboldened and built the capacity of the Attorney 
General’s Office, and improved judicial independence through the creation of  
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“High Risk Courts” and the investigation of judicial corruption.1468 (See further 
discussion under Legacy, below.)
The Rios Montt Trial
In January 2012, former head of the state Jose Efraín Rios Montt and his then chief of 
military intelligence Jose Mauricio Rodríguez Sánchez were charged with genocide 
and crimes against humanity allegedly committed during Rios Montt’s presidency 
during 1982 and 1983.1469 The charges arose from systematic massacres of the 
country’s indigenous population carried out by Guatemalan troops and paramilitary 
forces during this phase of the country’s long and brutal civil war, as well as the 
related mass forced displacement. The first genocide charge against Rios Montt 
and Rodríguez Sánchez came in relation to 15 massacres against the Ixil population 
living in the Quiche region during his rule between March 1982 and August 1983. 
These charges allege that Rios Montt was the intellectual author of 1,771 deaths, the 
forced displacement of 29,000 people, sexual violence against at least eight women, 
and torture of at least 14 people. They allege that Rodriguez Sanchez implemented 
military plans responsible for the killing of civilians in the Ixil areas of Nebaj, Chajul, 
and San Juan Cotzal, in Quiche. In a second genocide charge, introduced in May 
2012, Rios Montt was charged in relation to the deaths of 201 people in Dos Erres 
(Petén) in December 1982.1470
In May 2013, the judges in High Risk Tribunal A convicted Rios Montt and sentenced 
him to 80 years in prison for genocide and crimes against humanity. However, 
Rodríguez Sánchez was acquitted of both charges. The court’s judgment represented 
the first-ever domestic conviction of a former head of state for genocide. However, 
10 days later the Constitutional Court annulled the verdict on procedural grounds in 
a confusing and contentious decision.1471
After several attempts to re-launch the case, a re-trial of Rios Montt and Rodríguez 
Sánchez for the Ixil genocide began in October 2017.1472 Because Rios Montt suffers 
from dementia, his trial was being heard behind closed doors, and he would not be 
sentenced if found guilty. Rodríguez Sánchez was being tried publicly. He was also 
facing genocide and crimes against humanity charges in the Dos Erres case.
Sepur Zarco Case
In February 2016, High Risk Tribunal A found Lieutenant Colonel Esteelmer 
Reyes Girón, former commander of Sepur Zarco military base, and former military 
commissioner Heriberto Valdez Asig, guilty of crimes against humanity, sentencing 
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them to 120 and 240 years, respectively.1473 The two were accused of crimes 
including sexual violence and sexual and domestic slavery against 14 women. The 
court also found Girón guilty of the murder of three women, and Asig guilty for the 
enforced disappearance of seven men who were husbands of the victims in this case. 
The High Risk Appellate Court upheld the judgment in July 2017. This was the first 
national case involving sexual violence related to Guatemala’s 36-year civil war.
Spanish Embassy Fire
In January 2015, a High Risk Tribunal sentenced Pedro Garcia Arredondo, former head 
of a special investigations unit of the PNC, to 40 years in prison for murder and crimes 
against humanity committed in relation to the siege and fire at the Spanish Embassy 
in 1980.1474 He was also convicted and sentenced to 50 years in prison for the killing 
of two students at the funeral for victims of the siege. Dozens of indigenous and 
student activists and diplomats were killed during the siege and fire at the Spanish 
Embassy, and this was the first time anyone had been tried for those crimes. The 
court found that Arredondo played a leadership role in the siege, noting that he let 
the protesters and hostages burn to death while preventing emergency intervention.
CREOMPAZ
Beginning in 2012, investigators from the Attorney General’s Office and the Forensic 
Anthropology Foundation of Guatemala exhumed 565 bodies from 85 graves located 
within what is now called the CREOMPAZ military base.1475 The base was used 
during the civil war as a center of military coordination and intelligence. Fourteen 
military officers were arrested on January 6, 2016, in relation to the case. In June 
2016, a judge ruled that eight retired officers, including former army chief Benedicto 
Lucas Garcia, must face public trial for their role in the forced disappearances. 
Another accused, who has mental health issues, should face trial under special 
provisions, the judge found. The judge dropped the charges against two defendants. 
However, since then, the trial stalled. As of late 2017, the proceedings remain tied up 
in a series of appeals and other legal motions.
Molina Theissen
In 2017, five retired senior military officials went on trial charged with the enforced 
disappearance of 14-year-old Marco Antonio Molina Theissen and the illegal detention, 
torture, and rape of his sister Emma.1476 Two of the accused are heavily decorated 
generals previously believed to be untouchable by the courts: Benedicto Lucas Garcia, 
former army chief of staff, and Manuel Callejas y Callejas, former head of military 
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intelligence and the presumed leader of the Cofradía organized crime syndicate. The 
other three accused include Francisco Luis Gordillo Martínez,  commander of Military 
Zone No. 17 where Emma was detained in Quetzaltenango in 1981; Edilberto Letona 
Linares, former second commander of Military Zone No. 17; and Hugo Ramiro 
Zaldaña Rojas, former “S-2” intelligence official of the chief of staff. In October 2017, 
pretrial judges in High Risk Court C scheduled the trial to begin on March 1, 2018.
Legacy
Impact on Political Change
CICIG has had leeway to act as an independent protagonist within Guatemala’s 
political/legal framework, making it a new and experimental form of international 
justice mechanism.1477 CICIG’s early difficulties were not a surprise; nor was it a 
surprise that its first commissioner, Carlos Castresana, resigned in frustration in 
2010. For most of its existence, CICIG faced significant opposition from parts of 
Guatemalan society, including members of the justice sector, congress, economic 
elites, and many whose interests were threatened by the commission’s work. The 
commission struggled to make an impact, and occasionally strayed from its primary 
mission. However, even in its early years, CICIG saw some important victories, 
including the resolution of the Rosenberg case, which proved that President Álvaro 
Colom had not committed murder; its participation in the conviction of former 
President Alfonso Portillo for corruption; and its help in revealing an illegal security 
operation carrying out targeted killings run by President Óscar Berger’s interior 
minister, Carlos Vielmann. CICIG’s second commissioner, Francisco Dall’Anese, 
likewise faced resistance from the Guatemalan government—especially around the 
Rios Montt trial—and he too resigned in frustration in 2013.
When Iván Velázquez took over as commissioner, it appeared that CICIG would 
close down soon and with few significant cases to its name. Under the leadership of 
Velázquez, however, CICIG returned to its core mission of targeting the relationship 
between political corruption and criminal activity in Guatemala’s state institutions. 
Under Velázquez, CICIG scored a number of important victories, including 
revealing the massive La Linea corruption scheme that helped bring down President 
Pérez Molina and Vice President Baldetti. The huge protests that forced out Pérez 
Molina and Baldetti upended the country’s political order, uniting the left with 
elements of the right for the first time in the country’s history and motivating a new 
generation of social activists. The protests may also have offered a glimpse of a 
future Guatemala that is less corrupt and truer to the rule of law.
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CICIG ultimately has had a significant impact on Guatemalan government, justice, 
and society. It offers an important model for other countries struggling with endemic 
corruption, organized crime, and compromised state institutions. It has played a 
fundamental role in shaping and strengthening the country’s justice system, empowering 
judicial operators, and building capacity in the Attorney General’s Office. It has 
expanded prosecutorial capacity in corruption and organized crime cases, as well as 
grave crimes cases stemming from the civil war. This can be seen in the Rios Montt, 
Sepur Zarco, CREOMPAZ, Spanish Embassy, and Molina Theissen cases.
Impact on Partners
The early encounters between the commission and the Attorney General’s Office 
were initially fraught.1478 CICIG staff viewed national prosecutors as plodding 
through cases within a clientelistic and hierarchical culture, and responding to 
the whims of attorneys general, including sometimes closing cases for political 
reasons.1479 In turn, Guatemalan prosecution officials claimed that the quality 
of CICIG’s lawyers varied greatly, complained that internationals did not trust 
Guatemalan counterparts with confidential information in high-profile cases, and 
were unwilling (or unable to see the need) to learn the subtleties of local legal rules 
and judicial practices. Many legal setbacks in major cases, they suggested, were due 
to the failure to manage them properly, in line with Guatemalan practice.1480
The two institutions, however, managed to struggle through their differences. 
Guatemalan prosecutors learned from CICIG, gained access to technology, 
developed new forensic capabilities, and scored successes in cases in which CICIG 
was not a party. The nature of the relationship shifted, and the Attorney General’s 
Office began to assert a leading role in selecting and managing CICIG-related 
cases. CICIG also supported the attorney general’s efforts to strengthen institutions, 
helping to establish a new special unit to investigate human trafficking and violence 
against women in 2011, and transferring CICIG’s Analysis Unit to the Attorney 
General’s Office in 2012.
CICIG has had less success dealing with the Interior Ministry and police. Police 
officers, from directors to new recruits, had been accused and convicted of stealing 
drugs, running extortion rackets, moonlighting for organized crime cartels, acting 
as hired killers, or serving as the implements of “social cleansing.” Officers are 
generally poorly educated, trained, supervised, and equipped. 
The judiciary also created much of the trouble regarding CICIG’s work: judges 
rejected crucial evidence without any legal basis or released defendants on 
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bail in inappropriate circumstances; weak case management was magnified by 
accomplished dilatory practices; and there were dysfunctional oversight and 
disciplinary procedures as well as a pervasive culture of informal clientelistic practices. 
The commission’s ongoing public battle with the judiciary, particularly over senior 
appointments, succeeded in exposing to public view the influence-peddling 
machinations hobbling the institution’s independence and performance. Its highly 
visible role supported an unusually broad civil-society, multisector effort to reduce 
the influence of political and economic interests in judicial selections. The major 
umbrella organizations, Convocatoria Ciudadana and Guatemala Visible, have 
continued to function but have lost momentum in the absence of clear, pending 
institutional challenges, and have yet to demonstrate an ability to tackle issues 
surrounding the willingness of the country’s elites to subject themselves to broader 
rule-of-law reforms.
CICIG significantly influenced the judicial sector in three ways. First, CICIG helped 
establish new election procedures for magistrates and the attorney general. This 
strengthened the independence of the justice system and facilitated the election of 
two independent and very competent attorneys general: Claudia Paz y Paz (2010–2014) 
and Thelma Aldana, who was elected in 2014 and, as of late 2017, still held that post. 
Both have dedicated themselves to accountability for grave crimes in Guatemala.
Second, CICIG strengthened the Attorney General’s Office’s independence and 
capacity for conducting complex investigations and prosecutions as well as building 
effective victim and witness protection programs. CICIG has built domestic 
capacity in part through extensive trainings and through joint investigations and 
criminal prosecutions. In addition, CICIG facilitated the creation of specialized 
units within the Attorney General’s Office, including the Human Rights Violations 
Unit, the Analysis Unit for complex investigations, a special police force for criminal 
investigation, and a Police Information Platform, and it also strengthened the 
Special Investigation Methods Unit. Thanks to this institutional strengthening, the 
newly professionalized Attorney General’s Office is able to take the lead role and 
conduct more solid investigations into networks of corruption and impunity.
Third, CICIG proposed the creation of a system of High Risk Courts to adjudicate 
sensitive cases related to organized crime and corruption in order to provide more 
safety for magistrates, witnesses, and lawyers involved in the cases.1481 The courts 
only have competency to hear cases involving specific crimes such as genocide, 
torture, crimes against humanity, and crimes related to organized crime laws such 
as money laundering, drug trafficking, and the financing of terrorism.1482 With more 
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security, judges can more easily assert their independence. The High Risk Courts 
are located in Guatemala City and have jurisdiction over the whole country. They 
have heard complex cases of organized crime, corruption, and serious violations 
of human rights. The success of this system has helped generate new popular 
confidence in legal institutions and the rule of law.
Financing
Although CICIG began operations with borrowed funds, intense fundraising efforts 
in late 2007 and early 2008, assisted by the UN, produced commitments for 90 
percent of CICIG’s two-year budget by mid-2008.1483 The initial budget, estimated 
at US$10 million per year, quickly grew to US$20 million by 2009 before financial 
crisis–induced reductions to US$15 million near the end of 2011.
CICIG is a financially independent institution that receives funds from voluntary 
contributions from the international community, with the United Nations 
Development Programme managing a trust fund. Donations have come from 
Canada, Denmark, Spain, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European 
Union. In-kind support, such as human resources, has come from Argentina, 
Chile, Colombia, France, Sweden, and Uruguay.1484 The U.S. Department of State 




According to Article 5 of the agreement concluded between the UN and the 
government of Guatemala, the commissioner is only required to submit periodic 
reports to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The legal status of CICIG 
as an international organization independent of the UN produced difficult 
management and oversight problems.1486 Legally, the UN’s only connection to CICIG 
was the appointment of the commissioner, which has resulted in CICIG’s having 
relatively little interaction with UN headquarters in New York.  
CICIG staff were barred from direct communications with the Secretariat. Thus, 
while the UN had no control over CICIG’s activities, and almost no influence on 
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its work, it would have been held responsible for any scandal or management or 
operational failures.1487
CICIG’s legal independence undoubtedly provides strong advantages: it is able to 
move creatively and quickly in an area distant from UN experience; use funds for 
intelligence purposes; work efficiently with other governments to share information; 
arrange for witness protection or procure arrests; and react nimbly and boldly to 
political developments. However, the Guatemala experience reinforces the need for 
oversight. The risks of leaving the CICIG’s commissioner with unchecked authority 
over operations present a risk and affect central strategy issues, management of 
personnel and finances, and the relationships between the entity and state actors 
and criminal organizations.
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HAITI
Conflict Background and Political Context
Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier ruled Haiti as president from 1971 to 1986, 
succeeding his father, “Papa Doc” Duvalier, whose regime from 1957 to 1971 was 
notorious for its brutality. Jean-Claude’s regime was characterized by institutional 
violence and state-sponsored repression enforced by a network of security forces 
that answered directly to the president, including the brutal “Tontons Macoutes” 
(“Bogeymen”), a private armed group, in addition to the official military and police 
forces. Human rights organizations documented abuses including: disappearances 
and political killings; torture; and repression of the press and political dissent.1488  
A harsh prison system housed hundreds of political dissidents in long-term 
detention, often without trial, in which many died.1489 Duvalier amassed a fortune 
and maintained a lavish lifestyle despite presiding over one of the poorest countries 
in the world.
Jean-Claude Duvalier went into exile in France in 1986 after months of unrest and 
protests over economic conditions and political repression. The new government 
established a commission to investigate financial corruption under Duvalier and 
later instituted criminal proceedings against Duvalier and other members of his 
government for financial crimes and for crimes against persons. When Duvalier 
returned to Haiti two-and-a-half decades later, in January 2011, these proceedings 
were immediately reinstituted, and within two days, he was being investigated 
for both financial crimes and human rights abuses.1490 Rights groups called for 
accountability.1491 Outgoing Haitian President René Préval displayed limited 
support for the case. During presidential elections in May 2011 between Préval and 
Michel Martelly, both made public statements about the case fraught with political 
implication. President Préval, however, accepted the offer by the UN’s Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to assist and share expertise 
with Haitian judicial authorities in the months after Duvalier’s return.1492 Until early 
2012, Duvalier appeared at official events, social events, and public memorials 
for earthquake victims, flouting a judicial order in early 2011 placing him under 
limited house arrest. These ambiguous political signals, especially during the 
election season, may have dissuaded some witnesses and victims from emerging 
at the preliminary investigations stage. Such concerns also highlighted the need 
for an independent judicial process and the development of a victim and witness 
protection program. After winning the election, President Martelly appointed 
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many Duvalier supporters and former officials to his administration, suggesting 
the deep involvement of Haiti’s political class in the crimes of the Duvalier regime. 
Powerful political elements of the government were averse to pursuing genuine 
accountability, preferring not to uncover old networks. 
Following the dismissal of the human rights charges by Investigative Magistrate 
Carves Jean in January 2012, some steps were taken to facilitate accountability. 
The Haitian judiciary accepted a visit by U.S. lawyers to advise on regional and 
international human rights and accountability frameworks in February 2012, and the 
attorney general signaled his intention to contest the dismissal of the human rights 
charges. The OHCHR, the UN independent human rights expert, and the Secretary-
General all publicly supported accountability for Duvalier and facilitated limited 
technical assistance behind the scenes. The UN made these efforts in the context of 
its wider post-earthquake reconstruction role, led by the UN Stabilization Mission in 
Haiti (MINUSTAH), under the Secretary-General.1493 
Existing Justice-Sector Capacity
Haiti has “a weak, under-funded judiciary that is neither independent nor 
accountable to the Haitian people.”1494 The judiciary has no literature on 
jurisprudence, most judges lack legal texts, and underpaid judges are frequently 
unaware of changes to laws or the existence of relevant treaty law.1495 Haiti lacks a 
legal framework or structures for the protection of victims and witnesses.1496 The 
combination of extensive executive and elite control over judicial matters and a 
broad range of technical deficiencies has created problems across the board: from 
the fair and effective enforcement of judicial orders to respect for fair trial rights.1497 
The state routinely fails to investigate and prosecute major crimes.1498
Existing Civil Society Capacity
Haitian human rights organizations, lawyers, and activists have long been active 
in bringing complaints to the UN human rights bodies and the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), as well as domestic criminal cases 
including the judicial proceedings against Duvalier. For instance, they lodged 
complaints with the state prosecutor on behalf of Duvalier-era victims that formed 
the basis of instructions to investigating judges.1499 A civil society organization, the 
Citizen’s Collective for Prosecuting Duvalier, aimed at increasing public awareness 
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of the case. However, those involved in cases considered politically sensitive 
—including the cases against Duvalier— reported receiving threats and intimidation 
throughout the period of the Duvalier proceedings.1500 Attorneys involved in legal 
challenges to corruption felt the need to request protective measures from the IACHR.1501
Creation
Human Rights Watch suggested in 2011 that the international community, in 
addition to funding “behind the scenes” international assistance for proceedings 
against Duvalier, could consider “funding or seconding a temporary complement 
of international staff to work alongside Haitian staff,”1502 acknowledging the limited 
technical expertise of the Haitian judiciary regarding international criminal law and 
the potential for political interference. International experts took on no formal role 
in the justice system, but alongside local advocates, international bodies and civil 
society organizations nevertheless played important roles in the proceedings.
In May 2011, the IACHR issued a statement responding to petitions by a coalition of 
plaintiffs and human rights advocates. It noted that “as a State Party to the American 
Convention, the Republic of Haiti has an international obligation to investigate and 
where necessary, punish those responsible for the gross human rights violations 
committed during the regime of Jean-Claude Duvalier.”1503 The statement cited 
rulings from the International Court of Human Rights that statutes of limitations 
cannot bar prosecution for serious human rights violations.1504 Justice advocates 
saw the IACHR’s 2011 statement as a useful tool, but also one that revealed the 
judiciary’s weak understanding of and unwillingness to enforce its obligations 
as a member of the IACHR. International human rights organizations, including 
Human Rights Watch, the Open Society Justice Initiative, the International Center 
for Transitional Justice, Amnesty International, and the Boston-based Institute for 
Justice and Democracy in Haiti (IJDH) assisted a coalition of national groups in 
filing briefs to the IACHR and petitions before the Haitian court on the case, and 
generally supported legal and advocacy efforts.1505 The Justice Initiative filed an 
amicus curiae brief, and IJDH submitted draft questions to the juge d’instruction.1506 
Following the investigative judge’s decision in January 2012 not to pursue charges 
of serious human rights violations against Duvalier (see Prosecutions, below), the 
IACHR released a statement expressing concern over the declaration of the statute 
of limitations, signaling it would remain involved.1507 
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Legal Framework and Mandate
Haiti is a former French colony, and its judicial system is based largely on the civil 
law system used in France.
When Jean-Claude Duvalier returned to Haiti in January 2011, the minister of justice 
and the national prosecutor announced that the charging instruments would include 
“crimes against persons,” as well as financial crimes.1508 Under Haiti’s Penal Code, 
“crimes against persons” comprise murder, torture, enforced disappearances, and 
“sequestration” (analogous to false imprisonment). 
A coalition of national and international organizations organized a multipronged 
campaign to advocate that Duvalier be held accountable. At least 22 individuals filed 
criminal complaints in relation to the human rights charges, and other victims filed 
civil charges.1509 Under Haiti’s civil law system, the matter passed through several 
investigative and prosecutorial offices. The technicality of the proceedings, the 
limited understanding among local judicial personnel of Haiti’s international legal 
obligations, and Haiti’s inadequate legal framework for atrocity crimes made it more 
difficult for rights groups to intervene.1510 Rights groups criticized the investigation 
and noted instances of intimidation of victims who came forward to testify.1511 
Location
The proceedings against Duvalier and other members of his government were 
ordered by the state prosecutor in Port-au-Prince, Haiti’s capital.
Structure and Composition
The state prosecutor instituted the Duvalier proceedings, and the prosecutor 
appointed investigating judges to carry out investigations of financial crimes and 
crimes against the person. The proceedings went through the regular criminal courts 
and the Appellate Court in Port-au-Prince. 
Prosecutions
In January 2012, after a yearlong investigation, the investigating judge ruled that 
Duvalier would only face trial on corruption and embezzlement charges, not for 
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rights abuses. The judge found the legal grounds to include human rights charges 
and crimes against humanity insufficient, citing the statute of limitations under 
Haitian law barring prosecutions. Observers and activists criticized the ruling for 
not taking into account IACHR jurisprudence.1512 Both Duvalier and victims who 
had been accepted as civil parties appealed the ruling. The appeal hearings began in 
February 2013 in the Court of Appeal and concluded in May 2013. Duvalier and eight 
victims gave testimony. In January 2014, Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch claimed that the proceedings had stalled and that the Haitian authorities 
displayed no intention of carrying out thorough investigations into abuses from  
the Duvalier era.1513
On February 21, 2014, the Appeals Court of Port-au-Prince issued its decision, 
overturning the judgment and declaring that the acts of which Duvalier was accused 
constituted crimes against humanity. The court found that these crimes are not 
subject to any statute of limitations and ordered a new investigation to establish 
whether he should be prosecuted.1514
Later the same year, on October 4, 2014, Duvalier died suddenly of a heart attack, 
aged 63, in Port-au-Prince. Human rights groups called for the legal process to 
continue, on the basis that complaints were not aimed solely at Duvalier and that 
there were thousands of victims who deserved justice.1515 The proceedings appear to 
have stalled, however. In March 2017, the UN Independent Expert on Haiti, Gustavo 
Gallon, expressed concerns regarding the lack of progress in the trial of Duvalier’s 
associates. Gallon stated that there would need to be new resources and political 
support to realize victims’ right to justice for serious crimes committed during the 
Duvalier dictatorship.1516
Legacy
Duvalier’s sudden death frustrated victims who wished to see accountability for 
crimes during his regime. Victims and civil society organizations called for the 
continued prosecution of Duvalier associates and even the establishment of a 
truth commission.1517 As of late 2017, there were no apparent further significant 
developments with regard to criminal accountability or other transitional justice 
measures in relation to the Duvalier era. 
The effort to prosecute Duvalier included the provision of technical assistance 
to justice sector officials and civil society organizations, perhaps boosting 
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domestic capacity to prosecute grave crimes. The OHCHR, the IACHR, and other 
international organizations offered specialized trainings and technical assistance 
to domestic judicial personnel.1518 In August 2011, MINUSTAH reported that it had 
“worked with State authorities to advance efforts in response to long-standing 
cases of violations, including those committed during the regime of Jean-Claude 
Duvalier.”1519 The OHCHR, the UN Secretary-General, and the UN Independent 
Expert on Human Rights in Haiti also offered to facilitate limited technical 
assistance to Haitian prosecutors, investigators, and other judicial authorities.1520 
The UN Independent Expert publicly supported efforts by victim groups to appeal 
the January 2012 ruling.1521 The U.S. State Department also coordinated technical 
assistance and, in February 2012, dispatched a team of international legal experts to 
meet with members of the Haitian judiciary.1522 
Financing
The proceedings were financed as a regular part of the domestic criminal justice 
system, supported by technical assistance from the outside. 
Oversight and Accountability
The justice sector in Haiti “lacks oversight capacity.”1523 Critics charge that a Superior 
Council of Judicial Power established in 2012 to professionalize the judiciary has 
become just another instrument of executive control.1524
Monitoring by the IACHR and other international and civil society organizations 
appears to have been significant in bolstering the government’s willingness to pursue 
the case against Duvalier. The IACHR conducted several public hearings during 
the course of the proceedings. In May 2011, it issued a “Statement on the Duty of 
the Haitian State to Investigate the Gross Violations of Human Rights Committed 
during the Regime of Jean-Claude Duvalier” following a public hearing on impunity 
for human rights during the Duvalier dictatorship.1525 In May 2014, the IACHR again 
intervened, welcoming the Haitian Court of Appeals to reopen the investigation on 
the grounds that statutes of limitations did not apply to crimes against humanity, 
later calling on Haiti and other states to release official documents that could serve 
as evidence of the violations committed under Duvalier.1526
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MEXICO: INTERDISCIPLINARY GROUP OF INDEPENDENT 
EXPERTS 
Conflict Background and Political Context
On September 26, 2014, in the Mexican state of Guerrero, armed men attacked a 
group of more than 100 students from Raúl Isidro Burgos Rural Teachers’ School 
(Escuela Normal Rural Raúl Isidro Burgos) of Ayotzinapa. The attackers intercepted 
the students as they attempted to leave the small city of Iguala in commandeered 
buses to attend protests in Mexico City. In a series of incidents, the attackers, who 
included local police, opened fire, leaving six civilians killed and dozens more 
injured. The tortured body of one of the students, Julio César Mondragon, was 
found in the street hours later. Another 43 students were rounded up, arrested, 
and disappeared. For 10 days, the federal government refused to open a criminal 
investigation, stating that it was a matter for Guerrero state authorities. 
Within Mexico and internationally, the case and the government’s reaction sparked 
intense public outrage, leading to massive protests and diplomatic pressure. The 
incident occurred in the context of a wave of atrocities in Mexico that began in 2005, 
when the federal government deployed the military domestically on a large scale to 
combat organized crime. The Ayotzinapa disappearances illustrated the shocking 
severity of Mexico’s crisis of atrocity and impunity, and it followed other high-profile 
scandals that had eroded the credibility and reputation of the federal government 
and that of the state of Guerrero.1527 
As the pressure mounted, in November 2014 the federal government announced that 
it had reached an agreement with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR) and the families of the missing students to invite an Interdisciplinary Group 
of Independent Experts (Grupo Interdisciplinario de Expertos y Expertas Independientes, 
GIEI) selected by the IACHR to bring technical assistance to the investigation. 
Before the GIEI took up its work in March 2015, Mexican Attorney General 
Jesús Murillo Karam called a press conference to reveal the results of the federal 
investigation: what he termed “the historical truth” about what happened to the 
students. According to this, local police launched the attack on the orders of the 
Iguala mayor and turned over the disappeared 43 to the Guerreros Unidos crime 
organization, with which the mayor and police were colluding. The 43 students had 
been executed at a garbage dump outside a nearby town, and their bodies had been 
incinerated and ashes dumped in a river. 
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The families of the disappeared students rejected this story, and over the following 
months, the GIEI’s work and that of other outside experts cast severe doubt on 
its veracity. The outcome of the GIEI’s technical assistance revealed a federal 
investigation marred by incompetence, planted and manipulated evidence, claims of 
fire that were forensically disproved, a failure to pursue significant leads, and the 
torture of scores of detainees to support the government’s official narrative of the crime. 
Existing Justice-Sector Capacity
Mexico’s federal judiciary is a three-tiered system with a Supreme Court, circuit 
courts, and district courts; criminal activity in Mexico falls under either federal or 
state jurisdiction. While the Mexican judiciary is reasonably independent at the 
federal level, one significant difficulty with the system is that many jurisdictions have 
inadequate definitions of crimes or none at all.1528 Federal and state officials have 
also exploited the lack of clarity in the laws establishing jurisdiction to manipulate 
the treatment of cases, obstruct investigations, and avoid the prosecutions of serious 
crimes.1529 Official victimization surveys routinely show that over 90 percent of 
crimes in the country were not investigated or reported to authorities, and less than 
10 percent of criminal investigations end in a conviction.1530 
In 2008, the Mexican Congress amended the country’s constitution to establish a 
new criminal justice system that would scrap the “inquisitorial” approach heavily 
based on written evidence presented by a prosecutor, in favor of a more transparent 
“adversarial” model where lawyers argue their cases orally before a judge.1531 The 
new system would also incorporate the presumption of innocence and establish 
other basic rights for defendants.1532 Mexico remains several years away from fully 
implementing the adversarial model, which has been heralded as a needed step to 
counter the entrenched problems of corruption and to put an end to the use of poor 
and abusive investigative methods. However, cases related to organized crime are 
excepted from this transition. And even for other cases, those started in the old 
system will continue to be processed under the “inquisitorial” model, and even 
where the new model is in force, judges often continue to admit evidence obtained 
through torture. Meanwhile, the Mexican military has continued to exercise de facto 
control over some of the most egregious cases of civilian killings, creating parallel 
investigations in civilian and military courts, which are often more politicized.1533
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Existing Civil Society Capacity
Mexico has an active civil society working to expose and end corruption and 
impunity in the country. International NGOs are supporting the efforts of local 
NGOs and other civil society groups challenging the Mexican government’s failed 
war against organized crime. Groups involved in promoting and contributing to the 
national discourse include well-established academic institutions, independent 
research centers, human rights organizations, public interest law firms, victims’ 
groups, and students, as well as international NGOs operating locally within Mexico. 
In 2017, 20 Mexican organizations, three international organizations, and over 
50 individual human rights advocates joined efforts toward shared goals with the 
creation of a unified Platform Against Impunity and Corruption (Plataforma Contra 
La Impunidad y Corrupción).1534 
Among the most influential human rights entities in Mexico is the Miguel Agustín 
Juárez Human Rights Center in Mexico City (known as Centro Prodh), which 
has worked since its inception in 1988 to demand justice for gross human rights 
violations and promote higher standards in public security, accountability, and 
criminal justice reform.1535 It has represented witnesses and survivors of abuse in 
cases raising constitutional challenges against the federal government. In the case of 
Ayotzinapa, Centro Prodh has collaborated closely with the Guerrero-based 
Tlachinollan Human Rights Center, and both organizations have represented victims.
The lives of human rights advocates and journalists have come under frequent 
threat. Mexico is considered one of the most dangerous places in the world to be a 
journalist.1536 Since 2000, at least 104 journalists have been murdered while 25 others 
have disappeared. Out of more than 800 serious cases of harassment, assault, or 
homicide against members of the media in the last six years, the government has 
only convicted two suspects.1537
Creation
The GIEI was created on November 12, 2014, through an agreement between the 
IACHR, the Mexican government, and the representatives of the disappeared 
students from Ayotzinapa following the issuance of IACHR precautionary measures 
for the families and their representatives.1538 The president of the IACHR not only 
viewed the historic agreement as a mechanism for directly addressing the case 
of the disappeared 43 students, but also stressed that its creation represented 
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“a key opportunity to advance in solving a structural issue that Mexico has been 
experiencing for years.”1539 Rising domestic and international pressure for an 
adequate response to the Ayotzinapa disappearances within the context of thousands 
more cases of disappearances likely facilitated the Mexican government’s agreement 
to allow an international body within its jurisdiction for additional support and 
oversight. As part of its investigation surrounding the Ayotzinapa disappearances, 
many expected the GIEI’s efforts would lead to steps that would resolve the underlying 
structural problems giving rise to widespread disappearances in the country. 
The Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) made official an oral agreement reached 
on October 29, 2014, at a meeting of the students’ families with President Enrique 
Peña Nieto.1540 The parties established that Mexico would receive IACHR technical 
assistance for the investigation of the events of September 26 and 27, including 
the search for the missing 43 students. The MoA originally set the GIEI’s mandate 
for a six-month period, but foresaw the possibility of granting extensions for the 
completion of its objectives with the agreement of the IACHR and the parties. 
Under the MoA, Mexico accepted technical assistance from an interdisciplinary 
group of independent experts selected by the IACHR. The objective of the technical 
assistance offered by the GIEI would be to determine the whereabouts of the 43 
students with the aim of finding them alive. It further tasked the group of experts 
with investigating the victimization of other civilians and students involved in 
the events and ensuring that measures were in place for their protection. More 
generally, the MoA tasked the GIEI with making policy recommendations regarding 
disappearances in Mexico. This included recommendations for Mexico to conform 
to international standards of forensic investigations and best practices. The MoA 
also empowered the GIEI to advance lines of investigation and to determine 
criminal liability for the perpetrators. Finally, the MoA tasked the GIEI with 
providing technical analysis of the Mexican government’s assistance to victims of 
the September 26 and 27 attacks. 
Under the MoA, Mexico agreed to several obligations to facilitate the work of 
the GIEI. These included granting the GIEI access to investigation files, case 
documents, and other public information retained by the government. Mexico 
agreed to grant the GIEI the necessary resources and logistical accommodations to 
carry out its mandate. Mexican authorities were furthermore obligated to designate 
a high-level, cross-institutional group of officials with the capacity to work with the 
GIEI and implement its final recommendations. Finally, under the MoA, Mexico 
agreed to cover all the costs incurred from the GIEI’s operation. 
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The IACHR selected five individual experts to form the GIEI on January 18, 2015. 
The GIEI held its first meeting at the IACHR on February 11–12, 2015, to discuss 
its internal norms and procedures and to adopt an action plan for the fulfilment 
of its mission.1541 
Legal Framework and Mandate
The stated purpose of the agreement to establish the GIEI was four-fold: (1) to 
provide Mexico with an independent body of experts for a period of six months to 
address structural problems contributing to enforced disappearances in Mexico 
generally; (2) more specifically, to advance leads for the search of the disappeared 
43 students with the assumption that they are still alive; (3) to provide technical 
expertise in the investigation surrounding their disappearance and determine any 
criminal liability; and (4) to lend technical analysis on the government’s “Plan for 
the Attention to the Victims of the September 26 and 27 Events.”1542
The GIEI operated from February 2015 to April 2016. It held its first meeting in 
February 2015 and began its formal activities on March 2, 2015.1543 It was initially 
expected to conclude its mandate in October 2015, but after interim results of the 
investigation were obtained, the IACHR extended the GIEI’s mandate for six months 
at the request of the families of the victims.1544 The GIEI presented its final findings 
in late April 2016 and ended its mandate at the end of that month.
During the course of its mandate, the GIEI issued a total of 14 monthly progress 
reports and two major reports on its findings. The first major report, released on 
September 6, 2015, was titled, “Ayotzinapa Report: Research and initial conclusions 
of the disappearances and homicides of the normalistas of Ayotzinapa.” The second 
report, released on April 24, 2016, was titled: “II Ayotzinapa Report: Progress and 
new conclusions about the investigation, search, and attention to the victims.” 
On April 16, 2016, the IACHR announced that it would not renew the GIEI’s 
mandate because of the Mexican government’s refusal to allow the group to 
continue its work.1545 Despite the valuable contributions and advances it made 
in the investigation of the case, Mexico’s refusal to extend the GIEI’s mandate 
left the ultimate objective of its mission unfulfilled. While the IACHR and the 
representatives of the victims’ families advocated for the work of the GIEI to 
continue until the case was solved, Mexico’s consent was required under the terms 
of the MoA. In light of this, on July 29, 2016, the commission established a special 
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monitoring mechanism to follow-up on Mexico’s progress with the implementation 
of the recommendations made in the two reports.1546 For its part, the Mexican 
government affirmed that it would continue with its investigation and ensure that 
those responsible would be sanctioned. 
Under the legal framework of the MoA and the follow-up mechanism, the ultimate 
responsibility for delivering justice to the victims has always rested with the Mexican 
government. 
Location
The GIEI first convened in Washington, D.C., where the Organization of American 
States (OAS) is currently headquartered, and also met there thereafter.1547 It undertook 
its mandate through a series of in situ visits to Mexico and the state of Guerrero 
between March 1, 2015, and April 30, 2016, and maintained permanent representation 
in Mexico throughout its mandate. 
Structure and Composition
The IACHR selected the GIEI’s five independent experts from a list of 
recommendations made by the Mexican government and the representatives of 
the missing students. The selected experts formed a diverse group of professionals 
distinguished for their years of work in advancing independent human rights 
work: Carlos Martín Beristain, a national of Spain and a doctor of medicine and 
psychology; Angela Buitrago, a Colombian lawyer with a specialization in criminal 
law and criminology; Francisco Cox Vial, a Chilean lawyer and professor of 
constitutional law; Claudia Paz y Paz, Guatemala’s first female attorney general and 
a former judge; and Alejandro Valencia Villa, a Colombian human rights lawyer and 
professor of human rights, humanitarian law, and transnational justice.1548 
Prosecutions
The GIEI itself did not have a prosecutorial mandate. But its investigations shed 
light on the events in Iguala, as well as indications of a federal investigation 
featuring criminality, incompetence, and the manipulation of evidence.
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The GIEI’s work was essential in disproving the so-called “historic truth” that the 
Mexican government attempted to impose on the investigation just four months 
after the disappearance of the students. The Mexican government’s assertion that 
the students were killed and cremated at a trash dump contradicted facts uncovered 
in the GIEI’s investigation, as well as the scientific studies of a world-renowned fire 
expert and the internationally recognized Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team 
(Equipo Argentino de Antropología Forense, EAAF). Both forensic studies concluded 
that there was no scientific basis to support the government’s theory. They found 
that multiple fires had occurred at the trash site, but none large enough to incinerate 
43 bodies, and no evidence that a fire took place at all on the night the students 
were supposedly killed and cremated. The studies found the charred remains of 19 
individuals, but none that matched the DNA of the missing 43 students; rather, some 
of the remains definitively were not those of any of the disappeared students.1549
The experts helped advance other more credible lines of investigation, including 
a possible motive for a large-scale attack against the students. They concluded 
that on the night of the attack, the students commandeered a fifth bus, which was 
intercepted by federal police who offloaded the students and escorted the bus away 
from Iguala. The federal government omitted this bus from its investigation despite 
testimony from students regarding its existence, video footage of the bus, and its 
inclusion in an initial investigation handled by Guerrero state authorities. The bus 
that authorities later presented to the GIEI to examine did not match the bus seen on 
the surveillance video and described by students. The experts hypothesized that the 
missing bus could have contained hidden drugs or money belonging to the Guerreros 
Unidos criminal organization. Lending strong support to the experts’ hypothesis, 
another U.S. Department of Justice case concerning drug distribution in the United 
States found that individuals working on behalf of the Guerreros Unidos used 
commercial passenger buses to conceal and transport drugs from Guerrero,  
Mexico, to Chicago, Illinois.1550 
The GIEI’s investigation also revealed strong evidence that implicated several 
Mexican authorities. The experts concluded that security forces from all three levels 
of government were present during different attacks on the students, including 
municipal, state, and federal police. It found that the military was also aware of 
the attacks on the students and present at some of the crime scenes. According to 
testimonies, a group of soldiers entered the police station and searched the cells 
where the students were supposedly detained. The experts noted that in spite of 
the awareness of the prolonged attacks against the students, no security force 
intervened to protect them. Yet military agents reported their observations over 
the government’s C-4 communication system and took photos and video on a 
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mobile phone. The military refused to collaborate fully with the group of experts 
by denying them access to the phone video and the C-4 communications from the 
specific periods during the night of the attacks. In addition, Mexican authorities 
repeatedly denied the GIEI’s access to the soldiers based in Iguala, who likely 
witnessed all stages of the attack leading to the disappearance of the students. The 
GIEI concluded that the operation against the students had to have been centrally 
coordinated, given its sustained nature and the involvement of several patrols from 
at least two jurisdictions (Iguala and Cocula).
The group of experts faced a number of obstacles in carrying out their mandate 
that stemmed from the government’s unwillingness to collaborate fully with 
the investigation, including possible obstruction of justice and attempts to 
undermine or discredit its work and findings. Although the group of experts were 
able to directly interview federal, state, and municipal authorities, they were not 
allowed to interview soldiers directly, through surrogates, or be present when 
the federal prosecutors conducted the interviews with soldiers. In addition, the 
GIEI complained in both reports that the government frequently did not provide 
requested information necessary for carrying out its mandate in a timely manner.
The GIEI’s findings indicate that government authorities obstructed justice during 
the course of the investigation. Their findings revealed that nearly 80 percent of 
suspects detained by authorities had injuries indicative of torture or mistreatment.1551 
The experts analyzed the cases of 17 of the detainees whose testimonies aligned 
with the government’s theory and found signs that all had been tortured.1552 The 
allegations include abuses of men and women subjected to sexual violence, 
electrical shocks to the genitals, penetration, beatings, asphyxiation, and threats of 
physical harm to their close family members.1553 The GIEI concluded that there is a 
high likelihood most confessions obtained by authorities were coerced in order to 
align with its own version. In addition, the coerced confessions may have been part 
of a calculated misinformation campaign. Part of detainees’ testimonies supporting 
the government’s “historic truth” about the trash dump were suspiciously leaked 
to the media at a time when the government’s theory was being scientifically 
disproven.1554 Further, some of the leaks did not correspond with what was actually 
said in testimonies. The GIEI pressed the government in its reports to conduct 
internal investigations into sources of the leaked information and possible crimes 
committed against detainees.
More evidence of possible obstruction of justice by authorities arose with the 
government’s tampering of evidence at the San Juan River crime scene, where 
the government supposedly uncovered trash bags containing charred remains of 
410   OPTIONS FOR JUSTICE
some of the missing students. The government falsified the date in which the bags 
of remains were officially recovered, made apparent only after photo and video 
evidence provided by journalists from Guerrero revealed that federal investigators 
from the federal Office of the General Prosecutor (Procurador General de la 
República, PGR) had been at the scene a full day prior. The head of the Agency for 
Criminal Investigations was there himself, together with an accused suspect who 
subsequently showed signs of torture. The group of independent forensic experts 
from Argentina working on the case were not informed when the government 
uncovered the bags, and none of the activity from the day before the bags were 
officially reported as found, including the suspect’s presence, was documented in 
the government’s case files. 
Even after the findings of the GIEI and those of the group of independent forensic 
experts both disproved the government’s theory of the case, Mexican authorities 
refused to abandon their version of events and continued to resist new lines of 
investigation advanced by the GIEI. Beginning in September 2015, the group of 
experts pressed Mexican authorities to open lines of dialogue with U.S. authorities 
to investigate the use of Mexican buses traveling from Guerrero to Chicago to carry 
narcotics across the border. The PGR moved slowly, initiating those contacts several 
months later, in February 2016. The experts found that contrary to the Mexican 
government’s assertions, the students’ cell phones showed activity in the hours 
and days after they disappeared. The experts urged the Mexican authorities to 
investigate cell phone data of the missing students and of suspected perpetrators to 
track their movements on the night of the attack. The government failed to explore 
these additional lines of investigation while the GIEI remained in operation. 
Another matter complicating the work of the GIEI occurred in mid-March 2016, 
when a criminal complaint was filed in the PGR against Emilio Álvarez Icaza 
Longoria, the executive secretary of the IACHR, for the alleged crime of fraud 
related to US$2 million––the same amount the Mexican government paid the 
IACHR to cover the costs of the GIEI investigation. The complaint attacked the 
GIEI’s integrity and demanded an immediate end to its work. The complaint echoed 
a media campaign attacking the reputation of three individual members of the 
GIEI.1555 The IACHR categorically rejected this as a smear campaign and expressed 
its dismay that the PGR opened a preliminary inquiry based on a complaint it 
found “reckless and unfounded” and which “does not contain any fact that would 
constitute a crime.”1556 The PGR announced in April 2016 that it would not pursue 
any criminal action against Icaza.
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Legacy
On January 27, 2015, Attorney General Jesús Murillo Karam stood in front of 
television cameras and declared that the government had concluded its investigation 
into the case of the missing 43 students from Ayotzinapa. Four months had lapsed 
since the night of their attack. Over a year later, the government had still not located 
the disappeared students, and the experts had uncovered numerous inconsistencies, 
investigative failures, and institutional deficiencies in the federal government’s 
investigation. In the process of searching for the missing students, by mid-2015, 
over 60 clandestine graves in the state of Guerrero containing dozens of bodies and 
human body parts were discovered.1557 The results of the GIEI’s investigations were 
not only a judgment on the government’s false conclusions about the Ayotzinapa 
case, but on the state’s failure in bringing justice to thousands of disappeared 
civilians over the past decade. On the day that the group of experts presented their 
final report to the public, the representatives of the Mexican government were 
notably absent from the front row that had been reserved for them.1558 
Hours after the GIEI presented its final report, the PGR issued a public statement 
that both affirmed the work of the experts while simultaneously rebutting every 
recommendation identified in the report. The PGR claimed to have allowed the 
group of experts full access to the information they requested, declared that it had 
carried out their requests in pursuing the new lines of investigation, or directly 
challenged the experts’ findings by asserting it found no evidence relevant to the 
case. The PGR effectively shut down a line of investigation linking the attacks to 
a possible transnational drug trafficking operation by claiming it had examined 
the fifth bus, found no irregularities, and that the bus’s route was limited to travel 
between Guerrero and a neighboring state. 
In its statement, the PGR attempted to revive its theory that the students had been 
killed and incinerated at the dump site by releasing the results of a third forensic 
study. The additional study took place at the government’s insistence and under 
a signed formal agreement with the GIEI on the conditions of the analysis. The 
government broke the terms of its agreement by holding a press conference on April 
1, 2016, to release preliminary findings that appeared to support its theory of a large 
fire in the dump site. In reality, the stated evidence did not add to or disprove the 
original findings of the first two scientific studies. The study failed to link evidence 
of a fire to the night of the attack and failed to match the remains of the 19 people 
found at the trash site. 
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The PGR’s statement was an attempt to both justify and emphasize its own role in 
the investigation while making no mention of the multiple flaws in how it handled 
the case. It cited as one of the major benchmarks of its success the arrest and 
detention of 123 people allegedly linked to the students’ disappearance. The remarks 
positioned the Mexican government to later reject the continuation of the GIEI’s work. 
On July 29, 2016, the Inter-American Commission implemented a Follow-up 
Mechanism after it became clear that further international supervision would 
be necessary to protect the families of Ayotzinapa victims and to monitor the 
implementation of the GIEI’s recommendations. Although the mechanism will not 
participate directly in the case’s investigation, its specific objectives outlined in its 
work plan are as follows: (1) monitor the progress of the investigation; (2) provide 
advisory assistance and support to the process to search for the disappeared; 
(3) ensure that comprehensive attention is given to victims and their relatives; 
and (4) promote any structural measures that may be appropriate to resolve this 
matter and ensure that such an event does not happen again.1559 The mechanism 
would authorize four official visits and four technical visits in coordination with 
Mexican authorities from November 9, 2016, through November 2017. Official 
visits are led by the coordinator to the Follow-up Mechanism and the rapporteur 
for Mexico and accompanied by technical staff assigned by the IACHR Executive 
Secretariat. Technical visits are carried out by staff of the Executive Secretariat in 
order to compile any information and documents necessary to meet the objectives 
of the mechanism. The mechanism allows for specialists from other disciplines to 
accompany the staff as needed. In addition, the Follow-up Mechanism authorizes 
the IACHR to meet with relatives of the 43 disappeared students and other victims, 
hold meetings with other international bodies and civil society organizations to shed 
light on the case, hold high-level meetings and roundtables with representatives of 
state institutions, hold working meetings to implement the precautionary measures, 
and hold public hearings on the objectives of the Follow-up Mechanism during 
IACHR sessions. Through the mechanism, the IACHR is empowered to submit any 
requests for information and may issue preliminary observations, reports, and/or 
press releases on its findings. 
As of September 2017, the IACHR had conducted a total of three official visits, 
three technical visits, and two public hearings since the start of the Follow-up 
Mechanism. In the first public hearing in March 2017, over a year after the GIEI’s 
presentation and final report, the Mexican authorities continued to defend their 
“historical truth.”1560 During the IACHR’s second official visit in April 2017, members 
expressed “concern about the slow pace in coming to conclusions, both in the 
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search activities and in the effective clarification of the various lines of investigation 
indicated by the Inter-Disciplinary Group.”1561 The IACHR recognized that among 
many of the concrete recommendations made by the GIEI for moving forward with 
the investigation, Mexican authorities had taken administrative steps to contract 
Light Imaging Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) technology for the search of mass 
graves and had made progress with the investigation of telephone communication. 
Following its third visit in August 2017, the IACHR reported little progress and noted 
that the government’s insistence on one version of events, “which has already been 
ruled out by the GIEI, places a hurdle between the victims and their family members 
and jeopardizes the quest for truth and justice in this case.”1562
In June 2017, the IACHR held its second public hearing during its 163rd session, 
where civil society representatives noted the state’s continued lack of progress.1563 
The commission expressed its concern over explosive allegations that implicated 
the state in acts of espionage against representatives of the relatives of the students 
and members of the GIEI using Pegasus spyware. The spyware, used to threaten 
journalists and human rights activists, potentially added to the disruption of the 
GIEI’s efforts during the critical span of its mandate.1564 
In the months following the GIEI’s mandate, more evidence has surfaced that 
Mexican authorities withheld key evidence from the group of experts. Evidence in a 
case against a gang leader suggested that the head of state’s Criminal Investigation 
Agency had ties to the Guerreros Unidos criminal organization.1565 The case further 
revealed that the military had detained another suspected leader of the crime 
group a few months prior to the attack against the students. The military was aware 
in that operation that the Guerreros Unidos had a practice of using commercial 
passenger buses to transport drugs to the United States, and a book seized from a 
drug trafficker linked to the case contained phone numbers of various authorities—
information and documents that were deliberately withheld from the GIEI. 
As of September 2017, Mexican authorities had arrested 131 people in connection 
with the case, although some of these were charged with organized crime offenses 
and kidnapping not directly tied to the students. A majority of the arrests were 
of municipal police officers and alleged cartel members. Many of those being 
prosecuted have alleged they were tortured by officials. Other arrests include that of 
the former mayor of Iguala and his wife. It is unclear whether the PGR has followed 
through with the GIEI’s recommendation that it investigate officials responsible for 
leaking information to the media during its mandate. When an internal investigation 
appeared to be preparing criminal charges in relation to manipulation of evidence 
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in the case, the PGR’s inspector general was removed from office. The head of 
the Agency for Criminal Investigation, who was personally suspected of evidence 
tampering, resigned, but was swiftly appointed by President Peña Nieto to a position 
on the powerful National Security Council.
Although the GIEI was unable to locate the disappeared students, it represented an 
unprecedented model of international cooperation in Mexico and demonstrated that 
an independent body of technical experts could shine new light on a complex case, 
even amidst a system plagued by corruption, torture, and politicization. The GIEI’s 
work sustained domestic and international attention on an important case and 
expanded the circle of Mexicans who believe that further international involvement 
could help to address the country’s broader crisis of atrocity and impunity.
Financing
The Mexican government funded the GIEI’s operational costs for a total contribution 
of US$2 million by its Foreign Ministry to the IACHR.1566 Mexico disbursed its 
first US$1 million contribution in November 2014 and made a second series of 
disbursements totaling another US$1 million by March 2016.1567 The financial 
support was considered a voluntary contribution from Mexico to the IACHR and 
administered by the OAS. The IACHR depends on funding by OAS member states 
and others through regular contributions. For the years in which Mexico contributed 
funds for the operational costs of the GIEI, it did not make additional contributions 
for the daily operation of the IACHR. 
Oversight and Accountability
The GIEI was an independent body created by agreement between the IACHR—
an autonomous organ of the OAS—and the Mexican government. The agreement 
established an oversight role for the IACHR over the adoption of precautionary 
measures related to the Ayotzinapa case and the GIEI’s recommendations. Members 
of the GIEI were to enjoy “privileges and immunities as are necessary for the 
exercise of its functions” under the agreement, in accordance with international 
standards.1568 Similar to the immunities enjoyed by representatives of member 
states under OAS procedures, the members of the GIEI were to enjoy immunity 
from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of their personal baggage. With 
respect to words spoken or written and all acts done in their official capacity, the 
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GIEI was given immunity from legal process of every kind. In addition, all papers 
and documents belonging to the GIEI were to receive the privilege of inviolability. 
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ANNEX 3: MECHANISMS IN ASIA
BANGLADESH: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
Conflict Background and Political Context
Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan came at great cost. In 1971, the Pakistani 
army invaded what was then East Pakistan to quell the Bengali independence 
movement. Although there is no reliable data, estimates are that up to three million 
people were killed between March and December 1971, accompanied by widespread 
torture and the rape of hundreds of thousands of women. The minority Hindu 
population also paid a huge price in the conflict. Millions of people were displaced to 
India, which eventually intervened militarily to end the Bangladesh Liberation War. 
Soon after the conflict, calls for justice arose, but an agreement among India, Pakistan, 
and Bangladesh essentially granted a general amnesty for all Pakistani participants 
in the violence.1569 However, some domestic prosecutions took place, pursuant to a 
1973 international crimes statute.1570 In 1975, a military coup overthrew the postwar 
Awami League government and assassinated Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman. A successor government, led by General Ziaur Rahman, halted all trials. 
Military rule continued in the 1980s, and democracy was only restored in 1991. 
In 2009, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina—daughter of Sheikh Rahman—was elected 
in a landslide victory, bringing to supermajority power the long-term opposition 
party, the Bangladesh Awami League. The new government quickly lived up to 
its election promise to prosecute serious crimes committed in 1971, dusting off 
and amending the 1973 International Criminal (Tribunals) Act and establishing 
a domestic tribunal for the prosecution of war crimes. The International Crimes 
Tribunal (ICT) operates in a polarized political environment and has “deepened 
already considerable divisions within the Bangladeshi political elite.”1571 While 
perceived as a welcome accountability tool among the general population, the 
political opposition and international observers have widely criticized the tribunal 
for its lack of international fair trial standards and of judicial independence, as well 
as its one-sided application of justice. 
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Existing Justice-Sector Capacity
At the time of the ICT’s creation in 2010, the justice sector in Bangladesh faced 
several constraints in delivering timely and effective justice to its citizens, 
even beyond the immense challenge for investigators and prosecutors in 
assembling evidence of crimes four decades after the fact. The United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) assessed in 2012 that problems included a backlog 
of approximately two million cases, outdated laws, the absence of sufficient 
infrastructure and facilities, lack of access to justice for the majority of the 
population, and a lack of coordination and cooperation among the key justice 
delivery agencies as well as (international) nongovernmental organizations involved 
in the justice sector.1572 
In the 39 years following the war, Bangladeshi governments and the international 
community showed very little interest in bringing to justice the perpetrators of grave 
crimes during the independence war. Neither the military leaders in the 1980s nor 
the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) elected in 1991 sought to prosecute wartime 
crimes, undoubtedly because of the involvement of several of their leaders. In a 
2009 report, Human Rights Watch concluded that “there has been a lack of political 
will under successive governments to hold accountable those responsible for human 
rights violations. Of the thousands of killings of individuals in the custody of the 
security forces since independence in 1971 … very few cases have resulted in a 
criminal conviction.”1573 
Existing Civil Society Capacity
Bangladesh has one of the world’s largest civil society sectors and has a tradition 
of civil society advocacy and activism dating back to Pakistani rule. In a country 
that has been battered by natural disasters throughout its history, NGOs have 
traditionally focused on rural development, relief, and rehabilitation. In 1972, 
the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) formed with the goal of 
resettling returning wartime refugees. Since the end of the war, civil society has 
increasingly focused its attention on social and economic development, and has 
increasingly become involved in addressing legal and political issues, including 
judicial and legal reforms.1574 NGOs playing an important role in the advancement of 
human rights and the development of the justice sector include Odhikar (“rights” in 
Bengali), Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK), and Hotline Bangladesh. 
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Since the country’s return to civilian rule in 1991, domestic civil society groups 
have led an unrelenting struggle for accountability for crimes committed during the 
1971 war.1575 A Peoples’ Tribunal for war crimes trials was held in 1992 in Dhaka, 
symbolically prosecuting both Pakistani and Bangladeshi perpetrators for crimes 
against humanity. A People’s Inquiry Commission, which investigated war crimes, 
and a National Coordinating Committee for Realization of Bangladesh Liberation 
War Ideals and Trial of Bangladesh War Criminals of 1971—a civil society–led 
movement that has worked on gathering evidence, collecting witness statements, 
and advocating for war crimes trials—were also created during that time.1576 
The creation of the ICT saw increased government repression of voices critical of the 
tribunal’s functioning amid a general shrinking space for civil society groups. ICT 
prosecutors have brought contempt cases against critics of the tribunal. (For further 
examination, see the Prosecutions section, below.) In an environment of growing 
hostility to criticism of government of any kind,1577 some NGOs nevertheless remain 
involved in monitoring the tribunal’s work. 
Creation
Almost immediately after the end of the War of Independence, the Sheik Mujibur 
Rahman government passed the 1972 Collaborators Order,1578 which led to the arrest 
of thousands of Bengali war crimes suspects. Proceedings were initiated against 
2,849 individuals, and some 750 people were eventually convicted. In 1973 the 
government additionally passed an Indemnity Order,1579 granting immunity from 
prosecution to anyone who had fought “in the service of the Republic” and for 
any acts committed during the independence struggle, thereby effectively sparing 
Awami League affiliates from prosecution.1580 In December 1973, on the celebration 
of the second “Victory Day” of the war, a presidential order limited further trials by 
declaring a general amnesty for wartime collaborators against whom proceedings 
had not yet been initiated, with the exception of rape, murder, and arson cases. 
Between 1972 and 1974, a total of 37,400 persons were arrested and investigated, 
and about 11,000 perpetrators faced trial under the Collaborators Order.1581 
In 1972, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) published a legal study on 
wartime events and concluded that “it would be preferable if those considered 
principally responsible for these offences were tried under international law before 
an international tribunal.”1582 It argued that a United Nations hybrid tribunal 
with international judges would be better able to ensure fair trials. However, the 
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international community showed little interest, and the Awami League government 
opposed the idea, so an international tribunal was never created. Instead, the 
ICJ consulted with the Bangladeshi government on the creation of a domestic 
mechanism for the prosecution of international crimes, which resulted in the 
adoption of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act in 1973. At the time, no war 
crimes trials were held under the ICT Act.1583 
After the 1975 assassination of Sheikh Rahman and overthrow of the Awami League 
government, the new military government repealed the Collaborators Order, ended 
all war crimes proceedings, annulled several judgments, and released all suspects. 
The new administration even installed some of those previously convicted in 
high-level government positions. When military rule ended in 1991, the interest in 
accountability reemerged, and the National Committee for the Realization of the 
Bangladesh Liberation War Ideals and Trials of Bangladeshi War Criminals of 1971 
was set up and started gathering evidence, conducting interviews with witnesses 
of war crimes, and advocating for prosecutions.1584 Other initiatives included the 
Peoples’ Tribunal established in 1992, which held mock trials of several high-level 
suspects (including some who would later stand accused before the ICT), and a 
People’s Inquiry Commission, which investigated war crimes. The Bangladesh 
Liberation War Museum, established in 1996, contributed to the push to deal with 
the past by organizing two Genocide and Justice Conferences in the 2000s.1585 
The Awami League won the 2008 elections, following a campaign in which it 
promised to hold war crimes trials. The new government amended the 1973 ICT 
Act in 2009,1586 and the International Crimes Tribunal of Bangladesh (ICT) was 
established on March 25, 2010, on the anniversary of the war’s beginning in 1971. 
A second war crimes chamber—the International Crimes Tribunal of Bangladesh-2 
(ICT-2)—started operations in March 2012, but was later shuttered. While they 
coexisted, both tribunals operated under the 1973 act and shared the same 
prosecutorial and investigative teams, but the ICT-2 developed its own Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence.1587 
Legal Framework and Mandate
The ICT Act was adopted in 1973 “to provide for the detention, prosecution and 
punishment of persons for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other 
crimes under international law.”1588 The ICT’s founding statute was one of the first 
attempts at international law prosecutions since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, 
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and many legal experts regard it as a progressive piece of legislation for its time. 
However, by the time of the ICT’s creation, 39 years after the commission of the 
crimes and 37 years after the law’s adoption, the field of international criminal law 
had advanced immensely and the 1973 law had become outdated.1589 In 2009 and 
2012, the government adopted minimal amendments to the statute, while  
rejecting recommendations from many outside experts. According to many 
observers, the amendments were insufficient to bring the law in line with basic 
international standards.1590 
The ICT’s mandate covers three core international crimes—genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity—as well as crimes against peace, committed in Bangladesh 
“before or after the commencement” of the 1973 act.1591 The elements of the crimes 
are defined as follows: 
 (a) Crimes against Humanity: namely, murder, extermination, 
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, abduction, confinement, 
torture, rape or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian 
population or persecutions on political, racial, ethnic or religious 
grounds, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the 
country where perpetrated; 
 (b) Crimes against Peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or 
waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international 
treaties, agreements or assurances; 
 (c) Genocide: meaning and including any of the following acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnic, racial, religious or political group, such as: (i) killing members 
of the group; (ii) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members 
of the group; (iii) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(iv) imposing measures intended to prevent Births within the group; 
(v) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group; 
 (d) War Crimes: namely, violation of laws or customs of war which 
include but are not limited to murder, ill-treatment or deportation 
to slave labour or for any other purpose of civilian population in the 
territory of Bangladesh; murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war 
or persons on the seas, killing of hostages and detenues, plunder 
of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or 
villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity; 
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 (e) violation of any humanitarian rules applicable in armed conflicts laid 
down in the Geneva Conventions of 1949; 
 (f ) any other crimes under international law.1592 
The three core international crimes in the statute are largely based on the 
Nuremberg International Military Tribunal (IMT) Charter and on customary 
international law at the time of its writing. As such, they do not reflect developments 
in modern international criminal law through the creation and jurisprudence of 
the ad hoc international tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR, 
respectively), the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSC), or the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). This includes contemporary Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, and international standards of fairness.1593 There are several other 
problems arising from the application of an outdated legal framework relating to 
the legality and retroactivity principles in international law. Namely, Bangladesh 
is applying the Genocide Convention although it was not signatory to the 
1949 Convention at the time;1594 it has defined war crimes based on the IMT 
Charter, which concerned an armed conflict of international character, while the 
independence war was an internal conflict; and it includes the vague term “other 
crimes under international law.”1595 
The ICT Act was originally designed foremost for the prosecution of members of 
the Pakistan Armed Forces, affiliated Bengali militias, and other forces that had 
collaborated with the Pakistani army during the conflict. Initially, the personal 
jurisdiction of the ICT was limited to individuals or groups of individuals who 
were members of the armed or defense forces, including paramilitary groups, 
who committed crimes on the territory of Bangladesh; this was later amended to 
include non-military personnel.1596 After the 1974 Delhi agreement among India, 
Pakistan, and Bangladesh, it became technically impossible for the ICT to prosecute 
Pakistanis because the statute only allows the ICT to hear cases related to persons 
on the territory of Bangladesh. Beyond individual criminal responsibility, the ICT 
Act recognizes command responsibility for crimes under the statute, which is by now 
a customary norm of international law, but wasn’t established as such at the time 
of its adoption. Article 5(1) of the ICT Act sets out that official capacity is no bar to 
prosecution or the mitigation of punishment before the tribunal, meaning that state 
officials do not necessarily enjoy immunity from criminal proceedings for crimes 
they committed during their time in office.1597 
Beyond the prosecution of international crimes, the ICT may bring contempt 
charges against “any person, who obstructs or abuses its process or disobeys any of 
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its orders or directions, or does anything which tends to prejudice the case of a party 
before it, or tends to bring it or any of its members into hatred or contempt, or does 
anything which constitutes contempt of the Tribunal, with simple imprisonment 
which may extend to one year, or with fine[s] which may extend to Taka five 
thousand [about US$60 in 2017], or with both.”1598 The tribunal has convicted 
several local and international media and civil society representatives under this 
provision, with no right to appeal. 
International observers decry several provisions of the ICT Statute as being 
inadequate and resulting in unfair trials. This includes an article stating that the 
Criminal Procedure Code and Evidence Act are not applicable to any proceedings 
of the tribunal, the approval of trials in absentia with a final judgment, the removal 
of the right against self-incrimination, and the absence of a provision requiring 
adequate time for preparation of the defense case.1599 The application of the 
death penalty under Article 20(2) is perhaps the most controversial aspect of the 
ICT Statute, especially because its use has become the standard rather than the 
exception and because the application of death sentences has not been done in 
accordance with international law.1600 The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Bangladesh is a signatory, determines that the 
death penalty may only be applied in limited circumstances and that the convicted 
must be given a right to appeal and an opportunity to ask for mercy. Despite a 
theoretical right to appeal death sentences, neither of the ICCPR’s conditions have 
been followed in practice before the ICT.1601
In 1972, the government amended Article 47 and 47(A) of the Constitution of 
Bangladesh to allow for the speedy prosecution of Pakistani army generals, and 
critics argue that this contributes to unfairness. Article 47 states: “Notwithstanding 
anything contained in this Constitution, no law nor any provision thereof providing 
for detention, prosecution or punishment of any person, who is a member of any 
armed or defence or auxiliary forces … or who is a prisoner of war, for genocide, 
crimes against humanity or war crimes and other crimes under international law 
shall be deemed void or unlawful.”1602 Additionally Article 47(A) further denies war 
crimes suspects the right to appeal to the Supreme Court in case of violations of their 
rights under the Constitution. This results in a complete absence of constitutional 
protections for the accused before the ICT, as well as an absence of the ability to 
enforce their fundamental constitutional rights in court.”1603 
In addition to the ICT Act, in 2010 the ICT adopted the International Crimes 
Tribunal Rules of Procedure. These set out the powers and functions of the tribunal, 
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the Investigating Authority (a designated agency for investigations into crimes under 
the statute created under Article 8 of the ICT Act), the prosecutor, and the registrar. 
They also define the rights of the accused and rules of evidence.1604
Location
The ICT is located in Dhaka, Bangladesh’s capital, and is composed of two separate 
tribunals: ICT-1 and ICT-2. According to the in 2012 amended Article 11(A) of 
the ICT Act, “At any stage of a case, a Tribunal may, on its own motion or on the 
application of the Chief Prosecutor, by an order in writing, transfer the case to 
another Tribunal, whenever it considers such transfer to be just, expedient and 
convenient for the proper dispensation of justice and expeditious disposal of such 
cases.”1605 Thus far, the tribunal has not made use of this provision. The tribunal is 
housed in a historic building, formerly used as the premises of the East Pakistan 
High Court. Upon its creation, the building was completely refurbished, and a public 
gallery and designated media area were created, as well as rooms with large video 
screens to allow overflow audiences to view the proceedings.1606
Structure and Composition
The ICT is comprised of one chamber (previously two), an Investigation Agency, and 
a Registry. Apart from the involvement of international defense counsel (who have 
been prevented from appearing in court), the ICT’s judges, prosecutors, and court 
staff are Bangladeshi nationals. 
Chambers 
The ICT is comprised of one three-judge chamber, the ICT-1, which started 
operations in 2010. A second chamber, ICT-2, was created in March 2012 but has 
not been active since September 2015.1607 The Appellate Division of the Bangladesh 
Supreme Court hears appeals from the ICT.1608 Under the 2010 amendment of 
the ICT Act, all judges must be civilian, and military judges are not eligible for 
appointment. Any person who is a judge, is qualified to be a judge, or has been a 
judge of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh is eligible for appointment as a chairman 
or member of a tribunal. The government of Bangladesh appoints ICT judges and 
may at any time in the proceedings, whether due to illness of a judge or “any other 
reason,” declare a judge’s seat vacant and appoint another.1609 Judicial replacements 
have been a much-used practice before the tribunal, leading to criticism of political 
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interference and unfair trials. In some cases, the government replaced the full bench 
of judges over the course of the trial, resulting in a verdict rendered by judges who 
had only heard part of the evidence.1610 
Investigative Authority 
The ICT Act sets out as follows: “The Government may establish an Agency for the 
purposes of investigation into crimes [under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal]; and 
any officer belonging to the Agency shall have the right to assist the prosecution 
during the trial.”1611 The staff of the Investigative Agency is appointed by the 
government and is tasked with the investigation of cases; when there is sufficient 
reason to believe that a crime under the statute has been committed, the agency 
may take steps to arrest the accused.1612 After completion of an investigation, the 
Investigative Authority submits a report and all evidence to the chief prosecutor, 
who brings formal charges against the accused.1613 The Investigative Authority’s 
reports are not provided to the defense.1614 The government of Bangladesh also 
appoints the chief prosecutor and other prosecutors.1615 
Office of the Tribunal 
The Office of the Tribunal, which is equal to the Registry in other courts, is responsible 
for all administrative and secretarial services of the ICT, maintaining external 
relations, and serving as its channel of communication.1616 The office is composed 
of a registrar and a deputy registrar.1617 The office may control the entry of persons 
to the public gallery of the courtrooms, and the Rules of Procedure specifically state 
that “for ensuring orderly and disciplined state of affairs inside the court-room of 
the Tribunal, no counsel, journalist, media person or other people shall be allowed 
to enter the court room without having an ‘entry pass’ issued by the Registrar.”1618 
Structural Limitations of the ICT 
According to international observers, flaws in the composition and structure of 
the ICT include: the lack of an internal Appeals Chamber, the prohibition of any 
challenge to the composition of the tribunal or the appointment of judges, the 
absence of offices dedicated to ensuring defense rights, the absence of structures for 
the protection and support of victims and witnesses, and the absence of an outreach 
office.1619 Under the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the tribunal “may pass 
necessary orders directing the concerned authorities of the government to ensure 
protection, privacy and well-being of the witnesses and or victims. This process 
will be confidential and the other side will not be notified.”1620 However, to date, 
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the protective and security measures in place remain limited, and there have been 
reports of witness intimidation, interference, and disappearance.1621 
Prosecutions
The ICT arrested its first suspects in June and July 2010,1622 and the first trial 
commenced in October 2011.1623 As of 2017, the ICT-1 and ICT-2 Chambers 
combined have delivered 28 judgments against a total of 56 accused.1624 The majority 
of the defendants are senior leaders in Bangladesh’s main opposition parties, the 
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and the Bangladeshi National Party (BNP). As of October 2017, 
there have been no ICT defendants who have been acquitted of all charges brought 
against them. At least 20 suspects have been tried in absentia, several in group 
trials.1625 Most defendants are charged with crimes against humanity, while some are 
also charged with political crimes.1626 While there was hope that proceedings at the 
ICT would shed light on the widespread rape and other sexual violence targeting 
Bengali women during the conflict, there have been only a few cases resulting in 
judgments for rape and other crimes of sexual violence.1627
In addition to grave crimes cases, the tribunal has been involved in a range of 
contempt proceedings against national and international media and human rights 
organizations, cases which may be brought to the court under Article 11(4) of the 
statute. The Economist, the local newspaper Amar Desh, Human Rights Watch, 
and British journalist David Bergman have all been subject to such proceedings in 
relation to critical reporting on the tribunal.1628 This included reporting based on 
hacked correspondence that exposed clear evidence of judges being under political 
influence.1629 Within Bangladesh, room for debate about the effectiveness and 
functioning of the ICT is severely limited.1630 
Many observers regard the trials conducted before the ICT as fundamentally 
unfair, not in accordance with Bangladeshi or international law standards, and as 
a political instrument for the current Awami League government to exact revenge 
on opponents. Critics have also noted that Bangladesh lacks the legal infrastructure 
and technical capacity on the prosecution and defense sides to deal with complex 
international crimes trials.1631 English barrister Geoffrey Robertson, who wrote an 
extensive report on the ICT’s functioning in 2015, has stated: “I am sorry to say this, 
for I think the exercise itself laudable and necessary, and many of its participants 
have been doing their best to make it work, but the evidence set out in this report 
drives me to the conclusion that this trial process is calibrated to send defendants—
all from the Jamaat or the BNP—to the gallows.”1632 
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The arrest, detention, and charging of defendants has been murky, with defendants 
alleging they were held without being informed of the charges against them; some 
defendants were not initially held under ICT warrants. In December 2011 and 
November 2012, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention concluded that the 
ICT breached international law by detaining defendants without charge.1633 
ICT judgments have on occasion led to violent protests between opposing political 
groups, instead of the long-sought reconciliation. In February 2013, the death sentence 
against a popular Jamaat leader, Delwar Hossain Sayeedi, led to mass demonstrations 
by supporters, while a life sentence judgment delivered in the same month against 
Abdul Quader Molla caused the “the biggest mass demonstration in the country 
… in 20 years” by opponents calling for the application of the death penalty.1634 
During riots against the eventual execution of Molla in December 2013, about 200 
people were killed.1635 By the beginning of 2015, about 500 people had been killed in 
demonstrations following the declaration or execution of death penalties.1636
Legacy
The 1973 ICT Act intended to hold accountable the individuals responsible 
for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other crimes under 
international law committed during the Bangladesh Liberation War. While the 
tribunal may be said to have held to account several perpetrators of the 1971 war, 
shoddy trials taint the credibility of its findings, and it has completely ignored 
atrocities by the pro-independence movement. There have been no prosecutions for 
crimes committed against the Bihari minority, which was extensively targeted during 
and after the war. The tribunal could have been an important opportunity for justice 
and reconciliation 40 years after the end of the independence war, but concerns over 
the fairness and independence of the proceedings have marred its legitimacy.1637 
Beth Van Schaack, scholar and former deputy ambassador to the U.S. Office for 
Global Criminal Justice, has described the legacy of the ICT as follows: 
Proceedings underway before the [B]ICT pervert the values and goals 
of transitional justice, insult the victims who deserve a more legitimate 
accountability process, and threaten to leave a lasting stain on both the 
Bangladeshi legal system and the system of international justice writ 
large. Many of the defendants may in fact be guilty of the crimes of 
which they are charged. But because the proceedings are so profoundly 
unfair, and the defendants are subject to the death penalty, we will never 
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know for certain. Once hailed as a courageous and important exercise 
in historical justice, the BICT has become an object lesson for how 
international criminal law can be manipulated for political ends.1638
Impact on Society 
Despite international criticism, the tribunal has undoubtedly engaged the 
Bangladeshi population and has generally received public support. An April 2013 
opinion poll by a global marketing research firm showed that although almost 
two-thirds of the population thought that the war crimes trials are unfair, the ICT is 
seen by 86 percent of the population as a positive step made by the government.1639 
However, widespread demonstrations by both ICT opponents and supporters have 
often followed the tribunal’s sentencing decisions, strongly suggesting that this 
flawed form of domestic justice has exacerbated existing social division. 
Dealing with the Past 
Upon its creation, supporters touted the ICT as an opportunity to deal with the 
legacy of the war and repair some of the harm done to society. ICT proceedings 
held out the prospect of ending a culture of impunity that had persisted since the 
end of the war and of establishing the truth about what happened. The tribunal has 
doubtless shed some light on the “scale and the bestiality of the murders and rapes 
in East Pakistan in 1971.”1640 However, due to the unfairness of proceedings and the 
one-sided application of justice, Bangladeshis remain unable to openly debate the 
events of 1971, and the Awami League government appears to be using the ICT as 
tool for vengeance rather than national reconciliation, “while denying others the 
right to challenge its account for fear of retribution.”1641
Financing
In 2011, the International Center for Transitional Justice reported that a budget 
of about US$1.44 million had been set aside for the ICT by the government of 
Bangladesh for the entirety of its proceedings.1642 Although the ICT is a completely 
domestic mechanism financed through the regular state budget, the Ministry of Law, 
Justice and Parliamentary Affairs does not report on its annual budget. International 
financial support for the tribunal has been almost completely absent, because of the 
possibility for the application of the death penalty in the ICT’s sentencing.1643
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Oversight and Accountability
The ICT lacks an internal independent monitoring mechanism to assess the 
quality of proceedings and appointment of judges and prosecutors. Because the 
government is responsible for appointments, and may replace judges at any point in 
the proceedings, the absence of objective criteria for judicial performance creates 
greater space for arbitrary decisions. 
Due to the severe restrictions on domestic criticism of the ICT, informal forms of 
oversight have mostly been international. International human rights organizations 
and international law bodies initially welcomed the creation of the ICT and 
offered assistance and advice. The Office of Global Criminal Justice at the U.S. 
State Department has furnished technical and legal advice on the structure and 
jurisdiction of the ICT, and former U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues 
Stephen Rapp visited Bangladesh on multiple occasions while in that position.1644 
Upon the ICT’s creation, Human Rights Watch and the International Bar Association 
conducted substantive legal reviews and offered suggestions for amending the ICT’s 
rules of procedure. While international observers continue to monitor and comment 
on the ICT’s proceedings, their involvement and interaction with the Tribunal has 
diminished over the years. Those who have been critical of the ICT’s functioning, 
including The Economist, Human Rights Watch, and journalist David Bergman, have 
found themselves charged with “scandalization” offenses. 
Sustained and cohesive international and civil society involvement in the ICT is 
lacking, which is partially due to the limited space for criticism of the tribunal.  
A public, unbiased clearinghouse of information about the ICT is unavailable, 
making it difficult to collect basic information.1645 Until the end of 2013, the 
Bangladesh Trial Observer, an initiative by the Asian International Justice Initiative 
in cooperation with the Berkeley War Crimes Studies Center and East-West Center, 
offered “independent, objective coverage of trial proceedings at the International 
Crimes Tribunal in Bangladesh,” by producing daily trial monitoring reports.1646
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CAMBODIA: EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS 
OF CAMBODIA 
Conflict Background and Political Context
The Khmer Rouge, formally known as the Communist Party of Kampuchea, assumed 
power in Cambodia in April 1975. Led by Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge ruled until 
January 1979 and implemented ruinous and brutal policies that led to deaths on a 
massive scale, with estimates ranging from 1.7 to 3 million dead. The Khmer Rouge’s 
policy of forced migration from cities into the countryside led to countless deaths, 
and a campaign of political oppression against the Cambodian population included 
the curtailment of nearly all basic rights, campaigns of forced labor, executions of 
hundreds of thousands, and the establishment of vast prison systems. In the most 
notorious prison in Cambodia, known as S-21, only about 12 prisoners out of 14,000 
reportedly survived.1647 In 1979, Vietnamese troops captured Phnom Penh, Cambodia’s 
capital, and the Khmer Rouge leaders fled to Thailand, where they continued to carry 
out military campaigns. Until 1990, the United Nations recognized the Khmer Rouge 
as the legitimate representative government of Cambodia. The Paris Agreement of 
October 1991 achieved a comprehensive settlement with the Khmer Rouge, which 
continued to exist until 1999, when nearly all of the former leaders had “defected to 
the Royal Government of Cambodia, been arrested, or had died.”1648 
Although the country has democratic institutions on paper, longtime Prime Minister 
Hun Sen’s Cambodia is an authoritarian state with a reputation for widespread 
corruption. The government was party to the creation of the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) but has demonstrated limited 
tolerance for letting it operate independently in a way that could raise popular 
expectations for accountability more generally. Beyond broad criticism of corruption 
within the judicial system, there have been accusations of executive interference by 
the Cambodian government in the selection and appointment of national judges at 
the ECCC.1649 National investigative judges may also have been politically motivated 
in blocking investigations in two of the court’s four cases.1650 
Existing Justice-Sector Capacity
The Khmer Rouge reign left few legal practitioners and scholars remaining 
in Cambodia; most were killed or fled the country. At the time the ECCC was 
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negotiated and created, beginning in the late 1990s, there was no culture of judicial 
independence; practitioners lacked basic competencies; the system had poor 
infrastructure, including courthouses and jails; and exceedingly low pay fueled 
widespread corruption. Trials targeting security-sector officials were also routinely 
prone to disruption or termination by government entities.1651
Existing Civil Society Capacity
The targeting of intellectuals under the Khmer Rouge meant that civil society 
organizations were decimated under its rule. Civil society organizations, heavily 
dependent on foreign assistance and thus prone to government attack, only began to 
re-emerge after the 1991 signing of the Paris Peace Accords.1652 The Documentation 
Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam), which spun off from a Yale University research 
project in 1997, has been the leading organization documenting the atrocities of the 
Khmer Rouge era. Especially for a court challenged to scrutinize events now decades 
in the past, DC-Cam’s massive catalogue of information has proved invaluable 
to the ECCC’s work. As the court has spurred national conversations about the 
past, various civil society organizations have become more involved. For example, 
the court’s refusal to reopen investigations into Case 003 led to vocal protests by 
Cambodian civil society in May 2011.1653 
Creation
The initiative for the creation of a mechanism to prosecute atrocity crimes 
committed by the Khmer Rouge regime stretches back to the early 1980s. Cold 
war politics and geopolitical maneuverings by the United States blocked initiatives 
for accountability measures. The United States opposed an early proposal for an 
international tribunal put forward by Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden in 
1986. Although a UN Special Rapporteur labeled the regime’s acts as genocide in 
1986, the UN General Assembly avoided use of the term. In 1990, DC-Cam called 
for an international court to be established, with little traction. In 1997, the co-prime 
ministers of Cambodia requested the assistance of the UN and the international 
community in instituting an accountability mechanism. However, the Cambodian 
government’s desire for accountability was not unqualified or consistent; in 
September 1996, it granted amnesty to Ieng Sary (who later became a defendant 
before the ECCC). 
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For the United Nations, the challenge was to gain agreement on a mechanism 
that would be able to operate with Cambodian participation, but with sufficient 
independence. Specifically, the UN and others in the international community were 
concerned about a lack of judicial independence and capacity in Cambodia, as 
well as suspicion that the Hun Sen government would try to control who would be 
investigated, prosecuted, and tried.
The Cambodian government, which includes some former members of the Khmer 
Rouge, steadfastly opposed any court that would be composed of a majority of 
international judges or an international prosecutor, and in 2001 the Cambodian 
legislature passed a domestic law providing for the creation of specialized 
domestic chambers.1654 During the negotiations to establish this judicial body, the 
UN General Assembly passed resolution 57/228,1655 which essentially requested 
that UN negotiators accept the creation of a national court that would receive 
international assistance.1656 Despite this resolution, the UN Secretary-General sent 
a draft “Framework Agreement” to the UN General Assembly. This Framework 
Agreement proposed the establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of 
Democratic Kampuchea (ECCC), but also included a strong warning about serious 
flaws in the ECCC’s proposed design. The General Assembly approved the draft with 
no changes on May 13, 2003, and it was signed on June 6, 2003.1657 The ECCC had a 
weakened structure from the start, watered down after extensive negotiations and 
compromise between the international community and the Cambodian government. 
Although the agreement was finalized in 2003, the ECCC did not officially start 
work until February 20061658 and has since issued indictments in only two cases 
against five individuals (one defendant, Ieng Thirith, was found mentally unfit for 
trial; another, Ieng Sary, died). 
The UN Group of Experts for Cambodia and Proposals for an Ad Hoc 
International Criminal Tribunal
In 1998, the UN Secretary-General empanelled a “Group of Experts” to explore 
prosecution options and to assess Cambodian judicial capacity. After a 10-day 
visit to Cambodia in November 1998, that included little evidence-gathering or 
fact-finding, the Group of Experts issued a brief report surveying and evaluating 
politically feasible options for prosecutions.1659 The Group of Experts recommended 
that prosecutions be conducted for those most responsible for serious crimes, but 
found severe deficiencies in Cambodia’s judicial system. The group considered 
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and rejected proposals for a “mixed or foreign court established by Cambodia,” 
concerned that “such a process would be subject to manipulation by political 
forces in Cambodia.”1660 In a prescient passage, given ongoing political difficulties 
in establishing such a tribunal, the group noted: “Possibilities for undue influence 
are manifold, including in the content of the organic statute of the court and its 
subsequent implementation, and the role of Cambodians in positions on the bench 
and on prosecutorial, defense and investigative staffs. A Cambodian court and 
prosecutorial system, even with significant international personnel, would still 
need the Government’s permission to undertake most of its tasks and could lose 
independence at critical junctures.”1661 
Instead, the Group of Experts recommended the UN Security Council exercise 
Chapter VII powers to create an ad hoc international tribunal, with a single 
international prosecutor.1662 This proposal was rejected by the Cambodian 
government, and the UN balked. Intense negotiations between the UN and 
Cambodia began in the spring of 1999 on the design of a mixed international 
criminal tribunal, with the Cambodian government at times proposing fully domestic 
trials with international technical assistance.
Legal Framework and Mandate
The ECCC is an independent institution within the Cambodian judiciary, created 
by a statute that incorporates the Framework Agreement between the Cambodian 
government and the UN. The ECCC, which is staffed by both Cambodian and 
international employees, has adopted internal rules and practice directions within 
the framework of domestic law, noting that international rules of procedure may be 
taken into account to fill gaps or to ensure that international standards are met. 
The ECCC has jurisdiction over “senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea … [or] 
those most responsible for the crimes and serious violations of Cambodian penal 
law, international humanitarian law and custom, and international conventions 
recognized by Cambodia … committed during the period April 17, 1975[,] to January 
6, 1979.”1663 ECCC prosecutors are obligated under the internal rules to investigate 
any crimes they have “reason to believe” fall within the jurisdiction of the ECCC.1664 
With respect to two cases before the ECCC (known as Cases 003 and 004), the 
national (Cambodian) co-investigating judge and one international co-investigating 
judge—as well as the government of Cambodia—have been accused of manipulating 
the case files and investigations to “create the illusion of … genuine investigation[s]” 
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so that cases that the government wishes to prevent from going forward are 
dismissed.1665
The ECCC uses an amalgam of civil and common law. Civil party victims are 
represented by counsel as civil parties and have limited rights to reparations. 
The co-prosecutors undertake preliminary investigations and trigger judicial 
investigations by filing submissions with the Office of Co-Investigating Judges 
(OCIJ, comprising one national and one international judge). The co-investigating 
judges, or one of them acting alone, conducts judicial investigations and issues 
closing orders with the decision to indict the charged person or dismiss the charges.1666 
The Super Majority Rule 
The negotiated compromise between the UN and Cambodia produced a court 
with a majority of Cambodian judges in each chamber and a dual administrative 
system run by domestic authorities and the United Nations.1667 Chambers consist 
of joint panels of international and Cambodian judges, which make decisions by a 
“super majority” vote: four out of five judges at the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers, 
and five out of seven judges at the Supreme Court Chamber. The super-majority 
rule is designed to check and guard the independence of the court by “ensuring no 
significant decision is made without the concurrence of at least one international 
judge.”1668 For example, when the co-investigative judges or co-prosecutors disagree 
about whether to proceed with an investigation or the submission of charges, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber resolves the dispute. A supermajority decision is required to 
block the legal proceedings from continuing. This procedure was invoked in Cases 
003 and 004 (discussed in detail, below), when the international prosecutor sought 
to send the cases to the co-investigating judges for investigations, in disagreement 
with the national prosecutor. The dispute was submitted to the Pre-Trial Chamber, 
which split along international and national lines as to whether the investigations 
should proceed (three national judges against; two in favor). However, because the 
supermajority rule requires four judges to quash an investigation, the case proceeded 
to the investigation stage. 
Victims can participate formally at the ECCC in two ways: submit complaints to the 
co-prosecutor, or petition to participate as civil parties, thus recognized as parties to 
the proceedings and allowed to claim collective and moral reparations.1669
This structure appeared to open a groundbreaking opportunity for legal participation 
of victims. However, the jurisprudence developed in the first trial and subsequent 
changes in the internal rules significantly diminished the rights of victims’ civil 
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lawyers to participate in proceedings, and the balance may have shifted so that 
there is minimal difference between the rights of victims at the ECCC and other 
international or hybrid tribunals.1670 This jurisprudential narrowing of the role of 
victims-complainants and civil parties may reflect, in part, an understanding by the 
ECCC that the court could not logistically or financially handle the full number of 
civil party applicants. In Case 001, there were a total of 94 applicants; while for Case 
002, about 3,850 were admitted. 
The ECCC, in theory, wields a novel power allowing civil parties to seek “collective 
and moral reparations,” which prior generations of international hybrid criminal 
courts did not have.1671 Of the 36 forms of reparations requested by civil parties in 
the Duch trial, only two were granted: the inclusion of immediate victims and civil 
party names in the final judgment, and the compilation and publication of apologetic 
statements made by Duch during the trial. Among other reparations requests denied 
by the court were the establishment of a victims’ trust fund to finance temples and 
memorials, the preservation of atrocity crimes sites, and the declaration of a national 
memorial day.1672 The Trial Chamber refused to allow symbolic or moral repartitions 
that required funding or involved ordering the government of Cambodia to take any 
actions. Following the Duch case, it was clear that reparations would have to be funded 
from the assets of convicted persons (who claimed indigence) or from donor funds.
Location
The ECCC is located in the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh. It was not always 
clear that the mechanism created to deal with the crimes of the Khmer Rouge would 
be located in-country. The UN Group of Experts for Cambodia (see text box, below), 
which in 1999 proposed the creation of an ad hoc tribunal along the lines of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), weighed three potential locations for a court: 
Cambodia, The Hague, or elsewhere.1673 Although recognizing the advantages of a 
court accessible to witnesses, Cambodian media, and the general public, the group 
recommended against locating the mechanism in-country because it felt that this 
would jeopardize security and make the institution too prone to political pressures. 
It rejected the option of The Hague (including possible co-location with the ICTY) as 
too distant and recommended a location “somewhere in the Asia-Pacific region.”1674 
From the Cambodian government’s response to that report and throughout the 
ensuing negotiations, it was clear that any mechanism brought into existence would 
have to be located in Phnom Penh.
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Structure and Composition
The ECCC is comprised of the Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, headed 
by one Cambodian and one international judge; Chambers (composed of the 
Pre-Trial, Trial, and Supreme Court divisions); the Office of the Co-Prosecutors 
(OCP) headed by one Cambodian and one international prosecutor; and the Office 
of Administration (with a Cambodian director, and an international deputy). 
Reserve national and international judges and a reserve national and international 
prosecutor are appointed in each of these offices. Effectively, the court is split into 
national and international sides, with the idea that those sides cooperate (though 
as discussed below, this idea has remained unrealized for a certain portion of the 
court’s caseload). 
While the ECCC’s framework is intended to include domestic and international 
members equally, “overall personnel changes continue to reinforce the court’s 
national representation while failing to fill gaps on the court’s international side 
in administration, victims’ support and defense.”1675 The hybrid staffing structure 
was intended, in part, to facilitate capacity building and skills exchanges between 
national and international judicial personnel. Without formalized programs, 
however, such exchanges have been left to occur organically and depend on the 
particular unit and personalities involved.1676 
Chambers 
The ECCC is the only hybrid tribunal with a majority of national judges at both 
the trial and appellate levels. The UN Secretary-General nominates international 
judges to the tribunal. The Supreme Council of the Magistracy, a national body that 
appoints Cambodian judges to the ECCC, also determines whether international 
judges will sit in a reserve or full capacity. This has effectively given the Cambodian 
government an unintended authority over the appointment of international judges. 
In the Pre-Trial Chamber and the Trial Chamber, two international judges sit 
alongside three national judges. The Supreme Court Chamber is comprised of four 
Cambodian and three international judges.1677 
The Office of Administration 
The Office of Administration handles functions most associated with the Office 
of the Registry at other international tribunals, including defense support, victim 
support, court management, public affairs, outreach, and general staffing issues.  
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Defense Support Section 
Each accused is entitled to both a Cambodian and international lawyer who 
can be selected from a roster of lawyers maintained by the Defense Support 
Section. Defense teams are provided with full office facilities as well as legal and 
administrative support, including legal research. 
Outreach: Public Affairs Section and Victim Support Services
A 2011 population-based survey found that the main vehicles for disseminating 
information about the ECCC were media-based.1678 The ECCC’s Public Affairs 
Section (PAS) usually executes the outreach function. Outreach has at times been 
unevenly implemented because of the ECCC’s dual (national and international) 
administrative offices. The unit has not been immune to politics: key national 
staff have shown little interest in conducting outreach on controversial Cases 003 
and 004. Due to underfunding, the ECCC strongly relies on NGOs to implement 
outreach activities. Approximately “15 different NGOs have been directly involved 
in outreach activities in connection with the court since its inception, implementing 
a wide range of programs and contributing significantly to reaching out to rural 
communities.”1679 Along with producing media broadcasts and disseminating 
written information, NGOs have implemented interactive activities, including 
“community meetings, public forums, visits to the court, attendance at the first trial 
hearings and community screenings of the first trial hearings.”1680 The reliance on 
NGOs to conduct outreach has led to criticisms about lack of consistent messaging 
and concerns that NGOs “often produce their own messages,” creating a risk that 
“understandings of victims’ participation differ in the community.”1681 
PAS outreach activities during the Duch trial included “organizing public visits,  
live video feeds, assisting in production of weekly TV shows, uploading transcripts  
of the daily proceedings on the ECCC website, and holding weekly press 
briefings.”1682 The PAS facilitated over 27,000 individuals to attend the trial.1683  
PAS also produced general informational materials, and developed a one-day  
“Study Tour” program bringing Cambodians to the ECCC and the Tuol Sleng 
Museum. Over 30,000 individuals participated in this program in 2010.1684 
Cambodian television broadcast the Duch trial live, and it was widely watched,  
but this was not repeated for the Case 002 trials.
The Victim Support Section (VSS) coordinates assistance to civil parties at the court, 
which in practice means it undertakes many tasks normally handled by an outreach 
unit.1685 The overlapping roles of the PAS and the VSS has “contributed to a broad 
456   OPTIONS FOR JUSTICE
differentiation of audiences in terms of outreach,” with PAS having a broader focus 
on the general public, and the VSS having a more targeted focus on “one-to-one 
support to complainants and civil parties.”1686 By 2012, the VSS was “all but entirely 
nationalized.”1687 The VSS initially faced a “difficult start due to lack of funding and 
resources,”1688 but increased its outreach activities during the Duch trial, organizing 
regional forums with civil party applicants and civil parties. 
UN Special Envoy
The ECCC does not have a registrar or president, unlike other international 
tribunals; this has at times led to organizational difficulties because a registrar 
or president is usually the person designated to gather the principals of a court’s 
various offices to meet and discuss administrative matters.1689 Following a corruption 
scandal at the court, the UN Secretary-General appointed a special envoy in April 
2008 to fill some of the ambassadorial functions of a court president, including 
raising funds and representing the court’s interests to the international community. 
The special envoy’s position reflects the need for attention to the troubled political 
relationship between the UN and the Cambodian government. David Scheffer, the 
Special Expert to the Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance to the 
Khmer Rouge Tribunal, assumed the position in January 2012, succeeding Clint 
Williamson and David Tolbert. 
Prosecutions
As of late 2017, the ECCC had fully completed two trials through final appeal, and a 
judgment was pending in a third case. 
The first trial, known as Case 001, was against one accused person, Kaing Guek 
Eav, alias Duch. Duch, the former head of the infamous S-21 Prison, was convicted 
in July 2010 of crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions (he did not face genocide charges). The trial lasted 17 months, and 
an appeal was heard by the Supreme Court Chamber in 2011. In February 2012, the 
ECCC’s Supreme Court Chambers issued a final verdict in the Duch case, increasing 
the 30-year sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber to life imprisonment.1690 
Case 002 began in November 2011 against four accused (Nuon Chea, known as 
“Brother Number Two,” Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith, and Khieu Samphan). Ieng Thirith 
was found unfit to stand trial before the actual trial began.1691 Ieng Sary died in 
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March 2013, 16 months after the trial began. Given concerns about the defendants’ 
advanced ages, the ECCC issued a severance order so that the case would be 
sequenced in multiple segments.1692 The defendants were charged with genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. 
A September 2011 order by the Trial Chamber directed that the first stage of the trial 
(Case 002/1) would handle allegations of “population movement” (forced transfer 
of population) and crimes against humanity.1693 Other parts of the original Closing 
Order (synonymous with “indictment”), including allegations of genocide and war 
crimes, were deferred to later phases of the case (Case 002/2). In Case 002/1, the 
Trial Chamber issued guilty verdicts against Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan in 
August 2014. In November 2016, the Supreme Court Chamber upheld this ruling 
and the life sentences for the two convicted men, but was sharply critical of some 
of the Trial Chamber’s legal reasoning.1694 The parties in Case 002/2 against Nuon 
Chea and Khieu Samphan concluded their closing arguments in June 2017,1695 and 
Trial Chamber judges were still deliberating as of October 2017.
As of late 2017, Cases 003 and 004 were underway, with charges against one 
accused (Im Chaem) dismissed. Investigations regarding three further accused—
Meas Muth (Case 003), and Ao An and Yim Tith (Case 004)—were awaiting a 
decision by the international co-prosecutor on whether to refer the accused for trial. 
The Cambodian government, the Cambodian co-prosecutor, and the Cambodian 
co-investigating judge all opposed the prosecution of Cases 003 and 004.1696  
As the Pre-Trial Chamber could not reach a supermajority decision when the dispute 
between the co-prosecutors was raised, the rules dictated an outcome favoring the 
forwarding of the allegations to the co-investigating judges for judicial investigation 
in September 2009. However, the international co-investigating judge handled the 
subsequent judicial investigation with no assistance or cooperation from the national 
co-investigating judge. It remained uncertain how the standoff between the national 
and international officials on these cases would ultimately be resolved.
  
Legacy
Ordinary Cambodians closely followed the initial trial and indictment of former 
high-ranking officials. While perceptions of the court are difficult to measure, 
indications are encouraging.1697 Surveys show that a large majority of the 
Cambodian population are aware of the trials and support the ECCC.1698 Civil 
party representation and well-attended hearings provided victims and the broader 
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population with extensive information about past events that had been disputed, or 
more often, taboo. Beyond the court’s legal proceedings, memorialization projects 
and documentation centers have carried out activities related to the proceedings, 
including genocide education programs and the construction of victim memorials. 
The court’s biggest success has arguably been its ability to foster discussions among 
Cambodians about the crimes of the past and their causes.
The ECCC’s impact on the legal system has been more doubtful. On the positive 
side, many Cambodian staff at the court gained capacity by working on complex 
cases, often alongside experienced international experts. The UN’s Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Cambodian Human Rights Action 
Committee have facilitated meetings between judicial personnel of the ECCC 
and national judges in the ordinary Cambodian courts to share experiences and 
transfer knowledge and skills.1699 However, concerns about the integrity, capacity, 
and independence of the domestic judicial sector have increased during the court’s 
tenure, and despite the mixed structure of the court, it has contributed little in terms 
of capacity development of the broader domestic judicial system. The justice sector, 
obliterated during Khmer Rouge rule, remains prone to political influence and 
corruption, is largely staffed by judges and lawyers of limited technical capacity, and 
above all, is resistant to change due to the political leadership’s lack of political will 
to embrace the rule of law, including the concepts of judicial independence and fair 
trial rights.1700 Against this backdrop, it would always be a challenge for the ECCC to 
influence domestic judicial capacity and culture absent broader political change.1701
Given concerns about the lack of independence in the Cambodian judiciary, 
international donors and UN officials recommended that the ECCC complete all 
four cases rather than transferring any of them to fully domestic Trial Chambers. 
Indeed, because the ECCC Agreement, law, and internal rules have no equivalent 
to the Rule 11bis of the ICTY and the ICTR, any devolution of cases to national 
jurisdiction would likely require amendments to the statutory framework. 
Financing
Under the ECCC Agreement, Cambodia is to provide—at its expense—the premises 
for the co-investigating judges, the Prosecutor’s Office, the Extraordinary Chambers, 
the Pre-Trial Chamber, and the Office of Administration (Art. 14). It is also to cover 
the salaries of Cambodian judges and personnel (Art. 15). Meanwhile, the UN is 
to cover the salaries of personnel recruited by it, including international judges 
and the international co-prosecutor (Art. 16). Article 17 of the Agreement outlines 
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other forms of UN financial assistance to the ECCC, including the remuneration of 
defense counsel. Additionally, the Agreement stipulates a “phased-in approach” for 
the purposes of ensuring “efficiency and cost-effectiveness” (Art. 27). These 
provisions are reinforced by the relevant provisions in the ECCC Law (Art. 44, new).1702
The cost of the ECCC, compared to its small number of prosecutions and political 
difficulties, has drawn criticism, which has intensified with the court’s political 
gridlock. Between 2006 and 2014, ECCC expenditures were in excess of US$200 
million (of which approximately 25 percent was spent by the Cambodian side of the 
court).1703 While the ECCC’s annual budget was smaller in its early years (until the 
court became fully operational), annual operational costs in the years 2010–2015 
ranged from US$27 to 35 million.1704 As of 2015, the ECCC’s largest donor was Japan, 
contributing 35 percent of the total operating costs for the court, followed by the 
United States (11 percent), Australia (10 percent), and Cambodia (8 percent).1705 
The European Union (4 percent), and various EU countries (Germany [6 percent], 
the United Kingdom [5 percent], France, Sweden and Norway [3 percent each]) 
have collectively contributed about 25 percent of the court’s funding. Some states 
“fund both international and national sides, while others earmark funding for either 
the national or international side … [and] … some states prefer to mark funding for 
particular sections of the court’s operations.”1706 
During its lifespan, the ECCC has faced a number of funding crises.1707 The court 
entered into a deepening crisis in 2012–2013, when shortfalls in national funding 
led to Cambodian staff going for months without pay and striking in protest. 
The funding crises at the ECCC have had a disproportionate effect on national 
staff.1708 Although the ECCC Agreement stipulates that the expenses and salaries of 
Cambodia officials, staff, and judges be borne by the “Cambodian national budget,” 
it has contributed only 31 percent of these monies, much of which has been obtained 
by seeking voluntary contributions from the court’s main donors. The Open Society 
Justice Initiative has noted that the voluntary contribution model—and significant 
budget shortfalls—raise the danger that financial concerns at the court could drive 
judicial decision-making.1709 
Oversight and Accountability
The ECCC operates formally as an independent institution within the Cambodian 
justice system, but by nature of its hybrid staffing, elements of oversight and 
accountability are bifurcated, with nationals accountable to the national system 
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and internationals accountable to the United Nations. The Agreement between 
Cambodia and the United Nations establishes privileges and immunities for national 
and international staff and counsel.1710
Persistent allegations of corruption at the ECCC led to the Agreement to Establish 
an Independent Counselor at the ECCC in August 2009. The independent counselor 
(IC), required to be independent of the UN, ECCC, and the Cambodian government, 
was tasked with investigating corruption allegations within the ECCC.1711 However, 
the IC’s reports on corruption at the ECCC have not been publicly disclosed.1712
Beyond issues of corruption, the handling of the investigations of Cases 003 
and 004 has led to questions over whether agreed lines of authority have 
been respected in practice. Judge Laurent Kasper-Ansermet was appointed as 
international reserve co-investigating judge in February 2011 and assumed his 
duties as full co-investigating judge in December 2011, following the resignation 
of Judge Siegfried Blunk. The Cambodian government failed to provide formal 
approval for the appointment. The United Nations considered this failure a breach 
of the Agreement between the Cambodian government and the UN. Under the 
Agreement, the Supreme Council of Magistracy (SCM) in Cambodia was “required 
to replace a resigning international CIJ [co-investigating judge] with the reserve 
international CIJ, and leaves no room for deliberation.”1713 Despite this, the SCM 
rejected Judge Kasper-Ansermet in January 2012. After several months in limbo, 
Judge Kasper-Ansermet resigned in March, and the Secretary-General called on the 
Cambodian government to “promptly appoint” new international judges. Beyond 
the accusations of personal conflicts of interest in judicial appointments—national 
CIJ Bunleng was staunchly opposed to Kasper-Ansermet’s appointment and also 
sits on the SCM—the appointment gridlock points to the “UN’s apparent inability to 
effectively influence a decision regarding an agreement to which it is a party,” and 
the “fundamental lack of any internal mechanism [at the ECCC] to resolve disputes 
concerning judicial appointments.”1714 These structural deficiencies have led to 
several proposed remedies, including the call by the former UN Special Expert on 
the Khmer Rouge Trials, David Tolbert, for a judicial review mechanism as well as 
calls by the Open Society Justice Initiative for an independent, international panel of 
expert judges to conduct an inquiry into the stalled investigations in cases 003 and 
004. In the wake of the scandal over Judge Kasper-Ansermet’s failed appointment, 
Cambodian human rights activist Theary Seng “called upon the UN to invoke Article 
28 of the Agreement and withdraw cooperation” and cease to provide assistance.1715 
Thus, the scandal came to threaten the very existence of the ECCC itself.
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Civil society has provided a measure of informal accountability. In addition to the 
domestic work of the Documentation Center of Cambodia, two main international 
NGOs have been heavily involved in monitoring and reporting on the ECCC: the 
Open Society Justice Initiative and the Asian International Justice Initiative. 
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EAST TIMOR / TIMOR LESTE 
Conflict Background and Political Context
In 1999, after 24 years of Indonesian military occupation, the people of East 
Timor1716 voted for independence in a UN-sponsored referendum. The referendum 
process was met by widespread human rights abuses and widespread violence 
carried out by the Indonesian military and military-supported irregular armed 
groups against the civilian population. A national truth and reconciliation 
commission, the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR), 
later estimated that over 100,000 civilians died as a result of the conflict, and the 
physical infrastructure of the country lay in ruins, with nearly 70 percent of all 
buildings, homes, and schools destroyed. An estimated 75 percent of the population 
was displaced.1717
An international peacekeeping force, INTERFET, arrived to restore order, and the 
UN assumed administration and sovereignty beginning in October 1999, through 
the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), until 
2002. Under the UNTAET mandate, the UN established special panels in district 
courts, called Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor (SPSC). The SPSC, 
staffed by a mix of internationals and nationals, was tasked with investigating and 
prosecuting atrocity crimes. Following the UN transference of sovereignty in 2002, 
this international investigations unit closed in May 2005. The transfer of sovereignty 
back to Timorese authorities in 2002 left UN-appointed personnel largely in place 
but complicated issues of shared authority over the process between the UN and the 
East Timorese. An agreement by the UN to provide international assistance to the 
Office of the Prosecutor General on atrocity crimes investigations and pretrial legal 
drafting led to the creation of Special Crimes Investigation Teams (SCIT, see text 
box) under the UNMIT (UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste) mandate in 2006. 
SCIT did not begin its work until early 2008, when a formal agreement took effect 
between the UN and the government of East Timor. The SCIT was shut down in 
2012 when the UNMIT mandate ended before it could complete its investigations. 
Incomplete investigations were handed over to the Timor-Leste prosecutor general.1718 
Through late 2017, the serious crimes process has been beset by a series of internal 
and external political obstacles. Externally, Indonesia’s lack of cooperation has 
been a consistent obstacle. Many of the high-level perpetrators of atrocity crimes in 
Indonesia were out of the territorial jurisdiction of the Special Panels, having fled 
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either to Indonesia or Indonesian-controlled West Timor. Indonesia has consistently 
refused to cooperate with arrest warrants or to hand over indicted suspects, despite 
having signed an agreement with the UNTAET on a range of mutual assistance 
measures, including arrest warrant enforcement and transfer of indicted persons 
for prosecutions.1719 Indonesian ad hoc trials of atrocity crimes and human rights 
violations have been largely denounced as a sham.1720
Internally, serious crimes proceedings suffered from poor organization and a lack 
of commitment by the United Nations, including a failure to support demands for 
cooperation from Indonesia. Following the transfer of sovereignty in 2002, the 
governments of Timor-Leste have increasingly sought to “move beyond the past,” 
and thus signal an intention to close down serious crimes prosecutions in order to 
pursue friendly relations with their powerful neighbor.
Existing Justice-Sector Capacity
The scorched-earth campaign by Indonesian forces devastated East Timor, nearly 
destroying all political and institutional capacity. Physical judicial infrastructure, 
which was minimal even before the conflict, was looted and reduced to rubble. The 
systematic exclusion of East Timorese from government and judicial posts during 
the years of Indonesian rule and occupation led to a severe shortage of qualified 
judges and trained lawyers. Only a small number of Timorese were allowed to obtain 
legal qualifications during the Indonesian occupation, and most Indonesian justice-
sector professionals left East Timor in the post-conflict period. While advances have 
been made since 1999, the Timorese judicial sector is still marked by an absence 
of qualified judicial personnel and a considerable criminal case backlog.1721 Even 
after Timor-Leste gained sovereignty in 2002, some foreign judges and judicial 
officers, mostly from Portuguese-speaking countries, remained embedded in the 
system. This remained the case until the Timor-Leste Parliament voted to expel 
all foreigners from the justice sector in 2014, in response to a series of tax cases 
brought against foreign oil companies operating in the Timor Sea.1722 Although not 
the explicit target of the parliament’s actions, grave crimes proceedings also suffered 
following the dismissal of all foreign judicial personnel.1723
Existing Civil Society Capacity
Civil and political freedoms in East Timor during Indonesian rule were severely 
curtailed. The country emerged in 1999 with a weak and politicized civil society. 
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Catholic Church organizations such as Caritas Dili and the Justice and Peace 
Commission maintained their longstanding presence even during the occupation and 
have focused on reconciliation initiatives in the post-conflict era. The post-conflict 
period saw the proliferation of local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs, over 
300 registered with an umbrella NGO Forum by 2006), clustered around issues of 
peacebuilding, youth, humanitarian assistance, gender justice, and voter education. 
During the period of UN-led transitional government, these NGOs raised concerns 
about their lack of participation in governance and exclusion. Involvement by NGOs 
in the CAVR provided a platform and catalyst for many NGOs to gain knowledge and 
proficiency in transitional justice issues.1724
Creation
The United Nations created the Special Panels and associated special units not 
through a planned and integrated process, but through a series of ad hoc responses 
to East Timor’s crisis. Shortly after the Indonesian military withdrew in 1999, a 
UN fact-finding mission and a subsequent International Commission of Inquiry 
established by the UN Human Rights Commission recommended the establishment 
of an international criminal tribunal. However, the UN Security Council was 
unwilling to mount such a direct challenge to the Indonesian military regime, and 
donor countries were wary of the costs and duration of trials associated with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.1725 
UNTAET established the Special Panels in accordance with its general mandate 
to re-establish law and order, based on the initiative of international staff who 
considered it to be a “moral imperative” for the UN to create an accountability 
mechanism.1726 Because the UN had assumed sovereignty in East Timor in 1999, it 
was not possible for the Special Panels to be created through a bilateral agreement 
between the UN and the national government (as with the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone), or to be fully located within the domestic judicial system. The resulting 
structure was a complicated and shifting collection of units, with varying and 
shifting degrees of subordination to international and national institutions. Due to 
a lack of substantial consultations before the establishment of the Special Panels in 
2000, Timorese judges (who were initially expected to handle the cases themselves) 
and civil society reacted negatively.1727
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Legal Framework and Mandate
The Special Panels of the Dili District Court had jurisdiction over genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity committed at any time, and murder, sexual 
offenses, and torture committed between January 1 and October 25, 1999. Under 
the UNTAET Regulation, the Special Panels were empowered to apply Timorese 
and international law.1728 All the charges before the Special Panels involved crimes 
against humanity or serious offenses under domestic law; genocide and war crimes 
were not charged. While the temporal jurisdiction included the pre-1999 period, 
the large number of crimes committed during Indonesian occupation between 1975 
and 1998 were not investigated or prosecuted. There were multiple reasons for 
this: a Timorese government still wary of its former occupier lacked the political 
will to pursue these cases, the Prosecutor’s Office interpreted the applicable law 
narrowly, the case-selection strategy targeted high-level perpetrators, and there 
were resource constraints. The Special Panels were granted primary jurisdiction over 
national courts for the serious offenses within their jurisdiction. The definitions of 
international crimes, modes of liability, and defenses were drawn nearly verbatim 
from the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Definitions for 
national crimes were drawn from the Indonesian Penal Code, and the criminal 
procedure code was promulgated by UNTAET, combining civil law, common law, 
and elements from the ICC’s statute and rules of procedure. The “application of 
these relatively complex and unfamiliar procedures caused major difficulties in 
practice,”1729 and were ill-fitted to the local criminal justice system. Timor-Leste’s 
government promulgated a new criminal procedure code in January 2006.
Location
The Special Panels within the Dili District Court and a Court of Appeal to deal with 
serious crimes were located in Dili, the capital of East Timor/Timor-Leste.
Structure and Composition
The constituent parts of the Special Panels process included internationalized 
Special Panels (courts) at the district, appeals, and superior court levels; the Serious 
Crimes Unit (SCU) of investigators and prosecutors; the Deputy General Prosecutor 
for Serious Crimes (DGPSC), housed within the UN-created Office of the General 
Prosecutor (OGP), broadly under the Public Prosecution Service for East Timor; and 
the Defense Lawyers Unit (DLU).
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UNTAET created Special Panels of the District Courts and the Court of Appeals in 
June 2000, with each panel composed of one national and two international judges. 
The UN transitional government made these appointments with little to no local 
involvement. The Dili District Court was granted exclusive jurisdiction over serious 
criminal offenses. Difficulties and delays in the recruitment and appointment 
of international judges caused the Court of Appeals to be non-operational for 
more than a year and a half during 2001–2003. A severe shortage of judicial and 
administrative support staff hampered the work of the Special Panels; judges often 
“had to do their own research, drafting, editing, and administration.”1730
For its part, the DGPSC office was severely hampered by high staff turnover, 
short-term staff contracts, and nearly a year without a head. The unit only became 
fully functional by the end of 2003, a few months before it began the process of 
downsizing and closing. 
The SCU operated from 2000 until May 2005 and was staffed predominantly 
by UN-appointed internationals. By the time the unit was fully staffed, it began 
downsizing in anticipation of closeout. In 2003, the unit had 124 staff members 
made up of 33 UN prosecutors, investigators, forensic specialists, and support staff; 
32 UN police investigators; 40 national staff; and five national police investigators. 
By its closure in May 2005, the unit had 88 staff members (split about evenly among 
national and internationals). During the handover process in 2005, the unit hired 
37 translators and 13 trainees embedded within prosecution and informational 
technology sections. Between 2001 and 2005, five individuals held the position of 
head international prosecutor. Recruitment and appointments were carried out by 
UNTAET, but the office reported to the Timorese general prosecutor and attorney 
general. When the DGPSC’s office issued a high-profile arrest warrant against 
General Wiranto, this weak institutional arrangement provided cover for both UN 
and Timorese authorities to disavow ownership of the prosecutor’s efforts. 
No provisions were made for defense of accused persons before the Special Panels 
until September 2002. The UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET; 
replacing UNTAET) created the DLU, composed of international staff who provided 
defense services to defendants before the Special Panels. This early gap marked 
a serious deficiency within the special crimes process. One analyst observed: “In 
the first fourteen trials … not a single defense witness appeared.”1731 Because the 
DLU employed only international staff, it did not improve the capacity of local 
defense attorneys. At its conclusion, the DLU employed seven international defense 
lawyers, in addition to three assistants, and approximately seven interpreters and 
administrative and logistical staff. 
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The special crimes process lacked witness protection and support structures.  
The SCU had a small witness management unit to organize witness testimony,  
and it managed to obtain a few protective measures for a small number of witnesses 
in rape cases, but all other witnesses were left to care for their own security.1732  
The panels and the DLU had no witness protection system at all.  
Prosecutions
A prosecutorial strategy emerged in the Special Panels in late 2001, focusing on 
10 priority cases and indictments for crimes against humanity. This early strategy 
was criticized for under-utilizing mapping exercises and commissions of inquiry 
(national and international) that had laid out the systematic nature of the violations. 
In February 2003, the SCU issued its most high-profile indictments to date against 
General Wiranto, six senior Indonesian military members, and the former governor 
of East Timor. At the time, General Wiranto was a candidate for the presidency of 
Indonesia. Observers wrote that “the Wiranto case proved to be the breaking point 
in the relationship between the Timorese political leadership and the serious crimes 
regime. To the discredit of the UN and the Timor-Leste government, both bodies 
disassociated themselves from the Wiranto arrest warrant. In so doing, they signaled 
to senior perpetrators that the serious crimes process did not enjoy the committed 
support of the international community or the national authorities.”1733 
By the time the Special Panels closed in May 2005, they had tried 87 defendants in 
55 trials, 85 of whom were found guilty.1734 A significant number of the indictees were 
officers in the Indonesian military, and all were low-level perpetrators. More than 
300 remained at large, most in Indonesia, and incomplete cases were left for the 
SCIT, which was not in place until 2008.1735 
Links between Truth-Telling and Criminal Prosecutions in East Timor
The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) was set up in 
2001 by a UNTAET regulation to address non-atrocity crimes such as theft, arson, 
and killing of livestock through a Community Reconciliation Process (CRP).1736 An 
UNTAET regulation1737 and an agreement with the OGP1738 required the CAVR to refer 
cases involving serious crimes to the Serious Crimes Unit. 
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The intersection of CAVR’s mandate with the Special Crimes process yielded 
important examples of linking transitional justice mechanisms, and it has been cited 
as an example where “serious thought was given to the relationship between the 
disclosure process and prosecutions.”1739 The legal agreements and arrangements 
between the CAVR and the serious crimes prosecution process are an unusual 
example of a codified institutional arrangement between punitive and reconciliatory 
mechanisms. While the execution of the policy underlying the arrangement was 
problematic, the provisions of the UNTAET regulation were interpreted by CAVR to 
reflect “a policy decision that the work of the prosecution service should not be 
compromised by the truth-seeking function of the Commission.”1740
However, because the SCU did not have the resources to prosecute large numbers 
of alleged serious crime offenders, the referral arrangement resulted in an impunity 
gap, with certain offenders ineligible either for participation in the reconciliation 
procedures or for prosecution. Amendment of UNTAET directives in 2002 increased 
prosecutorial discretion on CRP eligibility, but did not fully resolve the situation. 
Delayed sequencing of the initiatives—CAVR was established a year after the 
Special Crimes Prosecutions and Investigation Unit—caused difficulties in the 
planning and execution of their respective mandates. 
Because CAVR was required to refer cases involving possible grave crimes to 
prosecutors, some lower-level offenders may have avoided the reconciliation 
process altogether. This was compounded during the early stages of the 
proceedings, when the prosecution strategy was less clearly formed and 
communicated. The legal arrangement between the CAVR and the OGP allowed 
testifying witnesses privileges against self-incrimination. While the OGP was 
allowed access to any statements recorded by the CAVR (compelling the CAVR to 
release information received confidentially), the OGP undertook not to initiate an 
investigation based solely on CAVR evidence. One study estimated that about eight 
percent of cases handled by the CAVR were vetted by the SCU or suspended during 
proceedings as possible serious crimes.1741
Legacy
At least in theory, locating the special crimes prosecutions in situ intended to make 
justice accessible and meaningful. This impact has been hard to measure and has 
had mixed results. The inability to prosecute high-level Indonesian perpetrators who 
fled to Indonesia, coupled with prosecutions of lower-level perpetrators and East 
Timorese, may actually have contributed to cynicism about the process among the 
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local population. Further, the Timorese government and general prosecutor  
proved unwilling to proceed with investigations against former East Timorese 
independence fighters.
Throughout its existence, the prosecution and investigation unit faced criticism for 
a number of weaknesses, including: lack of a coherent prosecutorial strategy; lack 
of basic facilities; weak jurisprudence and quality of judgments; inadequate legal 
defense representation; inadequate outreach; lack of political support from the UN 
transitional government and the Timorese government; a difficult and bureaucratic 
recruitment, appointment, and staffing process; and frequent changes of leadership. 
The Special Panels have also been criticized for failing to have a substantive, positive 
effect on the domestic judicial system. There was limited interaction between judges 
of the Special Panels and judges of the ordinary national court. Training programs, 
skills transfer, and capacity development were uneven, poorly coordinated, 
and delayed. Local observers complained that international judges were not 
properly trained on the intricacies of the national legal system and unqualified 
on international criminal and humanitarian law (judges were appointed under 
standard UN peacekeeping mission rules, which did not call for targeted advertising 
of vacancy notices). Not until 2002 was a training program initiated and funding 
secured for the salaries of trainees. 
The arrival of international defense lawyers in 2003 improved some of the glaring 
fair trial deficiencies, but the DLU had “little or no collaboration or interaction with 
Timorese defense lawyers,”1742 and Timorese defense attorneys gradually and nearly 
completely withdrew from serious crimes cases. Poor-quality jurisprudence, lack of 
standardization, and long gaps in the functioning of the Appeals Court minimized 
the long-term effect of the Special Panels process on East Timorese jurisprudence 
and the domestic judicial system. During the premature closeout phase in early 
2005, the SCU spent much of its time archiving files into a searchable database and 
working to close unfinished investigations and draft transfer documents to national 
prosecutors, in the hopes that the process would be resumed. These files and cases 
lay largely untouched until the resumption of serious crimes investigations in 2008 
with the support of the SCIT. 
The SPSC appears to have created little momentum for continued pursuit of grave 
crimes cases related to the conflict. Beyond the clear shortcomings of the model 
and its implementation, this can be explained by Timor-Leste’s dependence on 
Indonesia for investment, educational opportunities, communications, affordable 
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goods and services, as well their military and other forms of cooperation. This 
dependence has caused the government to seek to move “beyond accountability” 
and prioritize good relations with Jakarta.1743 In 2005, the two countries created a 
Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF), widely interpreted as a political signal 
to end the accountability process. Political interference in the serious crimes process 
has taken multiple forms, including the 2008 presidential commutation of sentences 
for those convicted by the Special Panels. In 2009, the president of Timor-Leste 
called for the closure of serious crimes investigations, and in 2014, all foreign judges, 
prosecutors, and other judicial officers were expelled from the country, further 
threatening the prosecution of atrocity crimes.1744 
As of late 2017, the recommendations of the CAVR and the CTF for justice and 
reparations had still not been implemented. Bills establishing a Commission for 
Disappeared Persons, a national reparation program, and a public memory institute 
were submitted to parliament in 2010, but debate of the draft laws had been 
continually postponed.1745
Special Crimes Investigation Team (SCIT) (2008–2012)
In 2008, the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) mandated a Special 
Crimes Investigation Team (SCIT) to resume the investigative functions of the SCU 
and assist the Office of the Prosecutor General (OPG) with outstanding cases of 
serious human rights violations.1746 The SCIT’s role was to investigate cases and 
submit the file to the OPG with a recommendation to either close the case or 
proceed with prosecution. SCIT had no prosecutorial powers itself and, unlike the 
Special Panels, its temporal mandate did not cover crimes committed before 1999. 
SCIT lacked outreach and public information staff, and outreach activities were 
mostly conducted under broader UNMIT transitional justice programs. A team of 
international investigators, legal coordination officers (including gender specialists), 
and forensics and administrative staff assisted the OPG in investigations and also 
prepared drafts of legal documents, indictments, and arrest warrants. A shortage 
of national legal officers caused communications difficulties with victims and 
witnesses. SCIT was funded by assessed contributions1747 through a special account 
maintained for UNMIT by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
Because SCIT lacked the power to initiate prosecutions, reliance on a reluctant and 
underresourced OPG made it unlikely that many cases would be brought to trial. 
While SCIT was an international mechanism, the agreement leading to its creation 
made it formally and operationally subordinate to the OPG. The arrangement has 
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been described as an unusual “role reversal” where “prosecutors [have a] lack 
of involvement in serious crimes investigations, [while] investigators develop the 
strategy and framework for the inquiry, as well as conducting the investigation, 
with the OPG provid[ing] approval for procedural steps as required.”1748 Cooperation 
between the SCIT and the OPG was minimal, seriously undermining the impact 
of the team on capacity building within the OPG. However, cooperation improved 
when a new prosecutor general assumed office in March 2009, for instance through 
weekly meetings and operational contacts. Institutional cooperation could have 
better been ensured through stronger agreements and a stronger mandate. SCIT’s 
physical location—offices were housed in the UN building in Dili, with three small 
regional outposts—contributed to a lack of integration with the OPG’s separate 
office and minimized the ability of the SCIT process to sustainably benefit the 
domestic justice sector. 
The nearly three-year gap between the closure of the SCU and the operationalization 
of SCIT in early 2008 caused a lack of continuity and a loss of institutional knowledge 
and staff, as well as reflected a lack of sustained focus on the part of the UN on 
accountability measures in East Timor. From the time of the SCU’s closure, at least 
three cases of atrocity crimes were brought to trial. These include: the Mau Buti 
case, with a verdict by the Appeals Court issued in June 2010;1749 the conviction 
of three former Nesi Merah Putih militia members for crimes against humanity in 
December 2012; and the sentence on appeal of a former AHI militia member in 
August 2014.1750 When the SCIT closed in 2012, it had completed 311 investigations 
and handed over 60 incomplete investigations to the prosecutor general.1751 The 2014
 expulsion of foreign judges called into question the continuation of grave crimes 
trials, as the UNTAET regulation stipulating that trials for serious crimes of 1999 
require two international judges and one Timorese judge remained applicable.1752
Financing
UNMISET funded both the SCU and the Special Panels through assessed and 
voluntary contributions. The total operating cost of the serious crimes process for 
the period 2003–2005 was US$14,358,600, which was around five percent of the 
overall assessed contributions to UNMISET. Voluntary contributions during this 
period amounted to approximately US$120,000.1753 There was a significant overall 
underinvestment in the system, as well as poor resource allocation between the 
two, with an “overemphasis on only the investigatory and prosecutorial arm of the 
process.”1754 The SCU resource problems were eventually addressed. However, 
the Special Panels were severely underfunded throughout. In 2002, for example, 
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only US$600,000 was spent on the Special Panels, whereas the SCU spent almost 
US$6 million—out of a total budget for UNMISET of more than US$200 million.1755 
The SCU also benefited from the support of governments including Australia 
and Norway, as well as the U.S.-funded work of such international NGOs as the 
Coalition for International Justice.1756 Special Panels (with the exception of salaries 
for international judges) benefited from legal capacity assistance on international 
criminal law in 2002–2003 by the American University’s Washington College of Law, 
which covered its own expenditure.1757 
An assessment by the Commission of Experts to Review the Prosecution of Serious 
Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste in 1999 concluded that “the level of 
funding provided to the judicial process in Timor-Leste has been insufficient to meet 
the minimum requirements of the mandates of the above-mentioned institutions 
[SPSC, SCU, and DLU]”1758 and was “a major impediment to their work.”1759 
Oversight and Accountability
An independent organization created in 2001, the Judicial System Monitoring 
Program (JSMP), monitored trials before the Special Panels. Composed of national 
and international staff, JSMP also conducted outreach efforts in response to popular 
demands for information on the panels’ work.1760 The organization generated a 
detailed record of the decisions of the Special Panels and published monitoring 
reports analyzing their work.1761 When the panels closed, JSMP became a nonprofit 
organization working to improve the judicial and legislative systems in Timor-
Leste.1762
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ANNEX 4: MECHANISMS IN EUROPE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA
Conflict Background and Political Context
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) emerged from World War II 
as a communist country under the rule of President Josip Broz Tito. The new state 
brought Serbs, Croats, Bosnian Muslims, Albanians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, 
and Slovenes into a federation of six separate republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia) and two autonomous 
provinces of Serbia (Kosovo and Vojvodina). 
Ten years after Tito’s death in 1980, the country was in economic crisis and the 
mechanisms he had designed to both repress and balance ethnic demands in the 
SFRY were under severe strain. Slobodan Milošević had harnessed the power 
of nationalism to consolidate his power as president of Serbia. The League of 
Communists of Yugoslavia dissolved in January 1990, and the first multiparty 
elections were held in all Yugoslav republics, carrying nationalist parties to power in 
Bosnia, Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia.1763 Meanwhile, Milošević and his political 
allies asserted control in Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro, giving Serbia’s 
president de facto control over four of the eight votes in the federal state’s collective 
presidency. This and the consolidation of Serbian control over the Yugoslav People’s 
Army (YPA) heightened fears and played into ascendant nationalist feelings in other 
parts of the country. 
Declarations of independence by Croatia and Slovenia on June 25, 1991, brought 
matters to a head. Largely homogenous Slovenia succeeded in defending itself 
through a 10-day conflict that year against the Serb-dominated federal army, but 
Milošević was more determined to contest the independence of republics with 
sizeable ethnic Serb populations. There followed a series of large-scale armed 
conflicts in Croatia (1991–1995); Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995); and Kosovo 
(1998–1999).1764 Between 1991 and 1999 an estimated 140,000 people were killed, 
almost 40,000 persons went missing, and over three million persons were displaced 
internally and abroad, in what became known as the worst conflict in Europe since 
the end of World War II.1765
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In Croatia, clashes between Croatian government forces and forces opposed to 
succession—including Serb rebel groups and paramilitaries backed by the Serbian 
YPA and the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP)—led to bloody battles, 
notably in Vukovar. In March 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s declaration of 
independence, which was widely supported by Bosnian Muslims and Croats, led to a 
reaction from Serb military forces. Local militias with strong backing from Belgrade 
took control of Serb populated areas, targeting Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) and 
Croats in campaigns of murder, torture, sexual violence, and expulsion that became 
known as “ethnic cleansing.” Serb forces laid siege to the capital city of Sarajevo and 
declared a separate state within the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Majority 
Croat areas of the country sought to break away from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Zagreb-backed militias engaged in campaigns of “ethnic cleansing” targeting Serbs 
and Bosniaks. Between 1992 and 1995, the war in Bosnia led to the deaths of around 
100,000 people and the displacement of hundreds of thousands more. A “blizzard 
of resolutions” were adopted by the United Nations Security Council, addressing 
the raging conflict in Yugoslavia,1766 most notably, Security Council’s resolutions 
713 (1991), 764 (1992), 771 (1992), 780 (1992), 808 (1993),1767 and finally resolution 
827 (1993), which established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). 
Resolution 827 (1993), adopted by the UN Security Council on May 25, 1993, 
expressed “alarm at continuing reports of widespread and flagrant violations 
of international humanitarian law occurring within the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia.” Finding these to be a threat to international peace and security, 
the Security Council invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter to create an ad hoc 
criminal tribunal with the purpose of “prosecuting persons responsible for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia between 1 January 1991 and a date to be determined by the Security 
Council upon the restoration of peace.”1768 
While it was hoped that the creation of an international war crimes tribunal 
would contribute to ending atrocities and restoring peace, the ICTY was not the 
end of the Yugoslav wars. In July 1995, over just 10 days, the Bosnian Serb Army 
executed approximately 8,000 Bosniak boys and men seized in the UN “safe 
area” of Srebrenica, under the eyes of Dutch UN peacekeepers.1769 The massacre 
and ongoing shelling of Sarajevo finally prompted limited NATO military strikes 
against Bosnian Serb positions and increased Western leverage over the parties, 
allowing a negotiated end to the conflicts. In December 1995, the leaders of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia signed the Dayton Peace Accords, creating 
separate Bosniak/Croat and Serb majority entities within the Bosnian federation. 
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The Dayton Peace Accords ended the war in Bosnia but did not address the situation 
in Kosovo. Belgrade’s increasing repression of majority Albanian demands for 
independence over the course of 1997–1998 ultimately led to large-scale conflict 
between Serbian police and military forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). 
NATO airstrikes from March–June 1999 finally ended the Yugoslav wars.
For more detailed background on each of the individual conflicts, please see the 




At the time of the ICTY’s creation, the former Yugoslav republics were unwilling or 
otherwise unable to prosecute those responsible for atrocity crimes. Thus, the UN 
Security Council supported the creation of an independent criminal tribunal with a 
seat in The Hague, which would be able to prosecute crimes committed by all parties 
in the conflict. A 1995 Human Rights Watch report on the limitations of domestic 
war crimes prosecutions in Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia confirms the importance 
of the involvement of the ICTY, especially in the prosecution of high-ranking 
perpetrators. The report found that the ability of the local justice system to prosecute 
war crimes was not in line with international standards. According to Human Rights 
Watch, the judiciaries were highly politicized and lacked independence, courts often 
failed to ensure respect for due process rights, and authorities failed to prosecute 
members of their own forces.1770
In 1993, the UN Security Council adopted supplementary resolutions to the 
ICTY statute, one of which stated that the “strengthening of competent national 
judicial systems is crucially important to the rule of law in general and to the 
implementation of the ICTY and ICTR [International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda] Completion Strategies in particular.”1771 The Security Council thus 
extended the tribunal’s mandate beyond prosecutions, to include serving as a 
catalyst for national prosecutions of war crimes.1772 
Existing Civil Society Capacity
 
Countries in the former Yugoslavia do not have a strong civil society tradition.1773 
Although some groups engaged in antiwar activism during the conflict, civil society 
organizations played little to no role in the creation of the ICTY. International news 
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coverage of grave crimes and the work of international human rights organizations, 
however, contributed to focusing worldwide attention on events in the Balkans 
during the 1990s and were instrumental in pushing for the creation of an 
international tribunal. Human Rights Watch published numerous reports on human 
rights and serious violations of humanitarian law throughout the Yugoslav wars. It 
investigated human rights violations of Serb minorities in Croatia before the start of 
the conflict, violations of the laws of war by Serb insurgent forces and the Yugoslav 
Army during the Croatian War of Independence,1774 war crimes that occurred during 
Bosnia’s war,1775 and human rights abuses by Serbs against Kosovo Albanians.1776
Local civil society organizations evolved over the course of the Yugoslav conflicts. 
According to the Council of Europe Commission on Human Rights, “A vibrant 
civil society in the region of the former Yugoslavia with groups of professionals 
and victims … ha[s] been working for more than a decade gathering information, 
revealing evidence, co-operating with national and international institutions, 
organizing educational campaigns, giving support to victims and promoting 
accountability and reconciliation.”1777 Nongovernmental organizations have played 
an instrumental role in pushing for domestic prosecutions of wartime atrocities and 
investigations that are representative of the crimes committed and for the creation 
of other methods to address Yugoslavia’s violent past, despite operating in a climate 
that is often hostile to civil society.1778 The Research and Documentation Center 
(Bosnia), the Humanitarian Law Center (Serbia and Kosovo), and the Documenta-
Center (Croatia) have been some of the key actors in this process.1779
Creation
 
In response to reports of continued violations of human rights in the former 
Yugoslavia, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 
780 (1992), which called for the creation of “an impartial Commission of Experts 
to examine and analyze … grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other 
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of former 
Yugoslavia.”1780 In the “blizzard of resolutions”1781 addressing the raging conflict 
that followed, it slowly became clear to the international community that they were 
dealing with the largest conflict on European soil since the end of the end of World 
War II. The expert commission faced a number of difficulties in carrying out its 
investigations, most notably a lack of resources and absence of state cooperation, but 
produced a report that recommended the establishment of an international tribunal 
to put an end to such crimes and restore peace and security.1782 In Resolution 808 
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(1993), the Security Council recognized the need for the creation of an international 
tribunal “to end … crimes and take effective measures to bring to justice the persons 
who are responsible for them,” and further directed the Secretary-General to submit 
a proposal for constituting the court.1783 
In the context of the international community’s confusion and deadlock over how to 
effectively address the wars raging in Croatia and Bosnia, the UN Security Council 
did come to agreement on Resolution 827 of May 25, 1993, establishing an ad hoc 
international tribunal “for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violation 
of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia 
since 1991.”1784 The resolution contained the ICTY Statute, which determined the 
court’s jurisdiction and organizational structure, as well as its criminal procedure 
in general terms.1785 The creation of the ICTY under Chapter VII of the UN charter, 
concerning the United Nations powers for the maintenance of peace, raised high 
expectations for the tribunal as a means of peacebuilding. The ICTY’s founders also 
intended the court to create a reliable historical record of what happened for future 
generations in order to avoid “dangerous misinterpretations and myths.”1786 It remains 
disputed whether the tribunal was indeed an effective tool for the deterrence of 
further violence in the region, or for providing an official record of events.1787
Legal Framework and Mandate
 
The UN Security Council created the ICTY as an extraordinary measure under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter to restore international peace and security and to 
prosecute those (most) responsible for violations of international humanitarian law 
in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.1788 The subject matter jurisdiction of the 
tribunal includes war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.1789 War crimes 
are defined as grave breaches of the 1948 Geneva Conventions and violations of the 
law or customs of war (violations of customary international humanitarian law).  
The ICTY Statute incorporates the exact definition of genocide from Articles 2 and 3 
of the 1949 Genocide Convention, and it defines crimes against humanity  
in accordance with similar crimes within the charter and judgments of the  
post–World War II Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. The tribunal’s territorial 
jurisdiction is limited to the former Yugoslavia republics, and its temporal 
jurisdiction covers crimes committed after January 1, 1991.1790 At the time of the 
ICTY’s creation, the wars in Bosnia and Croatia were still ongoing, and therefore, its 
temporal jurisdiction was left open-ended. The ICTY has jurisdiction over individual 
persons, and the statute specifically provides that the tribunal may prosecute heads 
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of state or government.1791 The ICTY was the first international criminal court of its 
kind to include such a provision limiting head-of-state immunity.1792 
The governing legal instruments of the tribunal are the ICTY Statute and the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which the court’s judges adopted on February 
11, 1994.1793 Secondary legal instruments were developed over time, including 
agreements on the enforcement of sentences with third states, the headquarters 
agreement between the UN and the Netherlands, and a variety of rules governing 
such matters as detention and a code of conduct for the defense.1794 
The ICTY has concurrent jurisdiction and primacy over national courts. Early on in 
its existence, many already believed the tribunal should focus on prosecutions of 
those most responsible for crimes under the statute. Article 19 of the ICTY Statute 
dictates that the tribunal may at any point in the proceedings defer cases to national 
authorities; the court applied this concept extensively following the adoption of a 
completion strategy for operation (see annexes on Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia).1795 
The tribunal relied on states and international organizations to carry out arrest 
warrants and other requests for assistance. Therefore, Article 29 of the statute sets 
forth the obligation of all states to cooperate with the tribunal’s investigations and 
prosecutions.1796 In practice, and especially during its first years, obtaining state 
cooperation proved difficult for a pioneering tribunal operating in a region where 
there was little political support for its work and where conflicts were ongoing. From 
the end of the 1990s onward, under pressure from the international community and 
after filing numerous reports of non-cooperation, the situation temporarily improved.1797 
Location 
The ICTY premises are located in The Hague, the Netherlands.1798 However, the 
tribunal may sit elsewhere if its president deems it to be in the interest of justice.1799 
Upon creation of the tribunal, the United Nations decided that because of the 
ongoing conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and lack of political will and support for 
the ICTY in the region, the mechanism had to be seated elsewhere. Throughout 
its existence, the ICTY has had to contend with the distance between it and its 
constituents in the region: the victims and communities affected by the crimes 
within its mandate. 
Accused persons arrested and transferred to The Hague are held in the United 
Nations Detention Unit (UNDU) in the Scheveningen area of The Hague. Persons 
convicted of a crime before the ICTY do not serve their sentence in The Hague 
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The ICTY is composed of three main branches: the Chambers, the Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP), and the Registry. In line with the UN Charter, geographical 
representation is considered in hiring, and both national and international personnel 
staff these core organs. 
Chambers
The ICTY’s Chambers are composed of three Trial Chambers and one Appeals 
Chamber, assisted in their work by the Chambers Legal Support Teams. Each 
Trial Chamber has three permanent judges and a maximum of six ad litem judges 
appointed by the UN Secretary-General for a term of four years. Both permanent 
and ad litem judges are eligible for reelection after their first term. Each case must 
have a permanent judge among those assigned to hear a case and must conduct such 
hearings in line with the tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The Appeals 
Chamber consists of seven permanent judges, five of whom are permanent judges 
of the ICTY and two who are permanent judges of the ICTR. Each appeal must be 
heard by a bench of five judges. The judges elect a president who presides over the 
Appeals Chamber and assigns judges to cases at the Appeals and Trial Chambers, 
performs diplomatic and political functions related to the tribunal’s work, supervises 
the registrar, and submits an annual report to the General Assembly and a biannual 
assessment to the Security Council. The judges also elect a vice president who 
performs the president’s functions in his or her absence. ICTY judges come from 
a variety of legal systems; they are expected to be persons of high moral character, 
impartiality, and integrity.1801
The Office of the Prosecutor
The UN Security Council appoints the prosecutor upon nomination by the  
Secretary-General for a four-year renewable term. A deputy prosecutor (also 
appointed by the Secretary-General) and other prosecutors, legal officers, and 
investigators supports the prosecutor’s work. The OTP, which unlike at other 
international tribunals is not included in the statute as such, may investigate and 
prosecute serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia after January 1, 1991, and operates separately 
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from the tribunal’s other two organs.1802 Since 2004, the OTP has focused mostly on 
prosecution of existing cases, as it issued its final indictments that year. In line with 
the tribunal’s completion strategy, the prosecutor was involved in the scrutiny of 
cases with the aim of prioritizing them for prosecution, as well as handing over the 
rest of the cases to the national prosecutors.1803 
The Registry
The Registry serves as the “engine room” of the tribunal, providing essential 
court management and administrative support for the Chambers and Office of 
the Prosecutor, and serves as the channel of communication between the ICTY 
and the outside world.1804 The Registry consists of four divisions: the Division of 
Judicial Support Services, the Immediate Office of the Registrar, the Chambers 
Legal Support Section, and the Administrative Division. These are responsible for, 
among others, courtroom operations, court records and filings, witness support and 
assistance, legal support to Chambers, process requests for legal aid by accused 
persons, trial interpretation and translation of documents, supervision of the 
UNDU, and outreach and public information. The Registry also plays an important 
role, alongside other organs, in maintaining external relations and ensuring state 
cooperation with the court. The Registry is headed by the registrar, whom the 
Secretary-General appoints upon recommendation by the judges to a four-year 
renewable term.1805 
Victims and Witnesses Section 
The statute dictates that the ICTY shall provide for the protection of victims and 
witnesses.1806 The Victims and Witnesses Section (VWS) within the Registry consists 
of the Witness Support and Operations Unit (WSOU) and Witness Protection 
Unit (WPU). Together, these two units are responsible for the safe appearance of 
witnesses before the tribunal in The Hague, including the logistical arrangements, 
psycho-social support, and security measures which may be needed throughout and 
after the process.1807 According to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the ICTY’s 
judges may order a range of protective measures for witnesses testifying before the 
ICTY to make sure that their identity is not disclosed to the media or public.1808
Defense
While the ICTY does not have a designated defense office, the Registry is 
responsible for dealing with defense matters. The Office for Legal Aid and 
Defense Matters within the Division of Judicial Support Services is responsible 
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for the ICTY’s legal aid scheme. Over the years, the Registry has prepared various 
documents that regulate and support the work of defense counsel practicing before 
the ICTY, including a Directive on Assignment of Defense Counsel and a Code 
of Professional Conduct for Defense Counsel Appearing before the International 
Tribunal. Since 2002, defense counsel are organized in the Association of Defense 
Counsel practicing before the ICTY (ADC-ICTY).1809 Although not formally part of 
the tribunal’s structure, the ACD-ICTY was often involved by the Registry in the 
determination of policies concerning the defense.
Outreach
An ICTY outreach program was established in 1999, six years after the tribunal’s 
creation.1810 Then-President Gabrielle Kirk McDonald came to realize that “if 
the ICTY were to accomplish the UN-mandated goal of helping to bring about 
international peace and security, the people of the region must come to know and 
appreciate the Tribunal as being fair,” and outreach was seen as key to achieving 
that goal.1811 Activities carried out by the outreach program included capacity 
building of national judiciaries and legal professionals, awareness-raising among 
younger generations, grassroots community outreach, media outreach, organized 
visits to the tribunal, and production of information materials. The court created 
liaison offices in Belgrade, Sarajevo, Zagreb, and Pristina. These activities align with 
the program’s mandate of bridging the divide between the ICTY in The Hague and 
local communities in the various countries of the former Yugoslavia.1812 However, in 
part due to its very late start in organizing outreach, the ICTY has struggled with the 
inherently daunting task of explaining its mandate and complex proceedings in the 
face of misinformation campaigns. Despite the outreach program’s development, 
the tribunal never overcame the sense of remoteness from the Balkan region for 
which it was established.1813 
Prosecutions 
As of late 2017, the ICTY has concluded proceedings for 154 accused persons (19 
acquitted, 83 sentenced, 13 were referred to national jurisdictions, 20 individuals 
had their indictments withdrawn, 10 died before transfer to the tribunal, and seven 
died while in custody). In total, the tribunal indicted 161 persons. As of late 2017, 
10 remained in custody at the UN ICTY Detention Unit, while there were seven 
ongoing proceedings (one at the trial stage and six at the appeals stage).1814 
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In its first two years, the ICTY issued 34 indictments, but struggled to bring suspects 
to The Hague.1815 Trials only started in 1996, and the first judgment was delivered 
on November 29, 1996: a sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment for crimes against 
humanity committed in Srebrenica for Drazen Erdemović, a Bosnian Croat soldier 
in the Serbian army.1816 Initially, the Office of the Prosecutor lacked a consistent case 
selection strategy, and investigations focused on crimes committed in the Bosnian 
war, since this is where the UN Commission of Experts had already collected 
evidence. Many of the first investigations concerned lower-level, direct perpetrators, 
and not the high-ranking political and military leaders who orchestrated crimes, and 
who were well known within Yugoslavia.1817 The indictment of Bosnian Serb leaders 
Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić for genocide and other charges in November 
19951818 and the indictment of Serbian President Slobodan Milošević on May 22, 
1999,1819 were of much greater significance to the region and have helped shape 
perceptions of the tribunal. 
The ICTY has played a pioneering role in the prosecution of and development of 
jurisprudence on sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict.1820 In total, 
almost 50 percent of the tribunal’s indictments included sexual violence charges, 
and 32 individuals were eventually convicted under Article 7 of the ICTY Statute.1821 
The prosecutor’s first case, Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, was also the first international 
war crimes trial to include sexual violence charges in its indictment, including sexual 
violence against men.1822 Other judgments included convictions for aiding and 
abetting rape as a war crime, which is not included in the ICTY Statute as such;1823 
rape as torture under customary international law;1824 and sexual enslavement as a 
crime against humanity.1825
Although the prosecution achieved convictions of high-level perpetrators of the 
wars in the former Yugoslavia, its struggles with some high-profile cases have also 
affected regional perceptions of the court’s work. Prominent acquittals included 
those of Croatian General Ante Gotovina,1826 leading suspects of the KLA,1827 Vojislav 
Šešelj,1828 and Momčilo Perišić.1829 In the former Yugoslavia, the fact that a majority 
of ICTY indictments and convictions were against Serbs and Bosnian Serbs is 
varyingly seen as an accurate reflection of atrocities perpetrated during the Yugoslav 
conflicts, or as confirmation that the tribunal was a biased institution, established to 
punish Serbs.1830
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Legacy
The UN resolution creating the ICTY expressed an expectation that through its 
proceedings, it would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of international 
peace and security.1831 However, the tribunal’s legacy extends beyond the areas of 
its formal mandate.1832 Beyond the conviction of over 161 individuals for war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and genocide committed in the former Yugoslavia, the 
ICTY itself has claimed impact in various areas: the creation of an accurate historical 
record of the conflicts, the general development of international humanitarian law 
and international justice, strengthening of the rule of law in its target countries, and 
bringing justice to victims of atrocity crimes.1833
The Deterrent Effect of the ICTY 
When the ICTY was created, at the height of the Yugoslav wars, it was hoped 
that the creation of a war crimes tribunal would have a deterrent effect on the 
commitment of future crimes. It is clear to all that the ICTY was no panacea, since 
the worst of the Bosnian war was yet to come, and the Kosovo war commenced 
five years after the tribunal came into existence. Scholars disagree on the ICTY’s 
deterrent effect. Some claim that the tribunal has had, at best, a limited deterrent 
impact on mass violence in the former Yugoslavia.1834 Others argue that while the 
ICTY’s creation and its focus on the atrocities in the region did not immediately 
end the violence, near the end of the war and in its aftermath, the court was 
instrumental in altering the politics of violence, violent behavior, and the culture of 
impunity in Yugoslavia.1835 Especially the indictments of Bosnian Serb commanders 
Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, whose indictments excluded them from the 
Dayton peace negotiations, and the later indictment of Serbian President Slobodan 
Milošević, who was ousted from power not long thereafter, have been described as 
being instrumental to guiding the region back toward peace. 
Telling the Story of What Happened 
The ICTY has created the most complete documented history of crimes committed 
in the former Yugoslavia.1836 Its cases have proven key in the determination of the 
facts of crimes committed in Yugoslavia. Academic Marko Milanović writes of the 
court: “The detail in which the ICTY’s judgements describe the crimes and the 
involvement of those convicted make it impossible for anyone to dispute the reality 
of the horrors that took place in and around Bratunac, Brčko, Čelebići, Dubrovnik, 
Foča, Prijedor, Sarajevo, Srebrenica and Zvornik, to name but a few.”1837 The Kvočka 
et al. case, for example, was important in establishing the crimes that occurred in 
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Prijedor, Bosnia and Herzegovina.1838 Perpetrators in Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić 
disclosed information on the location of mass graves near the Sušica Detention 
Camp in Bosnia and Herzegovina, so that the victims’ families could finally locate 
and properly bury their dead.1839
Development of International Law 
The ICTY’s proceedings have made a significant contribution to international 
criminal law as well as international humanitarian law, which at the time of the 
tribunal’s creation was still in its infancy.1840 In the Tadić Jurisdiction Decision, for 
example, the Appeals Chamber, in defining an armed conflict, held that “an armed 
conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between armed states or 
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed 
groups or between such groups within a State.”1841 In addition, the ICTY has been 
able to shape jurisprudence on genocide,1842 crimes against humanity, command 
(superior) responsibility,1843 protected persons, and taking the first steps toward the 
formation of the notion of joint criminal enterprise as a mode of liability.1844
Strengthening Domestic Capacity 
At the time of the ICTY’s creation in 1993, it was assumed that local courts in the 
former Yugoslavia were unable or unwilling to bring perpetrators of atrocities to 
justice, let alone prosecute their own. Neither was there an expectation that the 
tribunal in The Hague would strengthen the capacity of national courts in the 
former Yugoslavia.1845 Over the course of its existence, perceptions started to change 
regarding the relationship between the ICTY and national courts. In 2003, the 
Secretary-General endorsed a plan of ICTY judges, which would become known 
as the ICTY “completion strategy.” This proposed that national courts in Bosnia, 
Croatia, and Serbia would be invited to assist the ICTY in the completion of its 
mandate. The completion strategy granted the tribunal an ability to transfer cases 
involving mid- and lower-level perpetrators to competent national jurisdictions 
in the former Yugoslavia, while continuing to monitor proceedings ongoing at 
the national level because of remaining concerns over the capacity of national 
jurisdictions to process complex war crimes cases.1846
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The ICTY and National Courts: Three Phases
Primacy (1993–1996): During the ICTY’s early years, atrocities in the former 
Yugoslavia were ongoing. Domestic prosecutions, if they happened at all, were not 
considered credible or adequate. While the ICTY noted that “national courts” could 
play an important role at the time, this was “likely directed at Western European 
countries that were capable of prosecuting fugitives from justice rather than courts 
in the Balkans.”1847 
Supervisory (1996–2002): In 1996, the ICTY drew up an agreement with countries 
in the former Yugoslavia to ensure that national prosecutions met international 
legal standards. The ICTY retained the power to review national investigations and 
decide whether domestic courts could issue indictments.1848 While this supervisory 
arrangement may have been necessary to safeguard the rights of the accused, it 
was ultimately disempowering for national justice systems and caused tension 
between the ICTY and national legal professionals. The ICTY did not view national 
courts as credible partners for justice, in part because of their weak capacity.1849 
This phase “did little to promote domestic development or to enhance the capacity 
of national institutions in the region” and may have caused a “chilling effect.”1850 
Spurring National Capacity (2002–Present): In 2002, the ICTY revised its 
approach and drew up a new framework, emphasizing the transfer of cases to 
domestic courts in line with a comprehensive completion strategy.1851 The ICTY 
created several working groups with international administrators in Bosnia (the 
Office of the High Representative) to shape the design of Bosnia’s War Crimes 
Chamber and Special Division for War Crimes in the national prosecutor’s office.1852 
The shift was driven in part by a practical and operational imperative to devolve 
cases in anticipation of the closure of the ICTY; it also reflected a shift in emphasis 
toward building domestic judicial capacity, more akin to a complementarity 
framework. While some contend the ICTY could have acted sooner and done 
more to strengthen domestic capacity, others insist that domestic courts were 
not genuinely established until 2005.1853 Under the completion strategy, the ICTY 
amended its rules to transfer Rule 11bis cases and cases which had not reached 
the indictment stage at the ICTY (“Category II cases”), and it also returned files on 
suspects that had been sent to the ICTY.1854 Most of these cases involved low- and 
mid-level defendants. This complementarity phase had varying success in different 
countries in the region, but spurred local capacity in three key ways: it (1) promoted 
transfer of information and evidence to local courts; (2) strengthened institutional 
and professional links in concrete ways around specific cases; (3) and shifted 
resources for war crimes prosecutions to the national level.
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Overall, many observers agree that the ICTY promoted domestic capacity to 
prosecute war crimes after the implementation of the completion strategy. 
Specialized war crimes chambers were created in Croatia (in 2003), in Bosnia (in 
2005), and in Serbia (in 2005). (For more detail, please see the separate mechanism 
profiles.) While trials in all countries showed numerous shortcomings—signs of 
ethnic-bias, ineffective witness protection, lack of capacity of police forces to conduct 
war crimes investigations, and sometimes poor quality of the judgments1855—there 
is an overall consensus that the situation would have been much worse without 
the ICTY’s involvement. Without the cooperation between the ICTY and national 
jurisdictions, the prosecution of war crimes cases would not have taken place, 
would have been politicized and failed to respect fair trial rights, or would have only 
started years later. Additionally, the array of activities undertaken by the ICTY and 
other international organizations to further strengthen the judiciary—such as the 
organization of trainings and study visits to promote the transfer of skills from ICTY 
to national judges and prosecutors—has generally improved the capacity of domestic 
judicial systems in the former Yugoslavia.1856
Bringing Justice to Victims 
Many have regarded the ICTY as an institution that failed to bridge the gap between 
The Hague and the victims and victim communities. This is partly due to the late 
start of its outreach program and the failure to adequately fund the program once 
it was launched.1857 Even so, the court has had a lasting impact on victims in the 
region. First, many victims have traveled to The Hague to testify before the court. 
This contributed to a sense of recognition of what happened to them and may help 
create a feeling for them that justice has been served.1858 As Diane Orentlicher has 
observed with regard to the ICTY’s impact in Bosnia: “After all kinds of war crimes 
and genocide, the people need some sort of satisfaction … that someone guilty be 
punished.”1859 She concludes that for victims, Bosnians and Serbs alike, victims  
felt effectively redressed by the ICTY because those responsible for atrocity  
crimes were punished.1860
A Lasting Impact on the Region 
s mentioned above, with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1503 in 
2003, the UN endorsed a strategy for the completion of ICTY investigations. The 
three-phased completion strategy determined that the tribunal was to complete 
all investigations by the end of 2004, complete all first-instance trials by the end 
of 2008, and close its doors by the end of 2010.1861 However, due to delays in 
securing state cooperation to enforce outstanding arrest warrants and extended 
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proceedings because of complexity of certain cases, the ICTY was unable to meet 
these deadlines. In late 2017, the tribunal was still in the process of completing its 
final cases and preparing to transfer all of its remaining functions to a newly created 
mechanism: The Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT). 
The United Nations Security Council created the MICT (formally, the International 
Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals) in 2010 to continue essential functions 
originally performed by the ad hoc international tribunals for Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda.1862 UNSC Resolution 1966 (2010) determined that the MICT, after its 
predecessors’ dissolution, “shall continue the jurisdiction, rights and obligations 
and essential functions of the ICTY and the ICTR.”1863 The residual mechanism 
is competent to arrest and prosecute remaining fugitives, refer cases to national 
prosecutions, handle appeal proceedings, review proceedings or retrials after the 
ad hoc tribunals’ closure, as well as supervise the enforcement of sentences, the 
protection of victims and witnesses, and the management and preservation of the 
former tribunals’ archives.1864 MICT started operations on July 1, 2013, in The Hague, 
the Netherlands,1865 and has the same organizational structure as the ICTY.1866 
The residual mechanism may not issue new indictments under the ICTY Statute, 
but it is mandated to continue the work that the ICTY (and ICTR) started.1867 
MICT has been playing and will continue to play an active role in monitoring and 
assisting national jurisdictions in the investigation or prosecution of war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, or genocide.1868 Additionally, the MICT is in charge of the 
preservation and management of the ICTY’s archives—unique records containing 
information on indictments, court proceedings, testimonies, judgments—which tell 
the story of the tribunal and its accomplishments.1869 
Financing
 
The ICTY is funded through the regular budget of the United Nations, in accordance 
with Article 171870 of the UN Charter, as stipulated under Article 32 of the Statute. 
In recent years, the ICTY’s annual expenditures have been approximately US$140 
million (each for the years 2010 and 2011), US$125 million (2012, 2013), and US$90 
million (2014, 2015).1871 The downward trend in annual operating costs reflects the 
winding up of the tribunal and its movement into the “residual mechanism” phase. 
As a point of comparison, the ICTY’s annual budget in 2000 was $90 million.1872 
Through 2007, the court had received over US$1.2 billion in funding.1873
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The Registry reports that the court’s legal aid system accounts for about 11 percent  
of the total annual budget.1874 The language section, responsible for interpretation 
and translation services, also accounts for a significant portion of the tribunal’s 
budget, since all trials require interpretation and transitional into three languages.  
A 2006 article put the cost of language services at 10 percent of overall Registry 
costs and put the Registry’s costs at 69 percent of the annual operating costs of the 
ICTY as a whole.1875
In addition to the regular budget, the ICTY has received donations and other 
forms of nonfinancial support from states and other agencies. Donations, although 
accounting for only one percent of the tribunal’s budget, have been vital for the 
court’s operations; they have been used to fund activities including the exhumation 
of mass graves and outreach.1876 The Registry’s outreach program, which is not 
integrated into the court’s regular budget, has relied heavily on contributions to 
the ICTY Outreach Program Trust Fund. Major donors have been the European 
Union, the United Kingdom, Luxemburg, the United States, Finland, Denmark, 
Norway, and the Netherlands.1877 As of July 31, 2015, the voluntary fund had received 
approximately US$53.4 million in donations since the ICTY’s creation.1878 In 2016, 
the EU confirmed that it would continue funding the outreach program until the 
tribunal’s closing.1879
Many have regarded UN-created ad hoc tribunals as too expensive for the value 
they deliver.1880 For the ICTY, this perception contributed to the development of an 
exit strategy by the UN Security Council. Various factors beyond judicial or staff 
salaries and expenses have driven the high cost of ICTY cases. These “include the 
length and complexity of international criminal trials; the inclusion of investigation, 
detention unit, and other non-judicial costs in the ICTY budget; translation and 
travel expenses necessitated by the international character of the tribunal and its 
location; unusual witness relocation costs [etc.].”1881 Failures of state cooperation, 
including Serbian institutions’ involvement in protecting fugitive Ratko Mladić 
from arrest, meant some trials that could have been merged had to be conducted 
separately, and thus started later. 
The ability of the ICTY (and ICTR) to rely on assessed rather than voluntary funding 
has provided greater budget certainty. This funding model has also helped to protect 
the court from accusations it serves the interests of donors who may be biased. 
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Oversight and Accountability 
Because the UN Security Council created the ICTY as an ad hoc body under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN has closely monitored its work. Article 34 
of the ICTY Statute provides that “the President of the International Tribunal shall 
submit an annual report of the International Tribunal to the Security Council and 
to the General Assembly.”1882 However, the ICTY lacks an international oversight 
mechanism “mandated to review the activities of the ICTY and either legislate to 
revise the Tribunal’s operational imperfections or present the Security Council with 
options and recommendations for this purpose.”1883 Because the statute does not 
provide guidance on indicators for the measurement of the tribunal’s performance, 
some observers have concluded that it has operated without meaningful 
oversight.1884
National and international NGOs working on justice issues in the former Yugoslavia 
have played a significant role by monitoring the ICTY’s proceedings. Important 
domestic actors include the Humanitarian Law Center, Fractal, and Youth Initiative 
for Human Rights (YIHR) in Serbia; YIHR, Documenta: Center for Facing the Past, 
and Center for Human Rights in Croatia; the Humanitarian Law Center-Kosovo in 
Pristina; and the Nansen Dialogue Centre in Bosnia. International NGOs that have 
closely followed the proceedings include Human Rights Watch, the International 
Center for Transitional Justice, and the Coalition for International Justice.
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BOSNIA: WAR CRIMES CHAMBER AND SPECIAL DIVISION 
FOR WAR CRIMES IN THE PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE
Conflict Background and Political Context
For the broader context of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see the profile of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
Between 1992 and 1995, around 100,000 people were killed during the war in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).1885 The war displaced many more Bosnians internally 
and abroad as they fled violence and grave crimes that included widespread sexual 
violence and the targeted destruction of cultural heritage. Following NATO’s 
intervention, the Dayton Peace Accords of November 1996 formally ended the war 
and created a new constitution for a nominally unified country. However, the Dayton 
agreement solidified the country’s division into two strong entities: The Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska (RS). State-level 
institutions were weak from the outset, as a majority of Serbs (concentrated in 
the RS) and many Croats (concentrated in the FBiH) rejected the state itself. 
Government officials in neighboring Serbia and, decreasingly over time, in Croatia 
continued to call into question the viability of a Bosnian state. Dayton created an 
international Office of the High Representative (OHR), which later gained powers 
to remove obstructionist officials and impose legislation.1886 OHR played a central 
role in the creation of the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its special 
War Crimes Chamber (WCC), as well as the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (POBiH) and its Special Division for War Crimes (SDWC). 
The Bosnian state remains fragile. Populations remain largely segregated by 
ethnicity, and the Dayton constitution, negotiated by nationalist leaders, established 
an election system that rewards candidates running for office who play on ethnic 
fears and promise protection for “their” people. Milorad Dodik, who has been the 
president of the Republika Srpska since 2010, has led sustained political attacks 
on state-level institutions, including the State Court. He called for the expulsion 
of international prosecutors,1887 and since 2015 he has pushed for a referendum to 
challenge the State Court’s authority over Serbs.1888 As centripetal forces tear at the 
state, the international community has grown weary of making a broken system 
work, but also has shown little interest in tackling the structural dysfunction of the 
electoral system created at Dayton. Against this backdrop, and despite their notable 
achievements, the State Court and POBiH will only be as viable as the state itself.
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Existing Justice-Sector Capacity
The complex structure of government institutions resulting from the Dayton Peace 
Accords was a key initial challenge in the creation of an impartial and effective 
legal system and in the improvement of judicial sector capacity.1889 Prior to the 
WCC’s establishment, some local courts handled war crimes cases referred from 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) under the 
1996 Rules of the Road Agreement (see text box, below).1890 Local prosecutions were 
mostly ineffective, suffering from lack of coordination, resources, and specialized 
war crimes prosecutors and investigators.1891 Additionally, prosecutions in local 
courts often reflected the ethnic composition of the local communities and were 
perceived as “ill-suited to render impartial justice.”1892 
Even as the ICTY suggested the transfer of its caseload to national jurisdictions, 
it raised concerns over the ability of these countries to fairly and efficiently tackle 
the cases, given widespread concerns about the safety of witnesses, judges, and 
prosecutors, as well as continued ethnic bias allegations and the overall weak 
capacity of the legal system.1893
Existing Civil Society Capacity
In the early 1990s, civil society in the former Yugoslavia was in a nascent state, still 
emerging from the incomplete transition from the post–World War II authoritarian 
rule of Josip Broz Tito. The war further weakened these fragile institutions, as 
many intellectual leaders fled. Further, the war left many civil society organizations 
polarized along ethnic grounds. Even multiethnic organizations with an ethos of 
tolerance found it difficult to attempt to influence the Byzantine state structures 
created at Dayton, especially as its election system was primed to respond to ethnic 
fearmongering rather than the type of advocacy typically used by NGOs.1894 As a 
result, even domestic civil society actors who favored the creation of a State Court 
and its special divisions for war crimes and organized crime had minor roles in its 
realization. While there were NGOs that advocated for the creation of a domestic 
mechanism for the prosecution of war crimes in the aftermath of the war, civil society 
and victims’ groups were barely consulted on the establishment of the WCC.1895 
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Creation
In September 2001, the ICTY’s Office of the Prosecutor presented the idea of 
establishing a special war crimes court in Sarajevo. The OHR had commissioned 
a group of experts headed by a former head of investigations for the ICTY to write 
a report on the need for such a court.1896 The WCC was created in the context of 
the ICTY’s completion strategy and as a direct result of a 2003 agreement between 
the OHR and the ICTY.1897 Following the creation of the State Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 2002 and as part of a wholesale restructuring of its judiciary, the 
OHR planned for the establishment of the WCC by adopting a series of laws—
among them a new criminal code and criminal procedure code in 20031898—which 
the national parliament later ratified. These processes were catalyzed by the ICTY’s 
completion strategy. The high representative made extensive use of his executive 
powers (known as the Bonn Powers) in creating the State Court, the Prosecutor’s 
Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina (POBiH), and its special divisions for dealing with 
war crimes and corruption.1899 The SDWC within the POBiH was created in January 
2005, and the WCC was inaugurated in May of that year.1900 
Legal Framework and Mandate
The WCC is a domestic chamber in Sarajevo that has jurisdiction over war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and genocide committed during the 1992–1995 conflict. 
The WCC applies domestic Bosnian law and handles cases referred to it from the 
ICTY and cases brought by SDWC prosecutors. For a period of time, the WCC had a 
mixed national-international composition, but as of 2012, the WCC is comprised of 
48 local judges only.1901
As stated above, in 2003, a new criminal code and criminal procedure code were 
approved by the national parliament. The new legislative framework substantially 
departed from the previous inquisitorial system. It abolished the investigative judge 
and placed prosecutors in charge of investigations. It also introduced the adversarial 
trial practices of direct and cross-examination and the concept of plea bargaining, as 
well as reducing the role of the judges in questioning witnesses. Despite these new 
elements, substantial aspects of old Yugoslav civil law remained in the 2003 criminal 
procedure code. For example, Bosnia still has no system of binding precedent or 
rules of evidence. The new code created substantial room for disagreement over 
how it should be interpreted.1902 
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Bosnia signed the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on July 17, 
2000, and ratified it on April 11, 2002. The 2003 criminal code catalogues and issues 
sentencing guidelines for international crimes. These include genocide; crimes 
against humanity; war crimes against civilians; war crimes against the wounded 
and sick; war crimes against prisoners of war; organizing a group of people and 
instigating the perpetration of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; 
unlawful killing or wounding of the enemy; marauding the killed and wounded at 
the battlefield; violating the laws and practices of warfare; unjustified delay in the 
repatriation of prisoners of war; and destruction of cultural, historical, and religious 
monuments.1903 The criminal code includes the notion of command responsibility for 
violations of international humanitarian law.1904 The Prosecutor’s Office used this 
code in all of its prosecutions, even though it was not in effect during the conflict. In 
July 2013, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights unanimously 
found that Bosnia’s retroactive application of the 2003 code violated the human 
rights of two convicted persons because heavier penalties were available under that 
code (the 1976 Yugoslav code) than under the code in effect at the times the crimes 
occurred.1905 The ruling applied to sentencing provisions and crimes that were 
defined in the 1976 code. The court noted that the 1976 code left crimes against 
humanity undefined, so prosecutors could still apply the 2003 code in those matters, 
as the offenses were defined under international law at the time of the events.1906
In 2004, the state-level parliament adopted a law to regulate the receipt of cases 
from the ICTY.1907 It states that for cases transferred to BiH under ICTY Rule 11bis, 
“the BiH Prosecutor shall initiate criminal prosecution according to the facts and 
charges laid out in the indictment of the ICTY” and adapt the indictment to Bosnian 
law.1908 Further, it provides for the possibility that the Bosnian prosecutor could add 
new charges to the adapted ICTY indictment in accordance with the Bosnian criminal 
procedure code.1909 Finally, the law also mandates that the Bosnian prosecutor 
pursue criminal proceedings in what have come to be known as Category II cases: 
pre-indictment cases that the ICTY prosecutor sends to the Bosnian prosecutor, and 
which do not, unlike Rule 11bis cases, require the approval of ICTY judges.1910 
Even as war crimes investigations and prosecutions increase across the region, 
mutual legal assistance frameworks on extradition, information sharing, and 
execution of sentences are weak and politically fraught. 
Witness Protection
In January 2003, the international high representative for Bosnia imposed the Law on 
Protection of Witnesses Under Threat and Vulnerable Witnesses.1911 That law specifies 
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that the court, the prosecutor, and other parties in the proceedings are to advise 
potentially threatened or vulnerable witnesses about available protection measures.1912
The criminal procedural code itself contains a general provision obligating judges 
to protect witnesses from in-court insults, threats, and attacks; in these events, they 
have the option to warn, issue fines, or even order arrests and prosecutions.1913 The 
Law on Protection of Witnesses further mandates judges to determine whether 
videoconference testimony should be used1914 and allows them to remove the 
accused from the courtroom “where there is a justified fear that the presence of 
the accused will affect the ability of the witness to testify fully and correctly,” 
in which case the accused is provided with access to live video of the trial.1915 
Under “exceptional circumstances,” witnesses under severe threat may testify in 
anonymity. Less exceptional, the law allows judges to delay disclosure of witness 
identity to the defense.1916 Officials found to have compromised witness protection 
measures face prosecution.1917 In September 2004, the Bosnian Parliament amended 
the criminal code to include penalties not only for officials, but for anyone involved 
in revealing the identity of a protected witness.1918
Both the criminal procedural code and the Law on Protection of Witnesses 
contain provisions on in-court protection for vulnerable witnesses. Victims of 
sexual violence are not allowed to be questioned on their past sexual behavior or 
predisposition.1919 Judges are required to “exercise an appropriate control over the 
manner of the examination of witnesses when a vulnerable witness is examined, 
particularly to protect the witness from harassment and confusion.”1920 In 
exceptional circumstances, the judges can pose questions to the witness on behalf of 
the parties and defense counsel, if these consent to the procedure.1921
Also in 2004, parliament approved the creation of a Witness Protection Department 
within the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), to which it gave the 
responsibility of conducting witness risk assessments.1922 The head of the Witness 
Protection Department is charged with protecting the witnesses under threat 
“during and after criminal proceedings.”1923 The program has the authority to 
provide protected witnesses with temporary cover identities and documents.1924 
In 2015, local NGOs and various UN entities working in Bosnia reported that the 
Witness Protection Department had been closed.1925
Shortcomings in witness protection experience and capacity led to the adoption of a 
Memorandum of Understanding between SIPA and the Registry of the State Court 
in February 2005. Although the WCC has been slow to develop witness protection 
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procedures, it has made significant gains after the adoption of a National Strategy 
for Processing of War Crimes Cases (National War Crimes Strategy) in December 
2008,1926 and through ad hoc procedures drawn up by judges. A national Witness 
Protection Program Law, which had been debated since 2008, was adopted in April 
2014.1927 However, the law is far from being inclusive, since the law applies only to 
witnesses testifying before the State Court and not to war crimes trials in District 
Courts in the Republika Srpska and other lower courts throughout the country. 
Concurrent Jurisdiction with District and Cantonal Courts 
The WCC shares concurrent jurisdiction over atrocity crimes with 16 District and 
10 Cantonal Courts throughout Bosnia’s Republika Srpska and Bosnian Federation 
entities, respectively known as “local courts.”1928
Bosnia’s judicial system does not provide a strict hierarchy between the State Court 
and the courts within the two entities, and therefore the WCC is not formally 
superior in jurisdiction.1929 This lack of clarity has prevented the development 
of national war crimes jurisprudence, as Cantonal and District Courts are not 
required to follow the WCC’s jurisprudence.1930 Decisions by the WCC are not 
identified by author, and dissenting opinions are not public (under national law), 
further limiting the impact of the WCC’s opinions.1931 However, the WCC has 
applied international humanitarian law (IHL) in a sophisticated, although at times 
inaccessible, manner, including on international criminal modes of liability such as 
joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility. The presence of international 
judges and prosecutors from the ICTY at the WCC and SDWC bolstered the WCC’s 
sophisticated application of IHL. 
Upon the establishment of the WCC and SDWC, prosecutors of the latter loosely 
followed a case strategy by sending “highly sensitive” cases to the WCC and 
“sensitive” cases to local courts. Since the adoption of the National War Crimes 
Strategy in 2008 by the Council of Ministers of BiH, cases have been sorted 
based on “complexity criteria,” taking into account “the gravity of the criminal 
offence, the capacity and role of the perpetrator, and other relevant miscellaneous 
considerations.”1932 The criteria did not provide clear guidance defining “most 
complex” and “less complex.”
The 2008 strategy, which sought to “ensure a functional mechanism of the 
management of war crimes cases, that is, their distribution between the state-level 
judiciary and judiciaries of the entities,” partially improved the division of tasks 
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between jurisdictions.1933 Yet, since its creation, implementation of the plan has 
been “complex, fraught with difficulty, and slow.”1934 One significant achievement 
was a comprehensive case-mapping project carried out in 2009 and 2010, which 
allowed the POBiH to report approximately 1,381 war crime case files on over 
8,000 suspects across all jurisdictions.1935 However, a study on the implementation 
of the strategy in 2016 showed that since the adoption of the strategy “the 
prosecution did not process the most complex war-crime cases to a sufficient 
extent” and that it was still working on 346 cases.1936 Since the strategy set the 
deadlines for completing the most complex cases by 2015, and all remaining war 
crimes cases by 2023, the study also concluded that while the transfer of cases has 
increased over time, it remains unsatisfactory. 
Location
The WCC’s location just outside of Sarajevo’s city center makes it accessible to the 
local population, although attendance at trials has been limited. 1937 The modern 
facilities of the court, including its audio-visual equipment, are used by other 
specialized divisions and will remain a permanent asset to the judiciary.1938 The 
premises include six courtrooms for war crimes trials. Defense attorneys have 
some designated offices in the court, although the main defense assistance office 
is located in a separate building. There is a real danger that the court is seen as 
a “Sarajevo” institution—mitigated somewhat by cantonal and district-level war 
crimes prosecutions. Most national court employees are Bosnian Muslims, a sign 
of their predominance in Sarajevo’s population and perhaps a sign of their greater 
acceptance of state-level institutions. Some have suggested that offering additional 
financial incentives could attract a more ethno-religiously diverse staff from 
different regions of the country.1939 
Structure and Composition
WCC organs comprise Chambers (trial and appellate divisions) and the Registry 
(housing outreach, witness protection, and public information divisions, and until 
2009 the Odsjek Krivične Odbrane [OKO], a defense assistance section). The 
SDWC, which is responsible for bringing cases before the WCC, resides within the 
POBiH. Apart from a designated war crimes chamber, the State Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina contains other specialized chambers, and the POBiH contains other 
prosecution units to try complex crimes including organized crime, corruption, and 
high-level criminal cases.1940
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Throughout the years of its existence, the organs within the State Court have 
made a shift from being internationally led to becoming fully functioning national 
institutions. The WCC and SDWC began with mixed composition in Chambers, the 
Prosecutor’s Office, the Registry, and the OKO, which is the defense support office. 
Many international staff and judges moved from the ICTY to the WCC and SDWC, 
bringing a wealth of experience and strengthening institutional ties.1941 International 
involvement was designed to enhance local capacity, transfer skills and knowledge, 
and blunt charges of ethnic bias in case selection and prosecution.1942 However, 
these goals were hindered from the beginning by a lack of “strategic vision to 
maximize the benefits of international staff.”1943 Capacity building “has not worked 
by simple mentoring or ‘by example.’”1944 (For more on this, please see the Legacy 
section, below.) Many international judges came from civil law backgrounds, while 
international prosecutors came from common law backgrounds, compounding the 
difficulties the WCC faced in harmonizing practices under the new adversarial code 
of criminal procedure.1945 
The pivotal period for the WCC was 2008–2009. A raft of reports and assessments 
of the WCC’s and SDWC’s achievements and shortcomings fed into a major 
restructuring of the court.1946 According to the OSCE and the EU, the court emerged 
stronger as a result of the reform initiatives and assessments.1947
Domestic implementing legislation, agreements, and transition plans envisioned a 
six-phase exit of international personnel within five years, by December 14, 2009.1948 
At the end of 2009, OHR issued a decision to extend the presence of international 
judges, prosecutors, and other personnel because of concerns about the national 
capacity to deal with war crimes cases without international assistance.1949 The 
Registry, which was initially an internationally led adjunct body outside of the 
WCC, had a fixed end date. It began phasing out international staff in 2006, earlier 
than the Prosecutor’s Office or Chambers, which both conditioned the phasing out 
of international staff upon the respective offices meeting certain benchmarks.1950 
These benchmarks included not just the number of cases that had been dispensed 
with, “but their complexity and the position of the defendant, whether there is a 
functioning witness protection program a prosecutorial strategy for handling cases 
that is consistently implemented, standardized judicial practice in routine areas, 
and finally an assessment of the political climate’s conduciveness to the ongoing 
accountability processes by evaluating public statements made by public figures and 
media reports of trials involving atrocity crimes.”1951 The existence of an underlying 
strategy to transition to a fully national court was commendable, although overly 
aggressive, and allowed too short of a timeframe for the impact of an international 
presence, given the complexity of the cases and political hostility toward the court.1952 
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Chambers
Three judges sit on trial court panels, and five on appeals panels. There were initially 
six of the former and two of the latter. The appellate structure and overbroad 
grounds of appeal under the criminal procedure code (including the lack of clarity 
in written judgments) has led to a high rate of vacancies of judgments and retrials. 
Initially, international judges comprised a majority on both panels, with national 
judges presiding as heads. In January 2008, the composition reversed. Before their 
withdrawal entirely at the end of 2012, international judges only sat on Appeals 
Panels. International judges were first seconded by their home government but 
were later selected through a competitive process administered by the Registry and 
salaried through a donor basket fund.1953 The High Judicial Prosecutorial Council 
(HJPC) formally appointed the international judges. International judges were 
initially not required to have extensive experience in criminal law (although many 
carried that experience from previous tenure at the ICTY), but later, international 
judges were required to have eight years’ experience in complex criminal matters 
(the same as national judges).1954 
Prosecutions: Special Department for War Crimes of the Prosecutor’s Office 
(SDWC/POBiH)
The SDWC is responsible for the prosecution of war crimes cases emerging from 
the 1992–1995 conflict.1955 Prosecutors are tasked with bringing “highly sensitive” 
cases before the WCC, while leaving “sensitive” cases to local jurisdictions. In 
practice, the SDWC prosecutors were slow to prioritize cases.1956 The prosecutorial 
strategy was not fully articulated until 2009 and has been “unclear, and in any 
event … not applied consistently or predictably.”1957 The Prosecutor’s Office 
clumsily communicated its prosecutions strategy to the public, sowing confusion 
about the role of ethnicity in case selection and prosecution.1958 The SDWC’s 
initial prosecutions and prosecutorial strategy drew heavily upon conflict mapping 
information gathered by the ICTY. As national prosecutors developed cases, 
however, they needed a comprehensive mapping strategy keyed to national 
prosecutorial strategy. In response, various needs-assessments and mapping 
processes were carried out to assist the prosecution.1959
The identification of thousands of war crimes cases at the investigative stage 
resulted in a backlog in prosecutions. Some of this backlog, beyond the inherently 
massive challenge of dealing with crimes perpetrated on such a large scale, and a 
poorly executed prosecutorial strategy, must also be attributed to overall weakness 
of the judiciary and the fragmentation of war crimes proceedings.1960 
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Since 2008, prosecutors increasingly used plea bargaining, an alien practice prior  
to the 2003 criminal procedure code. The strategic usefulness of plea bargaining  
vis-à-vis the goals of case backlog reduction efforts will need to be carefully 
weighed by prosecutors.1961 
By June 2008, six international prosecutors and thirteen national prosecutors were 
split into six teams, organized by region, in the war crimes prosecution section (with 
one international appointed per team). The mixed teams did not lead to extensive 
skills-sharing, as was hoped. International prosecutors were perceived to be more 
capable of tackling complex and politically sensitive cases (including in the State 
Court’s specialized anticorruption division) and handled most Rule 11bis cases. This 
generated some backlash: local prosecutors complained of exclusion from work 
that they felt capable of handling. On all except the Srebrenica prosecution team, 
international and national prosecutors did not work closely together on the same 
cases, which minimized interaction between international and national prosecutors. 
International prosecutors were paired with international legal assistants and vice 
versa. A 2007 plan by the international head prosecutor to standardize practice, 
improve communication, and develop institutional arrangements for information-
sharing was not fully implemented. In June 2011, four international prosecutors still 
remained at the WCC. International involvement ended at the end of 2012.
Registry for the State Courts of BiH and the Special Departments 
The Registry handles administrative affairs, case management, and outreach 
functions, and coordinates witness protection with a state agency.1962 Initially, the 
Registry housed the defense assistance office (OKO), which is now an independent 
institution. The Registry was created by an agreement between the OHR and POBiH 
in December 2004, and the OHR appointed an international as the initial registrar. 
By March 2006, the international registrar and deputy were replaced by nationals, 
and in the same year, the Registry was “split” into two offices in the WCC and the 
POBiH. By 2007, the POBiH registrar position was held by a national, and by 2009, 
most Registry staff in both offices were nationals. The existence of two Registries 
caused confusion as to authority over administrative issues, exacerbated by a lack of 
clarity about the overlapping role of a “Management Committee,” which was tasked 
with administrative, personnel, and budgetary matters.1963 The POBiH Registry was 
generally considered to be less effective, more bureaucratic, and redundant. 
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Outreach: Public Information and Outreach Section of the War Crimes 
Chamber Registry (PIOS) 
A lack of comprehensive outreach programs or strategy has been a key weakness of 
the WCC. Although no public information and outreach program can be expected 
to fully protect against political attacks and misinformation, weakness in this 
area made the court unable to mount a vigorous response to political attacks and 
perceptions of ethnic bias within Bosnia. The problem was particularly acute at 
the outset.1964 The outreach unit has, however, engaged in initiatives and steadily 
bolstered capacity over the years. A short-lived “Court Support Network” of NGOs 
carried information about the court to local communities between 2006 and 2007 
but closed because of lack of funds.1965 The United Kingdom funded the creation of 
a comprehensive public information and outreach strategy for the POBiH and the 
court, which was adopted by the judges in late 2008. Subsequent efforts included 
visits by victims to the court, media campaigns, and educational campaigns.
Witness and Victim Support 
The Witness Support Section within the SIPA Witness Protection Department and 
the Witness Support Office within the WCC Registry (WVS) provide thorough 
in-court witness support services to both prosecution and defense witnesses.1966 
Such in-court measures include transport and logistical assistance, sophisticated 
technology for voice distortion and video link, modest remuneration for travel, 
pretrial explanation of court procedures, use of closed sessions and private waiting 
rooms, and limited psychosocial support (at times subcontracted through NGOs). 
Post-testimony follow-up services are limited: the WVS staff includes professional 
psychologists and social workers, who are available through a 24-hour telephone 
hotline. Early international staff, including the first WVS director, came from 
the ICTY’s Victim and Witnesses Section, bringing a sense of the importance of 
witness protection and lessons-learned from early missteps at the ICTY. A criminal 
code provision allowing courts to assign legal representation to victim-witnesses 
under limited circumstances has not been applied since 2007 because of a lack 
of resources. Victims are also entitled to seek direct compensation claims from 
the WCC, but in practice they are instructed to use the criminal verdict to seek 
compensation through civil action.1967 
Out-of-court witness protection services are provided by a state agency, SIPA’s 
Witness Protection Unit. Early on, the Registry provided an international adviser, 
supported by a donor government, to facilitate the relationship between SIPA and 
the WCC. SIPA’s witness services have been limited due to a lack of resources and a 
weak national legislative framework for witness protection.1968
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Prosecutions rely heavily on testimony from victims and witnesses, although 
the courts have failed systematically to ensure their protection and continued 
participation. In some cases, inadvertent disclosure of the identities of protected 
witnesses by the parties and the judges has raised serious concerns. In 2008, victim 
and witness protection frameworks were significantly strengthened through two 
documents: internal rules and procedures created by an ad hoc working group of 
judges, and a national strategy for war crimes processing. The state court failed to 
successfully implement the witness protection provisions called for in the National 
War Crimes Strategy. A long-discussed national witness protection law was adopted 
in April 2014. Many victims and witnesses have been called to testify numerous 
times at the WCC, the ICTY, and the entity courts, leading to “witness fatigue,” 
compounded by weak coordination between courts. Because of the law, victim  
and witness support increased before the State Court, and gradually improved  
at entity-level courts.1969 
Defense: Criminal Defense Support Section—Odsjek Krivične Odbrane (OKO)
The Registry initially housed the OKO, which is now an independent institution 
and generally regarded as a good example of mixed-staffing structure. Initially, an 
international director and deputy headed OKO, which was staffed by nationals. 
International staff at times supplemented the national staff, including fellows 
and short-term international lawyers. In May 2007, a national lawyer replaced 
the international director as part of its transition to a fully national institution. 
OKO provides legal research, support, and assistance to national defense counsel, 
including translation services and training on law and practice issues.1970 The 
American Bar Association’s Central and Eastern European Law Initiative  
(ABA-CEELI) initially funded and assisted OKO.1971 
Accused are represented by privately retained national counsel and remunerated by 
the court, if justified by the defendant’s financial status. National defense counsel 
vary widely in quality. In most cases, the WCC appoints an additional ex officio 
defense attorney. OKO staff cannot directly represent accused, but often receive 
power of attorney from defense counsel, entitling them to review case files and 
attend closed sessions. While through 2012 there were international prosecutors, 
there were only international defense attorneys under rare circumstances. This lack 
of congruity raised procedural fairness concerns, especially as national defense 
attorneys initially lacked experience in conducting defense investigations. OKO 
maintains a list of counsel eligible to take cases at the WCC, and to be listed, most 
counsel are required to participate in its trainings. Over time, this has improved 
the quality of defense before the WCC. In response to concerns over defense 
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counsel’s limited access to ICTY evidence, the ICTY amended its rules to facilitate 
easier access to documents by all outside parties (the Rule 75H process). OKO’s 
international staff initially served as crucial intermediaries between national 
defense attorneys and the ICTY.1972
Prosecutions
By 2017, the WCC had issued 96 war crimes verdicts.1973 According to statistics from 
the OSCE War Crimes Processing Project—a project focused on expediting the fair 
and effective processing of war crimes cases in Bosnia—as of March 2013, 214 war 
crimes cases were completed in BiH (roughly evenly split between the WCC and the 
Cantonal and District Courts); a total of 235 persons were convicted and sentenced; 
and approximately 1,315 war crimes cases remained to be prosecuted.1974 By 2017, 
the War Crimes Map of the OSCE listed 410 war crimes cases that were adjudicated 
throughout BiH since the end of the war.1975 The ICTY transferred six cases involving 
10 defendants to the court under Rule 11bis, and motions to transfer cases were 
either denied or withdrawn in five other cases.1976 
Although a significant number of WCC cases included charges of sexual violence 
as either war crimes or crimes against humanity,1977 the overall number of sexual 
violence cases before the Bosnian courts remains low in comparison to the 
occurrence of such crimes during the 1992–1995 conflict. The OSCE reported in 
2015, “Over the last decade, more than 170 war crimes cases against over 260 
defendants have been concluded at the entity level and Brčko District BiH courts. 
Of these cases, 35 involved allegations of sexual violence against 45 defendants, 
wherein 34 perpetrators were convicted in 27 cases—representing a conviction 
rate of around 75 percent. At the end of December 2014, proceedings in 20 cases 
involving allegations of sexual violence were ongoing before the courts, while many 
more such cases were under investigation.”1978 In 2017, Amnesty International 
estimated that less than one percent of the total number of rape and sexual violence 
victims have come before the courts.1979
The 2008 National Strategy for War Crime Cases set the goal to complete the 
most complex and highest priority war crimes cases by 2015, and all other cases by 
2023. In the beginning of 2016, 346 cases against 3,383 individuals were still being 
processed by the Bosnian courts, which is not even half of the cases that need to be 
considered, according to the 2009–2010 case-mapping project.1980 This leads us to 
believe that it will be difficult—if not impossible—for the Bosnian courts to complete 
war crimes prosecutions before the set deadlines. 
ANNEXES   515
Legacy
The work of the WCC and SDWC—together with the work of the ICTY— has 
undoubtedly had an impact on the judicial system and Bosnian society as a whole, 
and has at least theoretically paved the way for truth-telling and reconciliation.  
A few years into the courts’ creation, Mirsad Tokaca, the director of the local NGO 
Research and Documentation Centre, stated: “While the ICTJ [International Center 
for Transitional Justice], the OSCE Mission to BiH, and others have identified a 
number of concerns relating to the BWCC [Bosnian War Crimes Chamber], it has 
generally received high marks for its overall performance and is now seen as a 
model form of hybrid court.”1981 
Impact on Society
Although “public appetite for justice in Bosnia as dispensed by the [WCC] has 
shrunk over time,”1982 the court engaged the population and implemented a 
genuine and sustainable process for war crimes prosecutions. OSCE surveys and 
measurements of public perception of the WCC and the other divisions of the 
State Court show that “public confidence in war crimes processing is fragile and 
widespread distrust in the institutions is still a feature in BiH society.”1983 A 2015 
survey by the UN Resident Coordinator’s Office in BiH showed a slight increase 
in public support for work of the WCC and other local courts. While 29.1 percent 
of the population showed confidence in the work of the Bosnian courts in 2013, 
this number increased to 42.1 in 2015.1984 The study also showed that while the vast 
majority of the population has little or no experience with war crimes proceedings, 
of those who had, only half recognized its relevance, while the other half held a 
neutral position toward the work of local courts.1985
A 2010 study on the perceptions on war crimes trials in Prijedor, a region northwest 
of Bosnia that suffered from brutal and widespread violence during the war, 
concludes: “However, the apathy and indifference towards the war crimes trials 
among victims betray a sense of hopelessness and utter lack of expectations that 
such trials will change much when it comes to their current status and relations 
in their communities. Victims’ expectations now appear to be solidly focused on 
individual perpetrators being removed from their midst. The dominant perception 
among Prijedor victims is, however, that a comprehensive, transformative, sort of 
justice is beyond reach and that war crimes trials cannot deliver on such promises in 
the present political and communal climate.”1986
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Ethnicity continues to play a major role in perceptions of wartime suffering.  
A UN survey in 2013 observed: “Bosniaks are convinced that their ethnic group 
suffered the most during the war. Croats believe that everyone suffered during 
the war but not equally, whereas Serbs believe that everyone suffered equally. The 
majority of citizens state that people from their ethnic groups were not responsible 
for the war crimes, and Bosniaks are more convinced in this than Serbs and 
Croats.”1987 Overall, many members of all ethnic groups remain unwilling “to face 
their own crimes or victims.”1988 And until today, persons who have been convicted 
or charged with war crimes remain in political power and sustain public support 
from their own ethnic group.1989
Twenty-five years after the end of the war, ethnic tensions remain engrained in the 
Bosnian society, and reconciliation between Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats is largely 
absent, which is partially due to the far-reaching ethnic separation cemented in 
Bosnia’s state structure and perpetrated through its election system. A 2014 report 
on the effects of the WCC on the reconciliation process in BiH concludes that while 
both victims and perpetrators of war crimes express that war crimes proceedings will 
contribute to truth-telling and prevention of further crimes in the future, they do not 
believe that war crimes trials in BiH have supported reconciliation.1990 Others also 
see that the State Court only remains a “potential path to reconciliation.”1991 
Finally, the Nuhanovic Foundation Center for War Reparations reported in 2014 that 
while the right to reparation is recognized under Bosnian laws, “the path to a successful 
claim for compensation or other forms of satisfaction in Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
an extremely arduous one and claimants are routinely thwarted by problems that 
are inherent in the post-war system of government.”1992 Legal victories by sexual 
violence survivors in 2015 opened up new prospects for reparation in their cases.1993
Impact on Legal Reform 
The introduction of new criminal code and criminal procedural code in 2003 was 
designed to facilitate war crimes prosecutions and transfers of cases and evidence 
from the ICTY,1994 and it managed to avoid some of the jurisdictional inadequacies 
facing other domestic war crimes courts.1995 However, a compromise agreement 
fragmented the judiciary, and entity courts are not required to follow the jurisprudence 
of the WCC. Local legal professionals experienced difficulties in implementing and 
shifting to the new system. The reforms were drafted mostly by foreign lawyers, 
creating some tension with local legal professionals, who felt the foreign lawyers did 
not adequately understand, appreciate, or adapt to the local legal context.1996 
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Before the WCC and the creation of a specialized war crimes prosecutions unit, 
there was little sustained involvement or investigations by District and Cantonal 
Courts into war crimes cases. Developing local capacity “became a concern only as 
a result of the need to close down the [ICTY].”1997 In mid-2010, survey and mapping 
exercises conducted with local and SDWC prosecutors of investigative stages of 
war crimes proceedings improved the situation.1998 Cantonal and district-level 
prosecutions are often tried under the Criminal Code of the former Yugoslavia, 
which does not foresee crimes against humanity (in contrast to the 2003 BiH 
Criminal Code applied by the WCC), hindering the full application of international 
humanitarian law at the local level.1999 Many District and Cantonal Courts do not 
have specialized war crimes prosecution and investigation units.2000 While there are 
many recommendations for how the process could have maximized coordination 
with local courts and generated a broader spill-over effect, the WCC, SDWC, and 
the 2008 National War Crimes Strategy generally improved capacity at the entity 
level, although inconsistently.2001 
As of 2012, both the WCC and SDWC are operating as independent institutions. 
According to many, despite all the remaining challenges and the continued 
involvement of a range of international actors, “it can be considered a successful 
example of phasing out international staff and assumption of the full ownership 
of national staff.”2002 While the performance of the State Court and other courts 
to address war crimes cases remains far from perfect, the EU continues to report 
improvements in the capacity to address the backlog of war crimes cases; a positive 
trend in the prosecution of war crimes cases involving sexual violence; and an 
increase in the use of victims and witness support and protection structures.2003
Training and Skills-Sharing
The WCC and SDWC lacked a focused and specialized training program or strategy 
to facilitate knowledge transfer between international and national personnel. 
Skills-sharing has been largely ad hoc and personality-driven. Numerous “study 
visits” by WCC judges and SDWC prosecutors to the ICTY helped form professional 
and institutional relationships between individuals, but yielded little transfer of 
operational “know-how.”2004 When conducted in the context of a specific case or 
investigation, however, study visits were fruitful, because “there were concrete 
concerns to discuss and practical outcomes that were sought.”2005 Outside groups 
conducted numerous trainings for personnel on international law and practice issues. 
In its early years, the court indiscriminately accepted training offers. As a result, 
many training courses were redundant and not responsive to the actual legal and 
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practical needs of the court, especially in management skills. Trainings yielded mixed 
results and led to “training fatigue.” Local legal professionals noted that trainers 
often were not well versed in Bosnia’s legal system—and international personnel 
noted they had not been properly trained themselves on local law and practice. 
The WCC and the broader judiciary formalized several initiatives, including: 
 • Witness Protection: In the early phase of the WCC, an international 
advisor on witness protection coordinated procedures between the 
court and the state witness protection agency. OSCE facilitated 
several high-level roundtables on witness protection guidelines. 
 • ICTY Legacy Initiatives: Includes study trips and seminars led by ICTY 
staff for national counterparts, internships for junior prosecutors 
from the Balkans at the ICTY, and the publication of a “developed 
practices” guide.2006 
 • Judicial Education: Since 2007, a Judicial Education Committee, 
chaired by an international judge, “assess[es] offers of training and 
select[s] appropriate topics based on existing needs.”2007 
 • Judicial and Prosecutorial Training Centers (JPTC): Since 2002, JPTC’s 
have operated across the FBiH and Republika Srpska entities. 
JPTCs offer crucial trainings for prosecutors and judges across the 
judiciary.2008 
Financing
According to Article 5 of the Law on Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the court has its 
own budget, “which shall be included in the budget of Bosnia and Herzegovina” and 
includes separate items for the work of Section I (for war crimes) and Section II (for 
organized crime, etc.).2009
The cost of the WCC project was estimated (in June 2006) at EUR 46.7 million. 
Figures from 2007 put the figure at EUR 48.5 million.2010 In the past, the funding 
came from contributions from international donors. Salaries for international 
personnel were funded directly by states and managed separately from the 
WCC’s budget. International donors also provided contributions toward the 
WCC’s operational costs. From 2006 onward, the Registry commenced a process 
of transferring staff (and associated costs) and assets to the court proper, to be 
contained in the future within the budget funded by BiH.2011 By 2007, the proportion 
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of international to national funds had “shifted from almost double to almost 
even.”2012 While there were some difficulties in generating the requisite funding early 
on in the chamber’s lifespan (for example, at the 2006 donor conference) generally 
its funding has been sustainable.
The WCC Transition Strategy transferred budgetary management from the Registry 
to national authorities. International funding was channeled through and managed 
by the Registry, and overseen further by the Transitional Council and ad hoc 
coalitions of donor countries. Because contributions to the WCC and SDWC were 
voluntary and independent of the UN, the Registry expended considerable effort in 
raising sufficient funds from a broad range of donor countries.2013 Generally, strong 
donor commitments from the outset sustained the WCC’s and SDWC’s financial 
situation. One exception was in the area of outreach, where a lack of initial support 
led to delays. The UK eventually funded a comprehensive public information and 
outreach strategy. As national funding increased, donors also viewed the court as a 
cost-effective, long-term investment. It was expected that the budget of the WCC 
and SDWC would be entirely funded from the national budget by 2010, and while 
this is formally the case,2014 Bosnia continues to receive financial support for war 
crimes proceedings from international donors such as the EU.2015 
The BWCC and the SDWC of the Prosecutor’s Office “have operated as cost-effective 
institutions, and their funding basis has been solid.”2016 As noted in the 2008 analysis 
of the WCC and SDWC by the ICTJ, the “trials at the BWCC [were] far less costly 
than those of international tribunals. … From 1994 to 2005 the average cost of each 
first-instance ICTY judgment by accused was 15 million euros; at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) it was 26.2 million. At the State Court the 
average cost was around 955,000 euros in 2006, around 680,000 euros in 2007, and 
the estimated cost for 2008 is a little less than 400,000 euros.”2017 Nonetheless, ICTJ’s 
review also notes some of the reasons why such comparisons are imperfect, for 
example, not reflecting the vast body of adjudicated facts (from the ICTY’s findings) 
admitted into evidence before the WCC, which significantly reduced the length of 
trials. The use of courts to try political and military leaders in relation to a large 
number of acts is also much more complex than the trial of an individual perpetrator. 
Oversight and Accountability
Oversight over the independence and accountability of the judiciary is in the hands 
of the High Judicial Prosecutorial Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HJPC), which 
was created in 2004. The HJPC appoints and supervises judges and prosecutors of 
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the State Court and local courts, drafts and oversees the courts’ budgets, and plays 
an important role in steering judicial and legal reforms.2018 From 2005 until 2012, 
the HJPC was formally responsible for the appointment of international judges. 
The appointment process steadily increased the quality of international judges, 
who brought “credibility and public trust to the court but much less in terms of 
capacity or skills building than might have been expected.”2019 Criticisms of the 
design of the role of international judges include the following: (1) The one-year 
appointment periods for some international judges did not allow judges to develop 
familiarity with the Bosnian legal system and the complex cases, and created 
unequal caseloads. (2) The selection process and criteria did not always yield judges 
with relevant criminal law experience or technical knowledge. (3) Information 
transfer and capacity building between international and national judges were not 
institutionalized, but occurred on a mostly ad hoc basis.2020 
The OSCE monitors trials as required under ICTY rules.2021 The OSCE’s long-term 
presence significantly contributed to building domestic judicial capacity in a number 
of areas beyond monitoring. Other local and international organizations, including 
the OHR and the UN Committee for Human Rights, also monitor trials and provide 
technical assistance to Bosnia’s judiciary. The EU monitors judiciary reform and 
the implementation of the National Strategy for War Crimes in the light of Bosnia’s 
future EU accession.2022
In 2005, the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN), launched a “Justice 
Series” on war crimes trials in Bosnia and continues publishing daily reports on war 
crimes cases before the State Court and local courts today.2023 
Early in the process, the ICTY had a direct role in oversight of Bosnian prosecutions: 
the so-called “Rules of the Road” procedure. The procedure, agreed to in Rome in 
1996, was created in response to concerns about the state of local trials: that they 
were being used as tools of ethnic revenge; that there was a lack of due process; and 
that there was a lack of coordination in handling war crimes case files among local 
courts and with the ICTY. The Rules of the Road procedure allowed the ICTY to 
review prosecutions undertaken by the authorities in BiH to prevent arbitrary arrests 
and unfair trials.2024 Under the arrangement, it was agreed that the ICTY’s Office of 
the Prosecutor would review case files of those suspected of committing international 
crimes during the conflict to determine whether the files contained sufficient and 
credible evidence to support the issue of an arrest warrant. The ICTY performed 
this function from 1996 to 2004, reviewing 1,419 cases against 4,985 persons, with 
approval given for 989 persons to be arrested on war crimes charges.2025 
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CROATIA 
Conflict Background and Political Context
The Croatian nationalist party declared independence from the Socialist Federalist 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) on June 25, 1991, which led to the Croatian War of 
Independence—also known in Croatia as the “homeland war.” Local Serb military 
forces, backed by the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), and Croatian government 
forces fought the war between July 1991 and November 1995. Ethnic Serbs organized 
local militia groups fiercely opposed to independence and declared their own 
independent Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) after claiming almost a third of 
Croatian territory and attempting to create an all-Serb state within Yugoslavia. In 
October 1991, the JNA began a seven-month siege of the southern Croatian city of 
Dubrovnik. Serb militia and JNA forces likewise besieged Vukovar, leading to the 
city’s complete destruction and a large-scale “ethnic cleansing” campaign against 
ethnic Croats. 
After the establishment of a UN ceasefire in 1992, and the European Union’s 
recognition of Croatia, the United Nations Security Council established an 
international peacekeeping force in Croatia, the United Nations Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR).2026 In the following years, violence abated, but there was no 
settlement of the war. In an attempt to end the war and reconquer lost territory, 
Croatian forces launched military operations Flash and Storm in 1995, which led to 
widespread killings and disappearances, and caused some 200,000 Serbs to leave 
the country.2027 The war effectively ended in 1995, and after two years of transitional 
administration under the auspices of the United Nations, Croatia regained control 
over Serb-held territories in 1998.2028 
During the Croatia’s War of Independence, Croatian and Serb forces committed 
grave crimes, including war crimes. Over twenty years after the war, there was still 
“no reliable, verifiable and undisputable number of victims of war, killed or missing 
on the territory of the Republic of Croatia.”2029 According to Amnesty International, 
approximately 20,000 people were killed, hundreds of thousands of people were 
internally displaced, and an estimated 300,000 to 350,000 Croatian Serbs left the 
country during and in the aftermath of the war.2030 
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Existing Justice-Sector Capacity 
Domestic courts have prosecuted war crimes cases since the start of the Croatian 
war in 1991, but international monitors have generally regarded local courts as 
incapable and ineffective in dealing with these cases. Concerns include the limited 
number of finalized cases; a disproportionate number of prosecutions and 
convictions of Serb perpetrators; the failure to investigate senior Croatian political 
and military leaders; and the absence of adequate witness protection mechanisms.2031
In 2004, Human Rights Watch concluded that the courts in Croatia were ill-
equipped to hear politically sensitive and legally complex war crimes cases, 
and observed a general absence of political will and public support for war 
crimes prosecutions against ethnic Croats.2032 The Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which has monitored war crimes trials since 1996, 
has expressed concern about basic fair trial guarantees, collective in absentia 
trials against Serb perpetrators, and a discrepancy in the application of sentencing 
between Croats and Serbs.2033 Furthermore, in a 2010 report, Amnesty International 
raised concerns that the domestic legal framework still remained unsuited to the 
prosecution of international crimes in accordance with international standards.2034 
Existing Civil Society Capacity
Since the war’s end, three local organizations in particular—Documenta: Center 
for Dealing with the Past; the Centre for Peace, Non-Violence and Human Rights 
in Osijek; and the Civic Committee for Human Rights—have played an important 
role in the monitoring of war crimes trials alongside international organizations 
such as the OSCE. Additionally, the Civic Committee for Human Rights (CCHR), 
established during the war, organized searches for missing and displaced people, set 
up the first legal aid systems in war-affected areas, and has monitored war crimes 
proceedings with an emphasis on cases in which there is fear of ethnic bias.2035 
The Documenta: Center for Dealing with the Past engages in “documenting and 
investigating prewar, wartime and postwar events” by organizing public debates, 
managing a database on wartime human losses, and monitoring war crimes at 
local and regional levels.2036 After 2000, local civil society groups and international 
pressure in the context of Croatia’s accession to the European Union were able to 
influence the implementation of judicial reforms and improvements in domestic war 
crimes prosecutions.2037
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Creation
War crimes proceedings first began during the war in Croatia. All county courts have 
jurisdiction to prosecute war crimes, but amendments to the Croatian Criminal Code 
in 2000 allowed for the transfer of complex war crimes cases to country courts in 
Zagreb, Osijek, Rijeka, and Split: Croatia’s four largest cities, and the locations of the 
largest State Attorney’s Offices.2038 In 2001, the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee (UNHRC) observed that while war crimes investigations and prosecutions 
were ongoing, national courts only had a limited capacity to finalize proceedings and 
suspected crimes committed by Croats (including those committed during Operation 
Storm) were not being investigated. Consequently, the UNHRC recommended 
that Croatia proceed “with the enactment of the draft law on the establishment of 
specialized trial chambers within the major county courts, specialized investigative 
departments, and a separate department within the Office of the Public Prosecutor 
for dealing specifically with the prosecution of war crimes.”2039 
The United Nations Security Council adopted the completion strategy of the 
International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 2003, which 
recommended the deferral of ICTY cases against mid- and lower-level perpetrators 
to competent courts in the former Yugoslavia.2040 During this period, the European 
Union was pressing Croatia to comply with international legal standards and 
effectively deal with its violent past. In October 2003, Croatia’s Parliament adopted 
the Law on the Application of the Statute of the International Criminal Court 
and the Prosecution of Criminal Acts against the International Law of War and 
International Humanitarian Law (Law on Crimes against International Law).2041 The 
parliament also adopted a Law on Witness Protection.2042 This legislation allowed 
for the creation of a strengthened structure for the investigation and prosecution 
of international crimes, including four new Specialized War Crimes Courts in the 
regular court system of Croatia. The first war crimes case was transferred to the 
Zagreb county court in December 2005,2043 but it was not until the beginning of 2011 
that the War Crimes Chambers were fully functional.2044 
  
Legal Framework and Mandate
There are two aspects to the legal framework in Croatia for the prosecution of 
international crimes committed during the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. 
The first concerns investigations originating in Croatia and prosecuted under 
Croatian law, and the second pertains to cases transferred to Croatia from the 
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ICTY, pursuant to Rule 11bis of the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The 
21 Croatian county courts apply domestic law and handle cases brought by country 
prosecutors or the State Attorney’s Office (SAO) and, on an occasional basis, cases 
transferred to national courts by the ICTY. 
Domestic Legal Framework 
During and after the war, Croatia continued to use the Criminal Code of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY CC). However, the SFRY CC did not 
include provisions on command responsibility and crimes against humanity, and did 
not clearly define war crimes. Although the Croatian Parliament adopted a “basic” 
criminal code in 1993 and a new criminal code in 1997, which somewhat expanded 
the definition of war crimes in comparison to the SFRY CC, many regarded this new 
code as insufficient for the prosecution of wartime crimes.2045
In October 2003, Croatia adopted the Law on Crimes Against International Law, 
which allowed for the prosecution of “crimes against international law of war and 
humanitarian law under Croatian law and other crimes within the jurisdiction of 
international criminal courts.” In 2004, the parliament amended the 1997 Croatian 
Criminal Code to define a wide array of international crimes, including genocide, 
the crime of aggression, crimes against humanity, war crimes against the civilian 
population, war crimes against the wounded or sick, war crimes against prisoners 
of war, torture, and other cruel or inhumane treatment. The amended code also 
includes the concept of command responsibility for crimes under international 
humanitarian law.2046 The Law on Crimes Against International Law assigns 
competence for the prosecution of these crimes to the county courts of Osijek, 
Rijeka, Split, and Zagreb,2047 and envisages that investigations will be conducted by 
specialist investigative units within the four county courts.
The 2003 Law on Witness Protection established a structure and procedures for 
the protection and support of witnesses in criminal proceedings, and a new Law on 
International Legal Assistance, International and Bilateral Agreements regulated 
regional and international legal cooperation.2048
The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights concluded in 2010 that 
Croatia has an “adequate legal framework relating to the prosecution of war-related 
crimes.”2049 However, judges continued to apply the SFRY CC or 1993 criminal code 
in war crimes cases.2050 Since the adoption of a Strategy for the Investigation and 
Prosecution of War Crimes by the State Attorney’s Office in 2011, a subsequent 
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implementation plan, and additional changes to the Croatian Criminal Code in 2013, 
specialized war crimes courts have made progress in applying more recent codes and 
laws in war crimes trials.2051
Referral of ICTY Cases 
In 2000 the UN Security Council adopted the ICTY Completion Strategy, thereby 
recognizing the role of domestic jurisdictions in the prosecution of international 
crimes committed during the war in the former Yugoslavia. Pursuant to the ICTY’s 
Rule 11bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, amended in 2002, the ICTY  
may decide to transfer cases to other courts, including those “in whose territory 
the crime was committed; in which the accused was arrested; or having jurisdiction 
and being willing and adequately prepared to accept such a case.”2052 Previously, 
concerns over fair trial standards, lack of capacity, and possible ethnically biased 
judiciaries barred the transfer of cases to Bosnia and Croatia.2053 The ICTY 
“referral bench” sent eight cases against 13 mid- and low-level accused to national 
jurisdictions.2054 The ICTY remained involved in the cases, keeping the authority to 
order victim protection measures and to monitor cases until their conclusion. At any 
time prior to judgment at the national level, the referral bench could order the case 
to be recalled to The Hague.2055 
Location
War crimes cases can be heard by any of the 21 Croatian county courts throughout 
the country. The 2003 Law on Crimes Against International Law leaves intact the 
jurisdiction of all country courts but allows for prosecution of war crimes in four 
specialized war crimes chambers in Osijek, Rijeka, Split, and Zagreb.2056 
The majority of proceedings in Croatia have taken place in courts situated in areas 
most affected by the 1991–1995 conflict.2057 In 2002, the OSCE reported that while 
over three-quarters of Croatia’s courts were involved in war crimes proceedings, 
the majority of trials were initiated in the courts of Osijek and Vukovar, as had been 
the case in previous years.2058 The advantage of this is that the trials are accessible 
to local audiences. However, regular county courthouses are not designed for 
war crimes trials, and this increases the risk of witness intimidation and judicial 
impartiality. A lack of separate entrances or waiting rooms for victims or witnesses 
leads to interactions between victims and defendants. 
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Structure and Composition
Specialized War Crimes Chambers 
Croatia has a tripartite judicial system consisting of 67 municipal and 21 county 
courts, the Supreme Court, and the High Court of Croatia.2059 War crimes 
prosecutions take place within this structure. The 2003 Law on Crimes Against 
International Law created specialized war crimes chambers in four of Croatia’s 
county courts as well as centers for the investigation of international crimes.2060 
However, it was not until 2011 that the war crimes sections became fully operational 
and received the first cases transferred from regular county courts.2061 
Specialized War Crimes Prosecution 
The State Attorney’s Office of the Republic of Croatia is composed of a principal 
State Attorney’s Office in Zagreb, and municipal- and county-level State Attorney’s 
Offices.2062 The 2003 Law on Crimes Against International Law established 
specialized prosecution offices within the Office of the Public Prosecutor, alongside 
the four specialized war crimes courts in Osijek, Rijeka, Split, and Zagreb. In 
the same manner as the specialized courts, the specialist prosecutors’ offices 
only started operations after the implementation of the 2011 action plan on the 
implementation of the Strategy for the Investigation and Prosecution of War 
Crimes. In 2015, the UN Human Rights Council reported that the specialized war 
crimes offices were now working in accordance with the 2011 action plan, and that 
“efficacy is increased in the work in cases against known perpetrators, and also in 
cases in which the perpetrators have not yet been found.”2063 The State Attorney’s 
Offices have a limited capacity to deal with war crimes cases. In 2017, the Zagreb 
prosecutor’s office had two officials working on war crimes.2064 
 
Witness Protection and Support 
The 2003 Law on Witness Protection created a Witness Protection Unit within 
the Ministry of Interior which “carries out and organizes the Protection scheme, 
carries out and organizes urgent measures and performs all other duties connected 
to protection of endangered persons, unless this Act provides to the contrary. 
Protection Unit is responsible for implementation of the Protection scheme.”2065 
Additionally, a specialized Witness Support Unit was established within the Croatian 
Ministry of Justice in 2005.2066 
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In 2008, with support of the United Nations Development Program, the first four 
witness support offices were introduced in the Vukovar, Osijek, Zadar, and Zagreb 
county courts, followed by the opening of three additional offices in Rijeka, Sisak, 
and Split in 2011.2067 In total, the seven offices are staffed by 14 personnel and 200 
volunteers. The program aims to ensure adequate witness protection in war crimes 
and other types of cases. The offices also provide free psychosociological support 
for witnesses in the preparation for and during trials, as well as provide general 
information to witnesses and victims about their roles and rights in trials. The 
witness support offices also take responsibility for nationwide awareness raising 
campaigns and “liaising with NGOs and public institutions, managing the 
witnesses/victims database, and documenting witness and victim support activities.”2068 
Public Information on War Crimes Trials 
No outreach or public information program on war crimes prosecutions exists 
within the Croatian judicial system. On the contrary, there is very little information 
available on the events of the 1991–1995 war, and civil society organizations 
are convinced that the Croatian government is “purposefully withholding the 
information about the actions of members of Croatian forces in relation to 
commitment of war crimes.”2069 From 2000 to 2010, the ICTY maintained a field 
office in Zagreb through which it conducted outreach activities.2070 As of 2017, the 
ICTY continued to organize limited outreach activities in Croatia. Upon the ICTY’s 
closure, the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT) is supposed to 
take over these responsibilities.2071 
Prosecutions
Domestic War Crimes Prosecutions 
According to the State Attorney’s Office, by December 2014, prosecutors had initiated 
war crimes proceedings against 3,553 persons and achieved convictions against 589. 
Of these, 44 were from Croatian military forces. First-instance criminal proceedings 
against 642 persons and investigations of 220 persons were still ongoing.2072 In a 
2016 review of war crimes trials before the Croatian courts, the Croatian NGO 
Documenta noted that “the Croatian judiciary is still faced with a large number of 
unprocessed war crimes, [and] the percentage of completely resolved crimes is very 
low.” As of late 2017, Croatia had delivered a total of 141 war crimes verdicts, which 
was the highest figure of all countries in the former Yugoslavia.2073 
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The practice of in absentia trials within Croatian courts explains the discrepancy 
between the total number of war crimes verdicts and the number of persons 
convicted. International observers have found that “in the period from 1992 to 2000, 
578 persons were convicted by Croatian courts for war crimes, out of whom 497 
were in absentia … [which amounts to] 86% of the defendants.”2074 In 2016, this had 
shifted: only one-third of the trials before the four specialized war crimes chambers 
were in absentia.2075 Following the transfer of early in absentia cases to specialized 
chambers, these and the Supreme Court ultimately overturned many verdicts.
There have been few prosecutions before the specialized war crimes chambers. 
In 2010, Amnesty International reported that since the 2003 adoption of the Law 
on Crimes Against International Law, only two cases had been transferred to and 
prosecuted by the special war crimes chamber, and both at the county court in 
Zagreb.2076 In late 2011 and the beginning of 2012, regular county courts transferred 
15 cases to the four specialized chambers, and several of these were then suspended 
out of concerns over in absentia trials.2077 During 2016, the specialized State 
Attorney’s Offices in Rijeka, Split, and Zagreb issued 12 indictments against 84 
persons (the specialized State Attorney’s Office in Osijek issued none); there were 
judgments for 21 persons during the year.2078
Several important wartime events remain uninvestigated. As of 2014, there had been 
no convictions for war crimes during Operation Storm, an operation that reportedly 
killed over 650 and destroyed over 20,000 buildings. While the State Attorney’s 
Office of Croatia has registered 167 victims and 27 war crimes related to Operation 
Storm in its database, the perpetrators of 23 of the crimes remain unknown.2079 
Crimes committed during the 1991 siege of Vukovar have only been partially 
investigated and prosecuted.2080
Rule 11bis Cases
As of 2016, “verdicts of the ICTY with final judgments, as well as one case referred 
to Croatia under the terms of Rule 11bis of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence, prompted [the] Croatian judiciary to initiate only a few criminal 
proceedings based on established facts about the crimes committed.”2081 Since the 
adoption of the completion strategy, the ICTY has transferred one war crimes case 
involving two defendants—the Croatian generals Rahim Ademi and Mirko Norac—
to Croatian courts. The Zagreb county court delivered a first-instance judgment in 
May 2008, finding Norac guilty of war crimes against civilians and acquitting Ademi 
of all charges. In November 2009, the Supreme Court of Croatia upheld the initial 
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judgment, and Norac was sentenced to six years imprisonment.2082 In February 
2005, the ICTY referral bench requested the referral of a second case to the Croatian 
courts, but the request to transfer the “Vukovar three” was eventually withdrawn 
and the accused judged before the ICTY.2083 
Legacy
Over the past twenty years, Croatia has improved the handling of domestic war crimes 
cases, but fair and effective justice for victims of the 1991–1995 war remains elusive. 
Domestic Capacity for War Crimes Prosecutions 
In 2010 Amnesty International concluded that since the end of the war in Croatia, 
and seven years after the ICTY started transferring cases to the Croatian courts, 
“only a very limited number of perpetrators have been brought to justice before the 
Croatian courts, and these proceedings have in majority not been in accordance with 
international criminal law and international fair trial standards.”2084 
However, since the adoption of a strategy for war crimes prosecutions and investigation 
and State Attorney’s offices and ministries action plans in 2011, as well as the 2010 
and 2012 strategies for the development of the judiciary,2085 the overall competence 
of the Croatian judiciary and the prosecution of war crimes have been enhanced. 
Improvements include the commencement of the usage of specialized war crimes 
courts in Osijek, Rijeka, Split, and Zagreb; the opening of State Attorney’s Offices 
dedicated to war crimes prosecutions in the four specialized war crimes courts; the 
creation of an electronic database on all war crimes committed on the territory of 
Croatia; better witness protection and support services in certain county courts; and 
the adoption of a strategy for the revision of trials conducted in absentia.2086
Throughout the years, domestic war crimes trials have been marred by ethnic 
bias. The majority of prosecutions—by 2009, over 80 percent—have been against 
Croatian Serbs for crimes committed against Croats, leading to allegations of 
ethnic bias in prosecutions and sentencing practices.2087 Since 2001, the OSCE 
“continued to observe a trend toward increased efforts by the Croatian authorities … 
to pursue all individuals responsible for war crimes, regardless of the national origin 
of perpetrators and the victims.”2088 In 2008, the State Attorney’s Office issued 
instructions aimed at addressing the prosecution bias against Serbs.2089 
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Additionally, civil society raised concerns over in absentia proceedings, which 
generally violated international fair trial standards.2090 Despite the adoption of a 
state attorney’s strategy on in absentia trials in 2016, these types of trials continue 
to make up one-third of the total. “Before the Osijek County Court all the trials are 
held in absentia, more than a half of trials before the Rijeka CC, and one fourth 
before the Zagreb CC.”2091 
Witness Protection and Support 
Local trials lacked effective witness protection and support procedures as well as 
infrastructure until 2009, which allowed witness interference and intimidation in 
trials.2092 Basic security procedures, such as separate entrances for witnesses and 
accused, are often not in place.2093 With the assistance of the UN Development 
Program, basic witness protection and support units were established at seven out 
of 21 county courts in Croatia. In 2016, the Commissioner for Human Rights of 
the Council of Europe reported that “even though a legislative and institutional 
framework has been put in place … additional efforts are needed to ensure effective 
witness protection and to encourage more people to disclose information, including 
information related to possible burial places, mass graves and potential perpetrators. 
[And] the laws and programs pertaining to the support and protection of witnesses 
needed to be strengthened and systematized.”2094
Specialized War Crimes Chambers 
Since the adoption of the 2003 Law on Crimes Against International Law, only a 
limited number of war crimes cases have been processed in the four specialized war 
crimes chambers in Zagreb, Osijek, Rijeka, and Split. In 2010, Amnesty International 
reported that only two war crimes cases had been brought before the War Crimes 
Chambers, and that a majority of proceedings continue to take place before county 
courts that lack experience and resources to effectively and independently prosecute 
international crimes.2095 In 2016, a total of 18 trials were underway before specialized 
war crimes chambers, and judgments in 13 cases against 26 defendants were 
issued.2096 According to the Croatian NGO Documenta, trials before specialized war 
crimes chambers were “marked by seldom-scheduled major hearings, lengthy 
procedures, frequent repetitions, absence of the defendant, and low prison sentences.”2097 
Impact on Society
“In general, dealing with the past, which includes …war crimes trials aimed at 
establishing the facts, bringing justice, acknowledging victims’ suffering and 
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recovering affected and vulnerable groups, as well as society as a whole, was almost 
completely absent [in Croatia].”2098 Limited information remains available on crimes 
committed during the war. Reconciliation between countries within the former 
Yugoslavia and between ethnic groups within the countries is still in its infancy. 
Moreover, the political will to prosecute Croatian political and military leadership for 
crimes committed during the war remains limited. The ICTY acquittal of Croatian 
generals Ante Gotovina, Mladen Markač, and Ivan Čermak—all of whom received a 
warm welcome upon their return to Croatia—for war crimes during Operation Storm 
in November 2012 was representative of this sentiment.2099
A 2010 study titled “Dealing with the Past in Croatia: Attitudes and Opinions of 
Post-War Actors and Public” shows that the majority of the Croatian population has 
not come to terms with its violent past. There is a widespread public understanding 
that the crimes committed during the Croatian war of independence were legitimate 
and necessary for regaining control over Croatian territory.2100 The study shows 
that 52 percent of the Croatian population thought that ethnic Croats were the only 
victims of the war, 31 percent believed that the majority of the wartime victims were 
ethnic Croats, and none of the interviewees thought that the majority of victims had 
been Serbs. Furthermore, while almost 100 percent of the study’s respondents had 
heard of crimes committed in the city of Vukovar, only 68 percent had heard of Serb 
casualties during Operation Storm.2101
Financing
Domestic war crimes prosecutions in Croatia are financed through the regular 
state budget of the Republic of Croatia and initially received financial and in-kind 
contributions from international donors. Furthermore, the Law on Witness 
Protection sets out that the funds that witness protection and information measures 
will be included as a special budgetary item in the regular state budget.2102 
In 2011, the annual budget for the judiciary in Croatia was about €368 million.2103  
In the years thereafter, the budget slightly decreased to approximately €313 million 
for 2013.2104 In that same year, €1.7 million had been allocated to the judicial 
academy for the training of judges and prosecutors.2105 According to the World Bank, 
with 43 judges per 100,000 inhabitants, Croatia has one of the largest court systems 
in Europe and expends 0.7 percent of its GDP for the judiciary.2106
532   OPTIONS FOR JUSTICE
Oversight and Accountability
The domestic system in Croatia includes several checks and balances for the 
independence and impartiality of the judicial system. The Croatian Supreme Court 
ensures “the uniform application of laws and equal protection under the law” and 
therefore may review all final judicial decisions.2107 In 2005, the OSCE reported that 
the Supreme Court overturned 65 percent of appeals judgments.2108 As a result of the 
EU accession preparations, Croatia adopted legal changes in 2011 and consequently 
strengthened its State Judicial Council and State Prosecutorial Council, which are 
responsible for overseeing the appointment and evaluation of the work of judges and 
prosecutors.2109 The Croatian Ombudsman, which maintains offices in Zagreb, Rijeka 
Osijek, and Split, may hear complaints of human rights violations and discrimination.2110 
The OSCE Mission to Croatia monitored domestic and Rule 11bis war crimes 
proceedings and published annual reports on domestic war crimes trials until the 
end of 2007.2111 A variety of other international monitoring bodies, including the 
European Commission, the Council of Europe Commissioner of Human Rights, and 
the UN Human Rights Council, have continued monitoring the Croatian judiciary 
ever since—some in the light of assessing Croatia’s readiness for EU accession.
At present, domestic civil society groups, including the Documenta: Center for Dealing 
with the Past, continue to publish annual reports on domestic war crimes trials.2112 
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KOSOVO
This annex covers three approaches to international justice in Kosovo since the 
end of the 1998–1999 war: (1) Regulation 64 Panels under the United Nations 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK); (2) war crimes trials under 
the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX); and (3) the Kosovo 
Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office. Common sections covering 
background on the conflict and the capacities of the domestic justice sector and civil 
society precede separate detail on each mechanism. 
Conflict Background and Political Context
 
Under Joseph Tito’s Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), Kosovo had 
the status of an autonomous province within Serbia. While the region had no 
equal standing with the six republics of the Yugoslav federation, it and another 
autonomous region (Vojvodina) had the right to create its own constitution and 
some government institutions. Despite this limited autonomy, Serbian dominance—
and neglect—of Kosovo created an impoverished country with weak institutions 
dominated by minority ethnic Serbs.2113 Kosovo Albanians, treated as second-
class citizens, increasingly agitated for status as a full Yugoslav republic. Widely 
supported non-violent protests began in the early 1980s. Slobodan Milosevic, 
president of Serbia, revoked Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989. In response, Kosovar 
Albanians created their own parallel government institutions and called for 
independence from the SFRY. For the next two years, Serbia “systematically 
suppressed Kosovo Albanians and suspended their institutions, shut down the 
education and health care system and expelled some 150,000 Albanians from their 
jobs in police, education, [and] state companies.”2114 
The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) have initiated scattered armed violence against 
the Serbian authorities since 1997, having been disillusioned by the exclusion of the 
“Kosovo question” from the Dayton peace negotiations on Bosnia and Herzegovina 
in 1995. The Serbian government’s heavy-handed response targeted civilians as well 
as militants, which created broader support for the KLA within the Kosovo Albanian 
population. The violence in Kosovo reached its apogee between March and June 
1999. State-sponsored Serb forces committed mass atrocities and ethnic cleansing 
of the majority ethnic Albanian population. The KLA also committed significant 
violations of international humanitarian law. In March, Serbian police and the 
military of the rump-Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) launched a military 
534   OPTIONS FOR JUSTICE
offensive in Kosovo in a “methodically planned and well-implemented campaign” 
that expelled nearly 80 percent of the entire population of Kosovo from their 
homes, including more than 850,000 ethnic Albanians from Kosovo.2115 NATO’s air 
campaign, Operation Allied Force, between March 24 and June 10, 1999, ended the 
conflict, but not before inflicting large-scale damage. 
In the war’s aftermath, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1244 
(1999), handing jurisdiction of Kosovo to the UN, which created the United Nations 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). UNMIK had a mandate 
to provide Kosovo with a “transitional administration while establishing and 
overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions 
to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo.”2116 
Together with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the 
UN shared responsibility for rebuilding the rule of law in Kosovo. At the end of 2008, 
the UN handed over overall rule of law assistance, including war crimes prosecution, 
to the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). 
Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia on February 17, 2008, but Serbia 
continues to claim Kosovo as an autonomous region. However, on April 19, 2013, 
the prime ministers of Kosovo and Serbia signed the Brussels agreement, with the 
aim of normalizing relations.2117 As of September 2017, 113 countries had recognized 
Kosovo.2118 The EU considers Kosovo to be a potential candidate for European Union 
membership but abstains from taking a position on Kosovo’s statehood claim.2119 
Negotiations on the final status of Kosovo continue under the EU auspices. 
In January 2017, the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office 
(KSC)—also known as the Kosovo Relocated Specialist Judicial Institution (KRSJI)—
was created alongside EULEX. This Netherlands-based mechanism was tasked with 
the mandate to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity that were not 
addressed by UNMIK or EULEX, nor by the International Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY).  
Existing Justice-Sector Capacity
After decades of instability and tensions between ethnic Albanians and Serbs, as well 
as a devastating civil war, Kosovo’s state institutions had completely collapsed. The 
conflict gutted the country’s physical infrastructure and judicial system, creating an 
“accountability and justice crisis.”2120 Beyond the absence of or severe damage to the 
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physical infrastructure of the judicial system—including court buildings, equipment, 
law libraries, and prisons—there was an “extreme lack in capacity.”2121 The absence of 
qualified judges, lawyers, and prosecutors, and significant ethnic imbalances among 
those legal professionals who remained in Kosovo after the war, cast a shadow over 
the legitimacy of the courts in the eyes of the local Serbian population. Kosovo’s 
majority Albanian population, following exclusion from participation in judicial 
functions under Serbian rule, had no public confidence in the legal system as a whole.2122 
The UN Secretary-General observed that there was “an urgent need to build genuine 
rule of law in Kosovo, including through the immediate re-establishment of an 
independent, impartial and multi-ethnic judiciary.”2123 By late 1999, prisons were 
overcrowded with detainees awaiting trial for atrocity crimes committed during 
the conflict. In response to these immediate justice demands, UNMIK established 
an international judiciary on the domestic administration of law, although the 
internationalization of the judiciary came in several phases, as described below.2124 
Existing Civil Society Capacity 
Civil Society after the War 
In the 1990s, civil society started to organize alongside the Albanian parallel 
government structures in Kosovo, but due to Serbian repression, it struggled 
to mature.2125 Civil society organizations began reorganizing themselves in the 
aftermath of the war and started recording human rights violations. One of 
UNMIK’s first actions was to pass legislation regulating NGO registration and 
operation, which paved the way for the formation of many new organizations.2126 
Throughout the years, domestic organizations have played an important role in 
holding war criminals accountable for their actions through trial monitoring, 
collection of evidence for trials, promoting public awareness, and keeping 
accountability on the agenda of policymakers. 
The Humanitarian Law Center-Kosovo (HLC), which opened an office in Pristina 
in 1996, published numerous reports on killings and disappearances of Albanians, 
as well as reports on KLA-perpetrated crimes against Serbs and other minorities.2127 
International human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch cooperated 
with, among others, the Center for the Protection of Women and Children, the 
Mother Theresa Society, and the Kosovo Helsinki Committee in the collection of 
evidence.2128 The Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF), 
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an organization that had been forced to stop its human rights work during the war, 
played an important role in the exhumation of graves all over Kosovo, sometimes 
working directly with the ICTY. Civil society pressure led UNMIK to first start 
exploring the idea of a war crimes tribunal (see text box on the Proposed Kosovo 
War and Ethnic Crimes Court [KWECC], below).2129
Civil Society after Independence
Civil society grew rapidly following Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008. 
The majority of new organizations were devoted to reconstructing the nation, 
easing ethnic tensions, and promoting reconciliation.2130 International donors gave 
generously, enabling the sector’s growth.2131 However, this dependence on outside 
funding became a weakness; international funding has diminished in recent 
years, making it challenging for civil society organizations to sustain themselves. 
Of the more than 7,000 NGOs registered in 2013, fewer than 10 percent were 
estimated to be still active in 2017.2132 Since the political agenda in Kosovo has been 
overwhelmingly focused on pressing issues such as encouraging the international 
community to officially recognize Kosovo as a state, it has been challenging for civil 
society organizations to push their own agendas.2133 However, some organizations 
continue to play a role in influencing public policy, and several local groups, 
including Medica Kosova2134 and the Humanitarian Law Center of Kosovo, continue 
to push for accountability for grave crimes. 
 
 
UN Regulation 64 Panels (2000–2008)
Creation
Immediately after the Kosovo war ended, the UN Secretary-General established 
the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) under 
Resolution 1244. UNMIK acted as the sovereign entity in Kosovo, administering 
the country as a UN protectorate until Kosovo’s independence. UNMIK engaged 
in building state institutions at the national and local levels, and the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) executed UNMIK’s mandate to 
exercise “all legislative and executive authority with respect to Kosovo.”2135 UNMIK 
shared a mandate with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) to reconstruct the rule of law, and this was supported by a number of 
fledgling Kosovo governmental and nongovernmental bodies.2136
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To step into the vacuum of a nonexistent judicial system, UNMIK established a 
civilian police force (CIVPOL) and an emergency justice system (EJS) compromising 
local judges and prosecutors.2137 From the start, concerns were raised over ethnic 
bias and lack of capacity among legal professionals to deal with war crimes cases so 
soon after the war’s end. In late 1999, UN administrators considered several options 
for establishing judicial accountability mechanisms for atrocity crimes, including  
a proposed ad hoc tribunal, called the Kosovo War and Ethnic Crimes Court  
(see text box, below).2138 
Proposed Kosovo War and Ethnic Crimes Court (KWECC)
In late 1999, UNMIK, UN Member States, and officials from the national judiciary 
began negotiations for a stand-alone, ad hoc, international-led tribunal that 
would sit in Kosovo, modeled on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY).2139 The negotiations reached advanced planning stages.2140 The 
KWECC expected to begin operations in mid-2000: the Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General, Bernard Kouchner, signed an establishing regulation; 
appointment procedures for international and local judges had begun; and a chief 
international prosecutor, Fernando Castanon, had already been appointed and had 
arrived in Kosovo.2141 
The proposed court would have “concurrent, primary jurisdiction with domestic 
courts of Kosovo” over violations of international humanitarian law, as well as 
war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity committed since January 1, 
1998.2142 The court would have simultaneous jurisdiction with the ICTY, with KWECC 
designed to prosecute lower-profile offenders not tried by the ICTY.2143 The court 
would consist of panels composed of international and local judges, prosecutors, 
and staff.2144 The proposal included plans for a witness protection unit and defense 
office. The proposed court was ultimately abandoned for numerous reasons, and 
plans were fully put to rest as the Regulation 64 Panels began full operations in the 
fall of 2000. Reasons included: 
• concerns from UN and international policymakers about replicating the costly 
ad hoc international criminal tribunals; 
• political obstacles arising from disagreement between the United States and the 
UN over reaching agreements for security arrangements; 
• concerns from the United States that the court would investigate alleged war 
crimes committed by NATO forces; 
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• opposition among Kosovo Albanian legal professionals concerned about 
potential resource drains to the judicial system; 
• fears that the KWECC would be “too independent” and exacerbate ethnic 
tensions by prosecuting ethnic Albanians; and 
• a lack of consultation with civil society.
After a flare-up of violence in February 2000 in the divided northern city of 
Mitrovicë/Mitrovica and a hunger strike by Kosovo Serb detainees awaiting trials 
in May, the judicial crisis came to a head. UNMIK realized that there was a need for 
non-biased judges and proceeded, through trial and error, to internationalize the 
judiciary in three successive phases. 
First, in February 2000, the SRSG issued UNMIK Regulation 2000/6, allowing for 
the appointment of an international judge and international prosecutor (collectively 
IJP) in the Mitrovica region. Usually, these judges were minorities on three-judge 
panels. Second, in May, the SRSG issued UNMIK Regulation 2000/34, extending 
the power to appoint IJPs to all five judicial districts in Kosovo, including one on the 
Supreme Court.2145 However, IJPs under Regulation 2000/34 were still a minority on 
judicial panels, meaning they were “not only consistently outvoted by the locals, but 
they were outvoted on the most significant inter-ethnic cases, which then permitted 
the Albanian judges to ‘overcharge’ the convicted Serbs in the sentencing phase.”2146 
The third phase created judicial panels with majority international judges. In 
Regulation 2000/64 of December 2000, prosecutors, the accused, or defense 
counsel (as well as UNMIK, of its own accord) were granted the right to petition 
UNMIK for the assignment of international judges and prosecutors to ad hoc panels. 
These became known as Regulation 64 Panels.2147 This trigger mechanism for 
international panels in Regulation 64 was initially flawed, containing a procedural 
loophole about the transfer of cases to international panels and leading to reversals 
of several cases before the Supreme Court.2148 A subsequent regulation fixed the 
loophole, requiring local prosecutors who abandoned a case to notify an IJP, who 
could then file for the case’s transfer.2149 
In 2008, Regulation 64 Panels wound down, and the UN transferred responsibility to 
prosecute war crimes cases to a European Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), 
which was to “assume responsibilities in the areas of policing, justice and customs, 
under the overall authority of the United Nations, under a United Nations umbrella,” 
in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999).2150 
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Legal Framework and Mandate
 
UNMIK authorized Regulation 64 Panels to exercise jurisdiction within domestic 
courts, trying crimes defined under domestic law. However, the definition of 
applicable domestic law was contested. UNMIK, acting as sovereign administrator, 
initially determined that applicable law comprised the criminal code prior to 
the March 1999 NATO intervention: the law of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia Criminal Code (SFRY CC), with some modifications. UNMIK made this 
decision with little consultation with local authorities, prompting early resentment 
of UNMIK’s judicial projects.2151 In response, UNMIK “issued new resolutions 
describing the applicable law to be the law in force in Kosovo on March 22, 1989, but 
like the initial decision, the applicable law was to be a hybrid of pre-existing local 
law and international standards. … Local law was only applicable to the extent that it 
did not conflict with international human rights norms.”2152 
In 2003, UNMIK enacted a Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo, but determining 
the applicable law in the “network of laws” remained difficult for both local and 
international judges.2153 The new code formed the basis of criminal law in Kosovo, 
incorporating criminal offenses under international law and shifting the Kosovo 
legal system toward a more common law design. The confusion and shifts of the 
applicable law (as well as previously mentioned procedural loopholes in Regulation 
64) had severe and negative consequences for the effective and expeditious 
prosecution of war crimes cases and led the Supreme Court of Kosovo to overturn 
several cases or send them back for retrial.
The confusion over which law should be applied in war crimes cases, especially in 
the early years after the conflict, has contributed to the high number of retrials in 
war crimes cases. These negative trends led to mistakes resulting in subsequent 
reversals by the Supreme Court, which sent the cases back for retrial. This problem 
has been exacerbated by the frequent change of international actors in the judicial 
system, coming from different judicial systems and having different interpretations 
of the law, which could be influenced by their own jurisdictions.2154
The 2003 Provisional Criminal Code and the SFRY CC of 1997 had a different scope 
and definition of crimes under international law. The Provisional Criminal Code 
includes genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes (as defined under 
customary international law and the Geneva conventions),2155 while the SFRY CC 
only encompasses genocide and war crimes.2156 In practice, the international crimes 
trials in which IJPs were involved focused primarily on war crimes.2157 
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Although the ICTY maintained concurrent and primary jurisdiction over national 
courts concerning atrocity crimes, the ICTY prosecutors focused only on the most 
senior perpetrators. Based on the experience elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, 
UNMIK recognized the need for international involvement in domestic war crimes 
prosecutions to try and to prosecute lower-level perpetrators. UNMIK justice 
sector officials “have described the relationship with the ICTY as collaborative 
and complementary, noting that UNMIK regularly assists the ICTY with its 
investigations.”2158 However, in creating the Regulation 64 Panels, UNMIK set up a 
separate framework for the prosecution of international crimes that did not take full 
account of the experience of the UN ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 
Location
The Regulation 64 Panels were part of the regular court system in Kosovo, and 
international judges and prosecutors could be placed in courts throughout the 
country. For the most part, IJPs used pre-existing buildings, with the exception 
of a single high-security courthouse built for the proceedings. The offices of 
international judges and prosecutors were often in separate buildings from their 
national counterparts, limiting interaction with the legal system and between 
national and international judges.2159 This limited the exposure of national judges to 
international legal practices and ran counter to hopes that international involvement 
would build capacity in the national judiciary. 
Structure and Composition
Appointment of International Judges and Prosecutors 
Regulation 64 Panels could be appointed on the motion of the SRSG or upon request 
by prosecutors, the accused, or defense counsel, where “necessary to ensure the 
independence and impartiality of the judiciary or the proper administration of 
justice.”2160 Regulation 64 did not contain clear criteria for the appointment of 
international judges or prosecutors, but “in practice the primary reasons for relying 
on [special panels] are either fears about perception of bias or concerns about 
intimidation of local judges,” and IJPs were appointed “mainly in cases involving 
interethnic conflict.”2161 UNMIK, responsible for the administration of the entire 
justice sector, often constituted international panels to handle non-atrocity crimes 
cases. IJPs in Kosovo heard a range of cases from “serious humanitarian crimes to 
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traffic accidents and illegal woodcutting.” The use of the panels at times appeared 
“arbitrary and ad hoc” and the panels suffered from a legitimacy problem.2162 
 
Registry and Judicial Support 
The International Judicial Support Section (IJSS) was established within the Kosovo 
Department of Justice (DOJ) to support international prosecutors and judges. It also 
provided legal support and Registry functions. In March 2003, a Criminal Division 
answerable to the DOJ provided support to the chief international judge (a position 
created in 2005) and prosecutor, and monitored developments in the cases.2163 
Judges 
The total number of international judges in the panels varied. By 2001, 17 
international judges were assigned, declining to 14 by 2005. The short-term 
appointment contracts (six months) discouraged applications from sitting judges 
in Western Europe and the United States. At times, international judges left before 
cases were fully adjudicated, meaning that at times “the main trial must start 
from the beginning, which may include re-administration of evidence.”2164 Almost 
none of the judges had experience in international humanitarian or international 
criminal law, and some did not have backgrounds in any form of criminal law. Many 
international judges were only superficially trained on the features of Kosovo’s 
legal system. International judges were located in the capital, Pristina, limiting 
their interaction with the legal system in the provinces, even if they were assigned 
to cases in other parts of the country. International law experts generally regard 
the jurisprudential quality of the decisions as poor, with little reference made to 
decisions under international law or jurisprudence beyond the UNMIK Regulations. 
Prosecutors 
By December 2000, three international prosecutors had been appointed, a number 
that eventually grew to 11 before shrinking back to nine by 2005. The quality of 
international prosecutors was generally considered to be quite good, but most had 
little experience with complex international humanitarian or criminal law cases. 
The interaction with national prosecutors was minimal: “International prosecutors 
tended to work alone, and cases are not shared between local and international 
prosecutors, and also because IPs are not required to take on a mentoring role.  
Many feel that joint teams of national and international prosecutors would have 
been a good idea, but time constraints and security concerns have been held to 
prohibit this.”2165 
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In 2005, steps were undertaken to establish a Special Prosecutor’s Office for the 
prosecution of high-profile war crimes cases, but such an office never came into 
existence under UNMIK. The idea was that the office would be staffed by national 
prosecutors, with transitional assistance by international prosecutors, and the idea 
was eventually implemented by EULEX.2166 (See Special Prosecution Office under 
EULEX Structure and Composition, below).
Defense
Defense counsel before the special prosecutors were often Kosovar, with many 
Albanian and Serb defense lawyers. Senior defendants—often members of the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)—usually retained private defense counsel. The 
Department of Judicial Administration under the Ministry of Public Services 
remunerated court-appointed counsel, paying them in lump sums (which some 
observers noted was a disincentive to work more hours). Respect for the rights of the 
accused before Regulation 64 Panels remained a significant concern throughout the 
process, but improved somewhat through training and support provided by an  
NGO funded by the Kosovo Criminal Defense Resource Centre and the Kosovo 
Chamber of Advocates.2167
Witness Protection
A specialized police unit provided witness protection services. UNMIK regulations 
allowed witnesses to remain anonymous in certain circumstances, in light of the 
frequent threats and reprisals against witnesses. UNMIK incorporated victim and 
witness protection regulations into the provisional criminal code, but a law on 
witness protection only passed after UNMIK transferred responsibility for grave 
crimes cases to EULEX. (See EULEX profile, below.) 
Translators and Interpreters
The Regulation 64 Panels faced severe understaffing of legal translators and 
interpreters, in part because the UN was reluctant to hire nationals, based on 
security concerns.2168 
Outreach
UNMIK did not have an outreach program to support the work of the international 
judges’ panels. Simultaneous prosecutions of Kosovo-related cases at the ICTY 
complicated public information campaigns. The ICTY established an outreach office 
in Pristina in 2001 that continued activities throughout Kosovo until the end of 2012.2169
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Training
The Kosovo Judicial Institute (KJI) coordinated judicial training, including study 
visits to the ICTY and war crimes law seminars. Shortly after the end of the 
deployment of the Regulation 64 Panels, the capacity of the domestic justice sector 
to adequately try war crimes cases remained low. Local justice-sector professionals 
received inadequate training in war crimes law and practice. A 2010 review by the 
OSCE of war crimes trials under UNMIK found that “throughout the reporting 
period there has been a lack of expertise in dealing with war crimes cases on the part 
of judges, prosecutors, defense counsel and investigators.”2170 Placing international 
judges with local judges on mixed panels was done in part to allay concerns about 
biased judges, as well as to institute knowledge-sharing and skills transfer. However, 
without institutionalized programs in place, little capacity transfer occurred between 
international and national staff. 
Prosecutions 
Initially, IJPs handled war crimes cases against Serbs, inheriting over 40 cases 
that ethnic Albanian judges had adjudicated before the creation of the Regulation 
64 Panels. Beginning in 2006, IJPs increasingly focused on organized crime and 
corruption cases. Difficulties in securing extradition of suspects from Serbia led to a 
decrease in prosecutions against Serbs, causing a perception that prosecutions were 
disproportionately focused against Kosovo Albanians.2171 
By the end of 2001, IJPs were handling around 80 ongoing court cases. The number 
of cases reached a plateau at 92 in mid-2004. In late 2003, the first verdict against 
Kosovo Albanians for war crimes committed within Kosovo was delivered in 
the Llapi Group case, which attracted widespread public attention. By 2004, the 
Criminal Division had begun proceedings in over 300 cases, including 83 war crimes 
cases. At the beginning of 2006, war crimes constituted approximately 10 percent of 
the cases initiated by international prosecutors.2172 The OSCE estimated that by the 
end of 2009, 37 individuals had been tried for war crimes in Kosovo.2173 Half of these 
were pre-2000 war crimes cases against Kosovo Serbs, which Regulation 64 Panels 
retried out of concern over ethnic bias.2174 In December 2008, UNMIK handed over 
1,000 war crimes cases to its successor, the EU-led rule-of-law mission (EULEX). 
The EULEX War Crimes Investigation Unit conducted a review of nearly 900 of 
these cases by early 2010 and began a mapping and case selection process.2175 
Transferring cases from local to international prosecutors required a reworking of 
the investigative file, the indictment, and at times, new translation of documents—
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all of which caused significant delays.2176 Even once cases were fully transferred to 
international prosecutors, cases were often delayed at the trial and appellate stages, 
due to an understaffed and under-resourced international judiciary. International 
judges and prosecutors had difficulty in securing appearances by witnesses and 
defendants not in detention (many of whom had fled to Serbia). Witnesses, fearing 
personal reprisals and a general return to ethno-political violence, were reluctant to 
appear before the international panels. The police and national prosecutors also may 
have deprioritized war crimes cases, focusing on immediate ordinary crimes and the 
deteriorating security context.2177 
UNMIK made only limited progress toward investigating and prosecuting war crimes. 
By 2008, 250 complaints had been lodged against UNMIK by families whose relatives 
had gone missing during the conflict.2178 These complaints alleged that UNMIK had 
not made any effort to investigate the abductions of their loved ones. The UNMIK 
Human Rights Advisory Panel investigated these claims and found that UNMIK had 
systematically failed to collect evidence and conduct thorough investigations into 
these cases.2179 UNMIK’s involvement with the Kosovo judiciary ended in November 
2008. In UNMIK’s decade of running Kosovo’s legal system, it completed just over 
40 war crimes trials, leaving over 1,000 others waiting to be heard.2180 
Legacy 
In a joint review of the ten years of UN-led efforts to prosecute war crimes in 
Kosovo, the OSCE and UNMIK noted that it faced “difficulties in obtaining reliable 
statistics of war crimes cases … due to the number of different authorities and 
institutions engaged in this area,” and also admitted “there has been a systemic 
failure to adjudicate war crimes cases.”2181 
The Regulation 64 Panels had no formal mentorship or training program between 
internationals and their domestic counterparts, disappointing policymakers and 
observers, and forming one of a myriad criticisms levied at the panels.2182 However,  
it is unclear whether UNMIK intended the Regulation 64 Panels to deliver 
sustainable and long-term rule-of-law capacity building. Rather, UNMIK may have 
created the panels as a necessary response to a biased and inadequate judiciary 
—in part because of the role thrust upon the UN as sovereign administrator of 
Kosovo—including the responsibility to administer a judicial system. As with other 
hybrid courts, the Regulation 64 Panels held potential for long-term and sustained 
benefits, but some have suggested that the international panels were “initiated in 
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reaction to pressing security and justice needs, not designed around a long-term 
vision of the system’s legacy.”2183 
Evaluating the “success” of the panels is difficult, then, as different actors held 
different expectations and conceptions about the panels’ purpose. Their legacy is 
best measured by their achievements in context, rather than their shortcomings 
compared to an ideal hybrid court: 
Clint Williamson, Justice Department Director of Kosovo from October 
2001 to November 2002, assessed the 64 Panels as a mixed success. 
He pointed out that despite some inadequately qualified international 
judges and prosecutors, some intimidation of local staff by perpetrators 
on the ground, and occasional local abdication of responsibility to 
internationals in high-risk trials, the [64] Panels proved a very valuable 
tool in Kosovo. While he encountered widespread resentment against 
the ICTY as an imposition by outsiders, he believed that local and 
international staff maintained very collegial relations within the hybrid 
structure, which received local buy-in. An OSCE report endorsed the 
Kosovo hybrid experiment overall, lending credence to arguments that 
despite significant flaws, Kosovo represents an improvement on the 
hybrid model over the East Timor Process.2184 
Financing
The financing for the Regulation 64 Panels was mostly provided through the UNMIK 
budget (based on assessed contributions by UN Member States, handled by the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations) and the Kosovo Consolidated Budget.  
The Panels faced severe budget shortfalls throughout their existence, and a sharp 
cutback in the overall UNMIK budget in 2001 decreased funding for judicial and 
rule-of-law programs in Kosovo. The total amount budgeted for Kosovo’s legal 
system was around 17.3 million euros in 2004, comprising some 2 percent of the total 
UNMIK budget.2185 
Oversight and Accountability 
The primary international monitor of the Kosovo judicial system during the 
operation of the Regulation 64 Panels—and still as of late 2017—is the OSCE.2186 The 
Legal System Monitoring Section (LSMS) of the OSCE mission in Kosovo has been 
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monitoring criminal and civil trials in Kosovo since 1999.2187 It shares its observations 
and recommendations with major actors of the judicial system and with the KJI, 
which the OSCE established to train domestic judges and prosecutors.2188 
Both UNMIK as a whole and its judges’ panels have been starkly criticized for 
lacking internal oversight and accountability mechanisms. International observers, 
such as the OSCE and the EU, questioned the excessive executive powers of the 
SRSG in the appointment and oversight of IJPs. IJPs were not, like their local peers, 
subject to the scrutiny of the Kosovo Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (KJPC), and 
UNMIK never created an independent monitoring body.2189 In an effort to counter 
criticism, UNMIK started creating various internal and domestic oversight bodies—
the Ombudsperson Institution, Claims Committee, and Human Rights Advisory 
Panel within the UNMIK structures—and it supported the creation of an impartial 
judicial council. However, according to Human Rights Watch, the internal oversight 
mechanisms were “either dormant or improperly constituted,” and the Kosovo 
Judicial and Prosecutorial Council was never realized under UNMIK.2190
Grave Crimes Proceedings under EULEX (2008–present)
Creation 
In 2006, during final negotiations over Kosovo’s future status, the Secretary-
General’s Special Envoy on Kosovo recommended, given the weakness of Kosovo’s 
judiciary, that international judges and prosecutors be kept in place to handle 
atrocity crime trials, as well as prosecution of organized crime, corruption, and inter-
ethnic cases.2191 In preparation for its increased involvement in Kosovo, in 2006 the 
EU established the EU Planning Team (EUPT Kosovo) for the establishment of a 
crisis management operation in Kosovo in the field of rule of law and possibly other 
areas.”2192 Pursuant to the work of the planning team, in December 2007 the EU 
expressed that it would be eager to “play a leading role in strengthening stability in 
the region in line with its European perspective and in implementing a settlement 
defining Kosovo’s future status.”2193 
On February 4, 2008, the European Union released Council Joint Action 2008.124.
CFSP,2194 forming the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). 
Not coincidently, Kosovo declared its independence two weeks later, and the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) announced that the United Nations Interim 
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Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) would reconfigure its international 
civilian presence in Kosovo and that the EU would be taking over its rule-of-law 
responsibilities.2195 To fulfill this mandate, EULEX is tasked with ensuring 
Cases of war crimes, terrorism, organized crime, corruption, interethnic 
crimes, financial/economic crimes, and other serious crimes are 
properly investigated, prosecuted, adjudicated and enforced, according 
to the applicable law, including, where appropriate, by international 
investigators, prosecutors and judges jointly with Kosovo investigators, 
prosecutors and judges or independently, and by measures including, 
as appropriate, the creation of cooperation and coordination structures 
between police and prosecution authorities.2196 
The support of EULEX in building the rule of law in Kosovo encompasses a large 
number of areas and institutions, including police, justice, and customs. This 
includes, among others, improving the performance and capacity of the Kosovo 
Police (KP), the Special Prosecution Office of the Republic of Kosovo (SPRK), the 
Special Chamber of the Supreme Court (SCSC), the Kosovo Judicial Council (KJC), 
the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council (KPC), and the Joint Rule of Law Coordination 
Board.2197 EULEX also took over responsibility for the UNMIK Office of Missing 
Persons and Forensics (OMPF), which later became the Department of Forensic 
Medicine (DFM) within Kosovo’s Ministry of Justice. 
EULEX assumed the responsibilities laid out in UN Resolution 1244 in December 
2008 and reached full operational capacity in April 2009. After 2008, EULEX’s 
mandate was renewed every two years, and as of late 2017, its most recent extension 
was due to expire in June 2018.2198 
Legal Framework and Mandate 
EULEX has a mandate to assist Kosovo’s authorities in the development of a 
sustainable and accountable justice free from political interference and ethnic bias. 
As described above, the EU rule-of-law mission aims to investigate and prosecute 
war crimes, organized crime, and other serious crimes.2199 The 2008 Council Joint 
Action additionally sets out a Monitoring, Mentoring, and Advising (MMA) objective 
to strengthen the justice sector and enhance the capacity of local judges and 
prosecutors.2200 EULEX judges may intervene in any case pursued by the SPRK, but 
have primary jurisdiction over war crimes, terrorism, organized crime, inter-ethnic 
violence, or other serious crimes listed in Article 3(d) of the Council Join Action.2201 
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War crimes trials in Kosovo take place through the ordinary court system and are 
heard by mixed panels of international EULEX judges and Kosovo judges. The Law 
on Courts dictates that war crimes cases should be heard by the Serious Crimes 
Division of the Basic Court.2202 The Serious Crimes Division hears cases with a panel 
of three judges, one of whom is designated as the presiding judge. When hearing war 
crimes, the panels are presided over by a EULEX judge, and a majority of the seats 
on each panel are filled by EULEX judges. These panels have jurisdiction over cases 
prosecuted by the Special Prosecution Office, which is responsible for investigating 
and prosecuting the most serious criminal offenses, including international criminal 
offenses, genocide, war crimes, organized crimes, and crimes against humanity. 
Although the Kosovo criminal procedure code states that domestic law should apply 
in war crimes cases, judges must determine which domestic law is applicable: the 
Criminal Code of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY CC), or the heavily 
revised, post-independence criminal code (KCPC).2203 The choice of legal code 
places EULEX judges (from countries with differing positions on Kosovo’s status) in 
the position of taking a stance on the recognition of Kosovo’s institutions, and thus 
the territory’s independence. 
All crimes under international law have been prosecuted under article 142 of the 
SFRY CC (war crimes against the civilian population).2204 There are significant 
differences between the SFRY CC and the KCPC’s codification of international 
crimes. The SFRY CC has limited treatment of international crimes. It includes 
genocide (Article 141) and several articles on war crimes (Articles 142–144).2205 The 
KCPC is more in line with modern international standards and includes crimes 
against humanity (Article 149) and command responsibility (Article 161).2206 
Since EULEX has only prosecuted crimes under the SFRY CC, there have been 
no prosecutions for crimes against humanity. There are consequences for not 
prosecuting crimes under crimes against humanity. Should a crime not fit within 
the definition of a “war crime,” it will be prosecuted under normal criminal law 
and subject to a statute of limitations.2207 With a massive backlog of crimes from the 
conflict with Serbia, it is likely that many victims will not receive justice because 
the statute of limitations will expire before their case is prosecuted. Kosovo’s 
constitution states that exceptions to the principal of legality should be made for 
crimes against humanity: “No one shall be charged or punished for any act which did 
not constitute a penal offence under law at the time it was committed, except acts 
that at the time they were committed constituted genocide, war crimes or crimes 
against humanity according to international law.”2208
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The EU rule-of-law mission consisted of two operational phases. From 2008–2012, 
EULEX was organized around three pillars set out in the 2008 Council Joint Action: 
police, judiciary, and customs. Following a strategic review of the mission’s 
performance, from 2012 onward EULEX was rearranged to work according to a new 
structure made up of an Executive Division, through which EULEX continues to 
exercise its executive mandate within the area of the police, customs, and judiciary, 
as well as a Strengthening Division, through which it implements its MMA program.2209 
Since 2012, there have been two concurrently operating witness protection programs 
in Kosovo: the EULEX Witness Protection Program and the new Kosovo Witness 
Protection Program. The EULEX Program has been in operation since assuming 
responsibility from UNMIK in 2008 and will continue to operate residually until 
the end of EULEX operations. The Kosovo Witness Protection Program began in 
2012 and is now the prevailing protection program. The legal foundation for witness 
protection measures in Kosovo is the Law on Witness Protection, passed in July 
2011.2210 (See Witness and victim protection and support, below.) 
Kosovo’s supervised independence formally ended in September 2012, which 
triggered the transfer of authority over the police and judicial institutions 
from EULEX to the government of Kosovo. While EULEX continued heading 
investigations and adjudicating complex and highly sensitive criminal cases 
—including war crimes, terrorism, interethnic crimes, organized crime, and 
corruption2211—this meant limiting the work of international judges and prosecutors 
to ongoing cases.2212
Location 
Since war crimes cases are heard through the regular criminal court system in 
Kosovo, they are first tried in regional basic courts in locations throughout the 
country. This has the advantage of making war crimes trials easily accessible to the 
public. However, a major drawback is that there is no courthouse that is specifically 
designated for war crimes trials. The basic court buildings are not structured to 
protect vulnerable witnesses. There are no separate entrances or waiting rooms for 
witnesses, making it possible for witnesses to be confronted by defendants. Often 
witnesses must wait in the halls of the courthouses before they testify, standing 
alongside defendants’ supporters.2213 Another disadvantage is that a single war 
crimes trial may have many defendants and many victims, which can be hard to 
accommodate in a regular courtroom. 
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Structure and Composition 
The courts in which EULEX prosecutors and judges operate are the same as those in 
which UNMIK authorities operated (Municipal Courts, District Courts, Basic Courts, 
Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court). War crimes cases are tried at one of the 
five District Courts of Kosovo.2214 There is no distinct War Crimes Chamber charged 
to hear these cases. Rather, at the height of EULEX’s involvement, war crimes cases 
were heard in front of a mixed panel of judges, with a majority of these judges being 
international EULEX judges.
Lack of Designated War Crimes Chamber 
Kosovo does not have any special procedures or court structures for hearing war crimes 
trials. War crimes trials are heard through the normal criminal court system by mixed 
panels, in the same manner as all other “serious” crimes. The absence of a designated 
War Crimes Chamber has resulted in a very small number of war crimes making it to 
trial, judicial incompetence, and inadequate protection for judges and witnesses.
First, by using the domestic criminal courts system, war crimes cases do not have 
priority over other criminal cases, which results in very few war crimes cases making 
it to trial each year.2215 This problem is particularly serious in light of a massive 
backlog of war crimes cases. Without prioritization of these cases, it will take many 
years for all of them to come to trial. War crimes cases are time sensitive because, 
as years pass, fewer witnesses will be alive to testify and accurate evidence will be 
more difficult to come by. Also, hearing war crimes trials through the criminal court 
system means that domestic judges with no experience with international criminal 
law are assigned to these sensitive and complex cases.2216 Finally, local judges 
have often sought to avoid placement on panels hearing war crimes trials.2217 The 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has found that many 
Kosovo judges report being threatened, and a number are the victims of physical 
acts of violence each year.2218 A situation of threats and intimidation of judges 
involved in war crimes cases continues to exist in 2017.2219
The OSCE has noted that the creation of a specialized War Crimes Chamber would 
address many of these problems. War crimes cases would be prioritized and heard 
in a timely fashion.2220 Local judges sitting in the War Crimes Chamber would 
become familiar with international criminal law and the nuances of war crimes 
cases. Finally, measures could be taken to enhance the protection of judges and 
prosecutors working for the War Crimes Chamber. Supporters of the current system 
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argue that the creation of a War Crimes Chamber would drain needed resources 
away from regular Kosovo courts.2221 
From 2008 to 2014, a combination of EULEX and Kosovo government departments 
made up the domestic response to war crimes trials. Since the end of Kosovo’s 
supervised independence in 2012, EULEX phased out its involvement in domestic 
war crimes prosecutions and started transferring its powers to domestic institutions. 
As of 2017, EULEX judges and prosecutors “continue to be embedded in Kosovo 
institutions and serve in accordance with Kosovo law until the complete transition of 
functions to the competent Kosovo’s authorities.”2222 Cases transferred to the Kosovo 
institutions continue to be monitored by EULEX’s Strengthening Division.
All war crimes prosecutions are handled by the SPRK, which is partly composed 
of EULEX prosecutors. The EULEX Police War Crimes Investigation Unit was 
established to investigate war crimes claims, with support from the DFM. EULEX 
supported the creation of the Kosovo Police War Crimes Investigation Unit 
(KPWCIU), which started operations in 2014. Initially, witnesses were assisted and 
protected by the EULEX Witness Protection Program and from 2012 onward by the 
Kosovo Witness Protection Program.
Internationalized Judiciary
From 2008 onward, mixed panels of judges heard war crimes cases. The panels are 
composed of a majority of international EULEX judges and are presided over by 
a EULEX judge. As of 2014, despite concerns about the readiness of local judges 
to handle war crimes cases by themselves, EULEX involvement in the judiciary 
has diminished. Today, the distribution of judges has shifted toward panels with 
a majority of or exclusively comprised of domestic judges,2223 except for “selected 
highly sensitive criminal cases” and cases before the Mitrovica Basic Court.2224 
The responsibilities of EULEX judges extends beyond hearing war crimes cases. 
These judges have an expansive role with two focuses: mentoring and exercising 
judicial power under the MMA component of the mission.2225 Judges are assigned 
to local courts throughout Kosovo. While embedded in these courts, they assist the 
local judicial authorities with establishing judicial framework and best practices.2226 
EULEX judges also sit on mixed panels with Kosovo judges to address specific cases. 
Within their primary competence are all SPRK-investigated or prosecuted cases. 
These cases include the most serious criminal cases, such as war crimes, genocide, 
and crimes against humanity, as well as organized crimes and terrorism, corruption, 
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and economic crimes. In 2012, only four of the 50 international EULEX judges were 
assigned to war crimes trials.2227 This limited the number of war crimes cases that 
may be heard at any one time.2228 In certain circumstances, EULEX judges have 
subsidiary competence to take over cases not prosecuted by the SPRK. For criminal 
cases, these circumstances included situations where the local judge has been 
threatened, crimes that are ethnically motivated, and crimes of great sensitivity or 
complexity.2229 Subsidiary competence was limited for civil cases, but EULEX judges 
may take over cases where there is a suspicion of impartiality or an inability of the 
Kosovo judges to hear the case in a fair manner.2230 
The panels in which EULEX judges exercised their jurisdiction were typically “of 
mixed composition with a majority of EULEX judges and presided over by a EULEX 
judge.”2231 However, Article 3 of the Law on Jurisdiction allows the president of the 
Assembly of EULEX Judges (AEJ) to decide “for grounded reasons” that panels in a 
criminal case should be composed of a majority of Kosovo judges. The president of 
the AEJ also has authority to decide that panels be “fully composed of Kosovo judges 
or not to assign EULEX judges at particular stages of the criminal proceeding.”2232 
After 2012, this mechanism was exercised more frequently. In several instances, 
mixed panels were composed of a majority of local rather than EULEX judges.2233 
From 2010 to 2014, international judges were most active in criminal proceedings 
before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and courts of Mitrovica.2234 
Between 2012 and 2014, EULEX judges were also assigned civil cases related to 
property disputes resulting from the 1998–1999 conflict.2235
EULEX judges are hired either through secondment or by contracting. Seconded 
judges are selected and funded entirely by their home nations. Contracted 
international judges apply directly to EULEX. Once hired, EULEX pays their 
salaries. All EULEX judges sign one-year contracts with the possibility of renewal.2236 
EULEX judges have criticized the contracts for being too short to allow judges 
hailing from different legal cultures to familiarize themselves with the Kosovo 
legal system.2237 In 2012, the OSCE observed that the process for the selection of 
international judges had improved in comparison with UNMIK, because judges can 
now be dismissed or sanctioned when they underperform.2238 
Together the EULEX judges make up the self-governing body of the AEJ, which meets 
a minimum of four times a year to make resolutions that are necessary to carry out 
the work of the EULEX judiciary.2239 If necessary, it divides into small working groups 
to discuss and address any issues the judges face.2240 The AEJ is also responsible for 
making disciplinary decisions regarding misconduct of EULEX judges.2241 
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Special Prosecution Office 
War crimes prosecutions are under the exclusive competence of the SPRK. The 
SPRK is a specialized office that operates within the Office of the State Prosecutor 
of Kosovo. Throughout the duration of EULEX’s mission in Kosovo, EULEX 
prosecutors will be heavily involved in the operations of the SPRK.2242 As of June 
2011, the office was composed of 11 EULEX prosecutors, 10 Kosovo prosecutors, 60 
support staff members, and five financial experts assigned to the Anti-Corruption 
Task Force.2243 The SPRK has the authority to request additional support from other 
divisions of the Office of the State Prosecutor of Kosovo.2244 The SPRK is presided 
over by the head of the SPRK, an office which was long held by an international 
EULEX prosecutor, and the deputy head of the SPRK, a domestic prosecutor.2245 By 
2015, the office was led by a local prosecutor.2246
The SPRK has exclusive competence over the most serious crimes, leaving less 
sensitive cases to local prosecutors. Crimes that are exclusively investigated and 
prosecuted by the SRPK include terrorism, organized crime, genocide, war crimes, 
and any case that is referred to Kosovo from the ICTY.2247 SPRK also has subsidiary 
competence over crimes typically investigated by the state prosecutor of Kosovo. 
It may exercise this competence in situations where the crime is “threatening the 
stability of the state” or is part of a larger transnational conspiracy.2248
The SPRK is in the challenging position of handling a large workload of both 
recent criminal cases and past war crimes cases. When EULEX and SPRK became 
responsible for prosecuting war crimes in 2008, they inherited UNMIK’s snarled 
backlog of open war crimes investigations. UNMIK transferred 179 open cases to 
EULEX, of which 63 were war crimes cases.2249 In addition, EULEX received 1,049 
war crimes police reports that UNMIK prosecution had never investigated.2250 A 
thorough review of these reports was conducted, which resulted in around 500 cases 
being closed or dismissed due to lack of evidence.2251 Many of the viable inherited 
cases proved to have incomplete files. In some cases, evidence was intentionally 
“misplaced” or disappeared.2252 The need for thorough re-investigation has limited 
the number of indictments that SPRK is able to make each year. 
Although SPRK has made some progress with prosecuting war crimes, the number 
of war crimes cases that adjudicated each year is very low. By March 2012, four years 
after EULEX involvement began, the SPRK had prosecuted only 20 war crimes 
cases.2253 Appeals or retrials of cases that UNMIK had opened largely made up the 
first wave of cases EULEX handled.2254 In 2015, a representative from the SPRK 
stated that there were about 300 cases of war crimes on the list of the prosecutor’s 
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office, of which 84 cases with 335 accused were under investigation at that time.2255 
Hundreds of war crimes remained to be investigated and prosecuted, and the rate 
of adjudications strongly suggested that the SPRK lacks the operational capacity 
to sufficiently address these. It was also unclear whether SPRK and EULEX had 
mapped out crimes and developed a cohesive prosecution strategy.2256 
SPRK and EULEX have not hesitated to prosecute Kosovo Albanians for their role 
in atrocities. This has turned public opinion in Kosovo against them.2257 The public 
is unaware that SPRK and EULEX have also cooperated with the Belgrade Special 
War Crimes Chamber to prosecute Serbs.2258 War crimes prosecutors, like judges, 
are the victims of threats and intimidation from the public, which can severely 
inhibit prosecutorial freedom.2259 In some cases, prosecutors have been physically 
attacked.2260 Prosecutors have stated that they do not feel that the security system 
currently in place provides adequate protection.2261 
In addition to the backlogs of war crimes cases inherited from UNMIK, there are 
many other war crimes that took place in Kosovo that have not been reported or 
sufficiently investigated. SPRK’s small staff has been unable to devote attention 
to these crimes. In 2011, Swiss senator Dick Marty released a report alleging that 
former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) leaders were involved in an organized crime 
ring that engaged in abductions, murder, and organ trafficking.2262 Under concerns 
that the SPRK would be unable to conduct an impartial, credible investigation into 
these claims, EULEX launched the internationally staffed EU Special Investigative 
Task Force to further investigate these crimes (see text box discussion of Special 
Investigative Task Force, below).2263 In 2016, the Kosovo government and European 
Union established a War Crimes Chamber based in the Netherlands and presided 
over by international judges to hear these cases.2264 (See The Kosovo Specialist 
Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, below.) 
EULEX Judges and Prosecutors 
At its height, the justice component of EULEX was composed of more than 50 
judges and around 30 prosecutors.2265 However, the number of EULEX personnel 
dedicated to the investigation and prosecution of war crimes appears to have 
been inadequate in light of the current number of outstanding cases.2266 Only 
four international judges regularly adjudicated war crimes cases and only two 
international prosecutors worked on war crimes cases.2267 From 2012 onward, 
EULEX judges also started to work on property-related civil proceedings in the 
Special Chamber of the Supreme Court (SCSC). In 2014, eight EULEX judges were 
assigned to this chamber.2268
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In 2011, the SPRK was comprised of 11 international prosecutors and 10 local  
Kosovo prosecutors. However, only two international prosecutors and two local  
Kosovo prosecutors worked within the War Crimes Investigation Unit (WCIU).2269  
By contrast, five international prosecutors and three local prosecutors worked within 
the Special Anti-Corruption Department or Task Force (ACTF).2270 In 2017, the SPRK 
was comprised of eight prosecutors and 30 support staff, and it continues to work 
with a number of EULEX prosecutors.2271 
EULEX Police War Crimes Investigation Unit 
The WCIU is a team of EULEX police officers, which in 2012 had a staff of 29 people.2272 
WCIU works in partnership with the SPRK to conduct thorough investigations into 
war crimes and is mostly assisting with exhumations and preliminary interviews. Like 
the SPRK, the WCIU has been confronted with the challenge of working through the 
backlog of unorganized and incomplete cases left by UNMIK.2273 SPRK has made steady 
but slow progress with investigations. In 2012, the unit had the capacity to conclude 
two to three investigations each year.2274 Subsequently, they decided to prioritize 
cases with multiple victims.2275 In addition to domestic investigations, WCIU 
cooperates across borders with the Serbian Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor by 
providing them with evidence and helping witnesses who live in Kosovo to testify in 
Serbian trials.2276 In 2014, EULEX started transferring responsibilities to the 
KPWCIU,2277 which will ultimately take over the responsibilities of the EULEX WCIU. 
Department of Forensic Medicine
While initially a EULEX institution, the DFM was transferred into the responsibility 
of the Kosovo Department of Justice in 2010, with continued mentorship from 
EULEX.2278 The DFM has a mandate “to clarify the fate of missing persons” and has 
“competence in forensic medicine and in forensic examinations related to ongoing 
criminal investigation.”2279 Accordingly, it plays an important role in providing 
evidence for the prosecution of war crimes, alongside the WCIU.2280 As of 2017, over 
1,600 persons remained missing.2281 The infrastructure of the DFM has improved 
in the past few years with new equipment, thanks to outside donors.2282 The DFM’s 
major weakness is that there are no local forensic anthropologists or archeologists 
assigned to the department.2283 Without skilled locals on the team, they will struggle 
to continue their work when EULEX support is completely removed from the 
program. EULEX claims that the unit is a victim of “political interference and poor 
management” by the Department of Justice.2284 There is little governmental support 
for recovering the bodies of the missing, and the government has provided the DFM 
with insufficient funds to carry out its work.2285 
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A full transfer of the responsibilities of the DFM from EULEX to the Ministry of 
Justice of Kosovo was envisioned to take place in 2012. However, a report published 
by Amnesty International in 2012 recommended delaying the transfer due to 
insufficient local capacity to carry out case investigations.2286 In April 2016, the new 
Law on Forensic Medicine finally came into force, paving the way for the DFM to 
become a fully operational independent agency.2287
Outreach
EULEX has an active Press and Public Information Office (PPIO). The PPIO 
represents all of EULEX, not just EULEX involvement in the Kosovo court system. 
At the height of operations, the PPIO had a spokesperson on-call 24 hours a 
day in order to support PPIO’s policy of taking “a pro-active approach with full 
transparency on mission objectives and a timely response to enquiries.”2288 The PPIO 
has a diverse approach to public information, using methods such as billboards and 
commercials to ensure that the public is aware of the work of EULEX. The PPIO also 
makes extensive use of social media. All information posted to these pages, as well 
as to the EULEX website, is provided in Albanian, Serbian, and English. 
With regard to war crimes trials, the EULEX website features an archive of court 
opinions presided over by EULEX judges.2289 However, there are no recently updated 
statistics available that show how many war crimes trials have been completed 
and how many have yet to be heard, and it is impossible to determine if the online 
archives are up-to-date. Until the end of 2014, the PPIO kept individuals informed 
on war crimes trials by posting frequent updates to its social media pages and 
website, as well as publishing press releases.2290 PPIO also engaged in outreach 
by bringing EULEX staff members into the community to educate and increase 
awareness.2291 In the past, EULEX prosecutors led a class on war crimes trials for 
students at a Kosovo law school. Similar outreach efforts have included facilitating 
presentations at high schools throughout Kosovo. SPRK does not have a stand-alone 
public outreach office, but the PPIO publicizes the work of EULEX prosecutors. 
In the beginning of 2015, the Kosovo Judicial Council and Kosovo Prosecutorial 
Council formally took over the public communications role of EULEX on court 
and prosecution cases. Since then, the SPRK and State Prosecution have their own 
spokesperson. However, EULEX continues to support the Kosovo institutions in 
their outreach and public information duties. 2292 
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Witness and Victim Protection and Support 
Witness and victim protection and support in Kosovo is the responsibility of the 
EULEX Witness Protection Program and the Kosovo Witness Protection Program. 
The competency of these programs is critical to ensuring the success of war crimes 
trials. In Kosovo, many witnesses are reluctant to testify against suspected war 
criminals, either out of fear of retaliation or out of respect for defendants’ roles 
in the conflict.2293 In order for witnesses to feel comfortable testifying, they must 
feel that they will be adequately protected from harm. Fears of retaliation are 
compounded due to the small size of Kosovo, where relocation within the national 
borders is typically insufficient to protect the individual. Witness intimidation 
is a serious problem that EULEX has not dealt with. On the topic of witness 
intimidation, Special Investigative Task Force Prosecutor Clint Williamson asserted, 
“There is probably no single thing that poses more of a threat to rule of law in 
Kosovo and of its progress toward a European future than this pervasive practice.”2294
Under the Law on Witness Protection, endangered witnesses to specific crimes may 
be eligible for protection measures. These crimes include criminal offenses against 
Kosovo or its citizens, international law, or the economy, and any other criminal 
offenses that are punishable by imprisonment of five or more years.2295 Protection 
measures available to these witnesses include basic measures, such as temporary 
relocation to a safe house, physical protection, and sealing identifying documents, 
as well as more extreme measures, such as a permanent change of identity, 
relocation inside or outside of Kosovo, and minor plastic surgery.2296 Financial 
support is available for witnesses for up to 12 months for witnesses unable to 
support themselves while under protection.2297 Additionally, the law offers witnesses 
social and legal support to “guarantee their security and his or her welfare as well 
as minimum living standard.”2298 Although the Law on Witness Protection has 
strengthened the support offered to many vulnerable witnesses in Kosovo, it fails to 
include specific measures of protection for the victims of war crimes or sexual offenses. 
Although there are in-court methods to protect witnesses, Kosovo’s judges and 
prosecutors rarely invoke these protections, leaving the identity of witnesses 
exposed and the witnesses vulnerable to threats and harassment.2299 Additionally, 
when a witness arrives at a courthouse to testify, there is no support or protection, 
leaving them at risk of intimidation and re-traumatization. As mentioned above, 
Kosovar courthouses generally lack designated waiting rooms for witnesses, leaving 
witnesses to stand in the halls alongside defendants’ supporters and occasionally 
leading to confrontations.2300 
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The EULEX Witness Protection Program was solely responsible for witness 
protection until the Kosovo Witness Protection Program was formed in 2012. Critics 
decried the witness program as understaffed and ineffective throughout its tenure. 
Failures of protection slowed investigations and prosecutions.2301 According to an 
Amnesty International report in 2012, a SPRK prosecutor stated that under EULEX 
there is “no witness protection or support available in the court system for victims 
of war crimes.”2302 Criticism of EULEX mounted following the 2011 suicide of Agim 
Zogaj, a war crime witness reportedly under EULEX protection.2303 According to 
Zogaj’s suicide note and a complaint his family lodged against EULEX, Zogaj was 
under intense stress and had received death threats.2304 His death prompted some 
diplomats to condemn EULEX for failing to recruit qualified candidates to the 
Witness Protection Program and for failing to implement the existing protections for 
vulnerable witnesses.2305
EULEX has struggled to protect witnesses requiring international relocation. The 
international community has been reticent to accept witnesses from Kosovo, who 
often have large families to support and do not speak a Western European language. 
Additionally, these countries hesitate because of lingering uncertainty over Kosovo’s 
statehood status. In 2011, the Council of Europe called upon its member states to 
support witness protection in the Balkans by accepting witnesses from Kosovo.2306 
In 2012, EULEX started setting up the Kosovo Department of Witness Protection 
with the support of the EU-funded Witness Protection in the Fight against Serious 
Crime and Terrorism II (WINPRO II) Project,2307 although it was not until June 
2014 that EULEX reported that the department had become fit for operations.2308 
Although Kosovo has made progress in the establishment of a legal infrastructure 
and institutions for the protection of witnesses in war crimes trials, witness 
intimidation remains problematic.2309 Remaining challenges include “international 
cooperation, education and awareness raising of the responsible actors, social, 
cultural and geographical factors as well as in the logistics aspect for financing 
witness protection programs.”2310
Defense
The Kosovo Criminal Procedure Code (KCPC) gives all defendants the right to 
assistance by a defense council throughout all criminal proceedings.2311 In cases of 
“mandatory defense,” for individuals who are unable to afford a private defense 
attorney, a pretrial judge can assign a defense council paid for by the public. Cases 
of mandatory defense are cases where the defendant is disabled in a way that would 
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impair their ability to defend themselves, cases that are being heard on remand, 
and cases where the defendant plans to plead guilty.2312 In addition to the mandatory 
defense cases, a defendant may be assigned defense council at public expense 
if he is indicted for an offense with a sentence of eight years or more.2313 Finally, 
regardless of sentence length, a publicly funded defense council may be appointed 
“in the interest of justice … if [the defendant] is financially unable to pay the cost of 
his or her defense.”2314
The Kosovo Chamber of Advocates (KCA) maintains a list of advocates who have 
volunteered to serve as ex officio defense council. It is the responsibility of the judge 
or the prosecutor to call the KCA and request an advocate if the defendant requires 
one. However, an insufficient number of attorneys have volunteered to be on this 
list, and some are underqualified for the cases in question. There is no specific list 
of attorneys that specialize in war crimes defense. Additionally, according to the 
American Bar Association, placing this responsibility in the hands of the judge or 
prosecutor can result in selecting “an advocate who will only do the bare minimum 
and will not challenge the prosecutor in any way.” A more recent pilot program 
revamps this system. With the new system, there is no volunteer list. KCA employees 
directly contact licensed advocates in the area, asking them to provide services.2315
 
While the state should pay defense attorneys, this is not always the case. There have 
been reports of defense attorneys asking for pay and being refused.2316 Without a 
guarantee of fair compensation, defense attorneys are less likely to take on ex officio 
representation. 
The Kosovo Judicial Council
EULEX recognized the importance of “independent, professional and impartial” 
oversight with the creation of the KJC in 2011.2317 To achieve this mandate, the KJC is 
tasked with selecting and proposing candidates for appointment and reappointment 
to judicial office” 2318 as well as overseeing “disciplinary proceeding of judges” 
and the general management of judicial reform.2319 The KJC is also responsible for 
implementing the budget of the judiciary with the assistance of EULEX advisors. 
EULEX advisors consist of “two international advisors, a national legal advisor and 
a national language assistant.”2320 Membership of the KJC cannot contain members 
of the executive branch of government.2321 However, the composition of the KJC does 
not satisfy European standards. While European standards require that all members 
of a judicial council be elected by their peers (the judiciary), the Constitution of 
Kosovo only requires five of the thirteen members be elected by their peers.2322 The 
eight remaining judges are appointed by government bodies.2323
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The Kosovo Prosecutorial Council 
The KPC is an independent institution responsible for “recruiting, proposing, 
transferring, reappointing and disciplining prosecutors.”2324 It is chaired by the chief 
state prosecutor and consists of an “advisor, a national legal advisor and an admin/
language assistant” with members from “the prosecution offices (experts) and from 
other parts of the civil society.”2325 
Joint Rule of Law Coordination Board
In 2008, EULEX established the Joint Rule of Law Coordination Board (JRCB), 
composed of the EULEX head of mission, the deputy prime minister of Kosovo, and 
representatives of the KJC and KPC, with the aim of coordinating efforts to build 
the rule of law in Kosovo and ensure capacity building of local institutions.2326 At the 
end of 2012, the JRCB also became responsible for monitoring the implementation 
of the “Compact” agreement between the Kosovo Ministry of Justice, the EU special 
representative, and the head of EULEX.2327
The Assembly of the EULEX Judges 
The AEJ is comprised of judges appointed by the head of mission to play the role of 
“watchdog of judicial independence.”2328 The AEJ is tasked with endorsing the method 
of case section and case allocation. It also has competence to assist with other issues 
that relate to judicial independence, including training of judges, ruling on appeals 
from disciplinary decisions, and electing members of a Disciplinary Board. 
Prosecutions
EULEX inherited over 1,000 war crimes cases not previously investigated 
by UNMIK.2329 In 2010, the EULEX WCIU began a review of these cases and 
implemented a case selection process.2330 The Council of Europe found that the 
war files, especially dealing with suspected KLA perpetrators, “were turned over by 
UNMIK in a deplorable condition (mislaid evidence and witness statements, long 
time lapses in following up on incomplete investigative steps).”2331
,0In 2012, Amnesty International judged that EULEX had made progress in the 
investigation of wnar crimes cases, but has not done enough to overcome the 
backlog of the UNMIK legacy. Under EULEX, the WCIU was only able to conclude, 
on average, two or three cases per year because the prosecution of war crimes was 
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only one of several EULEX priorities.2332 According to Bernard Rabatel, deputy 
head of the EULEX justice component, the prosecution of organized crime and 
corruption cases was EULEX’s top priority.2333 In 2015 the Humanitarian Law Centre-
Kosovo estimated that in 17 years of war crimes prosecutions under UNMIK and 
EULEX, only 44 cases had been completed. This included 20 cases involving 63 
Albanians and 22 cases involving 43 Serbs.2334 If compared to OSCE calculations that 
37 individuals had been tried for war crimes by the end of 2009,2335 it appears that 
under EULEX 69 individuals had been tried from 2010 to 2015. In January 2017, 
Human Rights Watch reported that EULEX judges had been involved in 38 war 
crimes verdicts since the mission’s establishment in 2008.2336 As of 2017, prosecution 
of war crimes and other serious crimes continued under EULEX auspices, but as 
the mission continued to transfer rule-of-law responsibilities to Kosovo’s domestic 
authorities, after 2014, new cases were only to be instigated by national judges.2337 
In 2015, for the first time since the transfer of authority, local prosecutors filed a war 
crimes indictment, which in 2017 was under consideration by local judges.2338
Beyond the modest number of prosecutions, progress in the investigation of missing 
Kosovo Albanians by Serb forces under EULEX has been slow,2339 and investigations 
into the fate of Serbs allegedly abducted by KLA members have been almost 
nonexistent or ineffective. The Klecka case is an excellent example of the difficulties 
Kosovo prosecutors face in bringing cases against former KLA commanders. In 2012, 
the Supreme Court—consisting of a panel of two international and one local judge—
ordered the acquittal of Fatmir Limaj and nine other ex-KLA fighters for detention, 
torture, and murder of Serbs and Albanians in Klecka, Limaj, and three others.2340 
The SPRK appealed the judgment and ordered a retrial, but Limaj was acquitted 
again in 2017.2341 Prosecutors viewed Limaj’s acquittal, as well as his previous 
acquittal for alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes in the Lapušnik 
Prison Camp (near Klecka), as the result of witness interference. After a key witness 
was found dead in Germany in 2012, the evidence was deemed first inadmissible 
and then unreliable.2342 Eventually, the difficulties in witness protection in the 
prosecution of former KLA leaders was a key reason for the creation of the Kosovo 
Specialist Chambers outside the territory of Kosovo. 
A disproportionate percentage of Serbs, Roma, and other minorities—450 out of 
499—remain unaccounted for.2343 The lack of proper investigation into missing 
minorities is likely the result of a lack of political will to investigate these crimes 
by government authorities in Kosovo. 2344 Authorities in Albania and Kosovo have 
not been cooperative in efforts to locate Serbs or Kosovo Albanians thought to 
have fallen victim to crimes committed by members of the KLA.2345 However, since 
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a 2011 Council of Europe report affirmed allegations of organ trafficking by KLA 
forces, authorities in Kosovo and Albania have demonstrated greater willingness to 
facilitate investigations of missing Serbs. 
Legacy
After 10 years of EU involvement in the development of the rule of law in Kosovo, a 
tremendous amount of legislation has been passed and new institutions created that 
have contributed to the rule of law in Kosovo. However, according to former EULEX 
judge James Hargreaves, a culture of impunity persists.2346 Judges and prosecutors 
continue to work in a highly politicized and ethnically polarized environment, and 
problems with the implementation of witness protection remains a problem.2347 
By 2017 one observer described EULEX’s results as “mixed at best and a debacle at 
worst.”2348 The “judicial system remains a mess. Despite limited achievements, the 
mission has struggled to make a substantial improvement to the Kosovo’s rule of law, 
and has not met the expectation to bring justice to key perpetrators of war crimes 
and corruption.”2349 The decision to establish the Kosovo Specialist Chambers in 
The Hague is an “implicit recognition of the failure of both UNMIK and EULEX to 
investigate and try … sensitive [war crimes] cases.”2350
Phaseout of International Personnel and Transition to a National Institution
On June 14, 2016, the Council of the European Union approved an extension of 
the EULEX mission to June 2018.2351 The EU granted this extension in order to 
give EULEX more time to strengthen the rule of law. While EULEX anticipates 
successfully completing the transition by the appointed end date, it reserves the 
right to request an additional extension or to otherwise “modify their engagement” 
should they believe it necessary.2352 
The EULEX mandate extension ushers in a period of transition where EULEX will 
gradually phase out international engagement in Kosovo institutions. The focus 
of this period will be capacity building and security.2353 EULEX prosecutors will 
continue existing work, but will not take on new cases.2354 Similarly, EULEX judges 
will continue to preside over continuing cases and appeals of cases that are already 
open, but will not hear new cases.2355 The composition of mixed panels will shift, 
making a majority of the judges local Kosovo judges.2356 EULEX judges will remain 
on the mixed panels until the end of the mandate. EULEX judges and prosecutors 
will continue their role of mentoring and advising Kosovo rule-of-law institutions 
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throughout the transition.2357 There will be a sizable reduction in EULEX staff 
members in proportion to their reduced role in Kosovo. 
Impact on Legal Reform
EULEX came into Kosovo with the intention of strengthening rule of law. Their 
mission has involved mentoring, monitoring, and advising alongside their exercise 
of executive authority. However, after years of involvement in Kosovo, EULEX 
has struggled to build capacity and empower local judicial institutions. Prior to 
2014, critics argued that EULEX’s lead in justice matters failed to allow Kosovo 
legal professionals to take ownership of the judiciary.2358 Since EULEX formally 
transferred all rule of law responsibilities to the domestic institutions in 2014, the 
rate of war crimes proceedings has fallen, suggesting that the judiciary is unprepared 
to stand on its own feet.2359 More broadly, critics say that EULEX has failed to build 
the rule of law and improve the local judiciary.2360
The Kosovo judiciary remains weak, and it will continue to face many challenges 
after EULEX’s departure. The greatest risks to domestic war crimes trials are security 
and lack of experience. Kosovo judges adjudicating sensitive cases, including war 
crimes cases, face threats and intimidation from the political elite and the public.2361 
Impact on Society
Public approval of EULEX is very low; as of 2013, only 22 percent of the population 
reported satisfaction with the mission.2362 EULEX officially takes a neutral stance on 
Kosovo statehood. For many Kosovo Albanians, a neutral stance is tantamount to 
aligning with Serbia.2363 The Kosovo Foundation for Open Society asserts that “no 
international rule of law mission can be successful in winning over public support in 
Kosovo if it does not clearly recognize Kosovo’s independence and statehood.”2364
Little information exists on public perception of domestic war crimes trials. Amnesty 
International reported in 2012 that there was a public impression that EULEX was 
targeting Kosovo Albanians for war trials.2365 This has resulted in low support for the 
current domestic war crimes trials mechanism. 
Financing
EULEX receives its funding from the member states of the European Union. The 
Council of the European Union approves the annual proposed budget.2366 In 2014, 
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the EULEX annual operating budget was 111 million euros.2367 This amount covered 
operations for all branches of EULEX—policing, judiciary, and customs. EULEX 
pays the salary of EULEX judges.2368 EULEX is financed by 26 EU member states (all 
member states except Cyprus)2369 through the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) budget and by participating non-EU states, which include Canada, Croatia, 
Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States.2370 While general information 
on the financing of EULEX is available,2371 EULEX does not disclose information 
relating to the salaries of international judges.2372 Funding for Kosovo’s domestic 
institutions, such as the SPRK, the witness protection program, and the judiciary, 
comes from the Kosovo national budget. The budget is set by the Committee for 
Budget and Finance of the Kosovo Assembly.2373 Many of these institutions, most 
notably the witness protection program, struggle due to insufficient funding.2374
A report by the American Bar Association published in 2010 found that Kosovo 
judges had been underpaid for several years. Prior to 2011, no law protected judicial 
salaries in Kosovo, and the salaries of local judges and prosecutors had not increased 
since 2002, despite a considerable increase in the cost of living.2375 District Court 
judges earned “less than 18 Euro per day (550 Euro per month gross).”2376 Lay judges 
did not receive regular salaries but rather a “modest per-case-fee.”2377 Judicial 
personnel and their international partners expressed that “a fully independent and 
strong judiciary is only possible with respectable salaries for judges … and the dire 
situation with judicial salaries has existed for so long in the fact of such uniform and 
persistent criticism due to a deliberate attempt by other branches of government to 
keep the judiciary subservient and ineffective.”2378 The situation improved in January 
2011 when provisions within the Law of Courts came into effect and tied judicial 
salaries to equivalent positions in the executive branch of Kosovo’s government. For 
example, the salary of the Supreme Court president now matches that of the prime 
minister.2379 Under this scheme, a judge’s salary depends on the level of court they 
preside over. For certain judges in high-level courts, this new scheme resulted in a 
60 percent increase over their 2010 salary.2380 
There have been problems with underpayment of the Kosovo Police, which 
according to Amnesty international is “not enough to encourage impartiality.”2381 
Similarly, the staff of the DFM are underpaid considering the qualifications 
required for their work. This poses a serious challenge to investigating allegations of 
organized crime against KLA forces.2382 
In accordance with Article 9(2) of the Council Joint Action of February 4, 2008, 
on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX consists primarily 
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of staff seconded by EU member states or EU institutions.2383 EULEX does not 
disclose information relating to the salaries of international judges.2384 As mentioned 
above, member states and EU institutions bear the costs associated with the staff 
they second to EULEX. These costs include “travel expenses to and from the 
place of deployment, salaries, medical coverage and allowances other than daily 
allowances and applicable risks and hardship allowances.”2385 EULEX may also 
recruit international and local staff on a contractual basis.2386 While non-EU states 
participating in the mission may second staff to EULEX, nationals from non-EU 
states are recruited on a contractual basis only, and exceptionally where no qualified 
applications from member states are available.2387 
Oversight and Accountability
EULEX is not accountable to Kosovo’s Parliament, Ombudsman, or Anti-Corruption 
Agency,2388 but the mission has created several internal accountability mechanisms 
within its structures. The Human Rights and Legal Office (HRLO) is an advisory 
and policy body responsible for ensuring that all EULEX’s activities are in line with 
international human rights standards.2389 The Human Rights Review Panel (HRRP), 
which has been operational since June 2010, addresses human rights violations that 
have been committed within the execution of the EULEX mandate. The HRRP panel 
is composed of four members, including one EULEX judge and international experts 
in human rights law. Since 2010, it has registered 188 complaints, out of which  
24 cases were deemed violations.2390 
At the end of 2014, the Kosovo daily newspaper Koha Ditore published an article 
accusing EULEX officials and international judges and prosecutors of corruption, 
including taking bribes.2391 The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy Federica Mogherini appointed an independent expert to investigate 
the allegations; the expert published a report on the matter in March 2015.2392 The 
report concluded that the allegations were unfounded, but that EULEX should 
have opened an international investigation at the time and highlighted several 
weaknesses in the mission’s management and structure. These allegations, in 
addition to general critiques of the effectives of the rule of law mission, have 
damaged the credibility of EULEX in Kosovo. 
The creation of the KJC, KPC, and AEJ as independent oversight mechanisms within 
the domestic structure of Kosovo are a positive step forward in the establishment 
of an impartial and independent judicial system in Kosovo. While under UNMIK, 
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the SRSG appointed local judges and prosecutors, but appointments are now made 
through independent mechanisms. 
Domestically, the Humanitarian Law Center-Kosovo (HLC) has been monitoring 
war crimes trials in Kosovo since 2000, providing a measure of informal 
oversight.2393 HLC writes and publishes annual reports that analyze all war crimes 
trials heard in Kosovo as well as the work of EULEX and the SPRK.2394
Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office 
Creation 
In April 2008, the former Chief Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Carla Del Ponte published her memoirs, in which she 
claims that Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) fighters kidnapped several hundred 
persons, mostly ethnic Serbs, and took them to prison facilities in Kosovo and 
northern Albania where they suffered further serious abuse. The book alleged that 
crimes against these abductees included illegal organ removal, organ trafficking, 
torture, and murder.2395 Under pressure from international media and civil society,2396 
the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) reluctantly opened 
what it called a preliminary examination into the crimes committed in the “Yellow 
House” in Drenica, Albania, in the aftermath of the war. A year later, the EU mission 
reported that it found no evidence of torture and murder in northern Albania, and 
was thus closing the case. 
Simultaneously, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe started 
an investigation into Del Ponte’s allegations. In 2011, the Swiss rapporteur of the 
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights presented a report titled “Inhuman 
treatment of people and illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo.” The report 
discussed war crimes and crimes against humanity against Serbs and Kosovar 
Albanians, with a focus on torture, inhumane and degrading treatment, and 
disappearances in detention centers under KLA control during and following the 
Kosovo war (see text box for Council of Europe Report).2397 
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Council of Europe Report on Inhuman Treatment of People and 
Trafficking in Human Organs in Kosovo 
Following the allegations made by former ICTY Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte, in 
2008 the Council of Europe launched a formal inquiry into organized crime, 
including human organ trafficking, by KLA forces. The inquiry led by Human 
Rights Rapporteur Dick Marty culminated in a report published in 2010: “Inhuman 
treatment of people and illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo” (also known 
as the “Marty report”).2398
The Marty report concluded that a “number of indications” appeared to confirm that 
organs were removed from a subset of Serb captives held at a clinic in Albania and 
trafficked abroad. Evidence suggested that these captives were “initially kept alive, 
fed well and allowed to sleep, and treated with relative restraint by KLA guards … 
moved through at least two transitory detention facilities, or ‘way stations’ before 
being delivered to the operating clinic.” KLA forces—specifically, affiliates of the 
Drenica Group—allegedly controlled these “way stations” in Dicaj, Burrel, Rripe, and 
Fushe-Kruje. Marty’s report found that the ICTY’s exploratory mission in Albania 
had been superficial, with a standard of professionalism prompting “bewilderment.” 
Moreover, the ICTY’s jurisdiction was limited to exploring crimes committed up 
to June 1999, and it had no authority to conduct investigations in Albania, except 
with the consent of Albanian authorities. However, organ trafficking by the KLA 
was “alleged to have occurred from the summer of 1999 onwards,” after Serbian 
forces had left Kosovo and NATO’s international forces were starting to establish 
themselves: a period of transition and chaos.2399 
In addition to crimes committed by KLA forces in the context of the Kosovo conflict, 
the Marty report found information related to suspected involvement of KLA leaders 
and international affiliates in the trafficking of organs through the Medicus Clinic in 
Pristina. The report stated that the “information appears to depict a broader, more 
complex organized criminal conspiracy to source human organs for illicit transplant, 
involving co-conspirators in at least three different foreign countries besides 
Kosovo, enduring over more than a decade.”2400 
The Marty report recommended: 
• that additional funds be allocated to EULEX for complex war crimes and 
organized crime investigations and prosecutions; 
• that EULEX dedicate special attention to the crimes of organ trafficking, 
corruption, and organized crime; and 
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• that Kosovo authorities break the “glass ceiling of accountability” and cooperate 
with investigations into allegation of crimes committed by KLA forces in 
northern Albania.2401
In response to the publication of the Council of Europe, the EU established, along 
with EULEX, a Special Investigative Task Force (SITF) in 2011 to investigate 
“possible abductions, detentions, mistreatment and killings … as well as any other 
crimes related to the allegations in the [EU] report.”2402 John Clint Williamson, 
lead prosecutor of the SITF, held meetings with judicial authorities as well as the 
diplomatic community in Pristina, Belgrade, and Tirana to discuss their cooperation 
with the investigation.2403 Kosovo’s President Atifete Jahjaga and other authorities in 
Kosovo pledged their full support for and cooperation with the investigation. Serbia’s 
then-President Tadic and Albania’s Prime Minister Berisha also committed to 
cooperate with the investigation. Moreover, in May 2012, the Albanian government 
passed a bill providing the task force access to Albanian territory for the purpose 
of investigating allegations of organ trafficking2404 as well as the authority to call 
witnesses and search premises through requests of mutual legal assistance.2405 
Under pressure from the EU, the United States, and the UN Security Council, the 
parliament of Kosovo agreed to the creation of a special mechanism.2406 On August 
3, 2015, the Kosovo Assembly adopted constitutional amendments and legislation 
allowing for the prosecution of crimes under domestic law by a mechanism placed 
outside Kosovo: the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s 
Office.2407 In September 2016, the mandate and staff of the SITF were transferred 
from the auspices of EULEX to the newly established Kosovo Specialist Chambers 
in The Hague. While the appointment of a registrar in April 2016 marked the 
commencement of the work, the court only became fully operational following 
the appointment of the specialist prosecutor on September 1, 2016, and the 
appointment of nineteen international judges in February 2017.2408 In July 2017, 
President Ekaterina Trendafilova announced that with the judges’ adoption of Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence for the Specialist Chambers, there “are no [longer any] 
legal impediments to receiving any filings or indictments.”2409
Legal Framework and Mandate 
The Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office were established 
to prosecute under Kosovo law any war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
other crimes committed between January 1, 1998, and December 31, 2000. The 
ANNEXES   569
Law on the Specialist Chambers and the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office dictates a 
specific material jurisdiction to the mechanism, in relation to allegations of grave 
trans-boundary and international crimes “which related to those reported in the 
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Report … and which have been the 
subject of criminal investigation by the [SITF].”2410 Beyond the prosecution of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, such as torture or inhuman treatment, hostage 
taking, murder, and enforced disappearances, investigations are likely to focus on 
transnational crimes, such as illegal organ transplantation and trafficking, which are 
defined under Kosovo law. The court’s territorial jurisdiction extends to both crimes 
committed and commenced within Kosovo, given that many of the crimes described 
in the Marty report are alleged to have taken place in northern Albania.2411 
The Specialist Chambers has jurisdiction over crimes under international and 
national law. The Constitution of Kosovo prescribes that customary international 
law has primacy over domestic law and certain international human rights treaties. 
Specialist Chamber judges may thus directly apply international law and apply 
jurisprudence from international criminal tribunals. However, Kosovo law will 
determine sentencing. Judges must take into account the prevailing punishment 
under Kosovo law at the time crimes were committed.2412
The Law on the Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office and the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, adopted by the judges in August 2017, constitute 
the mechanism’s governing legal framework. The Host State Agreement between
 the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Kosovo determines that the 
Host State shall only allow the temporary detention of suspects and witnesses, 
and that sentences of convicted persons shall not be served in the Netherlands.2413 
Therefore it can be expected that the KSC will enter into bilateral detention 
agreements with other states. 
The KSC is a court under national law that administers justice outside of Kosovo. 
The Specialist Chambers are attached to each level of the court system in Kosovo, 
including the Basic Court of Pristina, the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court, 
and the Constitutional Court, but operates completely independent of the courts 
of Kosovo and has primacy over all other courts.2414 In principle, the relation 
between the Specialist Chambers and national courts is nonexistent, except that 
the prosecutor may order the transfer of proceedings from any of the other courts 
in Kosovo.2415 In its composition, the Specialist Chambers is a new species among 
existing hybrid tribunals. It is the first among internationalized courts that does 
not employ staff from the region2416 since, according to a Kosovo law (ratifying an 
exchange of letters between the president of Kosovo and the EU high representative 
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for foreign affairs and security policy), the chambers must only be staffed with and 
operated by international staff and judges.2417 Scholars have questioned whether 
the mechanism should be considered an international court or internationalized 
(domestic) court. While its structure and personnel are international, legally it is a 
domestic mechanism because it is a court based on Kosovo law.2418 
Location 
The Specialist Chambers are an integral part of the Kosovar judicial system and have 
a seat in both Kosovo and The Hague, the Netherlands. The Host State Agreement 
between the Netherlands and the Republic of Kosovo on the Relocated Specialist 
Judicial Institution (the name that is used to refer to both the Specialist Chambers 
and the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office in the Host State Agreement) determines that 
the court will be hosted for the duration of its work. When necessary, and when it is 
in the interest of the mechanism’s administration or in the interests of justice, the 
Specialist Chambers may reside elsewhere.2419 
From the start of the discussions on the creation of the Specialist Chambers, it 
was evident that the mechanism needed to be located outside of Kosovo to secure 
independence and security of trials. Since the end of the war, the ICTY, the United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and EULEX courts 
have attempted to investigate KLA crimes, but all had limited success.2420 This has 
everything to do with the challenging climate for investigations in Kosovo. The 
ICTY had do drop almost all but one of its cases against KLA commanders because 
of lack of evidence.2421 Several cases showed signs of systematic and widespread 
witness interference and intimidation. In the Haradinaj et al. case, for example, it 
was reported that nine potential witnesses were killed while investigations were 
ongoing.2422 A second reason why it was decided to prosecute crimes within The 
Hague was the favorable climate for former KLA commanders, who continue to be 
regarded as heroic liberation fighters by many Kosovar Albanians. Popular support 
for KLA leaders was evident at the large-scale protests in Pristina in January 2017 to 
demand the release of former Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj who was detained 
in France based on a Serbian arrest warrant.2423 The first SITF report of July 2014 
concluded that conditions for conducting an investigation remained “extremely 
challenging,” among others because of a climate of intimidation that undermines 
the investigation of KLA crimes. Therefore, the EU, Kosovar, and Dutch authorities 
agreed that the protection of victims and witnesses could be better ensured by 
seating the mechanism in The Hague.2424 
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At the time the mechanism began operations at the end of 2016, the court’s building 
was still under construction. According to the municipality of The Hague, the 
premises will be finalized in April 2018.
Structure and Composition
The Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office (at times 
referred to as the Kosovo Relocated Specialist Judicial Institution or the Kosovo 
Specialist Court) consist of the Specialist Chambers proper (made up of four 
chambers and the Registry, which houses among other units, the Defense Office, 
Victims’ Participation Office, Witness Protection and Support Office, Detention 
Management Office, and Ombudsperson’s Office) and the Specialist Prosecutor’s 
Office as a distinct entity.2425 While legally part of the judicial system of Kosovo, 
the Hague-based court is a temporary construct for the period of investigations of 
crimes under the Law on Specialist Chambers. 
 
Chambers 
The Specialist Chambers is made up of a Trial Chamber, Appeals Chamber, 
Supreme Court Chamber, and a Constitutional Court Chamber, each composed of 
three judges. A single judge performs the functions of a pretrial chamber.2426  
The head of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy Mission in Kosovo  
(the head of EULEX) appoints judges to a roster of independent international 
judges upon the recommendation of an independent selection panel composed of 
at least two international judges.2427 The same process is used to select the Specialist 
Chambers’ president and vice president from among the judges. 
The president is the only judge who serves the court on a full-time basis.2428  
The judges on the roster will only be present at The Hague when the work so 
requires and as required by the president. Judicial functions may be exercised 
remotely, in part to contain costs.2429 
The head of EULEX appointed the KSC’s first president, Ekaterina Trendafilova  
(a former judge at the International Criminal Court), on December 14, 2016,2430 and 
then appointed a roster of 19 international judges originating from Europe and the 
United States of America on February 17, 2017.2431 According to Articles 25 and 33 on 
the Law on the Specialist Chambers, the president will assign judges to the various 
chambers, or panels, only once the special prosecutor files an indictment in the 
Specialist Chambers or upon other required judicial activity.2432 
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Office of the Prosecutor 
The specialist prosecutor has the authority to investigate and prosecute persons who 
have committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the Specialist Chambers. Unlike 
in many international or internationalized hybrid tribunals, but similar to domestic 
institutions, the prosecutor’s office acts independently of the other entities within 
the Specialist Chambers, as well as from other prosecution authorities in Kosovo.2433 
To ensure continuity of the work of the EU’s SITF, the last SITF prosecutor, David 
Schwendiman, was appointed as the first specialist prosecutor in September 2016.2434 
The head of EULEX appoints the prosecutor for a four-year term, and the prosecutor 
may be subject to reappointment.2435 The chief prosecutor is supported in his work by 
other prosecutors and can make use of the Kosovo police forces and other domestic 
law enforcement authorities, to the same extent as Kosovar prosecutors.2436 
Since the Specialist Chambers are part of the domestic system of courts in Kosovo, 
there is no bar to the prosecutor investigating crimes within the territory of 
Kosovo.2437 The status of the Office of the Specialist Prosecutor within Kosovo’s 
formal justice system may enhance cooperation between Pristina and The Hague.
Registry
The Registry is responsible for the administration and servicing of the Specialist 
Chambers and the registrar is responsible for the budget of both the Specialist 
Chambers and the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office. The head of EULEX appoints the 
registrar for a four-year term. Beyond the Victims’ Participation Office, Defense 
Office, Witness Protection and Support Office, and Detention Management Office, 
the Registry houses the Ombudsperson’s Office. The creation of the function of 
an ombudsman mirrors domestic Kosovo institutions and is another feature that 
distinguishes the Specialist Chambers from international tribunals. The Office of 
the Ombudsperson will act as an independent oversight mechanism which will 
“monitor, defend and protect the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in 
Chapter II of the Constitution of persons interacting with the Specialist Chambers 
and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office.” The ombudsperson can receive and investigate 
complaints, but “shall not intervene in cases or other legal proceedings before the 
Specialist Chambers, except in instances of unreasonable delays.”2438 The Registry, 
like the Office of the Prosecutor, can avail itself of domestic authorities such as the 
Kosovo police, and has the same authority as the Kosovo police under Kosovo law.2439 
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Witness Protection and Support Office 
The Law on the Specialist Chambers and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
set out a comprehensive system of witness protection in the Kosovo Specialist 
Chambers. The Witness Protection and Support Office (WPSO) is “responsible 
for protecting witnesses, victims participating in the proceedings and, where 
appropriate, others at risk on account of testimony given by witnesses.” It is the role 
of the WPSO to set out adequate protection measures for victims and witnesses, 
and to provide administrative, logistical, as well as psychological assistance to those 
participating in proceedings. Victims will participate in proceedings as a group 
and may be represented by a victims’ counsel who is appointed by the Registry.2440 
Victims may be awarded individual or collective reparations through an order 
against a convicted person, either by a Kosovo (civil) court or by a KSC panel.2441 
Outreach
The Registry is responsible for communications from the Specialist Chambers to 
the general public.2442 Early in its existence, the court recognized the importance of 
explaining its mandate and responsibilities, because of the difficult political climate 
in which it operates. The president, prosecutor, and registrar have regularly engaged 
with the media and civil society, encouraged visits to the court, and held press 
conferences to inform the public about important developments. Officials visited 
Pristina and Belgrade in its first year in a bid to foster cooperation with the court. 
Once proceedings begin, hearings will be live-streamed in English, Albanian, and 
Serbian, which will allow people in the region to follow the proceedings closely.2443 
Prosecutions 
As of late 2017, the prosecutor had not issued any indictments. The mechanism’s 
mandate makes explicit reference to alleged crimes included in the 2011 Council 
of Europe report. In July 2014, then-Chief Prosecutor of the SITF Clint Williamson 
stated that three years of investigations throughout Europe had led to compelling 
evidence of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by top KLA leaders. 
He stated that KLA officials “bear responsibility for a campaign of persecution 
that was directed against ethnic Serbs, Roma and other minority populations of 
Kosovo,” citing evidence of crimes including unlawful killings, abductions, enforced 
disappearances, illegal detention, sexual violence, and inhumane treatment.2444  
The Specialist Prosecutor’s investigations might concern high-level government 
officials and politicians. The Marty report made specific mention of former Drenica 
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group member Hashim Thaçi, who currently serves as the president of Kosovo.2445 
Those under previous ICTY indictment in the Haradinaj et al. case, including current 
Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj, could also be suspects. 
Legacy 
As of late 2017, the KSC was just getting underway, and it was too early to assess 
its legacy. The mechanism could provide a new opportunity for the people of 
Kosovo to deal with a violent past and to take a much-needed step in addressing a 
persistent culture of impunity.2446 If it provides accountability for KLA-perpetrated 
grave crimes, KSC proceedings could provide a sense of justice to the victims and 
contribute to a more complete understanding of crimes perpetrated during the 
Kosovo war. However, if the KSC is unable to overcome the challenges faced by 
previous mechanisms (including the ICTY) when investigating and prosecuting 
suspected KLA perpetrators, it could underscore impunity and have negative effects 
on the “stable” peace and progress that Kosovo has made since its declaration of 
independence in 2008.2447 
Financing 
The Specialist Chambers are financed by a grant to the KSC registrar through the 
budget of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union. 
The European Commission first approved the budget for the mechanism at US$29.1 
million in 2016 and allocated US$41.3 million to the mechanism for the period from 
June 15, 2017, to June 14, 2018.2448 Beyond EU support, the mechanism has received 
financial contributions from third parties, including Canada, Norway, Switzerland, 
Turkey, and the United States of America.2449 
Oversight and Accountability 
The EULEX in Kosovo, under the EU CFSP, is responsible for the appointment of the 
Kosovo Specialist Chambers president, judges, prosecutor, and registrar. The EU, the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the UN, who have 
been involved in building the rule of law in Kosovo since the end of the war, will play 
an important role in monitoring the proceedings of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers. 
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Within the Registry of the Specialist Chambers, an Ombudsperson’s Office has been 
created to “defend and protect the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in 
Chapter II of the [Kosovo] Constitution of persons interacting with the Specialist 
Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office in accordance with the Law and the 
Rules.” The ombudsperson may investigate complaints of misconduct by either the 
chambers or Specialist Prosecutor’s Office.2450 
For years, national and international NGOs have played an important role in the 
collection of evidence and pushing for accountability of crimes committed during 
the Kosovo war. Such organizations such as the Humanitarian Law Center—Kosovo, 
Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and other civil society groups may 
continue to provide informal oversight by monitoring and reporting on the Specialist 
Chambers’ proceedings. 
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SERBIA
Conflict Background and Political Context
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), and later the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (FRY) consisting of the remaining republics of Serbia and Montenegro, 
spent the majority of the 1990s embroiled in wars in Croatia, Bosnia, and its then 
province of Kosovo. 
For an overview of the dissolution of the SFRY and resulting conflicts, see the profile 
mechanism for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 
For greater detail on the conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, see the separate 
mechanism profiles for each. 
Following the wars, Serbia continued to be politically tense. In the postwar years 
the country weathered the dissolution of the rump Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
when Montenegro ended its union with Serbia in 2006; in 2008, the province of 
Kosovo declared independence. While a majority of the world’s countries recognizes 
Kosovo as an independent state, Serbia does not, and it maintains strong influence 
in majority Serb enclaves within Kosovo.2451 Serbia has also endured changes in 
political leadership, assassinations, and territorial disputes. Ethnic nationalists 
have remained powerful, including within security institutions. Nationalists have 
encouraged obstruction of the ICTY and continued to question the sovereign 
integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.2452 
Nevertheless, international pressure, has compelled the Serbian government to take 
actions at odds with often-prevailing nationalist sentiment. After years of resisting 
cooperation with the ICTY, Serbia arrested and handed over former President 
Slobodan Milošević to the court under threat of a U.S. aid suspension in 2001. In 
2003, Serbia became a potential candidate for European Union membership,2453 
and in the face of Dutch and Belgian insistence on conditionality attached to 
advancement through the stages of EU accession, Belgrade ultimately made a 
grudging series of arrests and transfers to the ICTY. These included the most 
prominent remaining fugitives: former Bosnian Serb political leader Radovan 
Karadžić in 2008 and, finally in 2011, his erstwhile military general Ratko Mladić.2454 
Additionally, Serbia has agreed to take steps to improve its relationship with Kosovo. 
To that end, the Brussels Agreement was signed in 2013, normalizing relations 
between Serbia and Kosovo. Serbia was granted official EU candidate status in 2012.2455
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Existing Justice-Sector Capacity
While the ICTY was formed to prosecute suspected war criminals, it was never 
intended to be the only method of prosecuting international crimes committed in 
the former Yugoslavia. All countries involved were expected to deal with lower-
profile war crimes domestically. Nominally, Serbia conducted war crimes cases 
through its criminal court system.2456 From 1995 to 2003—a period when Serbia was 
ruled by the nationalists Milošević and then Vojislav Koštunica—Serbia remained 
especially reluctant to prosecute individuals domestically. Despite the Serbian 
Ministry of the Interior collecting records of several hundred criminal acts, few 
investigations were opened and a mere seven cases made it to trial.2457 Prosecutors 
were far from impartial, primarily investigating crimes attributed to Kosovo 
Liberation Army soldiers. In several instances, Serbian police were investigated for 
war crimes, but these investigations were only instigated when there was publicity 
surrounding the cases.2458
In January 2012, a new criminal procedure code also went into effect that has 
significantly changed the Serbian judicial system, transforming it from an inquisitorial 
system into a more adversarial system. All preliminary proceedings and investigations 
are now the responsibility of the prosecution.2459 Investigative judges have been 
reassigned to play a passive role at preliminary proceedings.2460 Courts are no 
longer required to establish the “material proof ”; they will only examine evidence 
presented to them in motions from the parties. The new criminal procedure code 
has also introduced cross-examination.2461 Both parties are still given an equal 
opportunity to present their side of the case.2462 Ultimately, these procedural changes 
are designed to encourage prosecutors to prepare cases more thoroughly. 
Existing Civil Society Capacity
While some human rights organizations operated in Serbia in the 1990s and early 
2000s, they faced an unsupportive government and “violent intimidation” from 
nationalist organizations.2463 An additional barrier to civil society engagement around 
post-conflict accountability was public sentiment, encouraged by Milošević, that Serbs 
had been the most victimized ethnic group in the armed conflicts.2464 This resulted 
in widespread popular rejection of war crimes trials.2465 Nevertheless, there are a 
small number of NGOs operating in Serbia that have played an important role in 
supporting and monitoring both the ICTY’s work as well as domestic trials in Serbia. 
Chief among these are the Humanitarian Law Center, the Helsinki Committee for 
Human Rights in Serbia, the Youth Initiative for Human Rights, and Women in 
578   OPTIONS FOR JUSTICE
Black. These organizations have challenged dominant nationalist narratives through 
activities including advocacy, documentation of crimes, and victim representation.
Creation
In July 2003, the Serbian National Assembly passed the Law on Organization and 
Competence of State Bodies in the Proceedings against War Crimes Perpetrators. 
This law established the Special War Crimes Chamber (WCC) within the District 
Court of Belgrade and also created the Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor 
(OWCP), which would devote itself solely to investigating and prosecuting those 
suspected of war crimes.2466 In 2009, the WCC was renamed the Department of War 
Crimes (WCD), within the Higher Court of Belgrade. 
The 2003 law also created several auxiliary departments in order to help carry out the 
work of the OWCP and WCC/WCD: a War Crimes Investigation Service, a Special 
Detention Unit, and a Witness Protection Unit.2467 Additionally, the law established 
several procedural innovations, including the ability for witnesses to testify via video 
and mandatory audio recording and written transcripts of all trials.2468 
The impetus for the WCC/WCD’s creation appears to have largely been driven by 
ICTY prosecution of Serbs, which helped push Serbia to create a domestic method 
for trying war crimes. Furthermore, as transfer of war crimes cases to domestic 
courts became part of the ICTY’s completion strategy, this provided a useful 
framework in which Serbia could show that it was capable of handling war crimes 
prosecutions locally.2469 Outside parties, including the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), also helped Serbia establish this new system. 
The OSCE played an instrumental role in drafting the legislation and developing 
the court;2470 the ICTY helped train WCC judges and prosecutors;2471 and the United 
States helped finance training for court staff and also funded the construction of 
WCC/WCD courtrooms.2472 The first trial held in the WCC began in March 2004.2473
Legal Framework and Mandate
The WCC/WCD’s jurisdiction formally encompasses crimes against humanity and 
violations of international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia since 1991. The court applies Serbian law and hears cases referred 
to it by the Serbian Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor.
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In 2005, parliament amended the Law on Organization and Competence of 
Government Authorities in War Crimes Proceedings (Law on War Crimes 
Proceedings) to reflect changes to the WCC’s jurisdiction per the revised Serbian 
Criminal Code, which came into force on January 1, 2006.2474 The amended Criminal 
Code gave the WCC jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes.2475 Rather than use the revised code, however, the OWCP has continued 
prosecutions under the 1976 SFRY Basic Criminal Code, because that was the code 
in force when the crimes were committed.2476 Human rights organizations have 
criticized this interpretation of the legality principle. In practice, it means that, 
unlike in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo, Serbia’s war crimes prosecutor has never 
brought charges of crimes against humanity.
The legislation that created the WCC and the OWCP also laid out guidelines to 
regulate the transfer of cases from the ICTY to the WCC/WCD. Once transferred 
to Serbia, the case is heard under domestic law but can continue to be prosecuted 
based upon the facts that were the foundation of the ICTY indictment.2477  
Additionally, the OWCP may prosecute using evidence that was collected by the 
ICTY.2478 Finally, representatives of the ICTY have the right to attend any stage of 
the proceedings or request information about the developments of the case.2479
The authorities of the WCC in the District Court of Belgrade and Supreme Court 
of Serbia were transferred to the Department for War Crimes of the Higher Court 
and Department for War Crimes of the Court of Appeal in Belgrade after the 
implementation of judicial reforms in 2009.2480 
In February 2016, the Serbian Parliament adopted a long-awaited National Strategy 
for the Prosecution of War Crimes in Serbia (National War Crimes Strategy)2481 
with the aim “to significantly improve the efficiency of the investigation and 
prosecution of war crimes in the Republic of Serbia.”2482 The strategy sets out that 
this can be achieved by prosecution of higher-level perpetrators, increased regional 
cooperation, harmonization of jurisprudence, and an improved mechanism for 
victims and witness protection.2483 
Location 
The WCD is located in the Serbian capital of Belgrade. Although the WCC was a 
department of the Belgrade District Court, trials were not held at ordinary district 
courthouses but at a specialized courthouse, later also used by the WCD.2484 In 
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addition to housing the WCD, the Special Court building houses the Office of 
the War Crime Prosecutor, the Chamber for Organized Crime, and the Special 
Prosecutor for Organized Crime.2485 In 2006, the Victim and Witness Support Unit 
was given an office in the courthouse to accommodate victims and witnesses before 
and after they are called to testify.2486 While the WCD’s location in Belgrade has 
helped the court become accessible to the local population, it has also had the effect 
of alienating non-Serb victims and witnesses. The WCD has sought to mitigate this 
by offering the option of off-site interviews with Serbian prosecutors, coordinated 
through the Prosecuting Office of the witnesses’ home country.2487 On several 
occasions, the WCD has also permitted live video testimony during trials, though 
most of the witnesses are expected to testify at the courthouse.2488 
Structure and Composition
The WCC was not established as a free-standing court, but rather it was built into 
the court system of Serbia as one of a dozen departments within the Belgrade 
District Court (later the Higher Court of Belgrade).2489 Despite being at the same 
level as other District Courts, the WCC/WCD has several unique features, discussed 
below. The WCD includes the War Crimes Panels, an outreach department, and 
the Witness Assistance and Support Unit.2490 Two additional organs complete the 
Serbian domestic response to judicial accountability for war crimes: the Witness 
Protection Unit and the War Crimes Investigation Unit, both of which fall under the 
authority of the Ministry of the Interior.2491 
Chambers
The Department of War Crimes of the Higher Court of Belgrade (WCD, formerly in 
the Belgrade District Court) has six judges, who hear war crimes cases in two Trial 
Chambers of three judges each.2492 In addition to these six judges, there is one judge 
for preliminary proceedings. Until the criminal procedure code was revised in 2012, 
these judges served as investigative judges. As investigative judges, they played 
an active role in gathering evidence and determining whether the case should be 
brought to trial.2493 With the changes to the criminal procedure code, they now fill a 
monitoring role at the preparatory hearing.2494 These hearings help establish which 
facts are not in dispute and do not need to be brought into evidence; also, the judges 
make determinations on detention time or bail amounts, and order searches and 
exhumations. The Higher Court president chooses WCD judges from among the 
bench of judges within the Higher Court.2495
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WCD judges generally do not have experience in the field of international criminal 
and humanitarian law, and neither are they accustomed to using foreign literature 
and jurisprudence, largely because they do not have knowledge of English.2496 
Throughout the years, judges have received training from the ICTY, OSCE, and local 
NGOs on substantive international criminal law and practical skills, and groups of 
WCD judges have visited the chambers of the ICTY in person.2497 Since the end of 
a long-term OSCE project on strengthening the capacities of judicial institution in 
Serbia in 2011, no consequent training of the judiciary has taken place, and there has 
been significant turnover.2498
The Department of War Crimes of the Court of Appeals in Belgrade (formerly the 
Supreme Court of Serbia) is the appellate body responsible for war crimes prosecutions. 
The WCD within the Court of Appeal consists of a single Trial Chamber with five 
judges, which are assisted by six judicial assistants.2499 According to a 2015 report 
of the Humanitarian Law Center: “The work of the Higher Court Department 
and the Appeals Court Department may generally be considered appropriate, 
professional and successful. However, certain aspects of these departments are 
subject to criticism. These include mild penal policies, particularly with regard to the 
implementation of the mitigating circumstances, a number of politically motivated 
judgments and a complete absence of the public relations program.”2500 
Prosecutions
The OWCP includes the war crimes prosecutor, deputy prosecutors, a secretary, 
and other supporting staff members. The number of deputy prosecutors has 
changed over time, ranging from five in 2003 to nine in 2013.2501 It initially had a 
designated spokesperson, but in recent years, that has no longer been the case, and 
a deputy prosecutor takes up this role.2502 It has the same rights and responsibilities 
as other public prosecutor’s offices in Serbia; thus, all Serbian laws governing 
public prosecution apply to the office.2503 The prosecutor is elected by the National 
Assembly and is responsible for appointing the deputies, who are subsequently 
approved by the republic public prosecutor. Both the prosecutor and deputies are 
appointed for a four-year term, with the possibility of reappointment.2504 After the 
mandate of chief prosecutor Vladimir Vukčević expired on December 31, 2015, the 
position of war crimes prosecutor was left vacant for a year and a half.2505 
Like the WCD judges, prosecutors generally do not have experience in international 
criminal law, but the majority of the office’s associates and investigators are former 
ICTY employees and thus bring professional capacity to the institution. According to 
international observers, the OWCP has increased its professional capacity as a result 
of participation in trainings from the OSCE and other organizations.2506 
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The OWCP maintains a substantial backlog of uninvestigated cases from the 1990s 
onward.2507 Due to resource constraints, it currently relies heavily on authorities in 
Croatia as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina to make evidence available to it before 
the decision to initiate an investigation is made.2508 There are regional agreements 
for cooperation in criminal matters among Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro, 
and bilateral agreements among the prosecutors of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia.2509 
There are also memoranda of understanding that allow evidence to be shared 
between prosecutor’s offices in Serbia and Croatia, and Serbia and Bosnia under 
certain circumstances.2510 The OSCE has also collaborated with the prosecutor’s 
offices in Croatia and Bosnia to conduct joint investigations.2511
Despite these advancements, the OWCP has been criticized for its reluctance to 
take on command responsibility cases, as well as other cases involving high-ranking 
officials. The Humanitarian Law Center, a leading human rights organization 
in Serbia, contends that the OWCP has attempted “to conceal evidence of the 
involvement in war crimes of the institutions of the Republic of Serbia and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and of the individuals who hold important positions 
in these institutions.”2512 The relationship between the OWCP and UNMIK/
EULEX in Kosovo has also been difficult. As Serbia considers Kosovo to be part 
of its territory, this led to disputes with UNMIK and the European Union over 
jurisdiction, and it is challenging for the two justice systems to develop cooperation 
agreements.2513 The OWCP and UNMIK/EULEX have, however, worked together on 
several occasions.2514 
War Crimes Investigative Service 
The legislation that created the WCC also established the War Crimes Investigation 
Service (WCIS), a predecessor of a war crimes unit that was created in 2001 in 
response to the discovery of mass graves of Kosovo Albanians in Serbia.2515 A branch 
of the Ministry of Interior, the WCIS is a specialized office of the Serbian police 
that is responsible for investigating war crimes, searching for missing persons, 
and cooperating with the ICTY.2516 In 2015, the WCIS had 49 employees, including 
16 investigators, 10 analysts, and nine officers in charge of international legal 
assistance requests from the ICTY and countries in the region.2517 
From the beginning, the WCIS has failed to initiate investigations into war crimes 
and is only reacting to investigation requests from the OWCP. The OWCP has 
complained of a general lack of commitment of the WCIS to investigate crimes, and 
therefore it has lobbied to have the WCIS removed from the Interior Ministry Police 
and placed under its command to improve cooperation between the departments.2518 
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Many police officers consider a position on the WCIS to be undesirable because 
it is dangerous and could be perceived to be unpatriotic.2519 Serbian police forces 
have been widely implicated in the perpetration of grave crimes.2520 Despite these 
challenges, the WCIS has played a critical role in locating missing persons and 
arresting suspects in several WCD cases.2521
Outreach
The OWCP initially had an outreach department established in 2003, consisting 
of one spokesperson and an OSCE-funded public information coordinator.2522 The 
department’s main goal was to help sensitize Serbian journalists to war crimes 
issues and inform them that non-Serbs were being prosecuted for their crimes.2523 
Some of these efforts were successful, while others faltered. The WCC attempted to 
hold biweekly press briefings in late 2004 and early 2005, but stopped these events 
because of poor attendance.2524 Media reporting on WCD trials generally remains 
minimal. A December 2006 OSCE public interest survey indicated that 72 percent of 
respondents believed that domestic coverage of the WCC was inadequate.2525 Since 
financial assistance by the OSCE Mission in Serbia declined after 2011, the WCD 
stopped doing outreach altogether, and the Belgrade Higher Court merely issued 
press releases to announce judgments in cases.2526 
Victim and Witness Support Unit
The Law on Organization and Competence of Government Authorities in War 
Crimes briefly touched upon witness protection and support: the legislation called 
for a “Special Department” that would be responsible for “tasks relating to witness 
and victim protection.” However, it was not until 2006 that the WCC president 
established a Victim and Witness Support Unit (VWSU). The unit is small, with 
only three staff members since 2010, and is housed in an office in the WCC/WCD 
building.2527 The main tasks of the VWSU are to interact with witnesses, make 
arrangements for travel and accommodations, and offer explanations about trial 
procedures.2528 Another task of the VWSU is to provide psychological support. 
The staff members were trained by OSCE and have attended victim support 
conferences organized by the ICTY in The Hague.2529 The unit also works closely 
with the Humanitarian Law Center, which provides representation for witnesses. 
The VWSU had no state-provided budget and was reliant on modest donor funds.2530 
In the past, the United States provided the unit with US$17,000 to cover travel 
and accommodation for witnesses.2531 More recently, funds for witness travel and 
accommodation have come out of the presiding judge’s budget.2532
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While the legal framework for witness protection is in line with international 
standards, the witness protection program has had problems in implementation.2533 
These relate to the security of witnesses, as well as VWSU and court staff being 
unprepared and not properly trained to deal with vulnerable witnesses.2534 The 
Humanitarian Law Center also notes an absence of a psychological support system 
for victims, with this task being outsourced to external agencies or specialized 
NGOs. Witnesses coming from Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo are expected to request 
support in their own countries.2535 
Witness Protection Unit
The WPU was established in 2006 and is part of the Ministry of the Interior. The 
Law on the Program to Protect Parties in Criminal Proceedings establishes that 
the WPU’s mission is to provide the “economic, psychological, social, and legal 
assistance” necessary to protect the life and property of witnesses.2536 Under 
Article 106 of the Criminal Procedural Code, special protective measures apply 
if the prosecutor determines that the “life, health or freedom of the witness or a 
person close to him is threatened to such an extent that it justifies restricting the 
right to defense.”2537 Identity protection measures include: denying any questions 
that might reveal the individual’s identity, using a pseudonym, altering or erasing 
identifying data from the record, conducting examinations from a separate room 
using distortion of the witness’s voice, and conducting examinations using a device 
that alters sound and image.2538 The Law on Organization and Competence of 
Government Authorities in War Crimes adds additional protections for witnesses 
and victims who testify in the WCD, including allowing victims or witnesses to 
testify via videoconference link.2539 Additionally, the court may choose to protect 
personal information of a witness, should there be a compelling reason to do so.2540 
However, the WPU has suffered from underfunding.2541 Although the unit was once 
seen as a successful model of witness protection for the region, its main shortcoming 
is a lack of vetting for new staff, or accountability mechanisms for misconduct.2542 
It has faced allegations of unprofessionalism and incompetence, including 
intimidation and witness harassment.2543 This has been an issue particularly when 
the witness is a current or former police officer, seen as an “insider” witness. There 
have also been reports that certain officers employed by the WPU have themselves 
committed war crimes.2544
Criminal Defense Support
While defendants have the option of hiring a private defense attorney, those who 
are indigent can request appointment of counsel through the District Court in 
ANNEXES   585
Belgrade.2545 The District Court is responsible for paying the defense counsel, who 
is typically a contracted private attorney.2546 Defense attorneys receive the same 
wages for their work at the WCD as they would receive in the normal District Court, 
but this fee is approximately half of what a privately hired defense attorney would 
receive for the same work.2547 Low levels of compensation have the potential to 
affect the quality of the defense, including discouraging defense attorneys from 
conducting their own investigations. Furthermore, there is no structure in place to 
ensure that lawyers wishing to represent war crimes defendants have knowledge of 
international criminal law or human rights law, or are provided with training in these 
and other relevant areas.2548
Prosecutions
By November 2017, after almost fifteen years in operation, the WCC/WCD had 
adjudicated 66 cases, resulting in the conviction of 83 individuals, the acquittal of  
49 suspects, and the suspension of eight cases involving 13 others.2549 A further  
13 cases involving 43 accused were at the trial stage and six cases remained before 
the Appellate Court.2550 According to the OWCP, investigative proceedings were 
underway for 14 cases.2551 The number of annual indictments peaked in 2010 (with 
nine) and has steadily declined.2552 To date, most prosecutions have been against 
low-ranking military officers or police from the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for war crimes against the  
civilian population that were committed in Kosovo, Croatia, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.2553 Several additional prosecutions have been brought against Kosovo 
Albanians. The ICTY transferred one case to the WCC: that of Vladimir Kovačević, 
a former officer of the Yugoslav People’s Army.2554 The overall sentiment among 
victims, lawyers, and human rights organizations is that the number of cases 
adjudicated has been too low.2555 
Legacy
The WCD and the OWCP continue to operate in a hostile political context, and 
their legacy in terms of public knowledge and acceptance in Serbia remains as yet 
uncertain. Nevertheless, in terms of knowledge transfer and capacity building, 
the court has had a positive impact: Serbian judges and staff have all reported that 
their knowledge of international criminal law and international humanitarian law 
has improved as a result of the chamber’s creation. Judges also reported that their 
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engagements with ICTY and other judicial counterparts played an important role 
in the learning process.2556 In terms of the country’s legal framework, the WCC also 
partially led to the 2005 revision of the domestic criminal code, which codified 
international crimes.2557 Whereas the previous version of the code listed only two 
violations of international humanitarian law, the new code has sixteen articles 
covering such crimes as genocide and destroying cultural heritage. Other revisions 
to the criminal procedure code in 2006 also included the addition of witness 
protection provisions modeled after procedures of the ICTY.2558 Notably, these 
provisions apply not just to war crimes cases but also those of organized crime. 
Financing
The Serbian government is responsible for funding the OWCP and the WCC; 
however, early on, these departments received significant financial support from 
outside entities.2559 The most significant donors have been the embassies of the 
United States, the Netherlands, and Norway, as well as the OSCE.2560 This outside 
financial assistance has dwindled over the years, and the OWCP has struggled to 
meet its costs. From the time of the change of the criminal procedure code that 
put the OWCP in charge of grave crimes cases until at least 2016, there had been 
no increase in the OWCP budget. In the past, the office has been forced to rely on 
assistance from the United States and the OSCE to pay for international investigative 
trips.2561 The OWCP has also struggled because it cannot afford to hire legal support 
staff that could enable them to conduct broad investigations.2562 Neither do they have 
the “continuity and sustainability of the budget” to afford training of staff.2563 As 
discussed above, the VWSU has also faced serious financial struggles. 
Oversight and Accountability
The president of the Belgrade Higher Court assigns WCD judges from the 
preexisting judges of that court.2564 Judges currently sitting on other Serbian courts 
may also be seconded to serve a term on the War Crimes Panel.2565 This framework 
has raised questions about the WCD’s independence, particularly as Freedom 
House’s 2014 report on Serbia described the country’s judiciary as “inefficient and 
vulnerable to political interference.”2566
 
WCD judges serve a six-year term that is meant to allow the judges to develop 
expertise and commitment to international criminal justice. 2567 However, in 2014 
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an experienced WCD judge was removed by the president of the Higher Court 
after only four years appointment, without explanation.2568 WCD judges are paid a 
salary that is twice that of the District Court judges and benefit from an accelerated 
pension scheme, where 12 months of work for the WCD is equivalent to 16 months 
of regular employment.2569 
The OSCE Mission to Serbia monitors war crimes trials held in Serbia and has noted 
that the WCD has, on occasion, yielded to political pressure, for instance, pursuing 
cases involving Serbian victims even in the absence of solid evidence.2570 The OSCE 
and the prosecutor’s office communicate regularly in order to ensure that OSCE 
is able to carry out its responsibilities. Other NGOs, both local and international, 
monitor the trials of the WCC, preparing and disseminating reports that analyze 
their observations.2571 The ICTY has also sent representatives to observe the WCD.2572
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ANNEX 5: MECHANISMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
IRAQ: IRAQ HIGH TRIBUNAL
Conflict Background and Political Context
Iraq emerged from the Ottoman Empire with a British-installed monarchy that in 
1921 secured minority Sunni Arab rule in a country with a Shia majority, a large 
Sunni Kurdish minority, and a multitude of smaller ethnic, religious, and linguistic 
minorities.2573 A military coup in 1958 ultimately resulted in rule by the Pan-Arabist 
Ba’ath Party in 1968. The powerful vice president of the new government, Saddam 
Hussein, became president in 1979. Hussein tolerated no dissent in an increasingly 
totalitarian state and further narrowed control of the regime to trusted family and 
friends from his home village of Tikrit. 
Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, resulting in a disastrous war of attrition that only ended 
eight years later, after the United States threw its support to Hussein and Iran 
assented to a ceasefire agreement.2574 Hussein had used chemical weapons against 
Iranian forces, and in the “Anfal Campaign” of 1988, he had turned them against the 
restive Kurdish population of northern Iraq. The genocidal campaign resulted in the 
deaths of an estimated 50,000–100,000 Kurds.2575 
Despite the Anfal Campaign and continued severe repression of the majority Shia 
population and minority groups, Saddam Hussein maintained Western support 
until Iraqi forces invaded and annexed Kuwait in August 1990. The United Nations 
Security Council passed a series of resolutions demanding Iraq’s withdrawal from 
Kuwait, and the United States formed a large international coalition to evict Iraqi 
forces.2576 By the end of February 1991, the coalition had driven Iraqi forces out of 
Kuwait, but the First Gulf War left Hussein in power.
Hussein retaliated with brutality against southern Shias who had risen up against 
him—partly in response to U.S. instigation—during the First Gulf War. Kurds were 
partially protected from the regime’s reprisals through the imposition of a no-fly 
zone in the north. Western states ensured that sanctions against Iraq remained in 
place throughout the 1990s, punctuated by periodic U.S.-led military strikes against 
Iraqi forces meant to enforce Iraqi cooperation with UN weapons inspectors.2577
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Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the U.S. 
and U.K. governments began to make claims of Iraqi involvement in the attacks. The 
two governments manipulated intelligence information to support this false claim, 
as well as false claims that Saddam Hussein maintained significant stockpiles of 
chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.2578
In March 2003, the United States and United Kingdom led an invasion of Iraq 
without explicit prior authorization from the UN Security Council. The Second Gulf 
War had declared their aims to “disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to 
end Saddam Hussein’s support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people.”2579 Many 
international law experts viewed the invasion as illegal.2580 
Baghdad fell in April 2003, and a U.S.-dominated provisional administration took 
formal control of the country. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), led by a 
U.S. ambassador, struggled to administrate a country it was ill equipped to govern.2581 
The CPA and the CPA-appointed Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) launched a 
disastrous “de-Ba’athification” process that fed a growing Sunni Arab insurgency.2582 
Sectarian violence mounted. In 2004, emerging evidence that U.S. forces tortured, 
sexually abused, and committed other grave violations against Iraqi prisoners held 
in the Abu Ghraib prison outside Baghdad further undermined the legitimacy of the 
U.S. presence.2583 In this context, the Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT), created by the CPA 
and IGC in December 2003, faced immense questions of legitimacy from the start.
Existing Justice-Sector Capacity
Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s legal framework was inadequate and outdated, 
lacking in transparency and accountability provisions as well as human rights. 
The judiciary lacked independence,2584 although the Hussein regime often relied 
on parallel court structures—including the Revolutionary Court, the Ministry of 
Interior Court, and military courts—to target its opponents rather than the ordinary 
courts falling under the Ministry of Justice.2585 Hussein manipulated and corrupted 
the judicial system to serve political goals and marginalized key legal actors such 
as prosecutors and public defenders. Many vulnerable groups lacked access to 
justice.2586 The use of confessions obtained through torture further compromised 
the system.2587 Due to the large number of parallel courts, Iraq had relatively few 
jurists within the normal justice system. While many judges and prosecutors 
within the normal judicial system were not Ba’ath Party members, the process of 
de-Ba’athification further depleted the ranks of the normal justice system, leaving an 
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insufficient number of jurists to handle the new volume of post-transition cases.2588 
There was also significant damage to infrastructure—approximately 75 percent of 
the courts in Iraq were destroyed during the war, including 90 percent of the courts 
in Baghdad. Most had been left as burned-out shells devoid of even electrical lines 
or water pipes, including the Ministry of Justice building in Baghdad.2589 Court 
records and files likewise were destroyed.
Early on, the CPA focused on transferring justice matters to the Iraqi Ministry of Justice, 
including the supervision over prisons in order to prevent abuses. By 2004, the CPA 
had vetted judges, dismissing those thought to be corrupt or guilty of human rights 
abuses and reappointing others who had been dismissed by Hussein.2590 Primarily, 
efforts to rebuild the national judiciary were spearheaded through re-establishing 
the Council of Judges. The council is structurally separated from the ministry 
and given authority over court budgets, personnel, security, and property.2591 The 
council then evolved into the Higher Judicial Council pursuant to Article 45 of 
the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) and CPA Order 100, section 3(13). The 
CPA also established the Central Criminal Court of Iraq in 2004 with nationwide 
jurisdiction and a mandate to concentrate on the more serious crimes that other 
courts were often reluctant to deal with, including terrorism and organized crime.2592 
One of the challenges the CPA faced in taking these early steps was the weakness of 
the investigative agencies and intimidation, especially targeted at judges.2593
The current constitution was approved by a referendum that took place on 
October 15, 2005. Members of the Iraqi Constitution Drafting Committee drafted 
a constitution to replace the TAL.2594 The constitution provided for the Higher 
Judicial Council, which manages and supervises the affairs of the federal judiciary. 
It oversees the affairs of the various judicial committees; nominates the chief 
justice and members of the Court of Cassation, the chief public prosecutor, and the 
chief justice of the Judiciary Oversight Commission; and drafts the budget of the 
judiciary.2595 Article 90 of the constitution provides for the Iraqi Supreme Court, 
an independent judicial body that interprets the constitution and determines 
the constitutionality of laws and regulations. It acts as a final court of appeals.2596 
Despite the constitutional protection for human rights and freedoms, Iraqi activists 
and human rights organizations have repeatedly expressed concern about several 
violations by the government including unfair trials, arbitrary detention, and torture.2597
Several trainings for IHT judges and prosecutors were conducted between 2004 and 
2006 by the United States Institute of Peace, the International Bar Association, the 
Institute for International Criminal Investigations, the Department of Justice/U.K. 
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Foreign Office, the International Institute for Higher Studies in Criminal Science, 
the Global Justice Center, and the International Human Rights Law Institute. Many 
institutions and individuals involved in such trainings opposed the IHT’s provision 
for the death penalty, even though there was broad support for this in Iraqi society. 
Some of the internationals involved in training drew a distinction between training 
and institutional support; for them, training did not constitute an endorsement of 
the IHT as an institution, but provided an opening to improve fair trial standards and 
international human rights norms, including with regard to the death penalty.2598
Existing Civil Society Capacity
Hussein’s regime repressed civil society. It brought civil society groups under 
control through intimidation and by rewarding loyal organizations. It created new 
organizations under the umbrella of the Ba’ath Party and repressed organizations 
that failed to support the regime.2599 Throughout this era, nearly every civic 
institution that existed was affiliated with the Ba’ath Party.2600 
Iraqi civic space witnessed major opening after the fall of Hussein’s regime, and 
thousands of organizations were established and registered under the CPA’s 
authority.2601 However, many civil society actors lacked knowledge and skills in 
human rights, community development, outreach services, and other areas.2602 
Most early organizations were dedicated to humanitarian and relief efforts, but they 
have since begun to focus on human rights and democratic development, including 
elections and constitutional reform.2603 
Civil society also struggled to maintain independence from political actors and 
many therefore lack credibility and legitimacy. Since 2003, many political parties 
created local NGOs that align with or promote their agendas. Only a small fraction 
of NGOs are considered to be impartial, non-religious, or non-political.2604 Many 
Iraqis perceive new NGOs to be Western-funded and a reminder of subjugation.2605 
NGOs and civil society organizations still face many obstacles in Iraq, including 
bureaucratic delays in registering, threats from ISIS and terrorist groups, and limits 
on their activities.2606
Creation
The creation of the Iraqi High Tribunal, sometimes called the Iraqi Special 
Tribunal,2607 was intertwined with the American-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003.
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Beginning in 1991, the United States, the United Nations, and the Arab League had 
discussed inchoate proposals to prosecute senior members of the Saddam Hussein’s 
Ba’athist regime in Iraq.2608 In the wake of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Bush 
administration, Iraqi exiles, the UN, and international NGOs considered various 
prosecutorial mechanisms, including an ad hoc international tribunal and a mixed/
hybrid tribunal similar to the Special Court for Sierra Leone. These suggestions, 
though favored by a coalition of international NGOs, were rejected by the U.S. 
administration. A post-invasion draft plan to prosecute higher-level perpetrators 
at the IHT, while sending lower-level perpetrators to ordinary national courts, was 
rendered untenable by the disarray of Iraq’s judicial institutions and the country’s 
descent into violent chaos between 2004 and 2006.2609
In December 2003, the CPA delegated authority to the Iraqi Governing Council 
to establish the IHT; the CPA order included the IHT Statute and set out four 
conditions for the IGC to observe in creating the court:2610 
 1. The IGC would establish elements of the crimes under IHT 
jurisdiction consistent with international law and Iraqi law  
(as amended by the CPA); 
 2. The IGC should ensure that the IHT operate in conformity with 
international standards; 
 3. CPA rulings would prevail over any conflicting IGC or IHT ruling or 
judgment prior to the transfer of sovereignty to Iraqi authorities; and 
 4. The IHT must allow for the appointment of foreign judges.2611 
The IGC ordered establishment of the IHT by decree on December 10, 2003.2612 U.S. 
forces captured Saddam Hussein three days later. 
Following the transfer of sovereignty to Iraqi authorities in 2005, the Iraqi 
Transitional National Assembly passed an amended statute establishing the IHT 
into law in October 2005.2613 The IHT was created with the aim of “bringing personal 
accountability to those Ba’athists who were responsible for depriving Iraqis of their 
human rights.”2614 Iraq adopted a new constitution in 2005 that makes explicit 
mention of the IHT.2615 One day following the IHT’s formal creation in October 2005, 
the Dujail trial began. (See the Prosecutions section, below.) The IHT operated until 
its dissolution in 2011–2012.2616
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Legal Framework and Mandate
The CPA order and subsequent Iraqi legislation granted the IHT jurisdiction over 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other crimes under Iraqi law 
committed between July 17, 1968, and May 2003 (the period of rule by Saddam 
Hussein).2617 The IHT has personal jurisdiction over Iraqi citizens for crimes 
committed inside or outside of Iraq.2618 The tribunal has primacy over other Iraqi 
courts for the serious crimes within its jurisdiction.
The initial statute was poorly drafted, and the structure of the IHT contained 
many features alien to Iraqi law and contrary to international human rights 
norms. American drafters failed to incorporate civil law elements of the Iraqi legal 
system, such as the differing roles of investigative judges and prosecutors in the 
evidence-gathering stage and at the trial stage.2619 The 2005 law, in contrast to 
the previous CPA order, instructed the tribunal to follow the 1971 Iraqi Code of 
Criminal Procedure. The CPA, prior to the establishment of the IHT, had issued 
Order No. 7 to amend the Iraqi Criminal Code in order to bring it in conformity 
with international law.2620 The IHT promulgated separate Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence, but conducted its first trial mainly within the general Iraqi legal 
framework.2621 Some observers noted the inadequacy of the national criminal 
procedure laws for prosecution of complex serious crimes cases,2622 while other 
observers argued that Iraq’s legal system does not recognize court-fashioned rules, 
and instead, praised the use of the national rules.2623 
The substantive provisions of the IHT statute on international crimes, genocide 
(Article 11), crimes against humanity (Article 12), and war crimes (Article 13), were 
modeled on the Rome Statute. Article 14 of the statute presented a number of 
violations that preexisted under Iraqi law, such as “the wastage and squandering 
of national resources, pursuant to Article 2(g) of the Punishment of Conspirators 
against Public Safety and Corrupters of the System of Governance Law 7 of 1958.”
Location
The IHT was based in the capital, Baghdad. Although it never happened, the statute 
provided that upon the recommendation of the IHT president, the tribunal could 
also sit “in any other Governorate in Iraq as determined by the Governing Council or 
the Successor Government.”2624
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Structure and Composition
Iraqis staffed the IHT, assisted by some internationals, almost all of whom 
were Americans. The IHT president (not a sitting judge) was originally Salem 
Chalabi, a prominent Iraqi exile, appointed by the United States. His appointment 
was controversial and furthered skepticism about the IHT’s genuine political 
independence.2625 
The IHT comprised three Trial Chambers and a Cassation (Appeals) Chamber, with 
appeals regulated by the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.2626 The staff was entirely 
Iraqi, although the IHT statute allowed for the appointment of foreign judges, 
investigative judges, and prosecutors.2627 The statute required the appointment of 
foreign nationals “to act in advisory capacities or as observers to the Trial Chambers 
and to the Appeals Chamber.”2628 
The IHT’s Defense Office provided funding for defense counsel, and an 
international defense adviser was appointed in the midst of the Dujail trial. For 
security reasons, the identities of the judges were not disclosed. 
Despite intense national and global interest, the IHT conducted almost no outreach or 
public relations apart from televising partial proceedings of the Saddam Hussein trial. 
Direct staff assistance by internationals was almost exclusively provided by 
Americans. The U.S. Regime Crimes Liaison Office (RCLO), staffed by prosecutors 
and investigators from the U.S. Department of Justice, “assumed the responsibility 
for setting a prosecutorial strategy, training the judges and prosecutors, providing 
resources and personnel for investigations, evidence gathering, and establishing 
the IHT’s infrastructure.”2629 Very little other foreign assistance existed. One 
international expert assisted the defense, and a British expert assisted the judges of 
the Trial Chamber. Gradually, American involvement lessened and Iraqi ownership 
of the tribunal increased. While observers generally considered the American 
assistance to be professional and sound, “the role of the RCLO had a chilling effect 
both on the Iraqi desire to seek other external advice, and on the willingness of 
other international experts to participate.”2630 U.S. assistance dropped dramatically 
following the execution of Saddam Hussein in December 2006; by 2008, only four 
American legal advisors remained.2631 In addition, the application of the death 
penalty by the IHT meant that many European Union member states and most 
international NGOs were unwilling to offer technical assistance. 
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Prosecutions
Dujail Trial: The IHT held its first trial (known as the Dujail trial) against Saddam 
Hussein and eight co-accused for crimes against humanity committed in the town 
of Dujail between 1982 and 1984. Several senior defendants were accused of crimes 
against humanity and executed in early 2007,2632 and several lesser defendants were 
accused of aiding and abetting crimes against humanity (two were convicted).2633 
The trial began on October 19, 2005. On November 2006, the Trial Chamber 
released its judgment, and the Cassation Chamber issued its judgment on December 
2006. Saddam Hussein was executed on December 30, 2006, in a hanging that 
drew widespread international condemnation.2634 Serious evidentiary gaps led to 
criticisms of the Trial Chamber’s factual findings, and of lack of serious appellate 
review, including failure to present evidence fully meeting the evidentiary standard 
of proof and mens rea. For the lesser defendants, almost no evidence was presented 
to establish their level of knowledge, but rather, knowledge was assumed through 
their status as Ba’ath party members, not proven through actual or constructive 
knowledge. The standards of proof required for the taking of such overbroad 
judicial notice were not articulated. In addition, the filings and investigations of the 
prosecution and the investigative judges did not illuminate the patterns and schemes 
of repression during the long Ba’athist regime—a major disappointment to victims 
and advocates.2635 
Anfal Trial: A second trial, this one against Saddam Hussein, Ali Hassan al-Majif, 
and five other codefendants, began on August 21, 2006. (After the execution 
of Saddam on December 30, 2006, his case was withdrawn from the trial.) The 
defendants were charged with genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, 
in reference to the planning and executing a series of attacks in 1988 against Kurds 
in northern Iraq, using chemical weapons and killing up to 182,000 civilians.2636 On 
June 24, 2007, in a 963-page judgment, the IHT delivered a guilty verdict against 
five defendants and dismissed charges against one defendant.2637 The Cassation 
Chamber affirmed the verdict on September 4, 2007, in a decision criticized 
for a lack of “serious legal review” and a mere 30-day appellate review period—
inadequate given the complexity of the case and charges.2638 
Subsequent Trials: Little has been written about the IHT’s subsequent atrocity 
crimes prosecutions. A third case (known as the Merchants Case), based on charges 
stemming from the 1992 executions of 42 merchants by the Ba’athist regime, 
began in November 2008 and resulted in guilty verdicts on March 11, 2009, for 
eight codefendants.2639 The trial was described as “politically significant” because 
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the victims were Sunni, and the tribunal hoped it would help to counter Sunni 
perceptions that the IHT is a tool of Shia and Kurdish vengeance.2640 At the time  
of the tribunal’s dissolution in July 2011, there had been a total of 175 convictions  
and 133 acquittals.2641 Cases involving other states, in particular Kuwait and Iran, 
were never heard.2642
Legacy
The IHT’s lack of legitimacy and procedural shortcomings have limited the 
possibility for it to leave a positive legacy in Iraq. The UN Special Rapporteur 
on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions cited “glaring flaws” in the 
trial of Saddam Hussain, noting that the legal rights of the defendants had been 
“impeded.”2643 The Human Rights Council’s working group on arbitrary detention 
concluded that the trial failed to meet the basic fair trial standards.2644 International 
human rights organizations came to similar conclusions. Human Rights Watch 
cited numerous problems in the Dujail trial, including with regard to the IHT’s 
independence and impartiality, its protection of defense rights, and “evidentiary 
gaps” that impeded “the accuracy of many of the trial judgment’s factual findings, 
in particular concerning the knowledge and intent of the defendants.”2645 Amnesty 
International raised similar concerns about the IHT’s flaws and failures in the course 
of the Dujail trial.2646 
Extensive trainings in matters of international criminal law and legal procedure 
surely enhanced the capacity of some Iraqi judges, prosecutors, and other officials. 
Interaction with (mostly American) lawyers in the Regime Crimes Liaison Office 
surely also added value. However, without adequate safeguards to ensure the 
protection of basic fair trial and other international standards, it is doubtful that the 
IHT made a substantial positive contribution to rule-of-law development in Iraq. As 
Human Rights Watch noted, “The hope that the [Dujail] trial might have served as 
a model of impartial justice for a ‘new era’ Iraq, by upholding international human 
rights law and enforcing international criminal law, remains unfulfilled.”2647
Furthermore, the IHT appears to have contributed to divisions in Iraqi society. The 
tribunal lacked legitimacy with broad swathes of the population. Not only was it 
created by an occupying power despised by many Iraqis, but it lacked autonomy 
from the U.S. government and Iraq’s then Shia-dominated government. For many 
Sunnis watching the swift trial and execution of Saddam Hussein, which was 
accompanied by executioners chanting pro-Shia militia slogans,2648 proceedings at 
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the IHT looked more like another front in mounting sectarian warfare rather than 
any kind of new exercise in impartial justice.2649 Many Kurds looking forward to 
the IHT pronouncing a verdict on Saddam Hussein’s responsibility for the Anfal 
massacres had their hopes for justice and redress dashed by Hussein’s execution 
prior to the end of the trial, following his conviction in the Dujail trial.2650 To the 
extent that the IHT was introducing new concepts into Iraqi law, poor public 
communications and an absence of outreach inhibited its ability to make these 
understood by the broader population. 
Financing
Shortly after its establishment, CPA Administrator Paul Bremer announced that the 
United States would contribute $75 million to the IHT. 2651 By July 2007, the annual 
U.S. contribution specifically to support trials for international crimes had climbed 
to $128 million, with significant additional funds in support of such related expenses 
as judicial security and facilities, a witness protection program, and detention 
facility infrastructure.2652 Other estimates put the annual budget of the tribunal—
whose establishing statute provides that its funding and costs will be borne by the 
Iraqi state budget—at $138 million.2653
The funding was meant to support—among other things—the work of the Regime 
Crimes Liaison Office, whose staff played a leading role in supporting tribunal 
investigations and operations; the provision of security to both court personnel and 
defense lawyers; the exhumation of mass graves; upgrading facilities for storing 
and handling evidence; the building of courtrooms; the conduct of investigations, 
including interrogations; and the training of staff.2654
Oversight and Accountability
The IHT’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence included principles for judicial 
independence and impartiality.2655 However, in practice, the appointment process for 
IHT judges and prosecutors created at least the appearance of political influence.
The CPA made the initial appointments and issued procedures for the IHT, leading 
to criticism that the IHT lacked independence from American administrators. Even 
after the transfer to Iraqi authorities in 2005, however, appointment procedures were 
highly problematic and jeopardized the IHT’s independence. Judges and prosecutors 
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were nominated by the Supreme Juridical Council and approved by the Council 
of Ministers (up to 20 tribunal investigating judges could be appointed under the 
statute). The Council of Ministers (a political body) was empowered under the IHT 
statute to transfer judges to another court for any reason.2656 In addition, as part of a 
national de-Ba’athification process, no member of the staff (including judges) could 
have been a member of the Ba’ath party. Officials involved in the de-Ba’athification 
process wielded it as a political weapon against IHT judges, who were removed or 
threatened with removal. An internal de-Ba’athification committee for the IHT was 
created in 2006, in an attempt to prevent further political intimidation of the judges, 
but instead “consolidated a new power elite inside the Tribunal.”2657 The tribunal 
suffered from high turnover rates among judges, even within single trials; only one 
original judge from the Dujail Trial Chamber was present at the final hearing, after 
six substitutions and three changes of presiding judge. 
The Iraqi government also held sway over the judiciary in other ways. Amid ongoing 
violence in Baghdad, the Iraqi prime minister controlled funds for protection 
allowances and travel to the fortified International Zone, a crucial measure for a 
tribunal in which at least five staff members and three defense lawyers were killed 
during the first trial. 
Informal means of oversight were limited at the IHT. The International Center for 
Transitional Justice and Human Rights Watch were the only public organizations 
permitted to formally observe the Dujail trial throughout. While NGO and media 
attention to the tribunal shed light on its many shortcomings, this attention all but 
disappeared following Saddam Hussein’s execution. According to some observers, 
the near-complete withdrawal of the media together with the pullout of U.S. advisors 
following Saddam’s execution may have fueled greater dysfunction in subsequent 
proceedings.2658 There were reports of greater political interference, not only from 
the Iraqi government but also from the U.S. side. For example, the United States, 
which at the time was courting Sunni allies for the fight against Al-Qaeda, reportedly 
pressured the Iraqi Presidential Council to stop the execution of three Sunni 
defendants convicted in the Anfal trial.2659 
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LEBANON: SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON
Conflict Background and Political Context
On February 14, 2005, an explosion in downtown Beirut killed 22 people: former 
Prime Minister Rafik Bahaa-Edine Hariri, nine members of his convoy, and 
13 civilians who were nearby. An additional 226 people were injured. Hariri’s 
assassination took place “in a political and security context marked by acute 
polarization around the Syrian influence in Lebanon and the failure of the Lebanese 
State to provide adequate protection for its citizens.”2660
At least in part due to its location, bordering both Syria and Israel, Lebanon has 
repeatedly served as a battleground for the parties to the Arab–Israeli conflict.2661 
The political history of Lebanon includes a tragic, protracted civil war (1975–1990), 
Syrian military presence (1976–2005), and significant Syrian influence over 
Lebanese affairs.2662 Following the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon in 
2000 (which coincided with Hariri’s 2000–2004 term as prime minister), some 
political figures began to call for the reduction of the Syrian presence in Lebanon. 
This led to conflict between Hariri and Lebanese President Émile Lahoud.2663 
This division culminated in a dispute over the amendment of the presidential 
constitutional term—which for Lahoud was due to expire in 2004. 
A string of political assassinations and bombings occurred in 2004 and 2005, 
including Hariri’s February 2005 assassination. A network of Syrian agents and 
intelligence agencies, deeply linked to Lebanese politics, was widely suspected to 
be behind the assassinations. Following the assassinations, international pressure 
mounted on Syria to withdraw its troops from Lebanon, following a 29-year presence 
there; the last Syrian troops left the country in April 2005.2664
Lebanese politics are driven by sectarianism, nationalism, and Syria’s involvement. 
The increasing electoral domination of the Syrian-backed political wing of 
Hezbollah means a strong reluctance, and at times resistance, to adequately 
investigate political crimes, including the assassination and attempted assassination 
of politicians in 2004 and 2005. Political divisions deepened in 2011, a year of 
political paralysis in Lebanon. In January, the coalition government, led by Prime 
Minister Saad Hariri (son of the assassinated prime minister), collapsed. Najib 
Mikati replaced Saad Hariri as prime minister, raising fears of a deal with Hezbollah 
political leaders to end cooperation with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) 
638   OPTIONS FOR JUSTICE
in order to preserve a fragile minority government coalition.2665 Lebanon lacked a 
stable government until June 2011, when the political wing of Hezbollah formed a 
majority government, again led by Najib Mikati.2666 The Hezbollah political wing 
maintains deep ties with Syria and strongly opposes the STL. Over the course of 
2012, the escalating anti-government revolt in Syria placed increasing pressure on 
Hezbollah’s ties to Syria. 
After the STL announced four indictments of Hezbollah members in June 2011, 
leading Hezbollah politicians stated that the country would not contribute its 
required assessment to the court. They eventually relented in November 2011, but 
Hezbollah political leaders have vowed that the suspects in the Hariri case would not 
be arrested and handed over to the STL. 
Existing Justice-Sector Capacity
Lebanon’s justice sector suffered greatly from the 1975–1990 civil war, and in a 
2005 assessment, the World Bank observed that the sector had yet to recover.2667 
The judiciary is prone to political influence, there is a lack of technical capacity in 
multiple areas, and the Lebanese public seems to lack confidence in the sector.  
An assessment by the UN Development Programme in 2016 noted these and 
additional problems, including inadequate resources for the national judiciary and 
prosecutors, and inadequate protection for fair trial rights.2668
A UN fact-finding mission to Lebanon following the Hariri assassination referenced 
many of these same problems with regard to the domestic investigation into the 
assassination: the justice system exhibited a lack of coordination, professionalism, 
technical skill, and requisite equipment.2669 The mission concluded that “the local 
investigation has neither the capacity nor the commitment to succeed. It also lacks 
the confidence of the population necessary for its results to be accepted.”2670
Existing Civil Society Capacity
Civil society in Lebanon must navigate religious and sectarian division, while 
operating in a difficult security environment.2671 Nongovernmental organizations 
also struggle to influence policymaking in part because of the opacity of Lebanon’s 
Byzantine political structures.2672 Following the 2005 Syrian withdrawal, there was a 
surge in the number of registered NGOs, making Lebanon one of the more vibrant 
countries for civil society in the region.2673 Nevertheless, despite engagement with 
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the court through meetings and outreach events, civil society organizations have 
had a limited role in commenting on STL matters in Lebanese media, and their 
involvement in transitional justice issues has been largely donor-driven.2674 
Creation
In April 2005, following a request by the Lebanese government and discussions with 
the UN Secretary-General, the Security Council established the UN International 
Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC). The Security Council mandated 
it “to assist the Lebanese authorities in their investigation of all aspects of this 
terrorist act, including to help identify its perpetrators, sponsors, organizers and 
accomplices.”2675 The commission was preceded by a brief one-month UN  
fact-finding mission dispatched by the Secretary-General.2676 
The UN International Independent Investigation Commission  
(2005–2009)
The Security Council created UNIIIC to assist Lebanese authorities in investigating 
the Hariri assassination, and extended and expanded its mandate several times. 
UNIIIC was a hybrid investigative mechanism: international in mandate and 
composition but integrated with national authorities. Its backers viewed it as a 
necessary bulwark against political interference into investigations and a means to 
ensure cooperation from neighboring states. 
Unlike other investigative commissions, which were seen as distinct precursors to  
prosecution mechanisms—for example, in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda— UNIIIC 
effectively became the investigative component of the subsequently created STL’s 
Office of the Prosecutor. It operated while negotiations were underway for the STL’s 
creation, and when its mandate expired in February 2009, the commissioner, Daniel 
Bellemare, was named the first STL prosecutor.2677 UNIIIC was based in Lebanon 
(except for a temporary relocation to Cyprus for several months in 2006) and increased 
operations in The Hague in the run-up to the handover of its files to the STL. 
UNIIIC played a critical role in collecting evidence, including conducting a full-scale 
examination of the crime scene. UNIIIC investigated a multinational and powerful 
network, based in Syria, which had carried out a string of political assassinations in 
Lebanon, including allegedly that of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.2678
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As killings and bombings continued even after the December 2005 creation of 
UNIIIC, the government of Lebanon expressed its desire to the UN “to establish 
a tribunal of an international character.”2679 The Security Council tasked the 
Secretary-General with exploring options, and in March 2006, it requested that 
he consult with the Lebanese government on the creation of a tribunal.2680 Eight 
months later, the Secretary-General issued a report to the Security Council that 
outlined the design of what would become the STL.2681 The Security Council and 
government of Lebanon signed an agreement to create the STL in January and 
February 2007.2682 However, after a four-month deadlock in the Lebanese Parliament 
prevented the agreement’s ratification, a majority of the parliament’s members 
wrote to the Secretary-General to request that the Security Council use its Chapter 
VII authority to create the tribunal.2683 The Security Council did so in May 2007.2684 
The STL commenced operations in March 2009 with an initial three-year mandate, 
which the Secretary-General extended for a further three years in 20122685 and  
again in 2015.2686 
Legal Framework and Mandate
The STL’s mandate is to prosecute Hariri’s assassination and any other connected 
criminal acts in Lebanon between October 1, 2004, and December 12, 2005, of 
similar nature and gravity; investigation of later acts is also possible if agreed upon 
by the UN and Lebanon, with Security Council consent.2687 It has primary and 
concurrent jurisdiction over Lebanese national courts.2688 The STL has asserted its 
primary jurisdiction through communications from the Pre-Trial Chamber to the 
Lebanese prosecutors, ordering them to defer proceedings to the tribunal.2689 
The applicable law at the STL is the Lebanese Criminal Code.2690 An Appeals 
Chamber ruling stated that the STL is bound to follow domestic law “unless 
unreasonable … or not consonant with international principles and rules binding on 
Lebanon.”2691 In practice, this means the STL “read[s] Lebanese law in the context 
of ‘international obligations undertaken by Lebanon with which, in the absence 
of very clear language, it is presumed any legislation complies.’”2692 The interplay 
between Lebanese and international law at the STL (in essence, an international 
tribunal applying domestic law) causes some legal confusion. Additionally, legal 
scholars and observers note that the STL’s jurisdictional structure reflects the steady 
“internationalization” of law; and that through due process norms and concepts, it is 
“embedding international standards in a domestic jurisdiction.”2693 
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The STL Appeals Chamber made a landmark jurisprudential contribution toward 
defining the crime of terrorism under international law, marking “the first time 
that an international tribunal has authoritatively confirmed a general definition of 
terrorism under international law.”2694 While emerging international norms may 
prohibit granting immunity to heads of state for atrocity crimes, the norm against 
sovereign immunity for terrorism is not considered to be crystallized.2695
The STL Statute outlines modes of responsibility recognized in Lebanese law and in 
international criminal law. In case of conflict, the legal regime more favorable to the 
accused will apply.2696 The judges of the tribunal adopted the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence in March 2009, as required by the statute.2697 
The statute is silent regarding sovereign immunity but states that any amnesty 
granted shall not be a bar to prosecution.2698 The statute recognizes evidence 
collected by UNIIIC, a UN body that investigated the Hariri assassination and led 
to the creation of the STL.2699 The statute explicitly allows trials in absentia if proper 
steps have been taken to seek custody of the accused.2700 In case of conviction in 
absentia, the accused has the right to be retried. The STL statute also mandates legal 
representation of the accused when tried in absentia.2701 
Location
The STL sits in Leidschendam, a suburb of The Hague in the Netherlands. The 
agreement between the UN and Lebanon mandates that the STL have its seat 
outside of Lebanon and also that an investigations and public relations office be 
established in Lebanon, subject to arrangements with the government.2702 The office 
in Beirut has also facilitated cooperation and outreach initiatives.
Structure and Composition
In its structural features, the STL resembles a hybrid tribunal: it applies Lebanese 
and international law, retains concurrent and primary jurisdiction over Lebanese 
courts, and employs mixed national/international judges and staff. But the STL 
contains several structural innovations: (1) a predecessor international investigations 
body that essentially became the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP); (2) participation of 
victims in the proceedings, using elements of civil law; and (3) the establishment of 
a defense office as an independent organ of the court, outside of the Registry. Thus 
the STL has four organs: Chambers, the OTP, the Defense Office, and the Registry.
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Chambers 
The Pre-Trial Chamber consists of one international investigative judge according 
to the inquisitorial model. The investigating judge collects evidence, reviews 
indictments, and can revise charges proposed by the prosecutor. Two international 
judges and one Lebanese judge sit on the Trial Chamber. Two alternate judges 
(Lebanese and international) sit in reserve. A second Trial Chamber can be created 
upon request of the STL president or the Secretary-General.2703 Two Lebanese and 
three international judges sit on the Appeals Chamber. The STL uses an appointment 
method similar to the Khmer Rouge Tribunal in Cambodia (the only two international 
tribunals to do so).2704 The UN Secretary-General appoints international judges 
and prosecutors recommended by a “selection panel.”2705 Lebanese judges are 
nominated by the Lebanese Supreme Council of the Judiciary and appointed by the 
UN Secretary-General.2706 The Secretary-General is required to consult with the 
government of Lebanon on all judicial and prosecutorial appointments.
Prosecutor
The Secretary-General appoints the international prosecutor, upon the 
recommendation of the selection panel, for a three-year term. The Secretary-
General also appoints a Lebanese deputy prosecutor to a three-year term, but the 
agreement does not require the deputy prosecutor’s nomination by the selection 
committee. The STL’s first prosecutor had served as the commissioner of the 
UNIIIC, ensuring continuity in operations between the two legally distinct bodies. 
Defense Office
The Defense Office is an independent organ of the court, existing outside the 
Registry, a structural innovation at international tribunals.2707 The Defense Office 
itself does not represent individual suspects or accused, but develops and supports 
a list of lawyers who can be appointed as defense counsel. It published its first list of 
120 attorneys in September 2011. Privately retained counsel require Defense Office 
verification as being competent before they can appear before the STL. The office 
provides training to lawyers on international criminal law and STL procedure. The 
STL structure and procedure reflect inquisitorial features of the Lebanese civil law 
model, with certain divergences. For example, the Defense Office had to negotiate 
a memorandum of understanding with Lebanese authorities so that STL defense 
attorneys could carry out investigations in Lebanon—a role usually reserved for 
Lebanon’s investigating judges. 
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Registry 
The Secretary-General appoints the registrar who is the STL’s only UN staff 
member.2708 The Registry, located in The Hague, also has a field office in Beirut. It 
provides court management, security, and administrative support to the STL and is 
also responsible for external and diplomatic relations (including witness relocation 
agreements and bilateral cooperation agreements with states and organizations). 
Sub-offices of the Registry include the Outreach and Legacy Office (based in 
Beirut), the Public Affairs/Press Office (separate from the OTP press office), the 
Victims Participation Unit (VPU), and the Detention Unit. 
Victim Participation 
The VPU assists victims in applying to participate in the trial and provides administrative 
and legal support. Following the civil law model, victims can participate in the trial 
by accessing and submitting evidence, cross-examining witnesses (at the discretion 
of the Trial Chamber), and seeking damages in national courts on the basis of STL 
judgments. However, victims before the STL are “much more limited than the 
Lebanese partie civile model of participation.”2709 Terrorism proceedings in Lebanon 
are mainly held before military tribunals that do not allow civil party participation. 
Victims can only participate as parties after the confirmation of indictments and 
cannot join as criminal parties.2710 In August and September 2017, legal representatives 
of 72 victims of terrorism presented evidence in the case of Ayyash et al.2711 
Prosecutions
As of October 2017, the STL had one case in trial, a second under investigation, and 
two completed cases of contempt of court.
In the first case, Ayyash et al., four persons are on trial in absentia in relation to the 
Hariri assassination.2712 Judges confirmed charges of conspiracy to commit a terrorist 
act and other charges in June 2011, and the court transmitted arrest warrants to 
Lebanese authorities. A fifth accused subsequently died, and judges subsequently 
added another by ordering the joinder of two cases. The trial opened in January 
2014, but as of October 2017, all four accused remained at large. 
As of October 2017, a second case was still in the investigation stage. In August 
2011, the prosecutor asserted jurisdiction over three terrorist attacks targeting three 
Lebanese politicians in 2004 and 2005; the OTP believes these incidents are linked 
to the Hariri assassination.2713 
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The court has also considered requests for the disclosure of information related to 
the detention of individuals in Lebanon pursuant to UNIIIC investigations. In one 
case, judges have ordered a process of disclosure to an individual pursuing claims 
in Lebanese courts for unlawful detention; with regard to another case, STL judges 
have ruled against such a request.2714 
The STL also charged two individuals and two media companies for contempt and 
obstruction of justice.2715 The charges were in relation to media reports containing 
information about alleged confidential STL witnesses. Karma Mohamed Tahsin Al 
Khayat and Al Jadeed S.A.L./New TV were ultimately acquitted. Ibrahim Mohamed 
Ali Al Amin and Akhbar Beirut were both found guilty. Al Amin was sentenced to a 
€20,000 fine and Akhbar Beirut to a €6,000 fine.
Legacy
The STL “provides Lebanon with an important chance to use an independent 
criminal justice mechanism to challenge the tradition of political violence in 
Lebanon.”2716 The International Center for Transitional Justice has identified three 
possible ways the STL could leave a positive legacy in Lebanon: through legal 
developments in specific cases, by strengthening Lebanese investigative and judicial 
capacities, and through the so-called demonstration effect of the STL in raising 
awareness of accountability and the rule of law.2717 With regard to the last of these, 
much may hinge on whether accused persons, and anyone the court may convict 
in absentia, is ever arrested. A permanent failure to secure arrests through state 
cooperation could reinforce impressions that judicial institutions are ineffective. The 
tribunal’s limited mandate also leaves grave crimes committed during the course 
of the civil war unaddressed, so even if the STL ultimately achieves its aims of 
accountability for the Hariri assassination and related attacks, many Lebanese will 
still have unfulfilled hopes of justice.2718
Financing
The agreement states that 51 percent of the tribunal’s cost will be funded by 
voluntary contributions from UN Member States, with the government of Lebanon 
contributing the remaining 49 percent.2719 In an arrangement designed to ensure 
funding for the STL, the agreement stated that the STL would only begin to function 
once it had received funding for its first year, plus “pledges of contributions equal to 
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the anticipated expenses of the following two years.”2720 Resolution 1757 empowers 
the UN Secretary-General and the Security Council to seek “alternate means of 
financing” if sufficient voluntary contributions are not secured.2721 
In 2007, the Secretary-General anticipated required expenses of US$35 million for 
the first year, US$45 million for the second year, and US$40 million for the third 
year. The court’s approved budget for 2017 was approximately US$68 million.2722 
In 2011, Lebanon initially refused to provide financing to the tribunal, after the 
announcement of the first four indictments and ahead of the expiry of the tribunal’s 
mandate in February 2012. The confluence of these events led some observers to 
fear that Lebanon would use its required contribution as a negotiation tool over the 
renewal of the mandate, and some decried the shared funding model of the STL.2723 
Despite the cascade of difficulties for the tribunal, however, Lebanon submitted its 
payment and did not attempt to block the renewal. 
Oversight and Accountability
Under the agreement between the UN and Lebanon that established the STL, 
the parties shall “consult concerning the establishment of a management 
committee.”2724 Accordingly, ahead of the STL’s opening, a group of donor 
countries—led by the United Kingdom and including Germany, the Netherlands, the 
United States, France, and Lebanon—formed a management committee to provide 
input and coordination on nonjudicial policy, including financial decisions. This 
donor committee resembles a similar mechanism established to provide support to 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone. 
The STL Rules of Procedure and Evidence include provisions on recusal of judges 
due to conflicts of interest2725 and contempt of court.2726 A code of ethics governing 
the conduct of counsel before the STL is derived from three main sources: (1) the 
STL’s Statute, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and case law; (2) the Code of 
Professional Conduct for Counsel Appearing Before the Tribunal; and (3) the Code 
of Professional Conduct for Defense Counsel and Legal Representatives of Victims 
Appearing Before the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.2727 Directives on victims’ legal 
representation2728 and on the appointment and assignment of defense counsel2729 
provide some degree of additional oversight with regard to legal aid. With approval 
of the STL president, judges may also communicate misconduct to the relevant 
professional body in the counsel’s national jurisdiction.2730 
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SYRIA: INTERNATIONAL, IMPARTIAL AND INDEPENDENT 
MECHANISM ON SYRIA
Conflict Background and Political Context
While the Syrian regime has a long history of brutal repression, the current conflict 
that has engulfed the country and the larger region dates back to the Arab Spring. 
Following scattered protests in early 2011, by July thousands of Syrians had joined 
demonstrations against the Assad regime in cities across the country. By that time, 
what had begun as peaceful demonstrations increasingly turned to armed clashes 
with the Syrian army and security apparatus, along with the emergence of various 
rebel groups.2731 The first and main rebel group at the time was the Free Syrian Army 
(FSA), a group founded by defectors from the Syrian army and security forces in 
August 2011.2732 Different, smaller groups operated across the country in affiliation 
with the FSA; however, the emergence of jihadist groups such as the Islamic Front 
and Jayish Al-Islam marked a turning point as the conflict took on more sectarian 
contours, pitting the country’s Sunni majority against the president’s Shia Alawite 
sect. Regional and world powers—ranging from Russia to Turkey to the United 
States—were drawn into the conflict, while the rise of the Islamic State in Syria and 
Levant (ISIS) has added a further dimension.2733 
As of late 2017, six years of conflict had led more than five million Syrians to flee 
the country and internally displaced a further 6.3 million people.2734 The Syrian 
Center for Research Policy has documented 470,000 deaths, twice as many as 
the UN’s figures.2735 In 2017, Human Rights Watch also documented more than 
117,000 detentions or disappearances, the vast majority perpetrated by government 
forces.2736 Systemized torture and extensive killing in Syrian prisons has been well 
documented, including through photographic evidence of thousands of victims.2737 
Existing Justice-Sector Capacity
Emergency laws have governed Syria since the Ba’ath regime came to power in 
1963. Those laws created an environment where the authorities “abused the most 
basic rights and freedoms of the Syrian people on a wide scale and where they 
adopt arbitrary measures to silence critics in the name of safeguarding national 
security.”2738 In addition, while the Syrian Constitution provides for an independent 
judiciary, human rights organizations have long criticized the justice sector, 
contending that Syria’s courts operate in “shadowy” exceptions to general judicial 
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procedure.2739 This situation has only deteriorated since the onset of conflict: the 
UN Commission of Inquiry has concluded that it is very unlikely that independent, 
credible prosecutions that meet minimum international standards could be carried 
out in Syria in the near term.2740 This conclusion was based on what it assessed as a 
“lack of willingness on the part of the Syrian authorities and the likely inability of the 
system to carry out such prosecutions.”2741 Human Rights Watch has drawn similar 
conclusions.2742 
Armed groups operating on Syrian territory in areas outside of government control 
have established ad hoc court systems. Courts established by ISIS, for instance, 
claim to operate under Islamic laws.2743 In a 2017 ruling, a Swedish court examining a 
case related to courts established by armed groups in Syria held that such courts are 
permitted in principle, but only under certain conditions, including respect of fair 
trial rights under human rights and humanitarian law.2744 
Existing Civil Society Capacity
Throughout the conflict, Syrian civil society groups have operated in an 
extraordinarily challenging environment and faced enormous security risks.2745 
Several organizations operating both inside and outside of Syria are focused 
on documenting and reporting on human rights violations.2746 A partial list of 
Syrian organizations engaged on accountability issues includes the Violations 
Documentation Center, the Syrian Human Rights Network, the Syria Justice 
Accountability Center, the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression, and 
the Syrian Archive. An international NGO, the Commission for International Justice 
and Accountability has also engaged in extensive documentation work. 
International NGOs have supported national prosecutions in mostly European 
courts related to grave crimes in Syria.2747 These groups include the International 
Federation for Human Rights, the European Center for Constitutional and Human 
Rights, Guernica 37, the Center for Justice and Accountability, and the Open Society 
Justice Initiative.
Creation
A number of international commissions preceded the creation of the International, 
Impartial and Independent Mechanism on Syria (IIIM). In August 2011, the 
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UN Human Rights Council (HRC) established the Independent International 
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. The HRC mandated the 
commission to “investigate all alleged violations of international human rights 
law since March 2011 in the Syrian Arab Republic, to establish the facts and 
circumstances that may amount to such violations and of the crimes perpetrated 
and, where possible, to identify those responsible with a view to ensuring that 
perpetrators of violations, including those that may constitute crimes against 
humanity, are held accountable.”2748 The UN also established another investigative 
entity in relation to increasing reports of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. In 
2015, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2235 to create the 
UN-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism to hold chemical weapons users in the 
Syria civil war accountable.2749 
Efforts in the UN Security Council to refer the Syrian situation to the International 
Criminal Court repeatedly failed due to opposition from veto-wielding members 
Russia and China.2750 On December 21, 2016, the UN General Assembly voted 
to establish the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist 
in the Investigation and Prosecution of Those Responsible for the Most Serious 
Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since 
March 2011.2751 The UN Secretary-General presented the IIIM’s terms of reference 
in January 2017. In a note verbale to the Secretary-General, Russia summarized a 
number of complaints objecting to the IIIM’s creation. These include the objection 
that the IIIM is actually a prosecutorial body, which the General Assembly has no 
legal power to create. In Russia’s view, this mechanism therefore violates Article 2(7) 
of the UN Charter and Article 12, which limits the power of the General Assembly to 
deal with matters already being considered by the Security Council.2752 Supporters 
of the IIIM assert that the General Assembly’s authority to create it derives from 
the inaction of the Security Council to address the sustained perpetration of grave 
crimes in Syria.
Legal Framework and Mandate
The IIIM’s terms of reference mandate it to “collect, consolidate, preserve and 
analyze evidence of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights 
violations and abuses and to prepare files in order to facilitate and expedite fair and 
independent criminal proceedings, in accordance with international law standards, 
in national, regional or international courts or tribunals that have or may in the 
future have jurisdiction over these crimes, in accordance with international law.”2753 
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The IIIM’s subject matter jurisdiction includes “crimes under international law, 
in particular the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, as 
defined in relevant sources of international law,” while its temporal jurisdiction 
extends back to March 2011.2754 The terms of reference make clear that the IIIM is 
complementary to the Independent International Commission of Inquiry. While 
the commission focuses on “directly collecting information, publicly reporting 
recent broad patterns of violations, abuses and emblematic incidents and making 
recommendations,” the IIIM “primarily builds on the information collected by 
others, in particular the Commission, by collecting, consolidating, preserving and 
analyzing evidence and prepares files to facilitate and expedite fair and independent 
criminal proceedings in national, regional or international courts or tribunals.”2755 
The IIIM has a mandate to collect information and evidence from all parties to 
the conflict, the commission, the UN-OPCW Joint Mission, civil society groups, 
and states.2756 It is also mandated to collect such information through witness 
testimonies, interviews, and forensic materials.2757 The IIIM “shall seek to establish 
the connection between crime-based evidence and persons responsible, directly or 
indirectly, for alleged crimes falling within its jurisdiction, focusing in particular on 
linkage evidence.”2758 Information and evidence collected are to be analyzed and 
consolidated in a way that maximizes their use in “future criminal investigations and 
prosecutions.”2759 
The terms of reference task the IIIM with focusing on persons most responsible 
for violations. Resulting files shall include “relevant information, documentation 
and evidence in the Mechanism’s possession, both inculpatory and exculpatory, 
pertaining to the imputable crimes and to the mode or modes of criminal 
liability recognized under international law, including command or superior 
responsibility.”2760 
The IIIM’s primary purpose is to facilitate prosecutions and trials in other 
jurisdictions through sharing information “with national, regional or international 
courts or tribunals that have or may in the future have jurisdiction over these 
crimes, in accordance with international law, in order to facilitate and expedite 
fair and independent criminal proceedings, in accordance with international law 
standards.”2761 The IIIM also has the authority to share information at the request of 
those courts or on its own initiative. The IIIM will not share such information with 
jurisdictions that do not respect international human rights law, including fair trial 
protections and nonapplication of the death penalty.2762
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Location
The UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights announced in 
February 2017 that a start-up team for the IIIM had already begun its work, based in 
Geneva, Switzerland.2763 
Structure and Composition
The IIIM is headed by a senior judge or prosecutor with extensive experience in 
criminal investigations and prosecutions, and a deputy with extensive experience in 
international criminal justice and an in-depth knowledge of international criminal 
law, international human rights law, and international humanitarian law.2764 On July 
3, 2017, the UN Secretary-General announced the appointment of Catherine  
Marchi-Uhel of France as the first head of the IIIM.2765 Her term is for an initial 
period of two years, which is renewable.2766 In November 2017, Michelle Jarvis 
was named as her deputy. The IIIM also includes a Secretariat with expertise in 
the following areas: international criminal law, human rights law, international 
humanitarian law, criminal investigation and prosecution, the military, forensic 
matters (including in particular digital forensics, forensic pathology and forensic 
imagery), witness and victim protection, sexual and gender-based crimes and 
violence, children’s rights, and crimes against children.2767 
In appointing the members of the Secretariat, “due consideration shall be given to 
the representation of different legal traditions and gender balance and to appointing 
staff with the necessary language skills and regional expertise.”2768 According to 
diplomats, the UN is aiming to recruit between 40 and 60 experts in investigations, 
prosecutions, the military, and forensics.2769  
Prosecutions
The IIIM is not mandated to conduct prosecutions on its own, but will build on 
information collected to support efforts by other prosecutorial entities.2770 To that 
end, it has been described as a “prosecutor without a tribunal,” meaning that “it can 
build cases, but it does not have a dock for trying defendants.”2771 At the national 
level, several European countries have already started to investigate, prosecute,  
and try Syrians for war crimes on the basis of universal jurisdiction. In Germany,  
the federal public prosecutor opened investigations of international crimes in 
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Syria soon after the outbreak of the conflict.2772 And in July 2016, a German court 
concluded its first war crimes trial in relation to atrocities committed in Syria.2773 
A criminal court in France has also opened an investigation and appointed an 
investigative judge to probe charges of “torture,” “crimes against humanity,” and 
“forced disappearances.” The victims in the case claimed to have been disappeared 
by Syrian Air Force Intelligence.2774 
The necessary reliance on national courts to try perpetrators on the basis of their 
status within the country—in the absence of an ICC referral or establishment of an 
ad hoc or hybrid tribunal dedicated to Syrian crimes—means that most proceedings 
are likely to be directed against lower-ranking, non-regime perpetrators, or 
powerful perpetrators who still reside in Syria.2775 As an institution for the long-term, 
the IIIM can support these efforts and preserve and prepare evidence for more 
comprehensive accountability solutions, if they are ever created.
Legacy
In late 2017, the IIIM was still in the process of establishment. Many commentators 
remarked upon the novelty of creating such a mechanism via a General Assembly 
resolution, noting that it might enhance future prospects for using international 
investigative mechanisms to press for accountability in national jurisdictions.2776 
The legacy of the IIIM may ultimately be measured by its ability to encourage and 
support prosecutions in jurisdictions around the world.
Financing
The IIIM will initially be funded from voluntary contributions, although this 
arrangement is to be revisited by the UN General Assembly.2777 The UN announced 
that early contributions had been received from the Netherlands and Liechtenstein, 
with oral pledges from Qatar, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Hungary. In February 
2017, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights stated that “immediate funding 
requirements are at 4 to 6 million USD and while a precise budget is in development, 
annual operating needs are expected to be in the region of 13 million USD.”2778
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Oversight and Accountability
The IIIM’s terms of reference do not detail internal oversight mechanisms; 
furthermore, its personnel, records, archives, property, and assets are protected 
by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.2779 The 
head of the IIIM must submit a report to the General Assembly twice a year on the 
implementation of the IIIM’s mandate and set out its funding requirements, as 
appropriate, while preserving the confidential nature of its substantive work.2780 
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Open Society Justice Initiative
The Open Society Justice Initiative uses law to protect and empower people 
around the world. Through litigation, advocacy, research, and technical 
assistance, the Justice Initiative promotes human rights and builds legal 
capacity for open societies. Our staff is based in Abuja, Berlin, Brussels,  




The Open Society Foundations work to build vibrant and tolerant democracies 
whose governments are accountable to their citizens. Working with local 
communities in more than 70 countries, the Open Society Foundations support 




How can a country decimated by conflict establish accountability for grave 
crimes? How does a society reckon with mass human rights violations? How can 
perpetrators of some of history’s worst offenses be brought to justice?
The international justice movement seeks to address these issues. Today, that 
movement includes a diverse range of national courts, regional tribunals, and 
investigative mechanisms developed to deliver accountability in the aftermath 
of conflict. Some of these mechanisms have recorded major successes, holding 
fair trials that helped to re-establish the rule of law and bring justice to shattered 
societies. Others have struggled, hampered by inefficiency, lack of funding, or 
politics.
Options for Justice is the most ambitious effort to date to assess the design and 
impact of these different mechanisms—and to draw lessons that can inform the 
design of such institutions in the future. The report takes an in-depth look at 33 
different justice mechanisms, from high-profile international courts such as the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, to less formal domestic 
tribunals, such as the Gacaca courts of Rwanda, to mechanisms with a broader 
mandate that includes corruption, as in Guatemala.
Based on years of research and dozens of interviews with survivors, lawyers, 
judges, and other officials, Options for Justice is essential reading for anyone 
interested in establishing justice in the wake of mass atrocity crimes.
“This book should be invaluable to the practitioner tasked with setting up 
a tribunal to try those accused of grave crimes. To have in one place a wide 
variety of examples and models from which to draw upon—whether dealing 
with the mechanism design, jurisdiction, financing, structure, etc.—will no 
doubt prove to be of enormous value. This handbook fills a real void and 
constitutes a major contribution in assisting those conceiving and developing 
such mechanisms.”
—Larry Johnson 
Former UN Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs
